Todd Johnston v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Filing 124

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Denying 121 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/15/2019)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

TODD JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff,

8

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Docket No. 121

Defendant.

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

v.

9
10

Case No. 16-cv-03134-EMC

12
13
On September 16, 2019, this Court granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel Individual

14
15

Arbitration. See Docket No. 120 (“Order”). On September 24, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

16

Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration. See Docket No. 121 (“Mot.”).

17

I.

18
19

A.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard
Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party must seek leave of the court to file a motion for

20

reconsideration. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). To prevail, a party “must specifically show reasonable

21

diligence in bringing the motion” and establish one of the following:

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in
fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before
entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought.
The party also must show that in the exercise of reasonable diligence
the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact or law
at the time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law
occurring after the time of such order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or
dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court
before such interlocutory order.

1

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored and are not the place for

2

parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. Northwest Acceptance Corp. v.

3

Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988). “Nor is reconsideration to be used

4

to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought.” Gray v. Golden Gate Nat. Recreational

5

Area, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.

6

2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)).

7

B.

Plaintiff first notes:

8

The Court’s Order states that “both parties agreed” that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to decide the employee issue. To be
clear, Plaintiff does not agree that it would be inappropriate for the
Court to decide the employee issue, and accordingly seeks
reconsideration on this point.

9
10
11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Analysis

12

Mot. at 2 (citation omitted). Upon review, the record is less clear and the Court may have

13

overstated Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff argued that the question of arbitrability should turn on

14

legal analysis of the WARN Act, and not on the determination of a putative employee’s

15

classification, and thus Plaintiff did not seek resolution of classification status as a threshold

16

question. In any event, the Court does not find sufficient cause to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for

17

Reconsideration.
The Court thoroughly considered the legal arguments Plaintiff presented the Court before

18
19

it issued its Order.1 The Court identified two provisions from the Arbitration Agreement in

20

support of its determination that the case should proceed to arbitration as ordered. First, “[t]he

21

Arbitration Provision clearly and unmistakably provides that . . . the arbitrator must decide all

22

disputes . . . including the enforceability, revocability of the Arbitration Provision.” Order at 8-9 .

23
24
25
26
27
28

In its opposition to Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff’s primary contentions
were that the WARN Act contains contrary congressional commands that overrides the FAA and
that the WARN Act triggers the FAA’s Savings Clause with respect to Uber’s class waiver. See
Docket No. 112. All these arguments were reviewed and considered by the Court. In its Order, the
Court ruled that it “cannot reach the legal question regarding the relationship between the WARN
Act and the FAA until the threshold finding is made that Plaintiff is an employee.” The Court
found, further, that if the arbitrator sends the case back to the court, it will then determine whether
the class action waiver is valid. “If arbitrator determines that Plaintiff is . . . independent
contractor, the arbitrator may retain jurisdiction. . . . [and then determine the class action waiver].”
See Order at 8-9.
2
1

1

Since the arbitrability of the WARN Act claim turns upon whether Plaintiff is an employee,

2

Plaintiff’s status informs arbitrability, and therefore must be decided by the arbitrator. Id.

3

Second, the Delegation Clause specifies that the issues “arising out of or relating to” the

4

enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement are to be decided by the arbitrator. Id. (citing

5

O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that the

6

Delegation Clause is not unconscionable)). Regardless of whether Plaintiff agreed or disagreed as

7

to whether it would appropriate for the Court to decide the classification issue in deciding

8

arbitrability, the Court properly granted Defendant’s motion based on the facts before the Court.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court’s Order requiring individual arbitration is “problematic”

10

for two reasons: First, because the employment status issue is an element of his WARN Act claims

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

therefore should be pursued in court, not by arbitration. Second, the Court’s ruling to compel

12

arbitration would change the “posture of the case” because, regardless of the arbitrator’s

13

determination, Uber will attempt to enforce the class action waiver on individual basis. Mot. at 2.

14

These points were presented to the Court before it issued its Order. See Docket No. 112 (Opp’n).

15

Reconsideration is not permitted for arguments that were presented to and considered by the Court

16

prior to the issuance of its Order. Hestia Edu. Grp., LLC v. King, No. 15-cv-01463-DMR 2016

17

WL 1323079, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s [Rule 7-9(b)(2) challenge] is nothing

18

more than a thinly veiled attempt to reargue its original motion. This fails to meet the standard for

19

reconsideration based on ‘manifest failure by the court to consider . . . dispositive legal

20

arguments.’”) (citing Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(2)). See also Civ. L.R. 7-9(c) (“No motion for leave to file

21

a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument [previously made to the

22

Court].”).

23

///

24

///

25

///

26

///

27

///

28
3

II.

1
2
3
4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a
Motion for Reconsideration.
This order disposes of Docket No. 121.

5
6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7
8

Dated: November 15, 2019

9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4