Lee v. Master et al

Filing 31

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Granting 4 10 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/18/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Plaintiff,

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Case No. 16-cv-03250-EMC

CANDACE P LEE,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

v.

Docket No. 4, 10

TODD H. MASTER, et al.,

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Defendants.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Candace Lee is a vexatious litigant who has, since 1998, been subject to a pre-

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filing order requiring her to get this Court‟s permission before initiating litigation. See Docket No.

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20-1 Ex. A at 19 (imposing pre-filing order). On June 2, 2016, Judge Hamilton dismissed a

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complaint filed by Plaintiff, then using the name Candace Pingping Wuchang, pursuant to the pre-

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filing order, finding that the complaint was “frivolous and duplicative.” See Docket 11 Ex. 1.

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Plaintiff filed the present complaint nine days later. The present complaint, although filed under a

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different name, is substantially identical to the one dismissed by Judge Hamilton. See Docket No.

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1-1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff‟s allegations are difficult to follow, but the gravamen of her

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complaint is that the various Defendants breached a settlement agreement in a prior case. Plaintiff

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did not, in filing this complaint, attempt to comply with the pre-filing order. Now pending before

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the Court are Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss. See Docket Nos. 4 (“City Motion”), 10 (“Master

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Motion”). The Court GRANTS the motions and DISMISSES Plaintiff‟s complaint with

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prejudice.

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II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is the latest in a series of lawsuits that Plaintiff has filed against the City of Redwood

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City, its police officers, and its attorneys.1 The various cases all stem from Plaintiff‟s eviction

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from her home in 1995. Following that incident, in 1996 Plaintiff and her sister each filed

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lawsuits against the City and several police officers involved in the eviction. See Master Motion

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at 4. Those suits resulted in judgment being entered in favor of the Defendants, including an

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award of attorneys‟ fees of $25,000 to the City. Id. Plaintiff subsequently, in 1998, filed a

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petition to discharge her debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy code. Id. In response, the City

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sought to have Plaintiff‟s judgment debts declared non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. The

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Bankruptcy Court entered judgment in favor of the city on this issue. Id.

Id. at 5; see also Complaint at 11. In 2006, Plaintiff filed an action against the City and its police

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officers alleging that she was unlawfully arrested and subject to excessive force. See Docket No.

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For the Northern District of California

In May 2005, Plaintiff was arrested for alleged domestic violence and for resisting arrest.

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United States District Court

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11 Ex. 3 at 3. Plaintiff continues to raise these allegations in the present action. In August 2007,

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Plaintiff and the various defendants entered into a stipulation for dismissal according to which

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Plaintiff agreed to dismiss her lawsuit in exchange for the City‟s agreement to waive the previous

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$25,000 judgment against her. Docket 1-1 Ex. D. In accordance with the terms of the stipulation

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for dismissal, on August 9, 2007, the City executed an Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of

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Judgment, which specifically provided that the judgments entered in favor of the City in Plaintiff‟s

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prior case had “been satisfied in full.” Docket 1-1 Ex. C.
Over seven years later, on January 4, 2015, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Todd

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Master, a partner in the firm that had previously represented the City, claiming that the $25,000

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judgment against her “still [was] not considered as „satisfied in full.‟” Docket No. 1-1 at 6. Her

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basis for this assertion appears to be that a Google search for her name returns the bankruptcy

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court‟s prior decision that her judgment debt was nondischargeable. Id. at 7-8. In the exchange

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that followed, Defendant explained that “the City provided you with signed Satisfactions of

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Judgment as called for under the terms of the resolution of the case or cases,” and advised Plaintiff

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As Defendants point out, there have been at least six such lawsuits in this court alone. The 1998
prefiling order notes that Plaintiff has also been declared a vexatious litigant in state court. See
Docket No. 21-1 Ex. A.
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to retain a bankruptcy attorney if she believed “that a court, entity or person is not interpreting

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those documents correctly.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff indicated that if the Defendant Firm would not “do

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anything to remove the bankruptcy $25,000 none [sic] dischargeable judgment” then she would

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“go back to the City of Redwood City to make a claim for all the damages caused me back then

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and now.” Id. at 3.

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Plaintiff also, on January 6, 2016, filed a motion with the bankruptcy court “to remove the
nondischargeability” of the judgment entered against her. The court construed her motion as a

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request to vacate the prior nondischargeability judgment and denied it, noting that “the

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nondiscargeability judgment imposes no liability on Debtor separate from the liability that has

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already been released,” and that accordingly, “vacatur is not necessary” because the judgment

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“simply became moot upon satisfaction.” Docket No. 1-1 Ex. F.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff, under the name Candace PingPing Wuchang, filed a complaint in this Court

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against the present Defendants on May 26, 2016. 16-mc-80115-PJH, Docket No. 1. Judge

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Hamilton dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the pre-filing order on June 2. On

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June 13, Plaintiff filed the present complaint, in large part identical to the previous one, this time

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under the name Candace Lee.

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Plaintiff‟s complaint is frequently difficult to decipher, but her asserted claim for relief is

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“breach of prior case settlement contract,” which she claims arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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Docket No. 1-1 at 10. She also realleges that Redwood City police officers used excessive force

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during her 2005 arrest, although she does not frame her excessive force allegations as a separate

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claim for relief. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants “fooled” both Plaintiff and Judge Armstrong

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into agreeing to the settlement dismissing that case, and argues that Judge Armstrong

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unknowingly granted dismissal on the basis of Defendants “intentional wrong acts. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

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On July 7, 2016, Defendants City and Bolanos filed a motion to dismiss under Rules

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12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Docket No. 4. Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to allege a case or controversy within the meaning of

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Article III, that her claims are all time barred, and that she had not alleged sufficient facts to state a

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claim. On July 28, the remaining Defendants (the City‟s attorneys) filed their motion to dismiss,
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asserting the same grounds for dismissal. Docket No. 10.
On July 26, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the complaint should not be

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dismissed as to the City defendants for Plaintiff‟s failure to respond timely to the motion to

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dismiss. Docket No. 8. On August 9, Plaintiff filed a response to the OSC indicating that she had

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been unable to respond on time because she was in Taiwan pursuing other litigation. Docket No.

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17. On August 15, Plaintiff filed her oppositions to the two motions to dismiss. Docket Nos. 21

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and 22. The two oppositions, which are identical, do not respond to the substance of Defendants‟

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motions to dismiss. Rather, they assert generally that Plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact for

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purposes of standing, and assert that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
III.

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In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

“sufficient factual matter . . . to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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The Court‟s “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and

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construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d

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580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows

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the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Plaintiff‟s complaint cannot survive under this standard. First, as each group of

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Defendants observes, all of her claims are time barred. Although Plaintiff appears only to allege

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one cause of action – what she characterizes as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for breach of the

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settlement agreement – construing her pro se complaint liberally it appears that she may intend to

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bring an additional claim for excessive force under § 1983. Because § 1983 contains no specific

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statute of limitations, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations in § 1983 suits. See

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Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In California, the statute of limitations for breach of

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contract is four years, see Cal. Code Civ. P. § 337, and the limitations period for personal injury

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actions is two years, see id. § 335.1; see also Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d

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1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The statute of limitations applicable to an action pursuant to 42
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U.S.C. § 1983 is the personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action

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arose.”). The conduct she complains of, meanwhile, took place in 2005, for the excessive force

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claim, and 2007, for the supposed breach of the settlement agreement. Her complaint therefore is

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at best five years late. Even if this Court were to construe Plaintiff‟s principal claim as a

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standalone breach of contract claim, rather than a § 1983 claim, it would still be untimely under

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the same four-year California limitations period.2 See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 337. Plaintiff‟s

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opposition does not respond in any way to Defendants‟ timeliness argument. This alone is a

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sufficient basis for dismissal.
Even if her complaint was timely, however, Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim. With

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some basis to bring this as a § 1983 claim – Plaintiff has alleged no facts pertaining to any of her

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For the Northern District of California

respect to the purported breach of the prior settlement agreement, even pretending that there were

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United States District Court

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federal rights that were violated, nor to Monell liability on the part of the City – there is simply no

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factual support whatsoever for the claim that Defendants breached the settlement agreement. To

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the contrary, Plaintiff herself filed a copy of the Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Judgment,

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which had been filed with this Court in 2007. Docket No. 1-1, Ex. C. Plaintiff‟s allegation is

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plainly based on her misunderstanding of the search results for her name. Because she is still able

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to find the bankruptcy court‟s nondischargeability order online, she believes that it is still in effect,

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despite the explanation of the Court itself that the order is moot in light of Plaintiff‟s release by the

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City. But the state of the bankruptcy court record does not constitute a breach on the part of any

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Defendants. Defendants carried out their obligations under the contract.
With respect to any excessive force claim, Plaintiff‟s allegations are identical to those

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raised in her 2007 lawsuit. In other words, they are the very claims that Plaintiff agreed to dismiss

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with prejudice nine years ago in exchange for the waiver of the judgment against her. See Lee v.

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City of Redwood City, C-06-3340, Docket No. 123. Plaintiff raises no new allegations, nor does

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she make any argument as to why she should be permitted to relitigate those voluntarily dismissed

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claims nearly a decade later. This claim is barred by res judicata. See Ruiz v. Snohomish Cty.

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Moreover, it is doubtful that this Court would have jurisdiction over such a state law contract
claim.
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Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Res judicata applies when there is:

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(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between

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parties.”).
The Court further concludes that Plaintiff‟s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

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Despite the general rule that courts should freely grant leave to amend, “[l]iberality in granting a

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plaintiff leave to amend is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue

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prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d

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752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999). Granting Plaintiff leave to amend in this case would be futile for the

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reasons stated above; she simply has no plausible basis for claiming that any of the Defendants
breached a settlement agreement with her, nor is there any basis for her to belatedly relitigate the

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excessive force claims that she voluntarily dismissed nine years ago.
Furthermore, her complaint was brought in bad faith. After Judge Hamilton dismissed

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff‟s first attempt to raise the present claims for failure to comply with the pre-filing order,

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Plaintiff re-filed nearly the identical complaint a little over a week later, under a different name.

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Failure to comply with the pre-filing order warrants dismissal. But this blatant attempt to

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circumvent Judge Hamilton‟s order, along with Plaintiff‟s continued failure to comply with the

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prefiling order, also demonstrates her bad faith. As the Supreme Court has explained,

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“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a context-specific task

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that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678. In this case, in light of Plaintiff‟s long history as a vexatious litigant and her

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imperviousness to explanation regarding the status of the judgment against her, common sense

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dictates that she has not raised any plausible claims for relief and the instant filing is in bad faith.

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The Court therefore grants Defendants‟ motions to dismiss.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants‟ motions and

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DISMISSES Plaintiff‟s complaint with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter

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judgment and close the file.

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This order disposes of Docket Nos. 4 and 10.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: October 18, 2016

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