Martha Vaughn v. Coach, Inc.

Filing 80

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION by Judge Chhabria denying 59 Motion to Certify Class. (vclc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/8/2018)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTHA VAUGHN,

Case No. 16-cv-04633-VC

Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
CLASS CERTIFICATION

v.
COACH, INC.,

Re: Dkt. No. 59

Defendant.

1. Martha Vaughn's motion for class certification is denied because she has not shown
that common issues predominate over individual issues, as she must under Rule 23(b)(3). See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
In this suit, Vaughn alleges that store managers at Coach stores in California were
improperly denied a number of state wage-and-hour protections, including overtime
compensation and meal and rest breaks. Coach argues it was not required to provide these
protections, because its store managers are exempt executive employees under California law.
Both sides agree that Vaughn and other store managers did some managerial work. But Vaughn
argues that managerial work never constituted more than half of her and other store managers'
work, as it must to be considered an executive employee under California law.
The key issue for each purported class member's claim is whether that class member
spent more than half of her time engaged in managerial work. See Cal. Labor Code § 515(e);
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070 subsec. 1(A)(1)(e). This question, in turn, involves three main
inquiries: (1) what tasks did the store manager perform; (2) were these tasks managerial; and (3)
how much time did the manager spend on managerial and non-managerial tasks. Cf. Vinole v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 2009).
Vaughn has not established that these questions can be adjudicated on a class-wide basis.
And the record suggests that at least the third inquiry could require individualized proof. Though
the proposed class members share the same title, how store managers spend their time varies
substantially. In part, this variation flows from Coach's decision to give store managers
discretion in how to spend their time. In part, store managers' actual work varies because they do
not work in a standardized setting. Coach has store manager-led stores in California that
generate less than $500,000 in annual revenue, and it has store manager-led stores in the state
that generate around $20 million in annual revenue.1 See Dkt. No. 63-16, Gill Decl. ¶ 3. In a
small store, a store manager may supervise a total staff of around 7; in a larger store, a store
manager could work with around 10 associate and assistant managers, and in total supervise over
30 employees. See Dkt. No. 63-10, Aguilera Decl. ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 63-12, Dera Decl. ¶ 2; see also
Dkt. No. 63-18, Monroy Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Dkt. No. 63-20, Velez Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7-14.
Because Vaughn has failed to establish predominance, the Court declines to address the
remaining requirements for class certification at this time. See Kowalsky v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., No. 10-CV-02176-LHK, 2012 WL 892427, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012).
2. Denial of the motion is without prejudice. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable
to give Vaughn another chance to move for class certification because there is a reasonable
possibility that Vaughn could establish predominance in a subsequent motion. Cf. id.
Although Vaughn has not made the required showing in this motion, it appears possible
that both the inquiry into what tasks store managers in fact perform and the inquiry into whether
these tasks are managerial as a matter of law could be litigated on a class-wide basis. For
example, it seems that the question of whether a store manager is engaged in managerial work
while participating in sales to customers can be adjudicated as to all class members "in one

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Some Coach stores – apparently stores with higher revenues – also have a general manager.
See Dkt. No. 63-9, Stankard Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; see also Aguilera Decl. ¶ 2. The proposed class
excludes store managers who worked under a general manager. Dkt. No. 60-4, Mot. at 3.

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stroke." Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350; see 29 C.F.R. 541.108 (2000); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070
subsec. 1(A)(1)(e). This alone may be enough to satisfy predominance, given that a key dispute
for all of the claims appears to be whether the time store managers spent on the selling floor
should be considered exempt time. Cf. Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2016). And it is possible that the timekeeping records Coach has maintained for store
managers at stores outside of California could be used as common proof for establishing how
store managers at stores inside California spent their time. Because Coach did not keep similar
records for store managers in California (for the purpose, according to Vaughn, of evading
California's more stringent protections against improper classification of employees), the out-ofstate records may be the best evidence on this issue. For example, this evidence may show that
despite the discretion store managers are given, store managers – or store managers from a
particular subset of stores – spent at least 50 percent of their time on a set of managerial (or nonmanagerial) tasks. Yet these timekeeping records have not been provided by Coach (and
apparently not meaningfully sought by Vaughn) in discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 8, 2018
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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