Van Dusen v. Purcell et al

Filing 14

ORDER. The attached order dismisses the case without leave to amend because fundamentally, the dispute challenges the state bar's interim suspension. As such, it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent that there is any argument that the challenge is a general challenge to state-bar practices, Younger abstention bars the court's addressing the issue. (Beeler, Laurel) (Filed on 10/27/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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JAN VAN DUSEN

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Case No. 16-cv-04976-LB

Plaintiff.

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ORDER

v.

[Re: ECF No. 1]
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CATHERINE D. PURCELL, et al.,

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Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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This is a putatively in forma pauperis lawsuit. The plaintiff is a lawyer who was convicted of

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a felony for animal cruelty1 who now challenges the state bar’s interim suspension of her while

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she appeals her conviction.2 She raises two claims: (1) the suspension violates her right to practice

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her profession under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment

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and also violates the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the state bar’s procedures for setting aside

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interim suspensions also violate the Due Process clause because they require her to admit not just

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the fact of her felony but also the substance of the charges, thereby destroying her appeal rights. 3

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See Order — No. 13-cv-05023-HSG, ECF No. 263 at 1. Record citations are to material in the
Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top
of the documents.
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Complaint — ECF No. 1.
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Id. at 6-21.
ORDER — No. 3:16-cv-04976-LB)

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As defendants, she names judges who apparently are part of the state-bar court, the president of
the Bar Association’s Board of Trustees, and the chief trial counsel, all in their official capacities.4
She seeks declaratory or injunctive relief so that she can practice law until she resolves her appeals
and any habeas proceedings and to prohibit the defendants from “administering the discipline
system in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”5

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GOVERNING LAW

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case
unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
her case is within federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. / Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 264
F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189
(1936)).

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The plaintiff is pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis. A complaint filed by any person
proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte
review. The court must engage in a screening and dismiss any claims that: (1) are frivolous or
malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 and n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis
complaints . . . .”); Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint that lacks any
basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2). Cato v.
United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Id. ¶ 6.
Id. at 22.

ORDER — No. 3:16-cv-04976-LB)

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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ANALYSIS
Ms. Van Dusen’s complaint is barred for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602 (9th
Cir. 2005).
The Mothershed plaintiff was an attorney licensed in Oklahoma but practicing in Arizona.
Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 605. Following bar disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court of
Arizona censured him for practicing law without a license. Id. at 605. The Oklahoma bar
association then brought disciplinary proceedings against him, on the basis of the Arizona censure,
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court disbarred him. Id. He then sued in federal district court. Id.
Much like Ms. Van Dusen, the Mothershed plaintiff sued judges from the Oklahoma and
Arizona supreme courts, both states’ bar associations, individuals who had served on the states’
disciplinary tribunals, and other bar and court personnel. Id. at 605. He argued that the disciplinary
actions in both states had been procedurally deficient, including the Oklahoma process because (in
his view) it had not adhered to Oklahoma’s own rules governing attorney discipline. Id. He
brought state-law claims for (among other things) abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress; he brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of due process and equal protection. Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 605. The district court
dismissed his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604, 607-08.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that federal district courts may not exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Breck v. Doyle, 2014 WL
4810301, *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 26, 2014). The doctrine governs “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 606 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Bk. Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280
(2005)). “Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to
review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by
ORDER — No. 3:16-cv-04976-LB)

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filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Mothershed,
410 F.3d at 606. The Feldman case itself involved lawyers challenging bar-admission rules and
yielded this more specific expression of the doctrine, which is useful here:

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[O]rders of a state court relating to the admission, discipline, and
disbarment of members of its bar may be reviewed only by the
Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari to the state court,
and not by means of an original action in a lower federal court.

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Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n. 16 (quoted in Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607).

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The doctrine does not bar district courts from hearing “general challenges to state bar rules,”
such as those questioning the “general constitutionality” of such rules, so long as the suit does not

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— like Ms. Van Dusen’s — “require review of a final court judgment in a particular case.” Id. at

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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606-07 (quoting in part Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). Under Rooker-Feldman, the Ninth Circuit

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decided: “The district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

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Mothershed’s § 1983 and state law tort claims . . . .” Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 608. It accordingly

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affirmed their dismissal. Id. at 607-08; see also Craig v. State Bar of California, 141 F.3d 1353

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(9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (dismissing lawyer’s § 1983 claim against bar association under

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Rooker-Feldman); Breck v. Doyle, 2014 WL 4810301 at *1-*4 (discussing Rooker-Feldman in

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connection with challenge to bar disciplinary action).

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The complaint alleges that the Rooker-Feldman rule does not bar this lawsuit because the state

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bar proceedings do not address the issues in the complaint.6 But, at its core, the complaint

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challenges the interim suspension. Mothershed thus controls the outcome here. Ms. Van Dusen

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may not “collaterally attack state bar disciplinary proceedings in federal court.” See Mothershed,

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410 F.3d at 604. The court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Van Dusen’s complaint

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under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 604-07.

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Moreover, to the extent that there is any argument that Ms. Van Dusen raises a general

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challenge to state-bar practices that does not require review of the interim suspension, Younger

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abstention bars the court from addressing the issue. Absent extraordinary circumstances,

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Id. ¶ 3.

ORDER — No. 3:16-cv-04976-LB)

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