Bidwal v. Unifund CCR Partners et al

Filing 138

ORDER granting 112 Motion for Attorney Fees.In the attached order, the court reduces hourly rates, reduces the overall hours, and awards attorney's fees of $95,275.00 and costs of $2,267.48. (Beeler, Laurel) (Filed on 8/27/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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San Francisco Division

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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JAGDEEP S. BIDWAL

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Plaintiff.

Case No. 3:17-cv-02699-LB

v.

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UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS; UNIFUND
PORTFOLIO A, LLC; MATTHEW W.
QUALL; LANG, RICHERT & PATCH, A
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION;
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
PROCESSING, INC.; JULIO ASCORRA.

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ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO STRIKE
Re: ECF No. 112

Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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The plaintiff defaulted on a credit-card debt to Citibank and sued the defendants — who

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assumed the debt — based on their allegedly illegal attempts to collect the debt (allegedly by

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fraudulent service and an invalid default judgment and writ of execution), in violation of the

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federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt

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Collection Practices Act.1 By September 2018, the parties settled the case for $24,500, stipulated

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Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 6–8 (¶¶ 33, 39–43). Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File
(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF–generated page numbers at the top of documents.

ORDER – No. 3:17-cv-02699-LB 

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that the plaintiff was the prevailing party, and agreed that the court would decide a fees motion.2

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The plaintiff asked for fees of $381,615 (for 288.6 hours worked by three attorneys for a total of

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$190,807.50 plus a 2.0 multiplier) and costs of $2,267.48.3 The defendants challenge the fees as

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unreasonable but do not challenge costs.4 The court awards $95,275 in reasonable fees and

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$2,267.48 in costs.

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STATEMENT

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1. Facts Underlying the Complaint
The defendants are as follows. Unifund is a debt-collection agency, its collection lawyers are

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Quall Cardot and Lang Richert & Patch, and the lawyers’ process servers are EDP, Williams, and

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Ascorra.5
The plaintiff defaulted on his credit-card debt to Citibank, which wrote off the balance of

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$3,665.01 in September 2008 and sold the debt to Unifund in 2010.6 The plaintiff’s address on the

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account was 4631 Kester Avenue, Apartment 103, Sherman Oaks, California.7 The plaintiff

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alleges that he moved from the Kester address to the Bay Area at around the time of default, but he

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never gave Citibank notice that he moved, which meant that the Kester address remained his

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account address.8 On July 6, 2010, Unifund sent a collection letter to the plaintiff at his new

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address in Union City.9

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Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 6.

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Reply – ECF No. 123 at 2.

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Opp. – ECF No. 120.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 2–3 (¶¶ 4–12); Mot. to File Second Amended Complaint – ECF No. 94 at 2–3.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 4 (¶ 14).

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Citibank Statements, Ex. A to Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1 at 17.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 4–5 (¶¶ 18–20); Citibank Statements, Ex. A to Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1
at 17.

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Unifund Letter, Ex. 5 to Trueblood Dec. – ECF No. 113-5 at 1.

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Unifund referred the case to its attorneys, Lang Richert & Patch, for collection. On September

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7, 2010, the firm sent a collection letter to the Kester address.10 It was not returned

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undeliverable.11

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In November 2010, Unifund sued the plaintiff in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Mr.

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Quall was counsel of record.12 On December 6, 2010, Lang Richert’s process server EDP tried

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unsuccessfully to serve the plaintiff at the Kester address.13 EDP’s “Declaration re Diligence”

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states that service was unsuccessful because “subject not at this address” and “there are new

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tenants living at the given apt number.”14
The defendants engaged in the following efforts to confirm the plaintiff’s address.

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In December 2010, Lang Richert submitted a request to the Sherman Oaks Postmaster to

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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determine whether the plaintiff submitted a change-of-address form, and the Postmaster responded

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that there was no change-of-address order on file.15 EDP thereafter made three attempts to serve

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the plaintiff at the Kester address and then, on June 12, 2011, served the plaintiff by substitute

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service at the Kester address by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the occupant

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and mailed a copy to the address.16
On October 13, 2011, the state clerk of court entered default judgment against the plaintiff and

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in favor of Unifund in the amount of $3,665.01, $1,116.57 in accrued interest, and $303.00 in

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costs for a total of $5,084.58.17

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Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1 at 5 (¶ 8); Letter, Ex. B to Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1 at 13.

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Letter, Ex. B to Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1 at 13.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 4 (¶ 17); Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 8; Declaration re Diligence, Ex. 4 to
Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113-4 at 1.
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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 4 (¶ 18); Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 8.

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Declaration re Diligence, Ex. 4 to Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113-4 at 1.

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Request for Change of Address, Ex. D to Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120-1 at 88.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 4 (¶ 19); Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 9.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 5 (¶ 21); Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 9.

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In May 2012, the collection lawyers’ skip tracing showed that the plaintiff lived in San

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Ramon.18 The state-court files show that the defendants continued serving the plaintiff at the

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Kester address, including an October 2012 memorandum of costs, a March 18, 2013 bank levy,

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and a January 2015 change of address.19
On October 19, 2016, the collection lawyer levied the plaintiff’s bank accounts in Northern

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California in the amount of $4,594.41.20 The plaintiff called Quall Cardot, said that he had not

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been served, and provided proof of his address in 2010 including his Homeland Security

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documents and his marriage certificate.21
In February 2017, Unifund stipulated to set aside the default judgment.22

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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2. Relevant Procedural and Settlement History
The plaintiff filed his initial complaint in May 2017.23 According to Plaintiff’s counsel, they

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offered early to settle for $17,000 cash plus $7,500 in value for dismissal of the state case.

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(Ultimately, 18 months into the case, the federal case settled for $24,500 plus attorney’s fees and

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costs.24) The timeline after the filing of the complaint is as follows:

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June 5, 2017:

Plaintiff offers $36,322.33 to settle case (inclusive of $12,233 in
fees).25

June–August 2017:

Rule 26(f) conference and report, discuss ADR options26

August 2017:

First Amended Complaint27

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Skip Trace, Ex. 6 to Trueblood Dec. – ECF No. 113-6 at 1.

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Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113 at 10 (¶ 18).

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Debt Collection Records, Ex. 6 to Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113-6 at 3–4.

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Id. at 3–4; Collection Notes – ECF No. 113-7 at 1.

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FAC – ECF No. 25 at 6 (¶ 28); Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 4.

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Compl. – ECF No. 1.

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Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 4.

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Settlement Proposal, Ex. 8 to Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113-8 at 2 (included dismissal of state
case).

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ADR Certification – ECF No. 18; Joint Case Management Statement – ECF No. 19.

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FAC – ECF No. 25.

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September 2017:

Answer from Lang, Richert, & Patch; Quall/Unifund serve initial
disclosures; Draft Motion to Strike shared with defendants28

October 2017:

Amended Answer from EDP et al29

December 2017:

EDP offers to settle for $5,000 (inclusive of fees/costs)30

January 2018:

Plaintiff counters with $17,000 plus fees and costs31

January 2018

Unifund/Quall demand dismissal of case32

February 2018:

Initial case-management conference33

March-April 2018

Unifund/Quall ask to excuse client reps from attending mediation;
court orders attendance34

April 2018

EDP initial disclosures35

April 23, 2018

Unifund/Quall asks for updated demand; plaintiff offers $18,000 for
Unifund/Quall or $24,000 global, plus fees/costs36

May 2018

Settlement talks with Unifund in-house counsel37

June 14, 2018

Mediation; process servers are no shows; defendants serve plaintiff
with state court complaint38

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June 26, 2018

Plaintiff offers $20,000 plus dismissal of state case plus fees/costs39

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July 2018

Settlement offers from defendants of $10,000 and later $12,000 plus
fees/costs (but no dismissal of state case); plaintiff counters with
$20,000 plus dismissal plus fees/costs40

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Answer – ECF No. 31; Billing Records – ECF No. 112-3 at entry 9/11/17.

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Amended Answer – ECF No. 41.

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Settlement Emails – ECF No. 113-9 at 1–2.

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Settlement Emails – ECF No. 113-10 at 1–2.

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Defense Letter – ECF No. 113-11 at 1–4.

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Case-Management and Pretrial Order – ECF No. 51.

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Minute Entry – ECF No. 50; Order – ECF No. 57 at 1.

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Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 5.

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Id. at 4–5.

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Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113 at 11 (¶ 25).

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Id. at 11–12 (¶ 26).

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Settlement Emails – ECF No. 113-12 at 1.

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Settlement Emails – ECF No. 113-13 at 1–6.

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July 2018

Parties dispute whether federal case should be stayed; plaintiff files
second amended complaint; plaintiff settles with defendant Williams
(the process server) for $1,00042

September 14, 2018:

Case settles for remaining defendants for $24,500 ($16,000 in cash
from Unifund/Quall, $1,000 from Williams, dismissal of the state
case (a $7,500 value) with the court to determine fees and costs43

Fall 2018:

Finalize Written Settlement Agreement44

December 28, 2018

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Plaintiff responds to “extensive” discovery41

August 2018

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Stipulated Dismissal45

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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At the initial case-management conference in February 2018, the court limited discovery to
documents to keep costs low. 46 After the court referred the case for a settlement conference, the
parties disputed whether the stay remained in place, and the court ordered them to file a discovery
plan, reminding them that they should keep costs low.47 On July 30, 2018, the parties reported the
following: (1) the plaintiff wanted to stay the federal case and favored staying discovery; (2) the
plaintiff and the defendants propounded interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for
production of documents; and (3) the defendants noticed depositions of plaintiff’s wife, mother,
and father, all in Southern California (despite their living in the Bay Area).48 On August 2, 2018,
the court ordered the parties to file a briefing schedule for the motion to stay within seven days.49
The plaintiff decided not to file the motion.50 At Unifund’s request, on August 16, 2018 at a casemanagement conference, the court ordered the plaintiff to respond to the defendants’ 18 requests
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Billing Records – ECF No. 112-3 at 16–18; Billing Records – ECF No. 113-2 at 7–8.

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Joint Discovery Plan – ECF No. 84 at 2, 9; Williams Release – ECF No. 113-14 at 1–3.

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Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 7; Settlement Emails – ECF No. 113-5 at 1–5; Notice of Settlement – ECF
No. 101 at 2.

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Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 7.

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Dismissal – ECF No. 111.

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Case-Management and Pretrial Order – ECF No. 51 at 1, 3.

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Orders – ECF Nos. 78, 79.

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Case-Management Statement – ECF No. 84 at 2–9.

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Minute Entry – ECF No. 87.

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Plaintiff Status Report – ECF No. 88 at 2.

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Total

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Plus 2.0 Multiplier

$ 381,615.00

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Expenses

$

288.6

$ 190,807.50

2,267.48

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4. Parties’ Declarations Regarding Fees
4.1

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Mr. O’Connor is an attorney with forty-seven years of legal experience and has been an

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attorney’s-fee expert approximately 150 times.79 He worked at several private firms in the Bay

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Area and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San Francisco before opening his own firm, which

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specializes in business and tort litigation and expert work on attorney’s-fee analysis.80 Mr.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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O’Connor has been involved in legal fee-review cases since 1977 and developed his expertise in

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the area via work involving legal auditing and consulting.81 He is a member and lecturer at the

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National Association of Legal Fee Analysis, which is an organization dedicated to continuing

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education and the development of legal-fee-billing standards.82

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John D. O’Connor — Plaintiff

When he worked as a special counsel and director from 2001 to 2006 at the law firm Howard

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Rice, Mr. O’Connor kept informed about the rates of both AmLaw 500 firms and smaller business

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firms in order to set the annual rates of the firm.83 The firm did work throughout California, their

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surveys included rates from the northern and southern parts of the state, and in his experience, “the

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rate structure of the San Francisco Bay Area is virtually identical to that in the greater Los Angeles

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area.”84 He opines on fees in this case based on his litigation, firm, and fee-expert experience.85

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79

O’Connor Decl. – ECF No. 112–1 at 2 (¶ 1).

80

Id. at 2–3 (¶¶ 4–11).

81

Id. at 4–5 (¶¶ 16–18).

82

Id. at 5 (¶ 18).

83

Id. (¶ 20).

84

Id.

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Id. at 7 (¶¶ 26–28).

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Mr. O’Connor opines that Mr. Trueblood’s rate of $725 an hour is reasonable based on the

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middle range of rates of AmLaw 500 firms practicing in San Francisco and Los Angeles as these

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rates are like those charged by reputable small and mid-sized firms.86 To support his opinion that

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Mr. Trueblood’s $725 hourly rate is reasonable, he notes that Los Angeles courts awarded Mr.

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Trueblood an hourly rate of $495 in 2009 and an arbitrator awarded him $675 per hour in 2017.87

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As to Mr. Stempler, Mr. O’Connor notes his experience, cites to decisions from court in Southern

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California, and states that eight to eleven years of fee increases since those cases equate to the

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requested rate of $600 per hour.88 In 2017, a court awarded Mr. Block $475 per hour and opines

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that an increase to $550 is reasonable given the legal market.89 Mr. O’Connor opines that the

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attorneys’ hours are reasonable.90
In response to the defendants’ motion to strike his opinion, Mr. O’Connor explains why two

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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courts in the Northern District rejected parts of his opinions about reasonable hourly rates.91 Both

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cases were unusual fee petitions in hotly contested litigation92 and do not affect the analysis here.

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4.2

Alexander Trueblood — Plaintiff

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Mr. Trueblood is the plaintiff’s counsel, is a consumer-law and class-action specialist, and has

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28 years of legal experience.93 He worked at several reputable firms before opening his own firm

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in 1999.94 Top partners at major firms billed at rates averaging $900 per hour in 2012 while

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average rates for partners in surveyed firms within major markets averaged rates of $700 per hour

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in the same year.95 Courts have approved his hourly rates of $650 to $700 in southern California in

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86

Id. at 7–8 (¶¶ 32–35).

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Id. at 8–9 (¶¶ 38–39).

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Id. at 9–10 (¶¶ 43–49).

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Id. at 10–11 (¶¶ 50–52).

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Id. at 11–12 (¶¶ 53–57).

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O’Connor Supp. Decl. – ECF No. 123–1 at 2 (¶ 1).

92

Id. (¶ 1)

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Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 113 at 2 (¶¶ 2–3).

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Id. at 2–3 (¶¶ 3–4).

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Id. at 6–7 (¶¶ 9–10).

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the following cases: Vitrano v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Case No. 2:13-cv-02492-AB-

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MRW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015) ($700 in a class-action settlement of a consumer-credit case

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involving violations of the UCL and the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act); Jimenez

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v. Alaska USA Fed. Credit Union, Case No. BC516470 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015) ($700 in a case

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involving violations of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act); Wickremaratne v.

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Gateway One Lending & Finance, Case No. BC493061 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015) ($700 in a class-

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action settlement involving violations of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act);

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Wimberly v. Triad Financial Corp., Case No. 30-2008-00059511 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013) ($700 in a

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class action settlement); Walker v. Westlake Financial, Case No. BC436725 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2012)
($675 in a class-action settlement involving violations of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Finance Act); Bruno v. Capital One, Case No. BC 397149 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2011) ($650 in a class-

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action settlement); Tan v. Wheels Financial Group, Inc., Alternative Resolution Centers, ARC

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Case No. 78M4930 ($675 in 2017 in an individual consumer-credit reporting ADR case).96 He

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also cites a Northern District case: Baker v. GEMB Lending, Inc., Case No. 10-cv-05261-SBA

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(N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) ($675 in an uncontested fees order in a class-action settlement of a case

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involving violations of the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act and the UCL).

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He turned down other work as a result of this case.97

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In a supplemental declaration, Mr. Trueblood said that he worked 30 hours on the reply brief,

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Mr. Stempler worked on it too, and he asks for 15 hours.98

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4.3

Robert Stempler — Plaintiff

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Mr. Stempler also is the plaintiff’s counsel and is a consumer-rights specialist with over

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twenty years of experience.99 He cites cases in southern California where courts awarded him

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between $240 and $350 per hour in 2006 to 2008: Amrbiz v. Arrow Fin. Services, LLC, 2008 WL

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2095617, Case No. 07-cv-5423-JFW (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) ($350 in an individual FDCPA

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96

Id. at 8–9 (¶ 11).

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Id. at 9 (¶¶ 12–13).

98

Trueblood Supp. Decl. – ECF No. 123–3 at 2 (¶ 3).

99

Stempler Decl. – ECF No. 112–2 at 2 (¶ 1).

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case); Miller v. Midland Funding, LLC, Case No. 07-cv-04869-ODW (C.D. Cal. April 29, 2008)

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($350 in an individual FDCPA case); and Harlow v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 2007 WL

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3165669, Case No. 07-cv-5045-ABC (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2007) ($300 in a case where the plaintiff

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filed a removal motion with no “objectively reasonable basis” and attorney’s fees were awarded as

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a result).100

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He turned down other cases to work on this one.101

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4.4

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Mr. Block also is the plaintiff’s counsel, has nearly twenty years of experience, and has

Brandon Block — Plaintiff

specialized in consumer-protection litigation since 2007.102 Based on personal inquiries, his rate of

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$550 per hour is below the billing rates of his contemporaries at other law firms engaged in similar

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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litigation, and he lists cases where southern California courts awarded him hourly rates from $375

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to $525 in 2007 to 2016: Miranda v. Simple Cash Loans, Inc., Case No. BC580634 (Cal. Sup. Ct.

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2016) ($525 in class-action settlement in case involving violations of California’s finance-lenders

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law); Vitrano v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Case No. 2:13-cv-02492-AB-MRW (C.D. Cal.

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Feb. 2, 2015) ($465–$490 in a class-action settlement of a consumer-credit case involving

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violations of the UCL and the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act); Travis v. Consumer

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Portfolio Services, Inc., Case No. 34-2012-00131362 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2012) ($425–$465 awarded in

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debt-collection-harassment case).103
He turned down work on other cases by taking this one.104

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Id. at 3–4 (¶¶ 9–12). In a 2010 case, according to Mr. O’Connor, the court awarded Mr. Stempler
$350 in a non-complex individual FDCPA case, which Mr. O’Connor says is equal to $600 today.
O’Connor Decl. – ECF No. 112-1 at ¶¶ 46–47.

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101

Stempler Decl. – ECF No. 112–2 at 4 (¶¶ 15–16).

102

Block Decl. – ECF No. 112–4 at 1–2 (¶¶ 1–3).

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103

Id. at 5–7 (¶¶ 3, 8–9). Mr. O’Connor notes that Mr. Block received a $425 hourly rate in 2017 in
Tan v. Wheels Financial Group, Inc., Alternative Resolution Centers, ARC Case No. 78M4930, which
he says equates to $550 today. O’Connor Decl. – ECF No. 112-1 at ¶ 52. The court was unable to
verify awards in some of the cases listed in Mr. Block’s declaration because he did not provide proper
citations with case numbers or copies of awards.

104

Id. at 5 (¶ 6).

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4.5

Tomio Narita — Defendant

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Mr. Narita is the defendant’s counsel, has twenty-seven years of experience, and spent the last

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twenty-three years almost exclusively defending creditors, collection agencies, and law firms in

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class and individual actions.105 He charged the defendants $435 to $450 per hour, which he

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believes is a reasonable rate for someone with his expertise in FDCPA cases, and his clients would

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not pay the plaintiff’s rates.106 He attached charts attacking the plaintiff’s counsel’s billings.107

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4.6

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Mr. Nimoy is the defendants’ counsel, has practiced law for twenty-four years, and frequently

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defends FDCPA cases.108 He bills his clients $250 per hour for FDCPA cases, and they would not

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Steven Nimoy — Defendant

pay more than $250 to $300 per hour, and he believes $300 is reasonable.109

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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4.7

June Coleman — Defendant

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Ms. Coleman is an attorney at Carlson & Messer, has twenty-one years of experience,

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practices extensively in FDCPA actions in the Northern District, and provides evidence of the

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market rate in the district.110 Her knowledge of the rates in the district is based on her own billing

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rates, discussions with client and others regarding rates paid to attorneys for similar work, and

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discussions with other attorneys about what they are paid.111 She bills her private clients no more

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than $300 per hour in cases like this, and her clients likely would not pay more than $250 to $300

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per hour.112 In a 2008 Northern District case, a court awarded $375 per hour, but that was a more

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complex case than this case.113

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105

Narita Decl. – ECF No. 120–1 at 2 (¶¶ 3–4).

106

Id. (¶ 2).

107

Id. at 6 (¶¶ 12–13).

108

Nimoy Decl. – ECF No. 120–5 at 2 (¶ 2).

109

Id. at 2–3 (¶¶ 3–5).

110

Coleman Decl. – ECF No. 120–2 at 2 (¶ 2).

111

Id. at 3 (¶ 5).

112

Id. at 3–4 (¶ 6).

113

Id. at 5 (¶ 11).

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4.8

Stephen Turner — Defendant

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Mr. Turner is a law-firm partner at Lewis Brisbois and chairs his firm’s Consumer Litigation

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Defense & Financial Services practice group.114 He has thirty-nine years of experience and

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provided information about the market rate in the Northern District.115 He bills his clients $425 per

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hour, his clients likely would not pay more than $375 for the services provided here, and he

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supports an hourly rate here of $425.116

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4.9

Mark Ellis — Defendant

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Mr. Ellis is an attorney at Ellis Law Group, has thirty-two years of experience, and regularly

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defends financial institutions in FDCPA cases.117 He bills his clients no more than $275 per hour
in FDCPA matters, which is a reasonable rate for attorneys with his experience in the Northern

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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District.118 His clients likely would pay no more than $275 to $300 per hour, but he believes $400

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to $500 per hour would be reasonable in this case.119

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4.10 Fred Schwinn — Plaintiff (on Reply)

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Mr. Schwinn is an attorney at Consumer Law Center, Inc., has twenty-two years of legal

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experience, and provides information about the market rate in the Northern District.120 His name is

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in the survey of fees attached to the defendants’ opposition. His current rate is $650 per hour, and

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courts in Santa Clara County, Santa Cruz County, San Francisco County, and San Mateo County

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have awarded him $600 per hour in 2018 and 2019.121

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114

Turner Decl. – ECF No. 120–3 at 1 (¶ 1).

115

Id. at 2 (¶ 2).

116

Id. at 3 (¶¶ 4–6).

117

Ellis Decl. – ECF No. 120–4 at 1–2 (¶ 2).

118

Id. at 2 (¶ 4).

119

Id. at 3 (¶¶ 5–6). In Mr. Trueblood’s supplemental declaration, he submits declarations from Ms.
Coleman, Mr. Turner, and Mr. Ellis about his rates in other cases. Trueblood Supp. Decl. – ECF No.
123–3 at 2–3 (¶¶ 4–7).

120

Schwinn Decl. – ECF No. 123–2 at 3 (¶¶ 4–5).

121

Id. at 10–11 (¶¶ 12–13).

28
14

1

4.11 Ronald Wilcox — Plaintiff (on Reply)

2

Mr. Wilcox is a consumer-protection attorney at Wilcox Law Firm, P.C., has been practicing

3

since 1995, and is mentioned in the defendants’ fees survey, and a court in the Northern District

4

has awarded him an hourly rate of $400.122 See Garcia v. Resurgent Capital Servs, L.P., No. C-11-

5

1253 EMC, 2012 WL 3778852 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012) (Rosenthal/FDCPA case).

6
ANALYSIS

7

The plaintiff asks for $190,807.50 based on 288.6 hours billed and asks for a 2.0 multiplier,

9

resulting in a total fee request of $381,615. The defendants challenge the billing rates, the hours

10

billed, and the 2.0 multiplier.123 The court reduces the hourly rates, reduces the hours, does not

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

apply a multiplier, and awards $95,275 in fees and $2,267.48 in costs.

12

A debt collector who violates the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act is liable for costs and

13

reasonable attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 & 1788.30(c).

14

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff is the prevailing party, and the

15

defendants will pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.124
The fees analysis for the federal and state statutes begins with the lodestar. The “lodestar” is

16
17

calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

18

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559 (1992).

19

California also utilizes the lodestar method in determining a fee award. Chavez v. City of Los

20

Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970, 985 (2010); see also Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Watkins, 36 Cal. App. 5th

21

1070, 1100–01 (2019) (applying the lodestar to a Rosenthal Act case).125

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

122

Reply – ECF No. 123 at 4.

123

Opp. – ECF No. 120.

124

Settlement Agreement – ECF No. 113–3 at 2–3.

125

Under the federal and state standards, the court can adjust the “presumptively reasonable” lodestar
based on factors such as the novelty and difficulty of the case, counsel’s skill, and other factors that are
not part of the lodestar calculation. Kerr v. Screen Extra Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir.
1993); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48–49 (1977). This is a run-of-the-mill debt-collection case
that does not merit a multiplier.

15

1

1. Hourly Rates
The plaintiff asks for the following hourly rates: $725 for Mr. Trueblood, $600 for Mr.

2
3

Stempler, and $550 for Mr. Block. The defendants counter that the rates “should be awarded in the

4

range of $350 per hour” and that −− while Mr. Block should not receive any compensation at all

5

−− any award would be at “an hourly rate commensurate with other junior attorneys practicing in

6

the Northern District.”126 The court awards $475 for Mr. Trueblood, $375 for Mr. Stempler, and

7

$325 for Mr. Block.
The district court determines a reasonable hourly rate based on the “experience, skill, and

9

reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210

10

(9th Cir. 1986). This task is “inherently difficult.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

To assist with the determination the court looks to “the rate prevailing in the community for

12

similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers,

13

796 F.3d at 1210-11. This community is typically that in which the district court sits. Schwarz v.

14

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). The burden is on the fee

15

applicant to show his or her fee is in line with prevailing market rates. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11.

16

“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the

17

community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the

18

plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of

19

Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d

20

1207, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1998) (declarations by attorneys regarding the prevailing market rate in

21

the community may be enough to establish a reasonable rate in the market). In some cases, the

22

court may look outside of the forum community for rates if local counsel is unavailable “either

23

because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience,

24

expertise, or specialization required to handle properly the case.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d

25

1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting the reasoning of other circuit courts for considering out of

26

district rates).

27
28

126

Opp. − ECF No. 120 at 20 & n.13.

16

In awarding fees, the court considers fee awards in similar cases involving similar work by

1
2

comparable attorneys in the Northern District of California.
The defendants cite FDCPA cases in the Northern District where courts have awarded hourly

3
4

rates ranging from $250 to $600.127 See Forto v. Capital One Bank, N.A., No. 14-cv-05611-JD

5

(MEJ), 2017 WL 4168529 (N.D. Cal Sept. 20, 2017) (hourly rate of $250 and $200 respectively to

6

defense partner with 12 years’ experience and an experienced associate in a simple

7

FDCPA/Rosenthal case involving a debt of approximately $3,000 where the plaintiff acted in bad

8

faith and sought to harass the defendant; required the defendants to submit billing records);

9

Jacobson v. Persolve, LLC, No. 14-cv-00735-LHK, 2016 WL 7230873 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016)
(hourly rates of $500 for attorney with 19 years’ experience and $600 for an attorney with 40

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

years’ experience in putative FDCPA and Rosenthal class action); Ng v. US Bank, N.A., No. 15-

12

cv-04998-KAW, 2016 WL 7157760 (N.D. Cal Dec. 8, 2016) ($300 hourly rate to attorney with 20

13

years’ experience in a case alleging wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent concealment, and violations

14

of the FDCPA, Truth in Lending Act, and UCL); Alvarado v. Hovg, LLC, No. 14-cv-02549-HSG,

15

2016 WL 5462429 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (hourly rates of $450 and $400 in putative class

16

action where the plaintiff settled for $43,000 for alleged TCPA and FDCPA violations); Jiang v.

17

New Millennium Concepts, Inc., No. 15-cv-04722-JST, 2016 WL 3682474 (N.D. Cal. July 11,

18

2016) (hourly rate of $500 to experienced plaintiff’s attorney where the court entered a default

19

judgment of $10,462.90 against the defendant for non-complex FDCPA and Rosenthal violations);

20

Price-Pauline v. Performant Recovery, Inc., No. 14-cv-00850-JD, 2016 WL 310268 (N.D. Cal.

21

Jan. 26, 2016) (hourly rate of $600 to attorney with 28 years’ experience, $500 to attorney with 20

22

years’ experience, and $375 to attorney with six years’ experience in case alleging violations of

23

the FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, and California UCL where the plaintiff recovered $12,500); Martell v.

24

Baker, No. 14-cv-04723-BLF, 2015 WL 3920056 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015) (hourly rate of $500

25

to attorney with 18 years’ experience in a non-complex FDCPA/Rosenthal case); Garcia v.

26

Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., 2012 WL 3778852 (hourly rate of $400 to an attorney with 18

27
28

127

Id. at 22–23.

17

1

years’ experience in an individual FDCPA case that settled on the eve of trial); see also Garcia v.

2

Stanley, No. 14-cv-01806-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32550 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017) (hourly

3

rates of $500 and $400 for co-counsel who had 19 and nine years’ experience respectively in a

4

non-complex FDCPA/Rosenthal case).128
The court’s research revealed the following additional cases: Reenders v. Premier Recovery

5
6

Grp., No. 18-cv-07761-PJH (JSC), 2019 WL 2583595 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2019) (hourly rate of

7

$225 to attorney with two years’ experience in a simple FDCPA case); Schuchardt v. Law Office

8

of Rory W. Clark, No. 15-cv-01329-JSC, 314 F.R.D. 673, 689 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2016) (hourly

9

rate of $350 for a senior associate and $400 for other experienced attorneys in a FDCPA class
action settlement); Evans v. Creditor’s Specialty Service, Inc., No. 15-cv-03355-BLF, 2016 WL

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

730277 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016) (hourly rate of $320 for attorney with almost 8 years’

12

experience in a simple FDCPA case); De Amaral v. Goldsmith & Hull, No. 12-cv-03580-WHO,

13

2014 WL 1309954 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (hourly rates of $450 and $350 to experienced

14

FDCPA attorneys in non-complex case where attorneys showed similar past awards in the

15

district).

16

Applying these cases to this straightforward debt-collection case, the court sets Mr.

17

Trueblood’s reasonable hourly rate at $475 for the following reasons, among others.129
First, as illustrated above, it is consistent with fee awards in this district in similar non-

18
19

complex cases to attorneys of similar experience and expertise.
Second, while rates for defense attorneys are somewhat informative, they are not rates for

20
21

plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Santiago v. Equable Ascent Fin., No. C-11-3158-CRB, 2013 WL

22

3498079, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (while the court “does not doubt that the statements by

23

these attorneys reflect their clients’ preferences, they have not addressed the reasonable assertion

24

made by [the plaintiff] that the market for lawyers who represent plaintiffs in consumer actions,

25

and often work on a contingency basis, demand a higher rate than what is appropriate for defense

26
27
28

128

Id.

129

Ellis Decl. – ECF No. 120-4 at 2–3 (¶¶ 4–6) (hourly rate is $400 to $500 is reasonable; he bills no
more than $275 per hour for his FDCPA cases)

18

1

attorneys.”) (emphasis in the original); see also Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin’l, Inc., 523 F.3d 973,

2

981 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In order to encourage able counsel to undertake FDCPA cases, as Congress

3

intended, it is necessary that counsel be awarded fees commensurate with those which they could

4

obtain by taking other types of cases.”).
Third, despite the expert declaration that hourly rates in northern and southern California are

5
6

the same, Mr. Trueblood has not cited cases in this district except for an uncontested fees order in

7

a class-action settlement, which is a different type of case. Moreover, the general proposition that

8

rates are the same in law firms is unremarkable and not obviously applicable to non-complex

9

FDCPA cases (or cases of similar complexity) presumably taken on a contingency basis.
Fourth, when a plaintiff fails to meet its burden, the district court may place significant weight

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

on its own knowledge of attorney’s fees in the relevant community. Ingram v. Oroudjiani, 647

12

F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). Given the cases and plaintiffs-side lawyers’ declarations, and the

13

court’s own knowledge of fee awards in equivalent cases, see Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981, $475 is

14

on the high side for this kind of case. (A higher hourly rate might be justifiable in a more complex

15

case.)
Applying the analysis to Mr. Stempler and Mr. Block results in hourly rates of $375 and $325,

16
17

respectively.

18
19

2. Hours

20

The plaintiff seeks a fee award for 288.6 hours for work by three attorneys.130 The defendants

21

conducted a line-by-line analysis of the billing record and suggest that approximately 96.67 hours

22

are reasonable for a total fee award of $33,834.131 Given the straightforward nature of the case, the

23

court’s restricting discovery until August 2018, and a settlement of the case with no dispositive

24
25
26
27

130

Mot. – ECF No. 112 at 14 (273.6 hours plus 15 hours for the reply brief).

131

Exs. C & D to Narita Decl. − ECF Nos. 120-1 at 89−171; Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 26.

28
19

1

motions or equivalent work,132 the court finds that the following hours are reasonable: 116.3

2

(Trueblood), 101.9 (Stempler), and 5.6 (Block).133
The fee-seeking party has the initial burden to prove the reasonableness of hours expended on

4

the case using detailed time records documenting completed tasks and time expended. Hensley v.

5

Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945−46

6

(9th Cir. 2007). The district court may reduce an award if the documentation is inadequate or if it

7

finds that some of the hours were not reasonably expended, such as those that are “excessive,

8

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433−34. The opposing party then has

9

the burden of challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged. Gates v.

10

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397−98 (9th Cir. 1992). This must be done by specifically

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

3

identifying defects or deficiencies in the requested hours with conclusory or unsubstantiated

12

objections being insufficient to warrant a reduction. Cancio v. Fin. Credit Network, Inc., No. C

13

04-3755 TEH, 2005 WL 1629809, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2005). The court also conducts an

14

independent review of the fees for reasonableness. McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, n.5

15

(9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has also observed that “a defendant cannot litigate tenaciously

16

and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response.” City

17

of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11 (1986) (plurality opinion).
The defendants’ line-by-line review of the billing records covered the following areas:

18
19

duplicative time entries, eliminating Mr. Block’s time as unnecessary, eliminating incomplete or

20

vague entries, eliminating entries for time spent on administrative or clerical tasks, eliminating

21

entries for records that conflict for an identical task, eliminating or reducing the rate for services

22

that a junior attorney or paralegal could have performed, and reducing entries for block billings.

23

2.1 Duplicative Time Entries

24

The defendants challenge work by two (and later three) attorneys on the same tasks, including

25

conferring, preparing the complaint, making modest changes to the first amended complaint,

26
27
28

132

Minute Entry – ECF No. 76; Docket Order – ECF No. 78.

133

The plaintiff’s attorneys characterize the case as complicated. Mot. − ECF No. 112 at 16. It was
not, as the Statement shows.

20

1

drafting the second amended complaint and the motion for leave to amend, preparing a motion to

2

strike the defendants’ answer that was never filed, preparing for and attending mediation,

3

finalizing the written settlement agreement, preparing the initial case-management statement and

4

initial and amended disclosures, propounding discovery, and preparing the fees application.134 The

5

plaintiffs counter that the defendants made math errors and that their hours were reasonable.135

6

“Participation of more than one attorney does not necessarily amount to unnecessary

7

duplication of effort.” Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th

8

Cir. 2004). The court must exercise judgment given the particular facts of each case to decide

9

whether any duplication is unnecessary. Id. Here, the defendants argue that tasks such as
reviewing another attorney’s work and conferring about the case are unnecessarily duplicative, but

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

after reviewing the records the court does not fully agree.

12

The court reduces the billing records by category in the next paragraphs.

13

First, the defendants challenge 31.4 hours that the plaintiff’s attorneys spent communicating

14

with each other.136 The plaintiff counter that communicating avoids duplicating work, and 31.4

15

hours over a year and a half is not excessive.137 The court does not reduce hours in this category.

16

“[I]t is reasonable for the members of the legal team to meet regularly to develop strategy, update

17

one another on developments, and give and receive instructions regarding assignments.” Alvarado,

18

2016 WL 5462429 at *2 (allowing 39.8 hours over 15 months in similar FDCPA case); see also

19

Relente v. Viator, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-05868-JD, 2015 WL 3613713 at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9,

20

2015) (“it is obvious that co-counsel will have to communicate with one another to provide

21

adequate representation”); Elise Dragu v. Motion Picture Indus. Health Plan for Active

22

Participants, 159 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1128−29 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (“[C]ollaboration and

23

brainstorming are an important aspect of legal practice. Even the most competent and experienced

24

attorney does not have all the answers.”). “Therefore, the Court does not automatically exclude

25
26
27
28

134

Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 11–14.

135

Reply – ECF No. 123 at 10–14.

136

Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 12.

137

Reply – ECF No. 123 at 14–15.

21

1

[communications] exchanged between co-counsel, but looks to whether such [communications]

2

are actually ‘redundant’.” Jacobson, 2016 WL 7230873 at *2.
Second, the defendants challenge the hours spent drafting the complaints: 11.4 hours for the

3
4

original complaint, 3.4 hours for minor changes to it, 4.8 hours drafting the second amended

5

complaint, and 5 hours drafting and filing a motion for leave to file the complaint.138 The plaintiff

6

responds that that they actually billed the following: 9.4 hours for the original complaint, 1.3 hours

7

for the first amended complaint, 4.8 hours for the second amended complaint, and 5 hours on the

8

motion for leave.139
These cases are routine and involve (except for the facts) plug-and-play legal standards. The

9

court reduces the overall hours for the initial complaint to 5 (3.5 for Mr. Stempler and 1.5 for Mr.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Trueblood). See St. Bernard v. State Collection Service, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D. Ariz.

12

July 12, 2010) (reducing hours from 9.4 to 5). The defendants also cite cases that −− while

13

differing somewhat because they involve examples of complaints used by the plaintiff’s counsel’s

14

in different cases −− support this result.140 See Silva v. Patenaude & Felix, P.C., No. C 08-03019-

15

JW, 2010 WL 2000523 at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010) (reducing all hours by 20% including the

16

2.3 spent drafting an initial FDCPA complaint because, among other things, the complaint was

17

virtually identical to the plaintiff’s counsel’s complaint in a similar FDCPA case); Abad v.

18

Williams, Cohen & Gray, Inc., No. C-06-2550-SBA-JCS, 2007 WL 1839910 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

19

23, 2007) (reducing hours to draft FDCPA complaint from 4 hours to .5 hours because the

20

complaint was almost identical to other complaints filed by the plaintiff’s counsel); see also

21

Alvarado, 2016 WL 5462429, at *3 (reduced time to draft second amended FDCPA complaint

22

from 15.3 hours to 3 hours because changes were only a few paragraphs).

23

For similar reasons, the court reduces the hours for the first amended complaint from 1.3 hours

24

to .5 hours and solely for Mr. Stempler’s time because the changes were minor and primarily were

25
26
27

138

Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 12–13.

139

Reply – ECF No. 123 at 12.

140

Opp. – ECF No. 120 at 12–13.

28
22

1

to change party names.141 See Abad, 2007 WL 1839910 at *7 (minor changes to original complaint

2

warranted a reducing hours awarded from 2.1 to .5 for the first amended complaint).

3

For similar reasons, and following the weight of authority in this district, the court reduces the

4

hours for drafting and filing the second amended complaint to 3 hours (2 hours for Mr. Trueblood,

5

.5 hours for Mr. Stempler, and .5 hours for Mr. Block) and for the straightforward accompanying

6

motion from 5 hours to 3 hours (for Mr. Trueblood). Alvarado v. Hovg, 2016 WL 5462429 at *3.

7

Third, the plaintiff seeks 6.8 hours (1.2 for Mr. Trueblood and 5.6 hours for Mr. Stempler)

8

preparing a motion to strike that counsel did not file and that (they say) persuaded the defendants

9

to amend their answer (after they shared a draft).142 Drafting and sharing a motion is a strategic
decision that can aid judicial economy and does not per se mean that an unfiled motion is not

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

compensable. See Alvarado, 2016 WL 5462429, at *3 (the “Court will not second guess attorney

12

efforts to conduct the litigation strategy for the case, including when to start work on a motion.”)

13

(quotation omitted); ExpertExchange, Inc. v. Doculex, Inc., No. C-08-03875-JCS, 2010 WL

14

1881484, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (“[t]he fact that the motion was not, ultimately, filed,

15

does not mean that the time spent preparing the motion was unreasonable”). That said, the overall

16

time must be reasonable and the court awards 4 hours (.5 hours for Mr. Trueblood and 3.5 hours

17

for Mr. Stempler).

18

Fourth, as to fees for deposition preparation, the court worked to keep the case in document

19

discovery until right before settlement, as the Statement shows. Still, the court does not find the

20

requested 2.8 hours to be unreasonable, especially given the context of noticing family depositions

21

on the emotional-distress claims. See Long v. Nationwide Legal File & Serve, Inc., No. 12-cv-

22

03578-LHK, 2014 WL 3809401, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (finding time spent on

23

depositions compensable and not unreasonable).
Fifth, the attendance of two attorneys at mediation is not necessarily excessive because

24
25

mediation is an important point in a litigation. Gurasich v. IBM Retirement Plan, Case No. 14-cv-

26
27
28

141

Amended Compl. – ECF No. 25.

142

Reply – ECF No. 123 at 12.

23

1

02911-DMR, 2016 WL 3683044, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2016) (individual ERISA violation

2

case); Cruz v. Starbucks Corp., No. C-10-01868-JCS, 2013 WL 2447862, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 5,

3

2013) (individual ADA violation case); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 1999 WL

4

33227443, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 1999) (same for summary-judgment hearing in a Unruh Act

5

and ADA case because it is a pivotal point in litigation); Defenbaugh v. JBC & Associates, Inc.,

6

Case No. C-03-0651-JCS, 2004 WL 1874978, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004) (allowed fees for

7

two attorneys attending putative class FDCPA case mediation; three “almost certainly” would

8

have been unreasonable). In this non-complex FDCPA case involving modest damages and a

9

credit-card debt of $24,500, spending 35.1 hours in attorney time is excessive. The court cuts the
hours in half, resulting in the equivalent of an award for one attorney. This approach results in

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

9.65 hours for Mr. Trueblood and 7.9 hours for Mr. Stempler. Cf. Santiago v. Equable Ascent Fin.,

12

Case No. C-11-3158-CRB, 2013 WL 3498079, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (allowing travel

13

time) (citing Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 2017)).

14

Sixth, the defendants challenge the time spent on finalizing the settlement agreement as

15

unreasonable. Based on the straightforward nature of the case, the court reduces the plaintiff’s

16

overall hours from 5.7 hours to 5 hours (3.5 for Mr. Trueblood and 1.5 for Mr. Stempler).

17

Seventh, given that this is a straightforward FDCPA case, the court reduces the total hours for

18

preparing the initial case-management statement to 2 hours (.2 for Mr. Trueblood and 1.8 for Mr.

19

Stempler). See Abad, 2007 WL 1839910, at *8 (in a FDCA class action, reducing hours from 3.8

20

to 2).
Eighth, initial disclosures in an FDCPA case like this are modest. The court awards two hours

21
22

(.2 for Mr. Trueblood and 1.8 for Mr. Stempler). See Abad, 2007 WL 1839910, at *8 (plaintiff

23

sought only one hour for the same work). Again, propounding discovery in a straightforward

24

FDCPA case also entails modest effort. The court awards 4 hours to Mr. Stempler.
Ninth, based on its review of the billing records, the court awards Mr. Trueblood 25 hours for

25
26

the fees motion and reply, Mr. Stempler 1.5 hours, and Mr. Block .5 hours. This is close to what

27
28
24

1

they seek, and given their obvious effort, it is reasonable. Alvarado, 2016 WL 5462429, at *3

2

(awarding 24.5 hours).143
Tenth, the court finds the time spent beyond these categories of tasks to be excessive. This was

3
4

a simple case where very little happened. “[T]he district court can impose a small reduction, no

5

greater than 10-percent – a ‘haircut’ – based on its exercise of discretion, but anything more

6

substantial requires clear explanation[.]” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th

7

Cir. 2011). As a result, the court deducts a further 8.5 hours from the fee award (3 from

8

Trueblood, 5 from Stempler, and .5 from Block).
2.2

9

Vague Entries and Block Billing

The defendants challenge 29.5 hours as being vague (73 entries) or block billed (103 entries)

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

On this record, the court does not reduce them for vagueness and block billing. The court can see

12

the tasks in the context of the litigation timeline and thus can evaluate the reasonableness of the

13

entries. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n. 12.

14

2.3

Administrative/Clerical/Junior Associate Tasks

15

The court does not reduce the rate for the challenged hours given the tasks and that plaintiff’s

16

counsel are solo practitioners without associates or paralegals.144 See Missouri v. Jenkins ex rel.

17

Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (recognizing a “gray area of tasks that might appropriately

18

be performed by an attorney or paralegal”).

19

2.4

Inconsistencies in Time Entries

20

For the eleven entries at issue, the court reduces the time to the lowest time entry. See Ambriz

21

v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 2008 WL 2095617, at *5−6 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) (reduced

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hours for Mr. Trueblood and Mr. Stempler for this reason). This reduces allowable hours as

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follows: 1.2 hours for Mr. Stempler, 1.9 hours for Mr. Trueblood, and 0.4 hours for Mr. Block.

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143

The court denies the defendants’ motion to exclude Mr. Block’s time and accepts the plaintiff’s
explanation that they associated him for discovery and trial preparation. Reply – ECF No. 123 at 15.
The court deducts .5 hours from his requested fees as the submitted billing records document only 7.3
hours spent on this case, not the 7.8 requested in the plaintiff’s submissions. Billing Records – ECF
No. 112-5 at 1–2.
144

Trueblood Decl. – ECF No. 123-3 at 3 (¶ 10).

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4/17/18

0.2

0

n/a

2

4/24/18

0.2

0

n/a

3

4/27/18

0.1

0

n/a

4

5/4/18

0.2

0

n/a

5

6/6/18

0.2

0

n/a

6

6/7/18

0.1

0

n/a

7

6/20/18

0.4

0

n/a

8

6/22/18

0.2

0

n/a

9

7/10/18

0.2

0

n/a

10

7/13/18

0.2

0

n/a

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

7/17/18

0.3

0

n/a

12

7/20/18

0.1

0

n/a

7/25/18

0.5

0

n/a

8/2/18

0.1

0

n/a

8/2/18

0.1

0

n/a

8/7/18

0.1

0

n/a

8/23/18

0.2

0

n/a

8/27/18

0.1

0

n/a

8/29/18

0.1

0

n/a

9/11/18

0.2

n/a

0

9/11/18

0.1

0

n/a

9/13/18

0.1

0

n/a

9/13/18

0.1

0

n/a

11/9/18

0.1

0

n/a

11/28/18

0.3

0

n/a

12/10/18

0.1

0

n/a

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.
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1

2.5

Time Entries Of 0.1 Hours

2

The billing records have many entries of 0.1 hours. “Although a one-tenth hour timekeeping

3

practice is generally reasonable and a careful review of filings should be encouraged, billing 0.1

4

hours for certain practices sometimes requires a reduction.” Jacobson, 2016 WL 7230873, at *10

5

(citation omitted). The following entries are inflated and excessive:

6
Date

Attorney

8

4/4/17

Trueblood

9

5/12/17

Trueblood

10

7/21/17

Trueblood

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

7

9/22/17

Trueblood

9/28/17

Trueblood

4/20/18

Trueblood

5/9/18

Trueblood

5/9/18

Trueblood

17

7/27/18

Trueblood

18

9/12/18

Trueblood

19

9/19/18

Trueblood

12
13
14
15
16

20

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Review ADR Order
Review stip re ADR
Review request for extension of time by
process server’s counsel
Review stipulation to file amended answer
Review court’s order denying request to
appear telephonically at mediation
Review EDP’s counsel’s motion to appear by
telephone
Review email from mediator re attendance of
Ascorra and Williams at mediation
Review court order on discovery plan
Send release for Williams to client for
signature
Review court’s order mooting motion to
amend and setting further status report
deadlines and conferences

“While reviewing such notices takes some amount of time, experienced counsel must exercise

21
22

Task
Send draft complaint to Stempler

billing judgment to avoid excessive accumulation of 0.1 hour entries in reviewing such routine
documents and court communications.” Kalani, 2016 WL 379623, at *8. As in Jacobson and
Kalani, the court will reduce these entries by half, or .55 hours

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26

3.

The FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act award a prevailing plaintiff reasonable costs. 15 U.S.C. §

27
28

Costs

1692k(a)(3); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30. The plaintiff seeks, and the defendants do not oppose,
28

1

costs of $2,267.48. The court awards them.

2
CONCLUSION

3

The court calculates the lodestar as follows:

4
5
6

Attorney
Trueblood
Stempler
Block
Total

7
8
9

Rate
Sought
$725
$600
$550

Rate
Awarded
$475
$375
$325

Hours
Sought
144.3
136.5
7.8
288.6

Hours
Awarded
116.3
101.9
5.6
223.8

Total
$55,242.50
$38,212.50
$ 1,820.00
$95,275.00

The court thus awards fees of $95,275 and costs of $2,267.48.

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12

Dated: August 27, 2019

13

______________________________________
LAUREL BEELER
United States Magistrate Judge

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