Condry v UnitedHealth Group Inc.,et.al

Filing 259

ORDER by Judge Vince Chhabria denying 221 Motion to Intervene. (vclc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/19/2019)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RACHEL CONDRY, et al.,

Case No. 17-cv-00183-VC

Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
INTERVENE

v.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 221

Defendants.

In early 2017, six named plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against United Healthcare,
seeking to represent a nationwide class. The named plaintiffs sought retrospective as well as
prospective relief on behalf of themselves and the class. Relatively early in the case, the Court
expressed concerns to plaintiffs’ counsel about whether any of the named plaintiffs had standing
to seek prospective relief. Even if the Court hadn’t expressed these concerns, they should have
been obvious in light of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and the many subsequent
cases applying it. Nonetheless, during the period when the Court was considering cross-motions
for summary judgment as to the named plaintiffs, counsel did not seek to add a named plaintiff
qualified to seek prospective relief. After the summary judgment ruling, further discovery took
place, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, seeking certification of classes to
obtain both retrospective and prospective relief. Again, counsel did not seek to add a named
plaintiff qualified to seek prospective relief during this period. The Court denied the motion for
class certification, identifying numerous problems with it (including but not limited to the fact
that none of the named plaintiffs had standing to seek prospective relief). Denial was without
prejudice to seeking certification of a narrower class on a stronger evidentiary presentation. A

further period of discovery ensued, during which time counsel still did not seek to add a named
plaintiff qualified to seek prospective relief. More than three months later, the plaintiffs filed a
renewed motion for class certification. Along with that, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to
intervene on behalf of Teresa Harris, for the purpose of adding a plaintiff who had standing to
seek prospective relief. But the proposed complaint-in-intervention does not allege facts that
would give Harris standing to seek prospective relief. Although she alleges that she was
improperly denied coverage for out-of-network lactation services and that she continues to be a
United Healthcare plan participant, she includes no allegations about the likelihood that she will
need lactation services in the future. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (“Lyons' standing to seek the
injunction requested depended on whether he was likely to suffer future injury . . . .”).
Given this history, it would be unfairly prejudicial to United Healthcare to grant Harris’s
motion to intervene. In a case that is finally nearing its end, adding Harris would result in at least
one more motion to dismiss for lack of standing, which would need to be granted. And if Harris
were able to cure the defects in her proposed complaint, yet another discovery period would
ensue, presumably followed by another motion for summary judgment, presumably followed by
yet another motion for certification of a prospective relief class. In contrast, denial of the motion
does not prejudice Harris, because she is free to file a separate suit against United Healthcare
seeking both retrospective relief and, if she can ultimately allege the facts necessary to establish
standing, prospective relief. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(3); Rule 24(a)(2)
(intervention as of right available when motion is timely and “disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest”).
Accordingly, the motion to intervene is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 19, 2019
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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