Sentegra, LLC v. Asus Computer International

Filing 109

ORDER DENYING 87 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL by Hon. William Alsup. (whalc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/14/2016)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SENTEGRA, LLC,

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 16-03136 WHA

Plaintiff,
v.

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ASUS COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL,

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ORDER DENYING
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION
TO FILE UNDER SEAL

Defendant.

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/
ASUS Computer International moves to file under seal documents submitted in support

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of its pending motion for sanctions, including (1) billing invoices attached as Appendix A to the

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Declaration of Li Chen (Dkt. No. 87-3), (2) billing invoices attached as Exhibits 1–10 to the

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Declaration of Joshua Masur (Dkt. Nos. 87-6–87-15), and (3) portions of the Masur Declaration

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(Dkt. Nos. 87-4–87-5). ACI claims its invoices “are generally not public and may put the law

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firms at a competitive disadvantage if made public,” and that portions of the Masur Declaration

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“relate to non-public information, including information that is excluded from ACI’s calculation

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of fees” (Dkt. No. 87 at 3). Sentegra opposes the motion.

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“Historically, courts have recognized a general right to inspect and copy public records

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and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Thus, “a strong presumption in

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favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172,

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1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). In considering requests to seal judicial records,

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courts apply a “compelling reasons” standard to documents attached to dispositive motions and
a “good cause” standard to documents attached to non-dispositive motions. Id. at 1180–81.

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Here, both sides agree the good cause standard applies (Dkt. Nos. 87 at 2, 92 at 1). Good cause

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requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the

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documents are made public. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180; Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

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Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). “[B]road, conclusory allegations of potential harm”

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are insufficient. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130–31.

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Here, ACI has not shown good cause. Importantly, ACI does not claim attorney-client

invoices and billing information are “generally not public” (Dkt. No. 87 at 3, emphasis added)

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does not establish sealability. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Nor do ACI’s vague and

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skeletal assertions that public access to its invoices may potentially place its law firms “at a

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For the Northern District of California

privilege over any of its submitted materials (Dkt. No. 94 at 2). The mere fact that ACI’s

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United States District Court

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competitive disadvantage” (Dkt. Nos. 87 at 3, 94 at 2) show with particularity that “specific

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prejudice or harm will result.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. Such assertions are precisely

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the type of “broad, conclusory allegations of potential harm” our court of appeals has deemed

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inadequate to establish good cause. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130–31. ACI suggests that

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“making public the billable time entries in the sealed invoices could reveal information about

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the manner in which the law firms approach matters and litigate cases” (Dkt. No. 94 at 2,

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emphasis added). This suggestion, however, is speculative and lacks explanation. ACI does

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not identify with particularity any specific entries likely to harm a firm’s competitive advantage

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by revealing “sensitive information” about confidential litigation strategy (see Dkt. No. 87-1 at

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2). The Court’s own review of ACI’s submitted invoices also revealed no such entries. This

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order therefore concludes ACI has not shown good cause as required by Kamakana.*

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Additionally, the Court notes that ACI initially put the contents of its billing records at

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issue by bringing its motion for sanctions. Moreover, ACI volunteered the documents it seeks

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to seal — it claims the documents were unnecessary to decide the motion for sanctions in the

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first place (Dkt. Nos. 87 at 3, 94 at 2–3). Under these circumstances, ACI’s attempt to show

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ACI’s arguments are especially unpersuasive as to its voluminous billing invoices, which ACI seeks
to seal in their entirety (see Dkt. No. 87 at 2). See also L.R. 79-5(d) (a party seeking to file a document under
seal must submit both redacted and unredacted versions of that document unless the party seeks to file the entire
document under seal).

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good cause is all the more unpersuasive. To be clear, the Court agrees with ACI that it “should

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not be punished for being forthcoming or for going above and beyond the minimum required”

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(see Dkt. No. 94 at 3). But ACI should also not expect special permission to file unsealable

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documents under seal simply because it was exceptionally enthusiastic in attempting to prove

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up the amount of the very fees it seeks. If relief is ultimately granted on ACI’s motion for

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sanctions, the public has a right to know the basis on which the Court granted that relief.

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ACI’s motion to seal its billing records and portions of the Masur Declaration is
therefore DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: December 14, 2016.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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