DS-Concept Trade Invest, LLC

Filing 8

Order by Hon. Richard Seeborg denying 3 Motion for TRO.(vclc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2016)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DS-CONCEPT TRADE INVEST, LLC,

Case No. 16-cv-02785-VC

Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED COLD STORAGE,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 3

"The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for
issuing a preliminary injunction." Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F.
Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish," among other things, "that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
DS-Concept has not shown this likelihood of irreparable harm. "[E]conomic injury alone
does not support a finding of irreparable harm," Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television &
Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991), and DS-Concept's alleged injury is
purely economic. DS-Concept contends that it has an interest in Pecorino cheese under the
defendant's control, and that this cheese cannot be sold in the absence of a TRO. If the cheese is
not sold, DS-Concept will lose money. But "monetary injury is not normally considered
irreparable." L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th
Cir. 1980).
If DS-Concept ultimately prevails on its claims, it can recover damages for the lost value
of its cheese. Because DS-Concept might be able to recover damages later, it cannot obtain

equitable relief now. Accordingly, the application for a temporary restraining order is denied. 1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 24, 2016
______________________________________
RICHARD SEEBORG
General Duty Judge, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California

1

It is not clear whether DS-Concept has given the defendant adequate notice of this TRO
application. DS-Concept asserts that the "[d]efendant's identified counsel . . . has been notified
of the complaint and this application." TRO Application at 4 n.1; see also Castricone Decl. at
¶7. But DS-Concept does not explain how it knows that this lawyer is acting on the defendant's
behalf, and it appears that the defendant has not yet been served.
The Court may issue a TRO "without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its
attorney" only in unusual circumstances not present here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); see also Civ.
L.R. 65-1(b). In any event, because DS-Concept could not obtain a TRO even if it gave proper
notice to the defendant, the Court need not decide whether it has given proper notice.

2