Van Dusen v. Purcell et al

Filing 33

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Adopting 30 Report and Recommendation to Dismiss. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/1/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAN VAN DUSEN,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 16-cv-04976-EMC
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS

v.
CATHERINE D. PURCELL, et al.,

Docket No. 30

Defendants.

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Pending before the Court is Judge Beeler’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) to

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dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Docket No. 30. Pro se Plaintiff Jan

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Van Dusen filed a timely objection to the R&R on March 25, 2019. Docket No. 32 (“Objection”).

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For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Judge Beeler’s report is well reasoned and that

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the objection thereto is without merit for the reason stated in the R&R and those stated below.

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Ms. Van Dusen, a lawyer, brought this lawsuit challenging the decision of the State Bar of

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California to suspend her license to practice law as a result of her conviction for animal cruelty.

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See Docket No. 29 (“Am. Compl.”). The R&R recommended dismissal of the complaint without

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leave to amend because under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a “plaintiff cannot collaterally attack

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the state-bar disciplinary actions in federal court.” R&R at 2 (citing Mothershed v. Justices of

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Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 2005)). As the United States Supreme Court and the

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Ninth Circuit have explained:

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United States district courts . . . have subject-matter jurisdiction over
general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in
nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final
state-court judgment in a particular case. They do not have
jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state-court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those
challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.

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Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 606–07 (quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486

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(1983)). Judge Beeler observed that although Ms. Van Dusen’s complaint appeared to raise

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claims regarding general deficiencies in state-bar practices, “at its core, the complaint challenges

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the interim suspension” ordered against her. Docket No. 14 at 4. Accordingly, the court lacked

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subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Id.

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In her objection, Ms. Van Dusen concedes that “portions of my prayer requesting [relief]

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for myself personally violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Id. at 2. However, she contends

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that her complaint also raises a general challenge to state-bar practices, and therefore asks the

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Court to allow her to amend the complaint to focus solely on the general challenge while

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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removing any claims based on her particular case. Id. at 3.
Ms. Van Dusen is correct that if she were to amend the complaint to raise only a general

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challenge to state-bar practices, her claim would not be foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine. See Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607 (“[A] general attack on a [state bar’s] rules may be

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heard by lower federal courts.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, amendment would be futile

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because of the Younger doctrine. Under that doctrine, “abstention in favor of state judicial

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proceedings is required if the state proceedings (1) are on-going, (2) implicate important state

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interests, and (3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Hirsh v.

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Justices of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995). Judge Beeler has explained that

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Younger abstention bars consideration of Ms. Van Dusen’s general challenge here because all

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three factors are present: Ms. Van Dusen’s attorney disciplinary proceedings are ongoing, those

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proceedings implicate important state interests, and she has an adequate opportunity to address her

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federal constitutional claims in her state court proceedings. Docket No. 14 at 5.

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Ms. Van Dusen objects that Younger abstention does not apply here because the State Bar

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has already rendered a final decision to suspend her, so her state proceedings are no longer

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“ongoing.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 4. This argument misapprehends the law. “Younger abstention

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requires that the federal courts abstain when state court proceedings were ongoing at the time the

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federal action was filed.” Beltran v. State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis

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added); Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843, 850 (9th Cir. 2002); see 17B Charles Alan
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Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4253 (3d ed. 2007) (“Younger v. Harris and its

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companion cases went to great pains to make it clear that the rules there laid down applied only if

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there was a prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding was begun.”).

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Because Ms. Van Dusen’s disciplinary proceedings were still pending when this federal suit was

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filed in 2016, Younger abstention applies to bar her claims even though the proceedings have now

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concluded.

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Also unavailing is Ms. Van Dusen’s assertion that she did not or will not have an adequate

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opportunity to litigate her federal claims in state court. She believes that she will not have the

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benefit of an impartial forum in state court “because the California Supreme Court is a real party
in interest in any complaint against the State Bar of California.” Objection at 4. To be sure,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Younger “abstention is inappropriate in the ‘extraordinary circumstance’ that the state tribunal is

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incompetent by reason of bias.” Hirsch, 67 F.3d at 713 (citation omitted). But “one who alleges

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bias must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Id.

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(quoting Nenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)). Ms. Van Dusen has not

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alleged any facts to overcome that presumption. See Allegrino v. State of California, No. C06-

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05490 MJJ, 2007 WL 1450312, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2007) (holding that a “Plaintiff’s

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threadbare allegations regarding bias of the State Bar Court judges, even if true, would be

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insufficient to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity” for the purposes of establishing

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an “extraordinary circumstance” precluding Younger abstention). Accordingly, this Court is

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required to abstain from reviewing her claims, even if they are general challenges to state-bar

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practices.

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The Court therefore OVERRULES Ms. Van Dusen’s objection, and adopts Judge Beeler’s

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R&R as the order of the Court. The action is hereby DISMISSED without leave to amend. This

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order disposes of Docket No. 30. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 1, 2019
______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge
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