Raig Chaquico v. David Freiberg et al

Filing 20

ORDER re 16 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal. Signed by Judge Maria-Elena James on 8/4/2017. (mejlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/4/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CRAIG CHAQUICO,

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Case No. 17-cv-02423-MEJ

Plaintiff,
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ORDER RE: ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL

v.
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DAVID FREIBERG, et al.,

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Re: Dkt. No. 16

Defendants.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff Craig Chaquico moves to file under seal a 1993 Settlement Agreement (the “1993

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Agreement”), which he submitted in connection with his Opposition to Defendants‟1 Motion to

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Dismiss. Mot., Dkt. No. 16; Dkt. No. 16-4, Ex. A (1993 Agreement). Having considered

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Plaintiff‟s argument and the relevant legal authority, the Court issues the following Order.
LEGAL STANDARD

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There is a “strong presumption in favor of access” by the public to judicial records and

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documents accompanying dispositive motions. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d

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1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135

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(9th Cir. 2003)). To seal judicial records relating to motions that are “more than tangentially

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related to the merits of a case,” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1098

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(9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. FCA U.S. LLC v. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016), a

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party must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings,” Kamakana, 447

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F.3d at 1178 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, such showing is required

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Defendants are David Freiberg, Donny Baldwin, Chris Smith, Jude Gold, and Catherine
Richardson.

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even where “the [] motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective

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order.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.

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The strong presumption of public access to judicial documents applies to such motions

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because the resolution of a dispute on the merits is at the heart of the interest in ensuring that the

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public understands the judicial process. Id. The presumption does not apply in the same way to

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motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the merits of a case.” Center for Auto

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Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. With such motions, “the usual presumption of the public‟s right of

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access is rebutted.” Id. at 1179 (citing Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th

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Cir. 2002). A party seeking to seal documents attached to such motions nevertheless must meet
the lower “good cause” standard under Rule 26(c). Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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678 (9th Cir. 2010). This requires the party to make a “particularized showing” that “specific

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prejudice or harm” will result if the information is disclosed. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. “Broad

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allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy

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the Rule 26(c) test.” In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th

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Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and edits omitted).
DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff applies the good cause standard to the Settlement Agreement. Mot. at 1; Swift

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Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 16-1. As noted, Plaintiff submits the Settlement Agreement in connection with

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his Opposition to Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss. “Motions to dismiss are typically treated as

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dispositive motions and are more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.”

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Garrison v. Oracle Corp., 2016 WL 7042988, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2016). Because the

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Motion to Seal relates to a Motion to Dismiss, the Court applies the compelling reasons standard

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to Plaintiff‟s Motion to Seal. See Space Data Corp. v. X, 2017 WL 2118299, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

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May 16, 2017) (applying compelling reasons standard to sealing motion relating to motion to

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dismiss).

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Trial courts have the authority to grant protective orders to protect confidential settlement

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agreements. See Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1212 (noting that “courts have granted protective orders to

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protect confidential settlement agreements.”). But to do so, a court must “identify and discuss the
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factors it considered in its „good cause‟ examination[,]” considering whether particularized harm

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will result from disclosure of information to the public, and then balancing the public and private

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interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary. Id. at 1211–12.

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Counsel for Plaintiff David Swift declares “[g]ood cause exists to file the 1993 Settlement
Agreement . . . under seal because the 1993 Agreement contains a confidentiality provision.”

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Swift Decl. ¶ 2 (citing 1993 Agreement ¶ 4). “[A] settlement agreement cannot be sealed simply

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because the parties agreed to keep its terms confidential[.]” UCP Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Balsam Brands

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Inc., 2017 WL 1861851, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2017); see Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1

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Institutional Inv. Dealer, 2013 WL 636028, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) (“The existence of a

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confidentiality provision, without more, does not constitute good cause, „let alone a compelling

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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reason,‟ to seal.” (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136)); Select Portfolio Servicing v. Valentino, 2013

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WL 1800039, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013) (denying motion to seal settlement agreement where

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the “motion . . . is supported by a sole declaration, which only asserts that the material should be

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sealed because the parties agreed among themselves to make the settlement agreement

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confidential. This is insufficient. . . . [Movants] have not even made a showing that some specific

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harm or prejudice will result from its publication. . . . That they agreed among themselves to keep

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the settlement details private, without more, is no reason to shield the information from other non-

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settling parties to the case or the public at large.”); Civ. L.R. 79-5(d) (“Reference to a stipulation

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or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not

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sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.”). Plaintiff fails to show

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any specific harm or prejudice will result if the 1993 Agreement is filed publicly. Plaintiff‟s

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generalized claim of harm or prejudice is brought into question by the fact Plaintiff himself quotes

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portions of the 1993 Agreement in his publicly-filed Opposition. See Opp‟n at 9, Dkt. No. 17.

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Plaintiff does not request to redact this information in the Opposition. See Mot. Given that parts

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of the 1993 Agreement are already in the public docket, the Court sees no reason to seal this

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document in its entirety now.

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Nonetheless, within four days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an additional

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declaration to conform with Civil Local Rule 79-5. If Plaintiff fails to do so, his Motion will be

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denied. Plaintiff‟s declaration may not exceed five pages.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 4, 2017
______________________________________
MARIA-ELENA JAMES
United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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