Talita Queiros v. Target Corporation et al

Filing 30

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS 4 15 29 . (Illston, Susan) (Filed on 8/17/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TALITA QUEIROS,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 17-cv-03174-SI

v.
TARGET CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REMAND AND DENYING AS MOOT
MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 4, 15

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Before the Court are plaintiff Talita Queiros’s motion to remand this case to Alameda

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County Superior Court, Dkt. No. 15, and defendant Target Corporation’s (“Target’s”) motion to

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dismiss for failure to state a claim, Dkt. No. 4. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court

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determines that this matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the

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hearing set for August 25, 2017. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s

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motion to remand and DENIES AS MOOT defendant’s motion to dismiss.

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff brings this action after an electric shopping cart injured her ankle on July 12, 2016

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at a Target store in Daly City, CA. Compl. (Dkt. No. 1-1) at Prem. L-1. Plaintiff alleges that the

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defendants, Target and store manager Shawn Shugrue, “failed to properly maintain their electric

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shopping carts” used by Target customers. Id. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the motorized

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electric shopping cart that injured her Achilles tendon lacked proper safety wheels to protect and

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guard the metal corners of the cart. Id.

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Plaintiff filed this action on April 24, 2017 in the Alameda County Superior Court and

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served defendants on May 5, 2017. See Notice of Removal (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 8-9. In her complaint,

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plaintiff brings two causes of action: (i) for premises liability, against both defendants; and (ii) for

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products liability, against Target.

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defendants “negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises.” Id.

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Second, plaintiff asserts that the electric shopping cart was defective “when it left the control of

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each defendant” and proximately caused her injury. Compl. at Prod. L-2, L-4. As a result,

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Plaintiff seeks to recover lost wages, hospital and medical expenses, general damages, and

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damages for lost earning capacity. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in excess

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of $75,000. Compl. ¶ 14.

Compl. at Prem. L-2.

First, plaintiff alleges that both

On June 2, 2017, Target filed a Notice of Removal in this Court, alleging diversity

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notice of Removal (Dkt. No. 1). Target alleges that “Shawn

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Shugrue was not involved in [the] incident and his inclusion is a sham calculated to defeat

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diversity.” Id. ¶ 5. Therefore, Target maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter

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because, when disregarding Shugrue (a California citizen), the parties are of diverse citizenship

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and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. ¶ 7.

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On June 19, 2017, plaintiff moved to remand this action to Alameda County Superior

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Court. Mot. to Remand (Dkt. No. 15).

Plaintiff argues that Shugrue is a properly named

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defendant because he knew that the electric cart in question was defective, i.e., missing its rubber

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wheel guards, that he knew this for a year, that he neglected to repair the defective cart, and that he

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refused to assist plaintiff after she suffered injury in the store. Mot. to Remand at 4. In addition,

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plaintiff argues that Target’s removal was “procedurally improper, because not all defendants who

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had been served consented to removal.” Id.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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When a case “of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction” is

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initially brought in state court, the defendant may remove it to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

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There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction under

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28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A district court has

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diversity jurisdiction where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, and is between,
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inter alia, citizens of different States, or citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign

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state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. A district court may

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order remand to state court either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in

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removal procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The court may remand sua sponte or on motion of a

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party, and the parties who invoked the federal court’s removal jurisdiction have the burden of

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establishing federal jurisdiction. See Enrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.

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1988) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (U.S.1921)). “If at any time

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before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

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shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor of remand. Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d

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689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). Any doubt as to the right of removal must be resolved in favor of

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remand to state court. Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

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DISCUSSION

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Target argues that removal is appropriate on diversity grounds because Shawn Shugrue,

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the Target store manager, is a “sham” defendant, and thus his citizenship should be ignored for

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purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that Shugrue is a properly named defendant

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because as the manager of the Target store where plaintiff’s injury occurred, Shugrue was

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responsible for safe maintenance of the store and he failed to fix the defective cart that caused

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plaintiff’s injury. Complaint at Prem. L-5.

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A party is considered a “sham” or “fraudulently joined” defendant if “the plaintiff fails to

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state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the

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settled rules of the state.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(quoting McCabe v. General Food Corps., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)). The defendant

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invoking removal jurisdiction may “present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent.” Id. In

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demonstrating fraudulent joinder, “[t]he defendant need not show that the joinder of the non-

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diverse party was for the purpose of preventing removal. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate
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that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in State court

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against the alleged sham defendant.” Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807

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(N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Dodson v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992)). “The

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district court[] . . . must resolve all disputed questions of fact in favor of the Plaintiff.” Id. (citing

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Dodson, 951 F.2d at 42).

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Plaintiff states that Shugrue knew about the dangerous condition of this particular cart for a

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year prior to plaintiff’s injury. Mot. to Remand (Dkt. No. 15) at 4. Plaintiff further alleges that

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Shugrue “did nothing to fix the broken cart, despite the fact that he was responsible for all store

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operations.” Plaintiff also states that Shugrue refused to help her after she was injured in the store
and that he refused to take an injury report or otherwise offer assistance.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Target disputes much

of this characterization, and argues that Shugrue was not even present at the Target store on the

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date of the incident.

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admissible evidence.” Opp’n (Dkt. No. 22) at 2.

Target further argues that plaintiff’s allegations “are unsupported by

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Target has not met its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by demonstrating that

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Shugrue is fraudulently joined. The complaint is skeletal, but the Court cannot say that “there is

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no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action’” in state court against

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Shugrue. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as

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to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand is

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GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT. Plaintiff’s request for fees is

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DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand this

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case Alameda County Superior Court, DENIES AS MOOT Target’s motion to dismiss, and

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DENIES plaintiff’s request for fees. This action is REMANDED to Alameda County Superior

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Court.

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This order resolves Dkt. Nos. 4, 15. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 17, 2017
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SUSAN ILLSTON
United States District Judge

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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