Morales et al v. County of Mendocino et al

Filing 74

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Granting 58 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; and Denying 69 Defendant's Administrative Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Briefing. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/27/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LINDA MORALES, et al.,

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Case No. 16-cv-02429-EMC

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS; AND DENYING
DEFENDANT’S ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

Docket Nos. 58, 69
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Plaintiffs are Linda and Rudolfo Morales and Ms. Morales‟s minor grandson K.B.

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Plaintiffs have filed suit against the County of Mendocino, some of its employees, and two of

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K.B.‟s relatives – more specifically, his mother Buffey Wright and his minor cousin V.W. (Ms.

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Wright is also Ms. Morales‟s daughter, and V.W. is also Ms. Morales‟s grand-daughter.)

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According to Plaintiffs, in or about July 2015, Defendants conspired to remove K.B. from the

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Morales‟s home without cause. Currently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by

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K.B.‟s minor cousin V.W. Plaintiffs have asserted only one cause of action against V.W., namely,

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a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Having considered the parties‟

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briefs and accompanying submissions,1 the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss.

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After the hearing concluded, V.W. filed an administrative request asking for leave to file
supplemental briefing. Plaintiffs did not stipulate to the filing of supplemental briefing, even
taking into account V.W.‟s statement that she is willing to give Plaintiffs an opportunity to file a
responsive brief. The Court DENIES V.W.‟s motion. V.W. has failed to state why she could not
have made any of the arguments or cited any authority contained in her supplemental brief as part
of her original set of briefs (both the opening motion and the reply brief). Moreover, based on the
Court‟s brief review of the proposed supplemental brief, it appears that the brief simply makes
arguments that V.W. already made at the hearing and thus is effectively duplicative.

I.

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A.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard
V.W. has moved to dismiss the IIED claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6). According to V.W., relief is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs have failed to

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state a claim for relief.

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To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim after the
Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), [a
plaintiff‟s] factual allegations [in the complaint] “must . . . suggest
that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.” In other
words, [the] complaint “must allege „factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.‟”

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. . . . [The Ninth Circuit has] settled on a two-step process for
evaluating pleadings:

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth,
allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not
simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but
must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts
to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to
defend itself effectively. Second, the factual
allegations that are taken as true must plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not
unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to
the expense of discovery and continued litigation.

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Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2014).
Notably,

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[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,”
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant‟s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility „of entitlement to relief.‟”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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B.

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Elements of IIED Claim
Under California law, the elements of IIED are as follows:
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or
extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation
of the emotional distress by defendant's outrageous conduct. . . .
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Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civil community.

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In the instant case, V.W. argues that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a plausible IIED claim for

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multiple reasons:

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(1)

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distress.

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(2)

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e.g., intending to help K.B. as a possible victim of child abuse).

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(3)

Plaintiffs have failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct by V.W.

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(4)

Plaintiffs cannot plead an IIED claim because V.W.‟s reporting of child abuse is

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protected as a matter of law by California‟s Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act

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For the Northern District of California

Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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United States District Court

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(“CANRA”) and public policy. See Cal. Pen. Code § 11172(a) (“Any other person

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reporting a known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect shall not incur civil or

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criminal liability as a result of any report authorized by this article unless it can be proven

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that a false report was made and the person knew that the report was false or was made

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with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the report, and any person who makes a

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report of child abuse or neglect known to be false or with reckless disregard of the truth or

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falsity of the report is liable for any damages caused.”) (emphasis added).

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For the reasons stated below, the Court grants V.W.‟s motion on the basis of Plaintiff‟s

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that V.W. caused Plaintiffs‟ asserted emotional

Plaintiffs have failed to allege that V.W. intended to harm Plaintiffs (as opposed to,

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failure to sufficiently establish (3).

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C.

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Extreme and Outrageous Conduct
As noted above, a cause of action for IIED requires a showing of conduct by the defendant

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so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civil community. “Generally,

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conduct will be found to be actionable where the „recitation of the facts to an average member of

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the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim

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“Outrageous!”‟” KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 1028 (1995).

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According to V.W., Plaintiffs have failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct because there

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are repeated allegations in the complaint that she was mentally fragile or unstable and manipulated
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by Ms. Wright and her friends to help them in their conspiracy to secure the removal of K.B. from

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Ms. Morales‟s care. Cf. Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 297 (1976) (noting that

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“[b]ehavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant . . . abuses a relation or position which

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gives him power to damage the plaintiff‟s interest”).
At the hearing, Plaintiffs did not dispute that V.W.‟s mental state would be relevant to the

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should be left for the trier of fact to decide. See, e.g., Tr. at 13 (in response to Court comment that

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“[s]houldn‟t [it] make some difference” if the defendant were “a minor, who barely crosses the

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threshold of capacity and all that, versus somebody who is sophisticated and know[s] exactly what

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they are doing and what the harm that‟s going to be inflicted,” counsel for Plaintiffs stating that “I

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think that will make a difference” and then arguing that “down the road when there is more

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For the Northern District of California

issue of extreme and outrageous conduct. Rather, they simply took the position that the issue

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United States District Court

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discovery and evidence, those distinctions can be made”). The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiffs

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have failed to explain how a reasonable fact finder could conclude that V.W.‟s actions were

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extreme and outrageous based on the express allegations in the complaint that:

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V.W. was a minor who had “mental health issues,” a fact that both Ms. Wright and her
friends in the CPS unit knew. Compl. ¶ 56.

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V.W. was “young, impressionable, and psychologically fragile.” Compl. ¶ 57.

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Ms. Wright and Ms. Buxton knew that “VW had recently been a patient in a locked

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psychiatric facility due to mental health issues and diagnosis from which she suffered

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and required psychotropic medications to address.” Compl. ¶ 58; see also Compl. ¶ 92

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(alleging that “VW had been in a mental health facility in February 2015, and . . . she had

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threatened to kill herself if she was not removed from her mother‟s home”; also alleging

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that “while VW was in the mental health facility she had been placed on psychotropic

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medications”).

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To get V.W. to join the conspiracy, Ms. Wright and Ms. Buxton began to spend time

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with her and socialize with her; indeed, Ms. Wright even allowed V.W. to move in with

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her. See Compl. ¶ 57.

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In short, the complaint paints a picture where V.W. – a young woman who was mentally fragile
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and even had to be institutionalized and given psychotropic drugs – was exploited by older

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persons who befriended her and/or on whom she was financially dependent. The Court dismisses

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the IIED claim against V.W. because, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, Plaintiffs

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have failed to establish that V.W.‟s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Compare Angie M. v.

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Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1226 (1995) (stating that “reasonable minds could

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certainly differ whether it is beyond the bounds of conduct to be tolerated in civilized society for a

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48-year-old medical doctor to initiate and conduct an extended sexual relationship with a minor

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while encouraging her to break the law by providing her with alcohol and controlled substances

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and paying her to purchase such substances for him”), with Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035,

because there was an insufficient showing of extreme and outrageous conduct; plaintiff, the wife

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For the Northern District of California

1050-51 (2009) (holding that defendant was properly granted summary judgment on IIED claim

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United States District Court

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of a decedent who had set up a trust, had alleged that defendant – the trustee for the decedent‟s

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trust – made comments indicating that he would take action on the trust favorable to her if she

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performed sexual favors for him and unfavorable if she did not).
The dismissal of the IIED claim is with prejudice. Plaintiffs have not shown that they

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could make any additional allegations to cure the deficiency with the IIED – short of dropping

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allegations about V.W.‟s mental state which they cannot, in good faith, do given their Rule 11

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obligations to this Court.

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II.

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CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state
a claim for IIED, the Court grants V.W.‟s motion to dismiss.

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Although the Court is dismissing V.W. as a defendant, this does not preclude her from

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participating in this litigation as a witness. In addition, although now just a witness and not a

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defendant, V.W. will continue to be represented by pro bono counsel during the remainder of this

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litigation.

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This order disposes of Docket No. 58.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: July 27, 2017
______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

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