Motha v. Time Warner Cable Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. Granting 16 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Amended Pleadings due by 12/30/2016. (ndrS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/2/2016)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOSSLYN MOTHA,
Case No. 16-cv-03585-HSG
Plaintiff,
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
v.
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TIME WARNER CABLE INC., et al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 16
Defendants.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Josslyn Motha’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint
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for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants
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Time Warner Cable, Inc. (“TWC”), Time Warner Cable Enterprises, LLC (“TWCE”), Time
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Warner NY Cable, LLC (“TWNYC”), Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), and Bank of
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America NA (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred
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by (1) the statute of limitations; (2) the doctrine of issue preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff’s consent to
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the sale of the allegedly converted property, and otherwise fail to state a claim upon which relief
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can be granted. Dkt. No. 16 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff has filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 19 (“Opp.”), and
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Defendants have replied, Dkt. No. 36 (“Reply”).
The Court finds that this matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument and
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the matter is deemed submitted. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7–1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the
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Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred on its face and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to
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dismiss with leave to amend.
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I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the co-inventor of 4 U.S. patents, one pending U.S. application, several foreign
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patents and applications, and one U.S. trademark (collectively, the “Disputed IP”), all of which
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she developed over the course of several years with her ex-husband, Thomas Meyer. See Dkt. No.
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1 ¶¶ 2, 12. In January 2011, Plaintiff and her husband were divorced by Judicial Decree in
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Hawaii, and agreed to sell “some” of their patents by auction. See id. ¶ 15 & n.6. Following the
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sale of the Disputed IP, an auctioneer deposited $30,000 into the couple’s joint bank account. Id.
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¶ 15.
Plaintiff now alleges that she never executed a written assignment of her ownership rights
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in the Disputed IP, see id. ¶ 23, that assignments executed by TWC and its predecessor-in-interest,
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Pleasant View, LLC, were invalid transfers of ownership, see id. ¶¶ 32-33, that the Disputed IP
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was wrongfully converted, see id. ¶ 2, and that she did not “discover” the wrongful conversion
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until March 26, 2014, see id. ¶¶ 16-22.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint
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if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
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dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). On a motion to dismiss, the Court
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accepts as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and construes all factual inferences in
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the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d
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1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief
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above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although the Court generally is confined
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to assessing the allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached
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documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint and may be considered in evaluating
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the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th
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Cir. 1987). Similarly, “facts subject to judicial notice may be considered on a motion to
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dismiss.” Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).
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A statute of limitations defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss “[if] the running of
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the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816
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F.2d 482, 484 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir.
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1980). However, a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears “beyond doubt” that
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plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim. Hernandez v.
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City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998).
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III.
DISCUSSION
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A.
Judicial Notice
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As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the parties’ requests for judicial notice.
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See Dkt. Nos. 17, 20. A court may only “take judicial notice of facts that are ‘not subject to
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reasonable dispute.’” Pinterest, Inc. v. Pintrips, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
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(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). “Facts are indisputable, and thus subject to judicial notice, only if
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they are either ‘generally known’ under Rule 201(b)(1) or ‘capable of accurate and ready
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determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned’ under Rule
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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201(b)(2).” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003).
Defendants seek to judicially notice the following categories of documents: (1) documents
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related to an action filed by Plaintiff in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los
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Angeles; (2) a divorce decree filed in the Family Court of the Second Circuit, State of Hawaii;
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(3) an Auction Consignment Agreement; and (4) patent assignments publicly recorded with the
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USPTO on January 14, 2011, February 19, 2013, and April 24, 2013. See Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff
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also seeks to judicially notice the patent assignment publicly recorded with the USPTO on
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February 19, 2013, see Dkt No. 20, Ex. G, in addition to several documents related to facts not
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raised in the operative complaint. See Dkt. No. 20, Exs. A-F, H-O, Z.
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Patent assignments publicly recorded with the USPTO are the proper subject of judicial
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notice when they are undisputed. See Klang v. Pflueger, No. SACV 13–01971 JVS (DFMx), 2014
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WL 4922401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2014). Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff disputes the
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authenticity of her signature on the assignment publicly recorded with the USPTO on January 14,
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2011, and thus the validity of the two subsequently filed assignments. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 20, 23,
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33-34, 41. The Court therefore does not judicially notice the assignments for the purpose of
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establishing their validity. However, because Plaintiff does not dispute that the assignments were
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recorded with the USPTO, the Court finds it proper to judicially notice the assignments “for the
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limited purpose of demonstrating that the filings and actions described therein occurred on certain
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dates.” See Pinterest, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 997; see Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 19, 33; see Opp. at 16. The
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Court declines to take judicial notice of the remaining documents, as the Court does not rely on
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them in resolving this Motion. See Molex v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 11–cv–
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01282–YGR, 2012 WL 3042256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).1
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B.
Statute of Limitations
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Under California law, the statute of limitations for a conversion claim is three years. See
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Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(c)(1). “Breach alone does not trigger the statute of limitations” on a
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conversion claim. Applera Corp.-Applied Biosystems Grp. v. Illumina, Inc., No. C 07-02845
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WHA, 2008 WL 170597, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008). “The limitations period only begins to
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run when the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the facts giving rise to the claim.” Id. A
plaintiff “is deemed to have had constructive knowledge if it had enough information to warrant
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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an investigation which, if reasonably diligent, would have led to discovery of the fraud.” Gen.
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Bedding Corp. v. Echevarria, 947 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). It is well settled that “[i]ssuance of a patent and recordation in the Patent Office
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constitute notice to the world of its existence.” Id. at 1397; see also Sontag Chain Stores Co. Ltd.
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v. Nat’l Nut Co. of Cal., 310 U.S. 281, 294 (1940) (stating that following recordation with the
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patent office, “[c]onstructive notice of [a patent’s] existence goes thus to all the world”). “By the
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same token, recordation of [an] assignment . . . impart[s] like ‘notice to the world of its
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existence.’” Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co., 16 F.R.D. 141, 157 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
Here, it is evident from the face of the complaint and judicially noticed documents that
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Plaintiff had constructive notice of the allegedly fraudulent assignment of the Disputed IP as early
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as January 14, 2011, when Pleasant View, LLC recorded the assignment with the USPTO. See
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Dkt. No. 16-14. Reasonable diligence would have led Plaintiff to discover that assignment, and
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any allegedly fraudulent aspect of it, at that time. See Gen. Bedding, 947 F.2d at 1398. Plaintiff’s
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argument that each subsequent assignment restarted the clock on the statute of limitations does not
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change this conclusion. See Opp. at 20. The last assignment of the Disputed IP from TWC to
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The Court also does not consider any new facts presented by Plaintiff in its opposition. See Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 12(d); see also Schneider v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir.
1998) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the
complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s
motion to dismiss.” (emphasis in original)).
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TWCE was recorded with the USPTO on April 24, 2013. See Dkt. No. 16-16. Thus, even if
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Plaintiff’s assertion were correct, Plaintiff’s filing of this action in June 2016 fell outside of the
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three-year statute of limitations window that closed in April 2016, meaning the case still would be
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time-barred.2
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.3 As a general rule, leave to
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amend a complaint that has been dismissed should be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a).
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However, leave to amend may be denied when the Court “determines that the pleading could not
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possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
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2000). Given the lengthy history established in the underlying related cases, the Court has
significant skepticism that Plaintiff will be able to plead any new facts that change the analysis
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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above. Nevertheless, because the Court cannot conclusively say at this point that the pleadings
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“could not possibly be cured,” id., Plaintiff is granted a final opportunity to amend her complaint
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by December 30, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: 12/2/2016
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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Because the case is facially time-barred, even assuming Plaintiff’s “restart” theory is correct, the
Court does not decide whether that theory has any legal merit.
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Having found that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, the Court does not consider Defendants’
additional affirmative defenses or arguments.
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