Weaver v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 46

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND; CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE. Should plaintiff wish to file a Second Amended Complaint, she shall file such pleading no later than March 13, 2017. The Case Management Conference is hereby continued to April 21, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case Management Statement shall be filed no later than April 14, 2017. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on 02/24/17. (mmclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/24/2017)

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1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANNIE G. WEAVER, Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Case No. 16-cv-04907-MMC ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND; CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE Re: Dkt. No. 35 12 13 Before the Court is the “Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint,” filed 14 December 2, 2016, by defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). 1 Plaintiff Annie 15 G. Weaver (“Weaver”) has filed opposition, to which Wells Fargo has replied. Having 16 read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the 17 Court rules as follows.2 18 By order filed November 1, 2016, the Court dismissed Weaver’s initial complaint in 19 its entirety and granted Weaver leave to amend to allege sufficient facts to support two of 20 her four causes of action. Thereafter, on November 18, 2016, Weaver filed her First 21 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). By the instant motion, Wells Fargo argues Weaver has 22 failed to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the Court. As set forth below, the 23 Court agrees. 24 In Count I of the FAC, titled “Violation of Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Act,” 25 26 27 1 The motion is also filed on behalf of Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”). The operative complaint, however, includes no claims against BNYM. 2 28 By order filed January 20, 2017, the Court took the matter under submission. 1 Weaver’s claim is based on the theory that, in 2007, “Wells Fargo defendants 2 deliberately, fraudulently and maliciously placed [Weaver], a black woman living in 3 Oakland, in a high-cost subprime loan, precisely because she is a member of a minority 4 group Wells Fargo targeted for subprime ‘ghetto’ loans.” (See FAC ¶ 22.) The Court 5 previously dismissed the claim as pleaded in Weaver’s initial complaint for two reasons: 6 (1) Weaver’s failure to “include any factual allegations to support an exception to the 7 [two-year] statute of limitations, such as equitable tolling” (see Order, filed Nov. 1, 2016, 8 at 2:23-24), and (2) Weaver’s failure to include “facts to support [her] conclusory 9 assertion that . . . placement [into such loan] constituted discrimination” (see id. at 2:19- 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 20). In her FAC, Weaver now alleges she “did not learn that Wells Fargo’s 12 discriminatory actions constituted a violation of her civil rights and property rights until her 13 daughter hired a forensic mortgage loan auditor and lawyer earlier this year.” (See FAC 14 ¶ 33.)3 Without an additional showing, however, such allegations do not suffice to 15 support tolling of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 16 35 Cal. 4th 797, 807-08 (2005) (holding discovery rule “only delays accrual until the 17 plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action”; further holding plaintiff 18 “must specifically plead facts to show . . . the inability to have made earlier discovery 19 despite reasonable diligence”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 20 Moreover, Weaver has added no new allegations sufficient to support an inference 21 of discrimination. In particular, the new allegations to which she cites (see FAC ¶¶ 26-27) 22 as well as the earlier allegations on which she relies (see id. at 3:6-4:5; id. ¶¶ 22-25) all 23 pertain to Wells Fargo, whereas the lender with whom she alleges she negotiated the 24 subject loan in 2007 was not Wells Fargo, but World Savings Bank FSB, a “predecessor- 25 in-interest” (see id. at 2:2-9; id. ¶¶ 4-7, 24). 26 27 28 3 Weaver’s initial complaint was filed August 25, 2016, and, as noted above, the FAC was filed November 18, 2016. 2 1 Accordingly, Count I is subject to dismissal. 2 In Count II of the FAC, titled “Violation of Cal. Civil Code Sections 2923.6(c), (d) 3 and (e),” Weaver’s claim is based on the theory that “Wells Fargo sold [her] home in 4 foreclosure” while her “application for a loan modification was pending.” (See FAC ¶ 37.) 5 The Court previously dismissed the claim as pleaded in Weaver’s initial complaint, for the 6 reason that Weaver had failed to allege that she had submitted a “complete application 7 for a first lien loan modification” prior to the foreclosure. (See Order, filed Nov. 1, 2016, 8 at 3:13-15.) In her FAC, Weaver now alleges her “complete loan modification package 9 was under review” at the time of foreclosure. (See FAC ¶ 37). Without more, Weaver’s addition of the conclusory term “complete” is insufficient. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(h) 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 (providing application is “deemed ‘complete’ when a borrower has supplied the mortgage 12 servicer with all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable 13 timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 14 (2009) (holding complaint subject to dismissal where it lacks “sufficient factual matter” to 15 support its “legal conclusions”). In her opposition, Weaver makes reference to various supporting facts, 16 17 specifically, that “Wells Fargo had not denied her . . . application on the ground of 18 incompleteness or for any other reason,” had not “asked [her] for additional information at 19 the time of the sale,” and had postponed “scheduled foreclosure sales . . . four times 20 while the review of her application was pending.” (See Opp. at 8:11-14.) Those facts, 21 however, do not appear in the FAC. 22 Accordingly, Count II is subject to dismissal. 23 Although Wells Fargo seeks dismissal without leave to amend, the Court will again 24 afford Weaver an opportunity to amend to cure, if she can do so, the deficiencies noted 25 above. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 26 leave to amend “should be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct 27 the defect”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 28 // 3 CONCLUSION 1 2 For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, 3 and Counts I and II are hereby DISMISSED with leave to amend. Should Weaver wish to 4 file a Second Amended Complaint, she shall file such pleading no later than March 13, 5 2017. 6 In light of the above, the Case Management Conference is hereby CONTINUED 7 from March 3, 2017, to April 21, 2017, at 10:30 a.m. A Joint Case Management 8 Statement shall be filed no later than April 14, 2017. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Dated: February 24, 2017 MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

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