Leon v. The Hayward Building Department et al

Filing 62

Order by Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler granting 51 Motion to Dismiss. The attached order grants the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismisses the federal claims with prejudice and without leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6). The court dismisses the state claims without prejudice to Mr. Leon's raising any state-law claims in state court.(lblc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/2/2018)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
San Francisco Division
OLMEDO RIGONAR LEON,

Case No. 17-cv-02720-LB

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Plaintiff,
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

v.
THE HAYWARD BUILDING
DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Re: ECF No. 51

Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Omeldo Leon alleges that the defendants — the City of Hayward and the Hayward
Building Department — misused city zoning ordinances to harass and discriminate against him
and his daughter. Mr. Leon claims the defendants‘ actions deprived him of his constitutional rights
and violated California state law.1 The defendants move to dismiss the second amended complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6).2 This motion can be decided without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).
The court concludes that the second amended complaint does not remedy the defects the court
identified in its orders dismissing the previous complaints.3 Mr. Leon does not sufficiently allege

Second Amend. Compl. (―SAC‖) – ECF No. 48. Record citations are to material in the Electronic
Case File (―ECF‖); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
1

2

Motion ‒ ECF No. 51.

3

Orders – ECF No. 22, 44.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

that the defendants deprived him of his federal constitutional rights. Because Mr. Leon does not
state a viable federal claim, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims. The court grants the defendants‘ motion to dismiss and dismisses the federal claims with
prejudice and without leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6). The court does not reach Mr. Leon‘s
state-law claims and dismisses them without prejudice as to his raising them in state court.

STATEMENT
This dispute stems from zoning violations. More specifically, Hayward Building Department
charged Mr. Leon fines for zoning violations associated with his garage, which he also used as an
accessory dwelling unit.4 He claims that these violations existed when he bought his house.5 The

United States District Court
Northern District of California

defendants allegedly refused to allow Mr. Leon to file a permit to legalize the unit.6
Mr. Leon adds the following new facts to his second amended complaint.7


Mr. Leon is ―a Latino male, born in El Salvador.‖8



―The patterns of conduct complained of in [the] complaint are indicative of
deliberate targeting as a Latino male, and of his family as a Latino family.‖9



Mr. Leon ―was subjected to punishing, discriminatory and unfair practices by a
number of the Defendants identified as Doe in this Complaint, including the

4

SAC – ECF No. 48 at 4 (¶¶ 13–15).

5

Id. (¶ 15).

6

Id. (¶ 16).

Mr. Leon‘s opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 55) states new facts not included in the
Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, Mr. Leon states: ―In its most recent visitation, Plaintiff
received a report from a ‗plan checker‘ that asks for things that are specifically banned by the new
statute. . .‖ Opp. – ECF No. 55 at 6. As the court stated in its previous order (ECF No. 44 at 7), ―[t]he
Court cannot consider new facts alleged in opposition papers in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.‖
Peters v. Rust Consulting, Inc., 2013 WL 12202728, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013). ―Ordinarily, the
face of the plaintiffs‘ complaint . . . and the exhibits attached thereto . . . would control the Rule
12(b)(6) inquiry.‖ Schneider v. California Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1998). The
court cannot consider these supplemental arguments in this order. Moreover, even if the court were to
consider these facts, the new allegations do not sufficiently allege a procedural-due-process violation
because they do not state conduct that is arbitrary or shocks the conscience. See Cty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (―[T]he
substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‗can
properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.‘‖).
7

8

Id. at 2–3 (¶ 8).

9

Id.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

2

repetition of demeaning, sexist and discriminatory remarks, such as calling his
daughter ‗a purported engineer,‘ stating that she was ―unlikely to be capable of
doing the design work,‘ and other such remarks.‖10


The statements ―were made to [Mr. Leon], and in in front of him and his daughter,
about her skills and her qualifications, and were an example of invidious
discrimination.‖11



Mr. Leon ―was entitled, according to the rules and regulations enacted for operation
of the Building Department of the City of Hayward, to file a permit, subject to three
free revisions and further revisions at an hourly rate.‖12



―The refusal to accept the permit was deliberate and discriminatory, and indicative
of deliberate targeting as a Latino male, and his family as a Latino family.‖ 13



―[A]t a number of meetings members of the Hayward Building Department‖ called
Mr. Leon‘s daughter ‗the so-called engineer.‘‖14

This is Mr. Leon‘s third complaint. After Mr. Leon filed his original complaint,15 the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),16 and the court granted the

United States District Court
Northern District of California

motion with leave to amend because Mr. Leon stated no viable federal claim and thus the court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.17 Mr. Leon filed an amended complaint,18 the defendants
moved to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6),19 and the court granted the motion with leave to amend
because Mr. Leon again did not establish a viable federal claim.20
Mr. Leon‘s second amended complaint has four claims: (1) discrimination based on his
national origin, and through demeaning and sexist comments (the latter directed at his daughter) in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection; (2) the same
discrimination, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; (3) intentional

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 4–5 (¶ 16)

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Compl. – ECF No. 1

16

Motion – ECF No. 9.

17

Order – ECF No. 22.

18

First Amend. Compl. (―FAC‖) – ECF No. 25.

19

Motion – ECF No. 30.

20

Order – ECF No. 44.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

3

infliction of emotional distress in violation of California law; and (4) negligent infliction of
emotional distress in violation of California law. The defendants move to dismiss the second
amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).21

GOVERNING LAW
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A claim will normally survive a
motion to dismiss if it offers a ―short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.‖ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement ―must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‗state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

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Northern District of California

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). ―A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‖ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. ―The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‗probability requirement,‘ but it asks for more than a mere
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.‖ Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A
complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but ―a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the
‗grounds‘ of his ‗entitlement to relief‘ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a claim for relief above the speculative level . . .‖ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
citations omitted). Also, ―[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‗merely consistent with‘ a
defendant‘s liability, it ‗stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‗entitlement
to relief.‘‖ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all factual allegations
in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from such
allegations. LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1150 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). Such allegations must be
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435.

21

Motion ‒ ECF No. 51.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

4

While a court construes pro se pleadings more ―leniently,‖ the court cannot salvage claims that
are fatally deficient. See De la Vega v. Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., No. 07-CV-3619-WHA, 2007
WL 2900496, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007). If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave
to amend unless the ―the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.‖
Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990).

ANALYSIS
Mr. Leon‘s second amended complaint does not remedy the defects the court identified in its
orders dismissing Mr. Leon‘s previous complaints.22 The second amended complaint does not
introduce any new facts to support a minimally viable federal claim. The court has given Ms. Leon

United States District Court
Northern District of California

three chances to plead facts that support his claims that the defendants deprived him of his federal
constitutional rights. Because the second amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies the
court previously identified, granting Mr. Leon further leave to amend his complaint would be
futile. Accordingly, the court dismisses the federal claims in the second amended complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice and without leave to amend. The court dismisses the state claims
without prejudice to Mr. Leon‘s raising any state-law claims in state court.

1. Federal Claims
1.1

Procedural Due Process

Mr. Leon brings a procedural-due-process claim through § 1983. The complaint does not state
a minimally viable procedural-due-process claim because Mr. Leon does not allege a denial of
adequate procedural protections. ―To prevail on a claim for a procedural due process violation, the
party must prove three elements: 1) a protectable liberty or property interest, 2) government
deprivation of that interest, and 3) a denial of adequate procedural protections.‖ Holman v. City of
Warrenton, 242 F. Supp. 2d 791, 803 (D. Or. 2002) (citing Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998)).

22

Orders – ECF No. 22, 44.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

5

The only new fact in the complaint that supports a procedural-due-process claim is the
allegation that Mr. Leon ―was entitled, according to the rules and regulations enacted for operation
of the Building Department of the City of Hayward, to file a permit, subject to three free revisions
and further revisions at an hourly rate‖ and that Mr. Leon was ―refused the right to file [the] permit
to legalize the accessory dwelling unit (AUD), despite the fact that they had copies of plans, an
application, and a check.‖23 The amended complaint, however, does not say anything about the
process lying behind the relevant zoning rules, decisions, or penalties. Moreover, Mr. Leon did not
pursue an appeal of the decision to deny his permit application.24 Therefore nothing in the
complaint suggests that the defendants denied Mr. Leon ―adequate procedural protections.‖25
Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522–24 (1st Cir. 1983) (cited by Mr. Leon in support

United States District Court
Northern District of California

of his claim) does not change that conclusion. In Roy, the plaintiff sued the city of Augusta in state
court for denying his application to renew his license to operate a pool and billiard room. Id. at
1519. The Maine Supreme Judicial court concluded that the city‘s licensing ordinance violated
state-licensing laws, and ordered the city to renew the plaintiff‘s license. Id. In response to the
court‘s order, the city issued the plaintiff an expired and invalid license. Id. at 1519–20. The
plaintiff then sued the city in federal court alleging that the city violated his right to procedural due
process. Id. at 1520. The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the city‘s response to the
state-court order deprived the plaintiff of his property without procedural due process because the
city disregarded the state-court order. Id. at 1522.
The allegations in the complaint describe no such situation. The complaint does not allege that
the defendants deliberately ignored state processes or court orders. Mr. Leon‘s reliance on Roy is
therefore misplaced.
The court therefore dismisses the procedural-due-process claim with prejudice.

23

SAC – ECF No. 48 at 4 (¶ 16).

24

Order – ECF No. 44 at 5.

25

Order – ECF No. 22 at 8‒9.

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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1.2 Substantive Due Process
Mr. Leon also brings a substantive-due-process claim. The complaint does not allege a prima
facie substantive-due-process violation. Substantive due process ―prevents the government from
engaging in conduct that ‗shocks the conscience,‘ . . . or interferes with rights ‗implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.‘‖ Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that that ―the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by
executive action only when it ‗can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking,
in a constitutional sense.‘‖ Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (quoting Collins
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). And ―only the most egregious official conduct can

United States District Court
Northern District of California

be said to be ‗arbitrary in the constitutional sense.‘‖ Id. at 846 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 128).
The amended complaint alleges that the defendants deliberately targeted Mr. Leon because he
is a Latino. The allegations of invidious discrimination, however, are not supported by more than
conclusory facts. The complaint states: ―[t]he patterns of conduct complained of in [the] complaint
are indicative of deliberate targeting as a Latino male, and of his family as a Latino family.‖ 26 The
defendants‘ pattern of conduct includes: charging Mr. Leon for zoning violations that existed
when he bought his house;27 levying ―a number of heavy fines‖ against him; 28 refusing to allow
him to file a permit ―to legalize the accessory dwelling unit‖;29 and calling his daughter ―a
purported engineer‖ who is ―unlikely to be capable of doing the design work.‖30 These facts,
without more, do not support the allegation that the city discriminated against Mr. Leon based on
his national origin. The conduct alleged in the complaint therefore does not rise to the level of
conduct that can be said to ―shock the conscience‖ or be ―arbitrary in the constitutional sense.‖ See
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847. The court dismisses the substantive-due-process claim with prejudice.

26

SAC – ECF No. 48 at 5 (¶ 19).

27

Id. at 4 (¶¶ 15–16).

28

Id. at 6 (¶ 21).

29

Id. at 4 (¶ 16).

30

Id. at 5 (¶ 20).

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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1.3 Equal Protection
Mr. Leon claims that the defendants discriminated against him based on his national origin and
made sexist comments about his daughter, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The equalprotection claim fails because Mr. Leon has not pled with specificity that the defendants
intentionally discriminated against him.
―To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause,‖ a plaintiff ―must show
that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon
membership in a protected class.‖ Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154
(1999)); accord Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Put slightly

United States District Court
Northern District of California

differently, a plaintiff alleging that he was denied equal protection based on his race or other
suspect classification ―must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at
least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent.‖ Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch.
Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); accord, e.g., Caddell v. Helena Elder Hous., Inc., 494
F. App'x 809, 810 (9th Cir. 2012) (―The district court properly dismissed . . . equal protection
claims . . . because [plaintiff] failed to allege facts demonstrating a discriminatory intent.‖).
―[B]are assertions‖ and ―conclusory allegations‖ of discrimination will not suffice. See Moss v.
U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81). Nor
will the merely ―formulaic recitation of the elements‖ of a constitutional discrimination claim.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Additionally, ―[c]onstitutional
rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously.‖ Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610 (1973); Wesgate v. Leorna, 122 F.3d 1076, 1076 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johns v. Cty. of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)).
While Mr. Leon now identifies himself as a Latino male and alleges that the defendants
discriminated against him based on his national origin in making their decision to deny him a
permit, the complaint does not allege facts suggesting discriminatory intent. There are no facts in
his complaint to support his conclusory allegation that the defendants‘ ―refusal to accept [his]
permit was deliberate and discriminatory, and indicative of deliberate targeting as a Latino
ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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male.‖31 Mr. Leon‘s allegations that the defendant discriminated against him based on his national
origin are wholly conclusory. The only facts about discriminatory conduct in the complaint focus
on the sexist comments made to Mr. Leon‘s daughter about her qualifications as an engineer. 32 Mr.
Leon cannot assert an equal-protection claim on behalf of his daughter. See Broadrick, 13 U.S. at
610.
The court therefore dismisses the equal-protection claim with prejudice.
1.4 Fair Housing Act
Mr. Leon brings a claim under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The complaint
does not state a minimally viable claim under the Fair Housing Act. This statute outlaws
discrimination in the ―sale‖ or ―rental‖ of housing based upon someone‘s ―race, color, religion,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

sex, familial status, or national origin.‖ See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603–04. Mr. Leon does not
allege that the defendants discriminated against him in the sale or rental of a property. Nothing in
the complaint suggests that this case involves the sale or rental of a dwelling. Even under the most
lenient reading, the complaint does not suggest that this is a Fair Housing Act case. This claim is
therefore dismissed with prejudice.
1.5 Eighth Amendment
The complaint appears to bring an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines claim because Mr.
Leon alleges that the defendants charged him unfair fines for zoning violations. The complaint
does not state a prima facie Excessive Fines claim.
The Eighth Amendment‘s Excessive Fines clause ―limits the government‘s power to extract
payments, whether in cash or in kind, ―as punishment for some offense.‖ Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993) (quoting Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)) (emphasis removed). This ―notion of punishment . . . cuts across
the division between the civil and the criminal law.‖ Id. at 610 (quoting United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989)). ―The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the

31

Id. at 4 (¶ 16).

32

Id. at 5–6 (¶ 20).

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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Excessive Fines Clause,‖ moreover, ―is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.‖
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). ―[A] punitive forfeiture‖ — which can
include a civil penalty — ―violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to
the gravity of a defendant‘s offense.‖ Id.; accord U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Brookstreet Secs.
Corp., 664 F. App‘x 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2016) (―civil penalty‖).
The allegations in the complaint are not sufficient to allow allow a fact-finder to decide
whether the fines the defendants charged Mr. Leon are constitutionally excessive. The complaint
says only that he was ―issued a number of very large fines.‖33 The complaint does not say how
much or how many times the defendants fined Mr. Leon. He does not allege facts that suggest that

United States District Court
Northern District of California

the fines were disproportionate to the zoning violations. See Brookstreet Securities, 664 F. App‘x
at 656 (one Excessive Fines factor is ―nature and extent‖ of violation). The complaint also alleges
that the defendants told Mr. Leon that ―the amount required to appeal‖ the zoning decision
―exceeded. . . $800.‖34 The plaintiff alleges that this fee ―discourage[s]‖ people from seeking
review of zoning decisions.35 But as the court explained to Mr. Leon in its prior order, a filing fee
is not a ―punishment‖ within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.36
The court therefore dismisses the Eighth Amendment claim with prejudice.
1.6 Takings Clause
In his opposition, Mr. Leon raises for the first time a claim that the defendant‘s actions amount
to an unconstitutional taking of his property.37 The facts alleged in the complaint do not state a
minimally viable takings clause claim.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 6 (¶ 21).

35

Id.

36

Order – ECF No. 22 at 8.

Opp. – ECF No. 6–7. The court cannot procedurally consider this claim because Mr. Leon did not
raise it in his Second Amended Complaint. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 (―Ordinarily, the face of
the plaintiffs‘ complaint . . . and the exhibits attached thereto . . . would control the Rule 12(b)(6)
inquiry.‖) Regardless, the court addresses it in its analysis to explain the deficiencies of the claim to
Mr. Leon.
37

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that ―private property [shall not] be
taken for public use without just compensation.‖ U.S. Const. amend. V. It applies to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Schneider v. California Dep’t
Of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998). The ―taking‖ need not be the classic
―appropriation[] or ouster[]‖ of an eminent-domain proceeding; it can also be a ―regulatory
taking‖ — i.e. land-use restrictions so burdensome that they effectively deprive the owner of the
property‘s use. See generally Small Prop. Owners of San Francisco v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 141 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1396–97 (2006) (describing regulatory takings) (―The Takings
Clause applies as well to government enactments that, while not direct appropriations or ousters,
are equivalent thereto. These enactments have been called regulatory takings . . . .‖).

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Northern District of California

The complaint alleges that Mr. Leon was ―issued a very large number of fines‖ and ―told the
amount required to appeal exceeded the sum of $800.‖38 The complaint does not claim, or
factually allege, that the zoning restrictions have stripped Mr. Leon‘s property of ―all beneficial
economic use‖; nor has Mr. Leon made the lesser showing that the zoning rules have had such an
―adverse economic impact‖ that they amount to the ―functional equivalent of a traditional taking.‖
See Small Property Owners, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 1396 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). The court therefore dismisses the takings-clause claim with
prejudice.

2. State-Law Claims
This is a federal-question and supplemental-jurisdiction suit.39 The parties are all California
residents, so diversity jurisdiction is not in question. The plaintiff has not stated a minimally viable
federal claim. The court thus lacks federal-question jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, the court
does not reach Mr. Leon‘s state-law claims and dismisses them without prejudice to his raising
them in state court.

38

SAC – ECF No. 48 at 6 (¶ 21).

39

Id. at 2 (¶ 5).

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

11

CONCLUSION
Mr. Leon fails to state a minimally viable federal claim. Further leave to amend the complaint
to state federal claims against the defendants would be futile because Mr. Leon has not remedied
the deficiencies in the complaint that the court identified in its prior orders. Accordingly, the court
grants the defendants‘ motion to dismiss and dismisses the federal claims with prejudice and
without leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6). The court dismisses the state claims without
prejudice to Mr. Leon‘s raising any state-law claims in state court.
This disposes of ECF No. 51.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 2, 2018

United States District Court
Northern District of California

______________________________________
LAUREL BEELER
United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER – No. 17-cv-02720-LB

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