Grant v. Berryhill

Filing 21

ORDER by Judge Laurel Beeler granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 19 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.The court grants Mr. Grant's motion for summary judgment, denies the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this order. (lblc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/24/2018)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division United States District Court Northern District of California 11 ANTHONY M. GRANT, Case No. 17-cv-03423-LB Plaintiff, 12 v. 13 14 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Defendant. 15 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Re: ECF Nos. 18, 19 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Anthony Grant seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the 19 Social Security Administration denying his claim for disability benefits under Title II and Title 20 XVI of the Social Security Act.1 He moved for summary judgment.2 The Commissioner opposed 21 the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.3 Under Civil Local Rule 16-5, the 22 matter is submitted for decision without oral argument. All parties consented to magistrate-judge 23 24 25 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 4. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 1 26 28 2 Id. at 1. 3 27 Cross-Mot. – ECF No. 19. ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 1 jurisdiction.4 The court grants the plaintiff’s motion, denies the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and 2 remands for further proceedings. 3 4 5 STATEMENT 1. Procedural History 6 On November 15, 2012, Mr. Grant, born on August 31, 1970 and then age 42, filed a claim for 7 social-security disability insurance (“SSDI”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.5 On 8 December 28, 2012 he filed a claim for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title 9 XVI.6 He alleged congestive heart failure, sleep apnea, cellulitis with acute edema, high blood pressure, swelling in both legs, shortness of breath, and chest pain.7 On reconsideration, Mr. Grant 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 alleged that he was suffering from depression, his legs were “constantly swollen,” and he had 12 greater difficulty breathing.8 He alleged an onset date of July 30, 2010.9 The Commissioner denied 13 his SSDI and SSI claims initially and on reconsideration.10 Mr. Grant timely requested a hearing.11 14 On July 20, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Richard P. Laverdure (the “ALJ”) held a hearing 15 in Oakland, California.12 Attorney Reed Wickham represented Mr. Grant.13 The ALJ heard 16 testimony from Mr. Grant, vocational expert (“VE”) Timothy Farrell and medical expert (“ME”) 17 James Todd, M.D.14 On August 25, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.15 Mr. Grant 18 19 4 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 7, 9. 20 5 Administrative Record (“AR”) 228. 6 AR 236. 7 AR 93–94, 135–36, 278. 22 8 AR 136. 23 9 Id. 21 10 AR 105, 133 (determinations on SSDI claim); AR 118 and 147 (determinations on SSI claim). 11 AR 171. 25 12 AR 48. 26 13 Id. 14 Id., AR 32 (Dr. Todd testified by telephone). 15 AR 29. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 2 1 timely appealed the decision to the Appeals Council on September 15, 2015.16 The Appeals 2 Council denied Mr. Grant’s request for review on April 10, 2017.17 On June 13, 2017, Mr. Grant 3 timely filed this action for judicial review18 and subsequently moved for summary judgment on 4 April 6, 2018.19 The Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary 5 judgment on May 4, 2018.20 Mr. Grant filed a reply on May 18, 2018.21 6 7 2. Summary of Record and Administrative Findings 8 2.1 9 Medical Records 2.1.1 Alta Bates Summit Medical Center Physicians — Treating Mr. Grant was treated on multiple occasions at the Alta Bates Summit Medical Center from 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 January 2009 through August 2015.22 The records reflect his morbid obesity: for example as of 12 August 23, 2015, he was 5’ 8” tall and weighed 405 pounds.23 Mr. Grant often was admitted for 13 shortness of breath or difficulty breathing,24 chest pain,25 leg pain,26 and leg swelling.27 During the 14 course of these visits, emergency room physicians28 and specialists29 saw Mr. Grant and diagnosed 15 16 16 AR 27–28. 17 AR 1–7. 18 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 1–2. 19 19 Mot. – ECF No. 18. 20 20 Cross-Mot. ‒ ECF No. 19. 21 Reply ‒ ECF No. 20. 22 AR 599–746, 803–71, 1042–65, 1604–1781. 22 23 AR 1729. 23 24 See, e.g., AR 628, 700, 758, 1045, 1773. 25 See, e.g., AR 1045, 1733. 26 See, e.g., AR 1607, 1624. 25 27 See, e.g., AR 1045, 1607, 1613, 1624, 1740. 26 28 17 18 21 24 27 Mr. Grant saw numerous emergency room physicians, including Dennis Bouvier, D.O., Rebeka Barth, M.D., Reina Rodriguez, M.D., Benjamin Lerman, M.D., Justin Paul Lee, M.D., Christopher Michael Kolly, D.O., Melissa Tang, M.D., and Keala Landry, M.D. See AR 758, 1045–52, 1605, 1613, 1624, 1627, 1694, 1733, 1772. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 3 1 him with numerous chronic health problems, including morbid obesity,30 restrictive lung disease 2 due to morbid obesity,31 polysubstance abuse,32 hypertension,33 sleep apnea,34 edema,35 kidney 3 disease or kidney injury,36 dyspnea,37 cellulitis or sepsis secondary to cellulitis,38 diastolic 4 dysfunction,39 respiratory failure,40 congestive heart failure,41 lymphadenopathy,42 depression,43 5 chronic pain,44 and noncompliance or suspected noncompliance with his medications or dietary 6 regimen.45 Discharge summaries and consultation notes from two recent, fairly long admission periods at 7 8 Alta Bates Summit Medical Center illustrate some of the complications that Mr. Grant 9 experienced due to his chronic medical conditions. The first extended hospital stay was from 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 29 12 Mr. Grant saw numerous specialists, including Henry Tan, M.D., an intensive-care unit physician, James McFeely, M.D., a pulmonologist, Ole Dierks, M.D., a nephrologist, James Perlada, M.D., an infectious disease specialist, and Collin Mbanugo, M.D., a surgeon. See AR 729, 769, 1607. 13 30 See, e.g., AR 628, 752, 769, 1049, 1607, 1685, 1773. 14 31 See, e.g., AR 769. 32 See, e.g., AR 628, 1539, 1773. 33 See, e.g., AR 628, 769, 786, 1049, 1607, 1627, 1685, 1699, 1773. 16 34 See, e.g., AR 628, 769, 1049, 1685, 1724, 1773. 17 35 See, e.g., AR 729, 769, 783, 786, 807, 1737. 36 See, e.g., AR 628, 769, 1607, 1627, 1685, 1724, 1740, 1773. 15 18 19 See, e.g., AR 767, 780, 786, 1685. “Dyspnea refers to the sensation of difficult or uncomfortable breathing.” Neal v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-01503-SKO, 2015 WL 5232328, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015) (citing Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 589, 1359 (31st ed. 2007)). 20 38 21 39 22 37 See, e.g., AR 1607, 1627, 1724, 1731, 1773. See, e.g., AR 1694, 1724, 1740, 1773. “‘Diastolic dysfunction’ refers to an abnormality in how the heart fills with blood during the first part of the two parts of a heartbeat.” Smith v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv03139-AJB, 2016 WL 1211952, at *8 n.13 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2016) (quoting Texas Heart Institute, Diastolic Dysfunction, http://www.texasheart.org/HIC/Topics/Cond/ddisfunc.cfm). 23 40 See, e.g., AR 730, 769. 24 41 See, e.g., AR 786, 1694, 1773. 25 See, e.g., AR 1607, 1773. Lymphadenopathy is characterized as “enlarged lymph nodes.” Hamm v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 725 F. App’x 836, 837 (11th Cir. 2018). 26 43 See, e.g., AR 1627. 44 See, e.g., 1627, 1773. 45 See, e.g., AR 628, 766–67, 769, 1049. 42 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 4 1 November 19, 2014 through December 7, 2014.46 He weighed 364 pounds during this stay.47 2 Rachel Kalpna Munzni, M.D., noted that Mr. Grant came to the hospital for left leg swelling and 3 pain.48 Mr. Grant’s discharge diagnoses were sepsis (resolved), left leg cellulitis with DVT (deep- 4 vein thrombosis) ruled out, hypertension, acute kidney injury on chronic kidney disease, 5 lymphadenopathy, and morbid obesity.49 Mr. Grant underwent testing for deep-vein thrombosis, 6 including a Doppler ultrasound and a CT scan, and the test results were negative.50 David Perlada, M.D., an infectious-disease specialist, examined Mr. Grant’s “worsening 7 8 cellulitis” on his left leg.51 Dr. Perlada’s impression was that Mr. Grant was suffering from 9 “severe lymphedema”52 in his left leg “with superimposed cellulitis and probably a reactive lymphadenopathy on [his] left groin.”53 Dr. Perlada prescribed numerous antibiotics, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 recommended that an interventional radiology specialist aspirate the big lymph node in Mr. 12 Grant’s left groin, and deferred to a nephrologist concerning Mr. Grant’s “aggressive diuresis.”54 Collin Mbanugo, M.D., provided a surgical consultation.55 Dr. Mbanugo noted that Mr. 13 14 Grant’s left leg was swollen to twice the size of his right leg and that he did not see “any drainable 15 abscess.”56 Dr. Mbanugo concluded that “there [was] nothing that require[d] any surgical 16 17 18 46 AR 1605. 47 AR 1615. 48 AR 1607. 21 49 Id. 22 50 Id. 51 AR 1638. 19 20 23 24 AR 1641. “Lymphedema is a ‘swelling that generally occurs in one of your arms or legs.’” Hooper v. Astrue, No. 7:11-CV-244-D, 2012 WL 6645006, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2012) (quoting Lymphedema, Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/lymphedema/DS00609). 25 53 AR 1641. 26 54 Id. 55 AR 1642. 56 Id. 27 52 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 5 1 drainage” and recommended that Mr. Grant take an aggressive regimen of antibiotics and elevate 2 his left leg.57 3 Ole Dierks, M.D., a nephrologist, also saw Grant during this admission period.58 Dr. Dierks 4 assessed that Mr. Grant had an acute kidney injury on chronic kidney disease, left-lower-extremity 5 cellulitis, severe hypertension, obesity, lymphadenopathy, edema, OSA (obstructive sleep apnea), 6 hypertensive heart disease, leukocytosis,59 and anemia.60 Dr. Dierk’s plan was that Mr. Grant 7 should stop taking Lasix and start taking antibiotics.61 The second hospital stay was from March 16, 2015 through April 16, 2015.62 Leif R. Hass, 8 9 M.D., noted in Mr. Grant’s discharge summary that Mr. Grant was admitted “for treatment of CHF [congestive heart failure] exacerbation.”63 He weighed 384 pounds at the end of this hospital 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 stay.64 Christopher Kolly, D.O., an emergency-room physician, noted that Mr. Grant “arrived 12 diaphoretic, clammy, [and] in significant respiratory distress.”65 Mr. Grant was “only able to 13 verbalize one word sentences.”66 Mr. Grant’s discharge diagnoses were acute diastolic-congestive 14 heart failure “due to noncompliance and etoh (alcohol) use,” significant dyspnea and chronic 15 edema, acute kidney injury, obstructive sleep apnea, morbid obesity, chronic pain, polysubstance 16 abuse, debility, and anxiety due to recent trauma, namely, the death of a friend two weeks before 17 Mr. Grant’s admission to Alta Bates Summit Medical Center.67 Dr. Hass instructed Mr. Grant to 18 57 19 Id. 58 AR 1628. 20 59 21 “Leukocytosis is an increase in the number of white blood cells in the blood.” Boyle v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-1294, 2015 WL 350383, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2015) (quoting Leukocytosis, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/leukocytosis). 23 24 60 AR 1628. 61 22 Id. 62 AR 1685. The record is not entirely clear in that there are two discharge dates listed. The other discharge date is March 19, 2015. 63 25 Id. 64 AR 1687. 26 65 AR 1698. 66 Id. 67 AR 1685. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 6 1 follow up with his primary-care physician within five days, and he noted that Mr. Grant would 2 receive outpatient care at home.68 3 2.1.2 Eastmont Wellness Center Physicians — Treating From February 11, 2011 to December 22, 2011, Mr. Grant received treatment at the Eastmont 4 5 Medical Center.69 The medical evidence from Eastmont Wellness Center contains several 6 handwritten progress notes, many of which are difficult to read. The record indicates, however, 7 that physicians treated Mr. Grant for diastolic dysfunction, cellulitis, hypertension, congestive 8 heart failure, edema, and obstructive sleep apnea.70 The doctors on these visits would adjust Mr. 9 Grant’s medications to treat his symptoms. For example, on August 25, 2011, the doctor prescribed “flurosemide, metoprolol, enalapril”71 and recommended “venous stasis stockings to 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 use in morning.”72 12 2.1.3 San Leandro Hospital Physicians — Treating 13 Mr. Grant was admitted to San Leandro Hospital on two occasions. His first admission period 14 was from March 2 to March 7, 2011 for cellulitis, edema, redness, and pain in his right leg.73 Mr. 15 Grant also had a “significant leukocytosis of 21,000.”74 Zarlasht Fakiri, D.O., wrote Mr. Grant’s 16 discharge summary.75 Mr. Grant’s discharge diagnoses were right-lower-extremity cellulitis with 17 acute edema (improved), chronic lower-right-extremity edema (likely secondary to venous 18 insufficiency), acute clinical congestive heart failure (improved with Lasix and likely systolic), 19 morbid obesity, hypertension (improved), borderline diabetes mellitus (aggravated by Mr. Grant’s 20 21 22 68 Id. 23 69 AR 575. 70 See e.g., AR 582–84. 71 AR 582–83. 25 72 AR 583. 26 73 AR 414, 416. 74 AR 416. 75 See AR 415–18. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 7 1 obesity), hyponatremia76 (improved with fluid restriction), hypokalemia77 (secondary to Lasix), a 2 history of obstructive sleep apnea, pneumonia, normocytic anemia,78 and hypoalbuminemia.79 Dr. 3 Fakiri noted that Mr. Grant initially had a fever, but his temperature decreased and leukocytosis 4 improved after starting antibiotics.80 During the course of Mr. Grant’s stay, Mr. Grant was 5 eventually able to walk using a walker, his dyspnea improved, and his antibiotic regimen was 6 “tapered.”81 Dr. Fakiri noted that he had spoken with Mr. Grant “at length on several occasions 7 with his mother present” concerning weight loss, nutrition, and an exercise regimen.82 Joseph C. 8 Cheng, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, consulted and found that Mr. Grant could continue to wear 9 “hardware” on his right ankle that he had typically worn due to an earlier ankle fracture because 10 the hardware was not infected and because of Mr. Grant’s weight.83 The second admission period at San Leandro Hospital was from June 26 to June 28, 2013.84 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Madhumati Rampure, M.D., wrote in Mr. Grant’s discharge summary that Mr. Grant was 13 hospitalized for shortness of breath with acute respiratory failure.85 Mr. Grant’s admitting 14 diagnosis was acute respiratory failure (improved with no evidence of infection), mild congestive 15 “Hyponatremia is ‘a condition that occurs when the level of sodium in your blood is abnormally low.’” Marshall v. Astrue, No. 4:10-CV-1978, 2011 WL 5862625, at *8 n.28 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011) (quoting Hyponatremia, Definition, Mayo Clinic staff, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/ hyponatremia/DS00974). 76 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 “‘Hypokalemia’ is the name for abnormally low potassium concentration in the blood which may result from excessive potassium loss by the renal or gastrointestinal route, from decreased intake, or from transcellular shifts.” Collins v. Astrue, 493 F. Supp. 2d 858, 871 n.24 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2007) (quoting Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 513 (29th ed. 2000). 77 “Normochomic normocytic anemia is ‘a reduction below normal concentrations of red blood cells in which the hemoglobin content and red blood cell size are still normal.’” Buford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-cv-5751 (KAM), 2015 WL 8042210, at *4 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015) (citations omitted). 78 AR 415–16. Hypoalbuminemia is characterized as “low levels of albumin in the blood.” Houston v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-2148, 2014 WL 901095, at *7 n.24 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014). 79 80 AR 416. 81 AR 417. 25 82 Id. 26 83 AR 416. 84 AR 1013–16, see also id. at 1486–1516. 85 AR 1013. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 8 1 heart failure (improved with Lasix), morbid obesity, a history of hypertension, a history of sleep 2 apnea, “[p]robably compensated respiratory acidosis,”86 chronic kidney disease (currently stable), 3 normocytic anemia (with no evidence of an active bleed), chronic bilateral lower extremity 4 swelling (right lower extremity more swollen than the left lower extremity), and a history of 5 polysubstance abuse.87 Dr. Rampure noted that because Mr. Grant “initially was very lethargic and 6 sleepy,” T. Craig Williams, M.D., had concluded that Mr. Grant’s CPAP machine was most likely 7 leaking.88 Mr. Grant also underwent a CT scan to rule out a stroke, and the results were negative.89 8 Mr. Grant was placed on a BiPAP (bilevel positive airway pressure) machine, and his condition 9 improved.90 He was transferred out of the intensive-care unit and prescribed antibiotics and 10 steroids, which were later discontinued.91 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 2.1.4 Frank Chen, M.D. — Examining On July 30, 2011, Dr. Chen performed an internal-medicine evaluation of Mr. Grant, who then 12 13 weighed 340 pounds.92 He diagnosed Mr. Grant with hypertension (advising him to seek medical 14 attention), shortness of breath (likely due to obesity), chronic edema of both lower legs (greater in 15 the right due to venous stasis and prior history of cellulitis of the right lower leg), and morbid 16 obesity.93 Dr. Chen made the following functional-capacity assessment: 17 The number of hours that claimant could stand and walk in an 8-hour workday is about 4–6 hours. He may sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day. No assistive device is medically necessary. The amount of weight that claimant could lift or carry is 50 18 19 “Respiratory acidosis, also called respiratory failure or ventilator failure, is a condition that occurs when lungs can’t remove enough of the carbon dioxide (CO2) produced by the body . . . Respiratory acidosis is typically caused by an underlying disease or health condition . . . such as asthma, COPD, pneumonia, or sleep apnea.” Jackson v. Berryhill, No. 3:13-00692, 2017 WL 4937612, at *6 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2017) (quoting Healthline, Respiratory Acidosis, http://www.healthline.com/health/ respiratory-acidosis#Overview1). 86 20 21 22 87 AR 1013. 88 AR 1014. 89 Id. 25 90 Id. 26 91 Id. 92 AR 563–65. 93 AR 565. 23 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 9 1 3 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently. There are no postural limitations on bending, stooping or crouching and the claimant can perform this frequently. There are no manipulative limitations on reaching, handling, feeling, grasping or fingering, and the claimant can perform this frequently. There are no workplace environmental limitations.94 4 A corrective action letter was issued September 2, 2011, questioning “[the] quality of [Dr. 2 5 Chen’s] CE [(consultative examination)] reports, [and] thoroughness of examinations.”95 6 Subsequently, Dr. Chen was removed from the Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) “panel 7 for his unprofessional manner and failure to adequately correct deficiencies in his CE reports.”96 8 (The ALJ assigned no weight to his opinion.97) 9 2.1.5 Louis Giorgi, M.D. — Non-Examining Dr. Giorgi filled out a physical-residual functional-capacity assessment on August 25, 2011 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 and concluded the following about Mr. Grant: (1) exertional limitations: occasionally lift 20 12 pound; frequently lift 10 pounds; stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a total of 6 hours in 13 an 8-hour workday; sit (with normal breaks for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and unlimited push 14 and/or pull (including operation of hand and/or foot controls); explained the evidence in support of 15 these assessments as “gait normal” and “bilat. lower extremities: pitting edema;” (2) postural 16 limitation: occasionally climb ramps/stairs/ladders/rope/scaffolds, crouch, and crawl; frequently 17 balance, stoop, and kneel; (3) manipulative limitations: none; (3) communicative limitations: 18 none; and (4) postural limitations: none.98 Dr. Giorgi further noted that Mr. Grant suffered from 19 hypertension and had been advised to seek medical attention.99 20 21 94 22 23 24 25 Id. 95 AR 40 n. 1. (ALJ quoting first “Corrective Action” letter). AR 40 n. 1 (quoting third and final “Corrective Action” letter); see also Hart v. Colvin, No.15-cv00623 (JST), 2016 WL 6611002, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016) (approving a class-action settlement that included provisions for re-opening certain disability cases where the claimant was examined by Dr. Chen, but providing that “if Dr. Chen’s CE report was explicitly afforded no weight in the analysis, that individual [would] not be eligible for another review of his or her claim.”). 96 27 97 AR 40 n. 1. 98 26 AR 567–571. 99 Id. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 10 2.1.6 1 Jodi Snyder, Psy.D. — Examining On June 25, 2013, Dr. Snyder, a psychologist, examined Mr. Grant.100 She reviewed his 3 medical history, considered his chief complaint (obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and 4 shortness of breath), identified his substance-abuse history (denied present use, self-described 5 alcoholic with seven DUI’s and his last drink the day before), reviewed his employment history 6 (past construction and in-home care with last job four years ago).101 She administered a battery of 7 tests: a complete psychological exam, the Folstein Mini Mental Status Exam, the Wechsler Adult 8 Intelligence Scale, the Weschler Memory Scale, and Trails A & B.102 For the Mental Status Exam: 9 she noted his cooperative and friendly attitude, his fair eye contact, his falling asleep and poor 10 attention, his poor insight and judgment, and his depressed mood, among other things.103 His 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 2 intelligence test had borderline results for verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning, and 12 working memory, and extremely low results for processing speed and FSIQ.104 His Auditory 13 Memory Index Score was extremely low, and his Visual Working Memory Index was low 14 average.105 Her summary reflected the following additional points, among others: (1) cognitive 15 functioning: score suggested difficulties with cognition (but “considering he fell asleep, please 16 interpret with caution”); (2) emotional functioning: client reported depression due to worsening 17 medical issues; and (3) prognosis/discussion: “Guarded: Diffuse difficulty with cognition noted to 18 all domains. However, considering he fell asleep several times during the testing, please interpret 19 with caution. Claimant’s issues appear primarily medical in nature with secondary depression. 20 Will defer to medical opinion to address medical issues.”106 21 22 100 AR 798–802 23 101 AR 798–99. 24 102 AR 800. 103 Id. 25 26 Id. “FSIQ” is an abbreviation for “full-scale IQ.” See Nicholson v. Colvin, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1195 (D. Or. 2015). 104 105 27 AR 801. 106 Id. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 11 Her diagnosis was as follows: (1) Axis I: depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), 1 2 and cognitive disorder, NOS; (2) Axis II: deferred; (3) Axis III: hypertension; shortness of breath, 3 chronic edema of both legs (right greater than left); morbid obesity; and obstructive sleep apnea; 4 (4) Axis IV: chronic health concerns; economic problems; limited support system; occupational 5 problems; and (5) Axis V: a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score of 61.107 In her medical-source statement, she reported the following level of impairments for work- 6 related activities: (1) unimpaired: ability to follow simple instructions and ability to maintain 8 adequate pace or persistence to perform one or two simple repetitive tasks; (2) mildly impaired: 9 ability to maintain adequate attention/concentration; ability to adapt to changes in job routine; 10 ability to interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the public on a regular basis; 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 and ability to adapt to changes, hazards, or stressors in a workplace setting; (3) mild-moderate 12 impaired: ability to follow complex/detailed instructions; ability to maintain adequate pace or 13 persistence to perform complex tasks; ability to adapt to changes in job routine; and ability to 14 withstand the ability of a routine workday; and (4) no ability to manage funds.108 2.1.7 15 Preston Davis, Psy.D. — Non-Examining 16 On July 28, 2013, Dr. Davis, a psychologist, reviewed Mr. Grant’s medical records through 17 July 9, 2013.109 The records note Mr. Grant’s height and weight of 5’8” and 375 pounds.110 Dr. 18 Davis identified the following impairments, alleged and discovered: CHF (congestive heart 19 failure), sleep apnea, acute edema, HTN (hypertension), bilateral leg swelling, SOB (shortness of 20 21 AR 801–02. A Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score purports to rate a subject’s mental state and symptoms; the higher the rating, the better the subject’s coping and functioning skills. “A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for treatment.” See Worsham v. Colvin, No. 15CV55-WQH-MDD, 2016 WL 750108, at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (report and recommendation), adopted, No. 15CV55-WQH-MDD, 2016 WL 739792 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016). “According to the DSM–IV, a GAF score between 61 and 70 describes “mild symptoms . . . but generally functioning pretty well . . . . [sic] DSM–IV–TR, p.34.” Id. 107 22 23 24 25 27 108 AR 802. 109 26 AR 93–100. 110 AR 93. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 12 1 breath), chest pain, and discovered DAA (drug and alcohol abuse) issues.111 After reviewing Mr. 2 Grant’s medical history, Dr. Davis identified the following medically determinable impairments: 3 essential hypertension (primary, severe), obesity (secondary, severe), organic mental disorders 4 (other, non severe), and affective disorders (other, non severe).112 He found mild restrictions for 5 activities of daily living, difficulties maintaining social functioning, and difficulties in maintaining 6 concentration, persistence, or pace.113 There was “insufficient evidence” to evaluate if Mr. Grant 7 experienced “Repeated Episodes of Decompensation.”114 He concluded that Mr. Grant did not 8 meet the “A,” “B” or “C” criteria for Listings 12.02 or 12.04.115 9 2.1.8 Nick Mansour, M.D. — Non-Examining On July 22, 2013, Dr. Mansour reviewed Mr. Grant’s records and made a residual-functional 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 capacity (“RFC”) assessment.116 Mr. Grant’s exertional limitations based on his morbid obesity 12 are as follows: occasionally lift and/or carry (including upward pulling) 25 pounds; frequently lift 13 and/or carry (include upward pulling) 10 pounds; stand/walk (with normal breaks) for a total of 14 four hours; sit (with normal breaks) for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and unlimited 15 push and/or pull (including operation of hand and/or foot controls).117 Mr. Grant’s postural 16 limitations were as follows: frequently climb ramps/stairs; occasionally climb 17 ladders/ropes/scaffolds; frequently balancing; frequently stooping; frequently kneeling; 18 occasionally crouching; and occasionally crawling.118 Dr. Mansour offered the following 19 additional explanation: 20 This man’s main problem is his morbid obesity. He has actually diastolic dysfunction which is called diastolic CHF. I find no evidence of frank pulmonary 21 22 111 AR 97. 23 112 AR 99. 113 AR 100. 114 Id. 25 115 Id. 26 116 AR 101–03. 117 AR 102. 118 Id. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 13 1 edema or CHF and it appears that part of the problem may be excessive alcoholic intake and lack of compliance with his hypertension medications.119 2 3 He opined that Mr. Grant could not do his past relevant work as a home attendant or a security 4 guard because he was limited to sedentary work.120 He gave “great weight” to Dr. Frank Chen, 5 because it was “[consistent with] findings,”121 and less weight to Dr. Snyder’s analysis because the 6 opinion was “not fully supported by other evidence from other evidence of record.”122 7 2.1.9 On January 20, 2014, Dr. Saphir made an RFC assessment.123 He repeated Dr. Mansour’s 8 9 conclusions, also discounting Dr. Snyder and assigning “great weight” to Dr. Chen.124 10 2.1.10 Patrice Solomon, Ph. D. — Non-Examining 11 United States District Court Northern District of California J.R. Saphir, M.D. — Non-Examining On January 21, 2014, Dr. Solomon reviewed Mr. Grant’s medical records through January 1, 12 2014.125 She reported the following medical impairment/diagnoses: essential hypertension 13 (primary, severe); obesity (secondary, severe); organic mental disorder (other, non-severe); 14 affective disorder (other, non-severe); and substance-abuse disorders (other, non-severe).126 Dr. 15 Solomon also reviewed Mr. Grant’s psychological records and concluded that Mr. Grant did not 16 suffer from severe mental limitations.127 Concerning the “paragraph B” criteria for Listings 12.02 17 and 12.04, Dr. Snyder found that Mr. Grant had only mild limitations.128 She concluded that the 18 19 20 119 AR 103. 120 AR 104. 22 121 AR 101. 23 122 AR 103. 123 AR 130–31. 124 Id. 25 125 AR 121–29. 26 126 AR 128. 127 AR 127–29. 128 AR 128. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 14 1 evidence did not establish that Mr. Grant satisfied the “paragraph C” criteria for Listings 12.02 or 2 12.04.129 2.1.11 Lifelong Medical Care — Treating 3 Beginning December 26, 2012, Mr. Grant sought medical treatment at Lifelong Medical Care 4 5 in East Oakland, California.130 Mr. Grant went to Lifelong Medical Center until at least August 14, 6 2015.131 Mr. Grant mainly saw Aguia Heath, M.D.,132 and Serena Wu, M.D.;133 both were his 7 primary-care physicians.134 Mr. Grant also regularly met with pharmacists, who advised him about 8 his medications, stressed the importance of compliance with all of his medications, and 9 encouraged him to adopt a healthier lifestyle.135 On a less frequent basis, Mr. Grant saw Morgen Yao-Cohen, M.D.,136 a physician in Lifelong Medical Care’s congestive heart failure practice 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 group,137 and Eric Fuller, D.P.M., a podiatrist.138 Mr. Grant also saw social workers139 at Lifelong 12 Medical Center for his depression, anxiety, and polysubstance abuse, and they conducted home 13 visits.140 Mr. Grant visited Lifelong Medical Care for a variety of health issues, including foot 14 pain,141 issues with foot care,142 foot and leg swelling,143 a chronic cough,144 rashes,145 and ear 15 129 16 Id. 130 AR 921. 17 131 AR 1574. 18 19 20 132 See, e.g., AR 876–90, 897–908, 912–44, 969–80, 984–92, 1224–27, 1234–42, 1247–59, 1263–66, 1269–72, 1277–79. 133 See, e.g., AR 1035–37, 1176–79, 1184–94, 1199–1204, 1212–23, 1579–85, 1593–96. 134 The record indicates that Dr. Wu is a family practice physician. See AR 1037. 135 21 22 See, e.g., AR 894–96, 960–61, 966–68, 1168–72, 1180–83, 1195–98, 1205–11, 1228–33, 1260–62, 1267–68, 1273–76, 1560–63, 1586–87. 136 See, e.g., AR 1164–67, 1173–75, 1574–78, 1588–92. 137 23 AR 1187. 138 See, e.g., AR 891–93, 909–11, 981–83, 1243–46. 24 139 25 26 27 Mr. Grant saw Claudia Madison, LCSW, in August 2013 for his depression and alcohol abuse. See AR 993–94, 1569–70. He also saw Jennifer Wachter, LCSW, in July 2015 for his anxiety. See AR 1550–52. 140 Brigitte Peltekof and Celina Ramirez, LCSW, visited Mr. Grant at his home in June 2014. See AR 1565–66. Ms. Peltekof returned in April 2015 for another home visit with Clipper Young, Pharm.D., and a student intern. See AR 1562–63. 141 28 See, e.g., AR, 905, 977. ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 15 1 problems,146 but practitioners at Lifelong Medical Care also addressed many of his chronic health 2 conditions, such as obstructive sleep apnea,147 polysubstance abuse,148 cardiomyopathy,149 3 hypertension,150 edema,151 respiratory failure,152 congestive heart exacerbation or failure,153 4 cellulitis,154 kidney disease,155 noncompliance with his medications, dietary regimen, or use of his 5 CPAP machine,156 shortness of breath or breathing problems,157 intertrigo,158 and morbid 6 obesity.159 In addition to prescribing and adjusting Mr. Grant’s medications,160 the physicians at 7 Lifelong Medical Care repeatedly encouraged Mr. Grant to adopt healthy lifestyle changes, such 8 142 See, e.g., AR 909, 909–11, 977, 989, 1245. 143 See, e.g., 909–11, 921, 956, 1243–46. 144 See, e.g., AR 951, 956, 1250. 11 145 See, e.g., AR 901, 905, 917, 973, 977. 12 146 See, e.g., AR 901, 905, 962, 969, 973, 977. 147 See, e.g., AR 903, 908, 992, 1263, 1266, 1269, 1579, 1593. 9 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 13 14 148 See, e.g., AR 912, 917, 924, 951, 956, 959, 969, 971, 986, 989, 992–93, 1184, 1239, 1254, 1263, 1269, 1586. See, e.g., AR 912, 924, 951, 956, 986, 1212, 1220–21, 1227, 1242, 1254, 1256. “Cardiomyopathy is ‘a general diagnostic term designating primary noninflationary disease of the heart muscle, often of obscure or unknown etiology and not the result of ischemic, hypertensive, congenital, valvular, or pericardial disease.’” Hargrove v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-196-KS-MTP, 2016 WL 418172, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2016) (quoting Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 287 (29th ed. 2000)). 149 15 16 17 18 150 See, e.g., AR 924, 951, 962, 971, 1184, 1239, 1242, 1247, 1250–51, 1254, 1276–77, 1279, 1574, 1579, 1586. 151 See, e.g., AR 959, 986, 1246, 1254, 1266. 152 See, e.g., AR 899, 971 (same visit repeated in the record). 20 153 See, e.g., AR 992, 1167, 1175–76, 1184, 1192, 1199, 1216, 1579, 1586, 1593. 21 154 See, e.g., AR 1192. 155 See, e.g., id. 156 See, e.g., AR 905, 961, 1212, 1266. 23 157 See, e.g., AR 1216, 1218. 24 158 19 22 25 26 See, e.g., AR 1227, 1254. Intertrigo is characterized as “a rash that shows up between the folds of skin. It is a very common skin rash that can crop up throughout life.” Williams-Bey v. Carpenter, No. 14-0490-CG-C, 2015 WL 4602871, at *2 n.3 (S.D. Ala. July 29, 2015) (quoting WebMD, http://webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/guide/intertrigo-symptoms-causes-treatmentrisk_factors_). 159 27 See, e.g., AR 1254. 160 See, e.g., AR 899, 903, 920, 924, 954, 959, 964, 967, 1178, 1237. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 16 1 as limiting his sodium intake to reduce his hypertension,161 increasing his daily exercise 2 regimen,162 restricting his fluid intake to prevent fluid overload,163 eating healthier,164 and 3 monitoring his blood pressure at home with a blood pressure monitor that they provided for 4 him.165 Mr. Grant’s physicians repeatedly advised him to decrease his alcohol intake or abstain 5 from cocaine and alcohol use altogether.166 They also advised Mr. Grant to increase his 6 compliance with his medications167 and the use of his CPAP machine, stressing that it needed to 7 be fitted properly.168 They also provided assistance with leg and foot care, such as debriding and 8 trimming his nails and wrapping his legs when he suffered from edema.169 Dr. Wu — addressed by the ALJ because she did an RFC assessment — saw Mr. Grant 10 approximately twelve times between June 2014 and August 2015.170 Dr. Wu began treating Mr. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 Grant on June 26, 2014.171 The record reflects that Mr. Grant’s height and weight of 5’8’’ and 12 361.5 pounds.172 Dr. Wu saw Mr. Grant for a check-up and noted that Mr. Grant’s previous 13 primary-care physician was Dr. Heath.173 Dr. Wu listed Mr. Grant’s chronic problems (including 14 health-care maintenance, morbid obesity, obstructive-sleep apnea, hypertension, cardiomyopathy, 15 chemical dependency, alcohol abuse, a history of myocardial infarction,174 tinea,175 pedal edema, 16 17 161 See, e.g., AR 1167, 1261, 1276. 18 162 See, e.g., AR 967, 1175, 1261, 1584. 163 See, e.g., AR 895, 967, 1167, 1591. 164 See, e.g., AR 895, 967, 1175, 1584. 20 165 See, e.g., AR 1255. 21 166 See, e.g., AR 899, 959, 971, 980. 167 See, e.g., AR 1197, 1211, 1255, 1591. 168 See, e.g., AR, 908, 980, 1190. 23 169 See, e.g., AR 983, 1245–46. 24 170 See, e.g., AR 1176–79, 1184–94, 1199–1204, 1212–23, 1579–85, 1593–96. 171 AR 1221. 172 AR 1223. 26 173 AR 1221. 27 174 19 22 25 A myocardial infarction is commonly known as a heart attack. See Avello v. Colvin, No. 2:13-cv00504-JAD-GWF, 2014 WL 5506746, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 16, 2014). 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 17 1 cocaine use, intertrigo, TMJ (temporomandibular joint) arthropathy,176 depression, and gait 2 instability, and reviewed his medical history (including Mr. Grant’s active medications, allergies, 3 and family medical history).177 Dr. Wu treated Mr. Grant for cardiomyopathy and stopped two of 4 his medications, but she was unable to review his medications fully because Mr. Grant failed to 5 bring them to his appointment.178 On July 28, 2014, Dr. Wu completed an RFC evaluation for Mr. Grant.179 Dr. Wu recorded 6 7 “date of first contact” as December 26, 2012, presumably because this is the date that Mr. Grant 8 first began medical treatment at Lifelong Medical Center.180 She diagnosed him with morbid 9 obesity, obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and cardiomyopathy, with a fair prognosis. 181 She listed his symptoms as severe fatigue, limited mobility, and limited ability to ambulate. 182 She 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 expected his impairments to last over 12 months, and she noted that Mr. Grant was not a 12 malingerer.183 During a typical eight-hour workday, with the ordinary breaks, Mr. Grant’s pain 13 symptoms were “constantly” severe enough to interfere with the attention and concentration 14 necessary to sustain simple, repetitive, work tasks.184 Mr. Grant could tolerate moderate stress.185 15 In a competitive work situation, Mr. Grant could not sit (at any one time) for more than 45 16 17 18 175 19 20 21 Tinea is usually a fungal and bacterial infection. See Rickert v. Astrue, No. 1:07CV122, 2008 WL 820170, at *3 n.5, n.6 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 26, 2008) (citations omitted). Arthropathy is defined as “an inflammatory joint disease, such as rheumatoid arthritis.” Sandoval v. Barnhart, 209 F. App’x 820, 824 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 169 (19th ed. 2001)). 176 177 22 AR 1221–23. 178 AR 1223. 23 179 AR 1035–38. 180 AR 921, 1035, 1221. 24 181 25 AR 1035. 182 Id. 26 183 AR 1036. 184 Id. 185 Id. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 18 1 minutes, and his limitations (considered in combination) were likely to produce good and bad 2 days, resulting in absences from work of about two days a month.186 3 Dr. Wu next saw Mr. Grant on August 7, 2014 for a check-up appointment concerning his 4 breathing issues.187 He weighed 367.5 pounds.188 Mr. Grant complained of shortness of breath and 5 edema.189 He was not compliant with his Lasix medication because he had gone “away for a few 6 days” and failed to bring it with him.190 Mr. Grant reported that “he at baseline sle[pt] sitting up” 7 and “denie[d] nocturnal dyspnea or orthopnea.”191 Dr. Wu treated Mr. Grant for cardiomyopathy, 8 adjusted his medications, and ordered testing.192 She “g[ave] [Mr. Grant] strict ED (emergency 9 department) precautions.”193 Dr. Wu may have next seen Mr. Grant on August 12, 2014, when she 10 conducted “chart prep.”194 Mr. Grant next saw Dr. Wu on August 21, 2014.195 He weighed 378 pounds at this visit.196 He United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 was in the hospital and requested a larger hospital bed.197 Mr. Grant presented with 13 cardiomyopathy, and his symptoms were improving since he had become more compliant in 14 taking Lasix as prescribed.198 Dr. Wu “discussed with [Mr. Grant] going to another cardiologist” 15 in order to obtain “better documentation and communication,” and Mr. Grant was amenable to 16 186 AR 1036–37. 187 AR 1218–20. 188 AR 1220. 19 189 AR 1218. 20 190 Id. 17 18 Id. (punctuation altered). “Orthopnea is the sensation of breathlessness in the recumbent position, relieved by sitting or standing.” Jackson, 2017 WL 4937612, at *4 n.4 (quoting Vaskar Mukerji, Dyspnea, Orthopnea, and Paroxysmal Nocturnal Dyspnea, Clinical Methods: The History, Physical, and Laboratory Examinations (3rd ed. 1990), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK213/). 191 21 22 192 AR 1220. 193 Id. 194 AR 1203. The date of this visit is somewhat ambiguous in that October 10, 2014 is also listed. 25 195 AR 1212–15. 26 196 AR 1214. 197 Id. 198 AR 1212. 23 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 19 1 doing so.199 Dr. Wu addressed Mr. Grant’s chronic health problems, namely congestive heart 2 failure, his history of myocardial infarction, obstructive sleep apnea, and hypoventilation 3 associated with obesity.200 She conducted a physical exam, and Mr. Grant’s respiratory and 4 cardiovascular systems were normal.201 His condition was stable.202 Dr. Wu ordered a larger 5 hospital bed and referred him to see a cardiologist.203 Dr. Wu next saw Mr. Grant on November 12, 2014 for a check-up appointment concerning his 6 7 congestive heart failure, and he also presented with a rash on the left side of his face that had 8 persisted for two weeks.204 Her report — like others — details his history, his medical problems, 9 his vital signs (including his weight of 372 pounds), and his high blood pressure (with the notation that Mr. Grant forgot to take his medication the night before so his blood pressure was high).205 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Mr. Grant did not have a follow-up appointment scheduled with his new cardiologist, but he 12 indicated that he would make one so that he could discuss the results of a stress test he had 13 taken.206 Dr. Wu diagnosed Mr. Grant with a mild tinea infection on the left side of his face and 14 prescribed an antifungal cream.207 She performed a physical exam, and all of her findings were 15 normal.208 She referred Mr. Grant to a nutritionist and “encouraged” him to schedule an 16 appointment with his cardiologist.209 17 18 19 199 Id. 200 Id. 201 AR 1214. 22 202 Id. 23 203 AR 1215. 204 AR 1199–1202. 205 AR 1199. 25 206 AR 1202. 26 207 Id. 208 AR 1201. 209 Id. 20 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 20 Dr. Wu next saw Mr. Grant on December 17, 2014 for a follow-up appointment concerning his 1 2 recent hospital admission for cellulitis and acute kidney injury on chronic kidney disease. 210 Mr. 3 Grant stopped taking Lasix during his hospital stay due to his kidney injury, but Dr. Wu indicated 4 that she wanted to restart Lasix once his kidney injury was resolved.211 She deferred prescribing 5 Lasix until she received the laboratory results from Mr. Grant’s recent hospital stay.212 She 6 conducted a physical exam, and all of her findings were normal.213 Mr. Grant next saw Dr. Wu on January 8, 2015 for a routine visit.214 Mr. Grant was previously 7 8 admitted to Alta Bates Summit Medical Center, where he had been diagnosed with diverticulitis 9 and prescribed medication.215 Mr. Grant reported “great improvement” with respect to his heartfailure symptoms because he had lost some weight.216 At the time of this visit, Mr. Grant weighed 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 351 pounds.217 Mr. Grant “was off diuretics completely, and [he] report[ed] no active cellulitis.”218 12 Mr. Grant reported, however, that he continued to suffer from lymphedema.219 He reported that he 13 was considering undergoing a cardiology procedure and was due to see a cardiologist the 14 following month.220 Dr. Wu conducted a physical exam of Mr. Grant, and all of her findings we 15 normal except for some “lichenified patches” on his left shin.221 She adjusted his medications and 16 ordered a new mask for his CPAP machine.222 17 18 210 AR 1192–94. 19 211 AR 1194. 20 212 Id. 213 Id. 214 AR 1188–91. 22 215 AR 1188. 23 216 Id. 217 AR 1190. 218 AR 1188. 25 219 Id. 26 220 Id. 221 AR 1190. 222 AR 1190. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 21 1 Dr. Wu next saw Mr. Grant on March 30, 2015 for a follow-up appointment concerning his 2 chronic heart failure, hypertension, chronic cough, and mental health issues.223 He weighed 379.5 3 pounds at this visit. 224 Mr. Grant had recently been admitted to the intensive-care unit for chronic 4 heart-failure exacerbation, and Dr. Wu scheduled an appointment for Mr. Grant at a congestive 5 heart-failure group.225 She deferred adjusting Mr. Grant’s medication for congestive heart failure 6 until she could obtain additional laboratory test results.226 She also waited to see Mr. Grant’s 7 discharge summary before putting him back on certain medications for hypertension.227 Dr. Wu 8 “suspect[ed]” that Mr. Grant’s chronic cough was due to a “multitude” of factors, including his 9 chronic heart failure and “possibly undiagnosed COPD” (chronic obstructive-pulmonary disease).228 She prescribed medication and ordered an inhaler for Mr. Grant.229 She also referred 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Mr. Grant to therapy for his depression.230 Lastly, Dr. Wu conducted a physical exam, and all of 12 her findings were normal.231 Mr. Grant next saw Dr. Wu on April 13, 2015 for a follow-up visit concerning his congestive 13 14 heart failure.232 Mr. Grant’s weight was “up from baseline,” as he weighed 384 pounds.233 Mr. 15 Grant’s congestive heart failure was “poorly controlled,” and he had “pitting edema up to [his] 16 mid thigh.”234 Mr. Grant indicated that he was going to a lymphedema clinic and that he would 17 like a referral for general physical-therapy outpatient services at the same location.235 Dr. Wu 18 223 19 AR 1184–87. 224 AR 1186. 20 225 Id. 226 Id. 21 227 22 Id. 228 Id. 23 229 Id. 230 AR 1187. 24 231 25 AR 1186. 232 AR 1176–79. 26 233 AR 1176. 234 Id. 235 Id. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 22 1 noted that “home health” care services “was ordered” for Mr. Grant, but Mr. Grant reported that 2 “no one ha[d] shown up yet.”236 Dr. Wu conducted a physical exam, and all of her findings were 3 normal except for Mr. Grant’s chronic pitting edema.237 Dr. Wu adjusted Mr. Grant’s medications, 4 made an appointment for Mr. Grant at the congestive heart failure group, and indicated she would 5 check on the status of his home health referral.238 6 Dr. Wu next saw Mr. Grant on June 23, 2015 for a follow-up appointment concerning his 7 lymphedema and congestive heart failure.239 Dr. Wu referred him for home health care for his 8 lymphedema, and she also referred him to see a nutritionist.240 Mr. Grant’s condition was 9 “worsening since [he] left the lymphedema clinic,” and he did not have a “home RN (registered nurse) to help him with [his] leg wrappings.”241 Because of Mr. Grant’s body shape, he was unable 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 to wrap his legs by himself.242 Mr. Grant had not been “watching [his] diet,” and his congestive 12 heart failure was difficult to control.243 Dr. Wu spoke with him “extensively” about his diet and 13 exercise regimen and made an appointment for him at the congestive-heart-failure group.244 14 Mr. Grant’s last visit in the record with Dr. Wu was an August 3, 2015 for a follow-up 15 concerning his congestive-heart failure, hypertension, and sleep apnea.245 Mr. Grant recently 16 experienced shortness of breath, and he also had gained weight since his last visit.246 He weighed 17 403 pounds.247 Dr. Wu conducted a physical exam, and all of her findings were normal.248 She 18 236 19 Id. 237 AR 1178. 20 238 Id. 239 AR 1583–85. 21 240 22 AR 1584. 241 Id. 23 242 Id. 243 Id. 24 244 25 Id. 245 AR 1579–82, 1593–96 (same visit repeated in the record). 26 246 AR 1579, 1593. 247 AR 1581, 1595. 248 AR 1581, 1595. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 23 1 noted that Mr. Grant was supposed to have a follow-up appointment with a cardiologist but failed 2 to make one.249 Mr. Grant’s blood pressure “contin[ued] to be elevated,” and Dr. Wu made an 3 appointment for Mr. Grant at a blood-pressure clinic.250 Because Mr. Grant indicated that his 4 settings for his CPAP mask were not as effective as they had been, Dr. Wu scheduled a sleep- 5 study retest for him.251 Dr. Wu conducted a physical exam, and all of her findings were normal.252 6 She also adjusted his medications.253 2.1.12 Vincent Baldwin M.D. — Treating 7 Dr. Baldwin treated Mr. Grant from January 6, 2012 to April 3, 2015 for pain management 9 resulting from a right ankle fracture in 2010.254 He diagnosed him with “Status post Fracture of the 10 Right Ankle,” chronic pain syndrome, keloid255/ right ankle surgical scar, anxiety/depression, and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 bilateral lower extremity edema.256 Dr. Baldwin also diagnosed Mr. Grant with instability in his 12 right ankle257 and lower back pain258 at subsequent visits. His treatment included acupuncture with 13 electrostimulation, lower extremity massages, medication management, behavioral modification 14 techniques, vocalization of Mr. Grant’s psychological/emotional issues, a home exercise program, 15 and psychological/emotional support.259 Dr. Baldwin recommended that Mr. Grant receive 16 acupuncture and massage therapy two to three times weekly for the following twelve to sixteen 17 18 249 AR 1579, 1593. 250 Id. 251 Id. 21 252 AR 1581, 1594. 22 253 Id. 254 AR 1066–1154. 19 20 23 24 “A keloid is ‘a raised area caused by an overgrowth of scar tissue.’” Buford, 2015 WL 8042210, at *4 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015) (quoting Mayo Clinic, Keloid, http://www.mayoclinic.org/keloid/ img20007748). 25 256 AR 1152. 26 257 See, e.g., AR 1138, 1141, 1128. 258 See, e.g., AR 1067, 1070 (same visit repeated in the record). 259 AR 1152–53. 27 255 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 24 weeks.260 He prescribed pain medication and discussed changing Mr. Grant’s sleeping habits, 2 decreasing the amount of time Mr. Grant spent standing, and taking up aquatic aerobics. For 3 subsequent visits, Dr. Baldwin would see Mr. Grant “as needed for medication management, 4 treatment for flare-ups and exacerbations, and provide the necessary psychological and emotional 5 support.”261 Mr. Grant was “temporarily totally disabled” and “unable to do modified or his 6 regular occupation.”262 In March 2012, Mr. Grant’s conditions had improved, he had been 7 undergoing gait training to avoid falling, and while he was still “totally disabled and unable to do 8 modified work,” Dr. Baldwin “suspect[ed] that he should be able to return to work within . . . 3–4 9 months.”263 Subsequent recent treatment records indicate, however, that his conditions worsened 10 when he discontinued acupuncture, electrostimulation, and massage therapy because his insurance 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 carrier “denied the utilization of acupuncture and electrical stimulation and hands-on massage 12 therapy as primary treatment modalities.”264 13 At his most recent visit in April 2015, Mr. Grant continued to suffer from right ankle pain, 14 right knee pain, and lower back pain as well as other chronic health conditions, including edema, 15 congestive heart failure, pickwickian syndrome265 and severe narcolepsy.266 He recently had been 16 hospitalized numerous times for “hypertension and congestive heart failure as well as [an] 17 inability to ambulate due to the pain and discomfort in his lower extremities.”267 Dr. Baldwin 18 diagnosed Mr. Grant with a “right ankle fracture status post ORIF (open reduction internal 19 fixation),” right knee strain/osteoarthritis, chronic lower back pain/strain, congestive heart failure, 20 260 AR 1153. 261 AR 1153–54. 22 262 AR 1154. 23 263 AR 1119. 264 AR 1079–80. 21 24 25 26 Pickwickian syndrome is characterized “as a condition in which ‘impairment of breathing leads to hypercapnia, a reduced effect of CO2 in simulating respiration, hypoxia, cor pulmonale, and a risk of premature death.” Dyson v. Massanari, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 n.3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2001) (quoting Merck Manual 60 (17th ed. 1999)). 265 266 27 AR 1067, 1170. 267 Id. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 25 1 morbid obesity, severe lower extremity and abdominal edema, anxiety/depression, and 2 narcolepsy.268 Dr. Baldwin continued to prescribe pain medication.269 Mr. Grant’s depression and 3 anxiety were “so severe” that Dr. Baldwin also prescribed medication “for severe anxiety 4 spells.”270 Mr. Grant’s “overall prognosis [was] quite poor,” and Dr. Baldwin determined that he 5 was “permanently disabled and will be so for the rest of his life.”271 2.1.13 Berkeley Cardiovascular Medical Group — Treating 6 Dr. Wu referred Mr. Grant here for treatment for his cardiac condition.272 The treatment 7 8 records cover the period from September 11, 2014 to April 15, 2015 and reflect the following 9 information. On September 11, 2014, Duane Stephens, M.D., a cardiologist, evaluated Mr. Grant, noting his 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 past medical history, his medications, his physical condition (including weight of 370 pounds, 12 normal gait, and absent lower-extremity edema), and diagnosed him with cardiomyopathy and 13 obesity, among other conditions, and said that further cardiac evaluation was needed.273 He 14 underwent tests in September and October 2014.274 Mr. Grant came in for an office visit in 15 January 2015 after he had recently been hospitalized for a leg infection and diverticulitis.275 He 16 weighed 354 pounds.276 Dr. Stephens’s impression was that Mr. Grant suffered from 17 cardiomyopathy, old MI (anterior wall myocardial infarction), and obesity.277 Dr. Stephens 18 planned to keep Mr. Grant on the “chronic medical therapy” he was receiving for his 19 cardiomyopathy and myocardial infarction, and while Mr. Grant’s obesity had improved since his 20 268 AR 1069, 1072. 269 Id. 22 270 AR 1068, 1071. 23 271 AR 1069, 1072. 272 AR 1212, 1542. 273 AR 1542–43. 25 274 AR 1524–25, 1530–31. 26 275 AR 1547–48. 276 AR 1547. 277 AR 1548. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 26 1 last visit, Dr. Stephens “instructed” Mr. Grant on a low-fat diet.278 Mr. Grant saw Dr. Stephens 2 again for a follow-up in April 2015.279 Dr. Stephens diagnosed Mr. Grant with the same medical 3 conditions and determined that further cardiac evaluation was needed for Mr. Grant’s myocardial 4 infarction.280 He did not make any changes to Mr. Grant’s medical therapy.281 2.1.14 Eden Medical Center — Treating 5 Dr. Wu referred Mr. Grant for therapy at the lymphedema clinic at Eden Medical Center.282 6 Mr. Grant went to Eden Medical center from January 14, 2015 to June 5, 2015 for physical 8 therapy and lymphedema treatment.283 In January 2015, Mr. Grant saw Allyn Martinez, OT, for a 9 lymphedema evaluation.284 Ms. Martinez reviewed Mr. Grant’s medical history.285 Her clinical 10 impression was that Mr. Grant suffered from bilateral stage 3 edema in his right lower leg and 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 entire left leg and that Mr. Grant had numerous other impairments including his skin integrity, a 12 risk of infection, and a lack of a lymphedema management program.286 She planned a therapeutic 13 program lasting four to six weeks, with Mr. Grant’s receiving manual lymph drainage, 14 bandaging/compression garments, a home exercise program, and the use of a compression 15 pump.287 Over the course of Mr. Grant’s treatment, occupational therapists repeatedly cleaned and 16 wrapped Mr. Grant’s lower extremities in compression bandages288 and discussed the benefits of 17 obtaining compression garments.289 They also taught Mr. Grant and his brother how to bandage 18 19 278 Id. 20 279 AR 1544–46. 280 AR 1546. 21 281 22 Id. 282 AR 1308–09, 1392–94. 23 283 AR 1286–1485. 284 AR 1297–1302. 24 285 25 AR 1311–14. 286 AR 1300. 26 287 AR 1301. 288 See, e.g., AR 1320, 1331, 1340, 1362, 1471. 289 See, e.g., AR 1340. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 27 1 his lower extremities.290 In April 2015, Marina Villarey, OT, saw Mr. Grant and found that he was 2 “progressing slower than anticipated toward [his] goals”291 of having effective compression 3 garments, being able to effectively manage his lymphedema at home, being able to stand for 4 longer than 15 minutes, and being able to walk approximately one block “with less pain.”292 His 5 progress continued to be slower than anticipated the following month due to multiple missed 6 appointments, lack of compliance at home, and an inability to purchase compression garments. 293 In a May 2015 physical therapy evaluation with Raphael Joson, PT, Mr. Grant’s goal was to 7 8 get back into shape, particularly in terms of increasing his ability to walk, stand, and engage in 9 recreational activities.294 Mr. Joson characterized Mr. Grant’s rehabilitation potential as “fair” because he expected Mr. Grant’s progress “to be hindered by the severity and irritability of [his] 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 condition” as well as “the presence of comorbitities” such as chronic heart failure.295 Mr. Joson’s 12 plan for Mr. Grant included “Manual Therapy, Therapeutic Exercise, Therapeutic Activity, Neuro 13 Re-Education, Patient Education, Gait Training, Caregiver/Family Training/Education, ADL 14 Training,” and “Aquatic Therapy and Balance Training.”296 As planned, he started Mr. Grant in 15 pool therapy during his next visit three days later.297 Medical Expert Testimony: James Todd, M.D. — Non-Examining 16 2.2 17 Dr. Todd, a specialist in cardiology and internal medicine, testified by telephone at the July 20, 18 2015 hearing.298 In response to questions by the ALJ, and based on his review of Exhibits 1F–18F 19 the medical records,299 Dr. Todd testified as follows. 20 290 See, e.g., AR 1351, 1362. 291 AR 1372. 292 AR 1300. 23 293 AR 1416, 1450, 1470. 24 294 AR 1383–84. 295 AR 1383. 296 AR 1384. 26 297 AR 1402–03, see also AR 1425–27, 1458–60, 1479–81 (subsequent pool therapy visits). 27 298 21 22 25 AR 50, 60–78; see also AR 1039–41 (Dr. Todd is board certified in cardiology and internal medicine). 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 28 1 Mr. Grant had several impairments.300 2 First, he had pain in various parts of his body (“particularly in a non-healing fracture of the 3 right ankle”), but there was “no documentation of physical therapy”301 or evidence that Mr. Grant 4 used an assistive walking device.302 “My estimation is that the pain is definitely present, but not so 5 severe as to interfere with routine repetitive tasks.”303 Second, he had “restrictive lung disease by pulmonary function test.”304 He was hospitalized in 6 7 2010 and on June 26, 2013; “After he recovered in June of 2013[,] it would appear that he’s 8 relatively well as far as his lungs and his heart.”305 Third, he was morbidly obese.306 Dr. Todd lost track of his weight but said it was “well in the 9 10 high 200s,” which “restricts his lungs from taking a full breath.”307 Fourth, he had a history of polysubstance abuse, including possible active use of cocaine and United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 active use of alcohol.308 13 Fifth, he had a depression problem but had not sought care.309 14 Sixth, he “has a global left ventricular ejection fraction, with some evidence of reversible 15 ischemia on the lateral wall and the anterior septal region, with an ejection fraction of 41 16 percent.”310 17 18 19 299 AR 60. 20 300 AR 61. 301 Id. 302 Id. 22 303 Id. 23 304 Id. 305 Id. 306 Id. 25 307 Id. 26 308 AR 62. 309 Id. 310 Id. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 29 1 Dr. Todd disagreed with Dr. Wu’s RFC, thinking Mr. Grant was “overrated in terms of his 2 ability to stand and walk.”311 Dr. Todd testified that there should be a six-minute walk test and was 3 unable to locate any physical therapy notes.312 He also indicated that there was no record as to 4 whether Mr. Grant had ever seen a cardiologist.313 Dr. Todd also testified about Mr. Grant’s history of polysubstance abuse, pointing out places 5 6 in the record that indicated Mr. Grant drank one or two pints of vodka on a daily basis and worked 7 in a liquor store.314 Dr. Todd testified that “ongoing alcohol use” weakens the heart.315 He added 8 that Mr. Grant was not compliant with his medications.316 He mentioned that Mr. Grant had seen 9 Claudia Madison, LCSW, at Lifelong Medical Center, whom he referred to as a “psychologist, possibly,” and that Mr. Grant had discussed his cocaine use with her.317 Dr. Todd further 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 mentioned that Mr. Grant had been “too sleepy during [his session with Ms. Madison] to be able 12 to sign an informed consent.”318 Dr. Todd attributed Mr. Grant’s sleepiness to his substance abuse, 13 rejected Mr. Grant’s explanation that sleep apnea was causing him to be sleepy, and discounted 14 the possibility that Mr. Grant suffered from narcolepsy on the grounds that it was “not mentioned 15 anywhere in the record.”319 16 Dr. Todd then made several recommendations.320 17 First, he recommended that Mr. Grant undergo a six-minute walk test “to see what his 18 problems are in terms of walking and whether he requires a walker or whether he requires a 19 cane.”321 20 311 AR 63. 312 Id. 22 313 AR 63–64. 23 314 AR 64. 315 AR 65. 316 AR 65. 25 317 Id. at 67. 26 318 Id. 319 AR 67. 320 AR 70. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 30 1 Second, he suggested that the ALJ “get a list of [Mr. Grant’s] current medications and then 2 verify it with the local pharmacy that he uses” to determine whether Mr. Grant has been compliant 3 with his medications.322 Third, Dr. Todd recommended that the ALJ “get notes from [Mr. Grant’s] physical 4 5 therapy.”323 6 Turning to the RFC, Dr. Todd concluded that, if he were to “take away the ankle problem,” 7 Mr. Grant would have “no trouble” performing “light work, which would be six hours of standing 8 and walking.”324 Even factoring in Mr. Grant’s ankle injury, Mr. Todd found “no reason” why Mr. 9 Grant would be unable to perform sedentary work.325 In response to questioning from Mr. Grant’s lawyer, Dr. Todd responded that any limitations that Mr. Grant experienced as a result of his 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 edema were entirely of his own making: 12 The bottom line is [Mr. Grant is] causing edema by his bad habits. He needs to take his medications as directed, and he needs to stop alcohol. So if you’re going to say, well he needs to drink a pint or two of vodka every day, which it says he does, and, you know, he’s not going to take his cardiac meds, then he is, in fact, disabled by edema. 13 14 But it’s caused by him, not by — if he followed medical treatment, this would not be present. Yes, he has edema, and, yes, that’s limiting, but the treatment, he’s not following the treatment.326 15 16 17 2.3 18 In response to questions by the ALJ, Mr. Grant testified as follows.327 19 He last worked in 2010 in security and in-home care.328 He stopped working because he broke 20 Mr. Grant’s Testimony his ankle and got six screws and a plate.329 He looked for security and in-home care work so that 21 321 22 Id. 322 Id. 23 323 Id. 324 AR 76. 24 325 25 AR 77. 326 AR 78. 26 327 AR 52–91. 328 AR 52. 329 AR 52–53. 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 31 he could pay his bills.330 He fell asleep a lot due to sleep apnea.331 He also could not do actually do 2 the work because his legs hurt due to lymphedema and his injured ankle.332 He looked for work 3 where he could sit down most of the day.333 He worked “under the table”334 in 2013 at a liquor 4 store, where he would sit behind the counter for a few hours in the morning and make sure no one 5 was stealing.335 He did not think of it as a “real job” because the store owner was “doing [him] a 6 favor,” paying Mr. Grant’s bills for him in exchange for his supervision.336 He had been going to 7 Lifelong Medical Care for counseling as well as Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. 337 He used a 8 cane for walking around the house, and a walker for long distances.338 When he walked, he needed 9 to take breaks every four or five minutes, and he could walk a half block but had to “stop a couple 10 times” because it was hard for him to breathe and because he sometimes felt pain.339 For about two 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 years, an in-home care worker has helped him do “the chores, the shopping, cooking, helping put 12 clothes on . . . . and bathing.”340 He took his medicine regularly, but he had trouble remembering 13 to take them, and his in-home care worker helped by reminding him.341 He went to physical 14 therapy at Eden Medical Center for his ankle, and including physical therapy “in the pool.”342 He 15 16 330 AR 73. 331 AR 53. 332 AR 73. 19 333 AR 53. 20 334 AR 89. 335 AR 89–90. 336 Id. 22 337 AR 68–69. 23 338 AR 79. 339 AR 84–85. 340 AR 80–81. 17 18 21 24 25 26 27 AR 87 (“I was taking my medicines regularly, but sometime I don’t remember if I took my medicine, I didn’t take it, so sometime that just throw me off. My in-home care worker, she make sure I take my medicine on time every day, because sometimes, I think I took my medicine, then I really haven’t.”). 341 342 AR 73–74. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 32 1 slept with a CPAP machine but still feels tired during the day, frequently dozing off. 343 It was 2 difficult for him to lie flat because “then [he] can’t breathe.”344 Due to edema, he contended with 3 leg swelling, kept his legs wrapped up, and sometimes had to elevate them to mitigate the 4 symptoms.345 If he elevated his “feet too long [he] g[ot] like panic attacks,” feeling anxious 5 because elevating his feet made it harder for him to breathe.346 He could elevate his legs only for 6 “[a]bout 10 minutes because I don’t — that’s as long as I can take it.”347 Abstaining from alcohol 7 had not resulted in any noticeable improvement in his symptoms.348 8 2.4 9 In response to questions posed by the ALJ at the July 20, 2015 hearing, VE Farrell testified Vocational Expert Testimony: Timothy Farrell that since 2000, Mr. Grant worked as a security guard (semi-skilled with an SVP of 3, light 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 exertion), care-giver (semi-skilled SVP of 3, medium exertion), construction worker (semi-skilled 12 SVP 4; heavy exertion), and parking lot cashier (unskilled with an SVP of 2, light work).349 The 13 ALJ did not pose any hypotheticals to VE Farrell concerning an individual of Mr. Grant’s age, 14 education, and prior work experience. 15 2.5 16 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether Mr. Grant 17 was disabled and concluded he was not.350 At step one, the ALJ found that that Mr. Grant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 18 19 Administrative Findings since his alleged onset date of July 30, 2010.351 20 21 343 AR 82. 22 344 AR 83. 23 345 Id. 346 AR 84. 347 Id. 25 348 AR 86. 26 349 AR 55, 58. 350 AR 32–42. 351 AR 34. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 33 At step two, the ALJ found that Mr. Grant had the following severe impairments: “status-post 1 2 right ankle fracture; cellulitis and lymphedema of the right leg; morbid obesity; history of acute 3 heart failure; sleep apnea; hypertension; and substance abuse disorder, active (ETOH and 4 cocaine).”352 The ALJ also determined that Mr. Grant’s mental impairments were not severe.353 At step three, the ALJ found that Mr. Grant did not have an impairment or combination of 5 6 impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.354 The ALJ 7 considered “sections 1.02, 3.10, 4.02, and 12.09, which describe major dysfunction of a joint, 8 sleep related breathing disorders, chronic heart failure and substance addiction disorders 9 respectively . . . .”355 Also, “pursuant to Social Security Ruling 02-1p, [the ALJ] considered [Mr. Grant’s] obesity and combined effects of his impairments.”356 The ALJ found that Mr. Grant 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 “does not have a combination of impairments that meet or medically equal any listed impairment 12 in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4.”357 He agreed with and adopted Dr. Todd’s 13 conclusion that Mr. Grant’s “impairments, singly or in combination, does [sic] not meet or equal a 14 listing.” 358 At step four, the ALJ found that Mr. Grant had the RFC “to perform sedentary work as defined 15 16 on a function-by-function basis in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), except he cannot climb 17 ladders, ropes or scaffolds and must avoid noxious fumes and extreme cold, heat, and 18 humidity.”359 In reaching this RFC determination, the ALJ relied “for the most part on the 19 assessment of Dr. Todd, according his opinion great weight because it was consistent with the 20 21 22 352 AR 34. 23 353 AR 35–36. 354 AR 36. 355 Id. 25 356 Id. 26 357 Id. 358 Id. 359 AR 37. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 34 1 preponderance of the longitudinal medical evidence of record as a whole” and because “Dr. Todd 2 is the only physician in this case to have reviewed the entire medical evidence of record.”360 3 The ALJ gave “less weight” to the medical opinions of Dr. Saphir, Dr. Mansour, and Dr. 4 Giorgi “to the extent they [we]re inconsistent with the assessment of Dr. Todd.”361 He assigned no 5 weight to the opinion of Dr. Chen, who was “removed from the DDS panel for his ‘unprofessional 6 manner and failure to adequately correct deficiencies in his CE reports.’”362 He accorded “little 7 weight” to Dr. Wu’s assessment: 8 I accord the assessment of Dr. Wu little weight because it is inconsistent with the preponderance of the longitudinal medical evidence of record as a whole. There is little basis for Dr. Wu to conclude [Mr. Grant] is unable to sit for at least 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and that [Mr. Grant] is likely to be absent from work about 2 days per month. Her statement is conclusory and she did not cite specific findings or studies. Most tellingly, she failed to mention the likely pervasive adverse effects of [Mr. Grant’s] substance abuse on his physical functioning. The foregoing leads me to conclude her statement amounts to mere advocacy rather than objective analysis.363 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 The ALJ then discredited Mr. Grant’s testimony, finding his “allegation of complete 13 14 debilitation [was] not generally credible.”364 The ALJ reasoned, relying on Dr. Todd’s testimony, 15 that Mr. Grant’s “physical functioning would be greatly enhanced if he were to cease his substance 16 abuse,” and that the record contains “extensive evidence of non-compliance with medications and 17 diet.”365 He questioned Mr. Grant’s credibility due to his being “a poor historian” and noted that 18 “his claims of abstinence from cocaine and reduced drinking conflict with most of the record.”366 19 The ALJ then found that Mr. Grant was unable to perform any past relevant work experience 20 and proceeded to step five.367 21 22 360 AR 40. 23 361 Id. 362 AR 40 n.1 (quoting a “Corrective Action” letter). 363 AR 40. 25 364 Id. 26 365 Id. 366 Id. 367 Id. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 35 At step five, the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 1 2 economy that the [Mr. Grant] can perform” and concluded that he was not disabled.368 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have jurisdiction to review any final decision of the 5 6 Commissioner if the claimant initiates a suit within sixty days of the decision. A court may set 7 aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error or 8 are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 9 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 12 Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court should uphold “such 13 inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence.” Mark 14 v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence in the administrative record 15 supports the ALJ’s decision and a different outcome, the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision 16 and may not substitute its own decision. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1999). 17 “Finally, [a court] may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 18 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 19 20 GOVERNING LAW 21 A claimant is considered disabled if (1) he or she suffers from a “medically determinable 22 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 23 be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the 24 “impairment or impairments are of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his 25 previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 26 27 368 AR 41–42. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 36 1 other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2 1382c(a)(3)(A) & (B). The five-step analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled 3 within the meaning of the Social Security Act is as follows. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 4 C.F.R. § 404.1520). 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 Step One. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant is not working in a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant case cannot be resolved at step one, and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Step Two. Is the claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) severe? If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Step Three. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specified impairments described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and is entitled to benefits. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the case cannot be resolved at step three, and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Step Four. Considering the claimant’s RFC, is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the case cannot be resolved at step four, and the case proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 20 Step Five. Considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, is the claimant able to “make an adjustment to other work?” If not, then the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is able to do other work, the Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to show other jobs in significant numbers in the national economy: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R., part 404, subpart P, app. 2. 21 For steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. At step five, the burden 17 18 19 22 shifts to the Commissioner. Gonzales v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 23 (9th Cir. 1986). 24 25 26 ANALYSIS Mr. Grant contends the ALJ erred by (1) improperly weighing medical opinion evidence by 27 discounting and disregarding the medical opinions of treating and examining physicians without 28 providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, (2) failing to include ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 37 1 depression, restrictive lung disease, bilateral edema, and congestive heart failure as severe 2 impairments at step two, (3) failing to adequately consider Listings 12.04 and 4.11 at step three, 3 (4) determining an RFC that was not supported by substantial evidence at step four, (5) failing to 4 provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Mr. Grant’s testimony, and (6) relying on an 5 erroneous RFC at step five.369 6 7 1. Whether the ALJ Properly Weighed Medical-Opinion Evidence Mr. Grant argues that the ALJ erred because he improperly weighed the medical-opinion 9 evidence.370 The court agrees with Mr. Grant. The court first discusses the law governing the 10 ALJ’s weighing of medical-opinion evidence and then analyzes the medical-opinion evidence 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 under the appropriate standard. The ALJ is responsible for “‘resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 12 13 ambiguities.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d 14 at 1039). In weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire case record, 15 including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 16 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reviewing 17 court [also] must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 18 specific quantum of supporting evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed standards that 19 20 guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.”371 Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 21 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Social Security regulations 22 distinguish between three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; 23 and (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 24 26 27 369 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 2–22. 370 25 Id. at 6–14. 371 The Social Security Administration promulgated new regulations, including a new § 404.1521, effective March 27, 2017. The previous version, effective to March 26, 2017, governs based on the date of the ALJ’s hearing, July 20, 2015. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 38 1 (9th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 2 physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing [non- 3 examining] physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 4 Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 5 An ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 7 doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 8 evidence.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, if 9 the ALJ finds that the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted, a reviewing court will 10 require only that the ALJ provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 12 marks and citation omitted); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (“If a treating or examining 13 doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 14 providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”) (internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted). The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians 16 may serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical 17 findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 18 An ALJ errs, however, when she “rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight” without 19 explanation or without explaining why “another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticiz[es] 20 it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for [her] conclusion.” Garrison, 21 759 F.3d at 1012–13. 22 “If a treating physician’s opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ because it is not ‘well- 23 supported’ or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the [Social 24 Security] Administration considers specified factors in determining the weight it will be given.” 25 Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. “Those factors include the ‘[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the 26 frequency of examination’ by the treating physician; and the ‘nature and extent of the treatment 27 relationship’ between the patient and the treating physician.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 28 404.1527(d)(2)(i)–(ii)) (alteration in original). “Additional factors relevant to evaluating any ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 39 1 medical opinion, not limited to the opinion of the treating physician, include the amount of 2 relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided[,] the 3 consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole[, and] the specialty of the physician 4 providing the opinion . . . .” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(6)). In addition to the medical opinions of the “acceptable medical sources” outlined above, the 6 ALJ must consider the opinions of other “medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources 7 and [the testimony] from nonmedical sources.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(1). “Other sources” 8 include nurse practitioners, physicians’ assistants, therapists, teachers, social workers, spouses and 9 other non-medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). The ALJ is required to consider observations 10 by “other sources” as to how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work, id.; nonetheless, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 5 an “ALJ may discount the testimony” or an opinion “from these other sources if the ALJ gives . . . 12 germane [reasons] . . . for doing so.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotations and citations 13 omitted). Dr. Snyder — Examining 14 1.1 15 The ALJ rejected Dr. Snyder’s assessment: 16 I reject the assessment of Dr. Snyder, according her opinion little weight. Although Dr. Snyder mentioned alcohol, she failed to address its effects and did not even include substance use or abuse in her diagnoses. She also noted [Mr. Grant] was a poor historian, thereby rendering anything he reported questionable and only marginally reliable. In addition, [Mr. Grant] denied cocaine use, which conflicts with the record. As a matter of fact, [Mr. Grant] tested positive for cocaine on May 4, 2013, indicating he was actively using around the time of the evaluation with Dr. Snyder. Moreover, he was falling asleep during the evaluation, and Dr. Snyder nonetheless based her conclusions on results that are questionable, as she herself had noted. The State agency medical examiners properly rejected Dr. Snyder’s assessment and deemed all mental conditions nonsevere, including [Mr. Grant’s] polysubstance abuse. Finally, there is no evidence of any mental health treatment, as [Mr. Grant] reported to Dr. Snyder, despite [Mr. Grant’s] assertion of such at the hearing. Neither the medical expert nor I could find any, and the representative did not cite any at the hearing.372 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 372 AR 35. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 40 1 The ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Dr. Snyder’s opinion — that she did not address the effects 2 of substance abuse — is not a specific and legitimate reason to discount her opinion. Generally, an 3 ALJ conducts the five-step analysis before considering a claimant’s drug and alcohol use: 4 5 6 7 8 9 [A]n ALJ must first conduct the five-step inquiry without separating out the impact of alcoholism or drug addiction. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is not disabled under the five-step inquiry, then the claimant is not entitled to benefits and there is no need to proceed with the analysis under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535 or 416.935. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is disabled and there is “medical evidence of [his or her] drug addiction or alcoholism,” then the ALJ should proceed under §§ 404.1535 or 416.935 to determine if the claimant “would still [be found] to be disabled if [he or she] stopped using alcohol or drugs.” Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935) (holding that an ALJ must complete the five-step framework before looking to see 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 whether a claimant would still be disabled if he or she were to cease from using drugs or alcohol). 12 Also, Nieves v. Astrue is instructive: there the district court held that “the fact that [a treating 13 physician] did not specifically discuss whether or how the plaintiff’s mental condition would be 14 affected in the absence of drug and alcohol use is not proper grounds for discrediting his findings.” 15 No. 06-cv-02478-REB, 2008 WL 4277995, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept.16, 2008). Also, as discussed 16 above, Dr. Snyder considered Mr. Grant’s combined impairments, including his alcoholism. 17 The ALJ’s second reason for discounting Dr. Snyder’s assessment — that she considered Mr. 18 Grant a “poor historian” — also does not meet the “specific and legitimate” standard. When a 19 physician’s opinion is heavily based on a claimant’s self-reports, rather than clinical evidence, and 20 the ALJ finds the claimant not credible, then the ALJ may discount the physician’s opinion. See 21 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). “However, when an opinion is not more 22 heavily based on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical observations, there is no evidentiary basis 23 for rejecting the opinion.” Id. (citing Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1199–1200). As discussed above, while 24 Dr. Snyder based her conclusions in part on Mr. Grant’s self-reporting, she also based it on her 25 review of his medical and personal history, his medical records, and her administration of tests. 26 The ALJ’s third reason for rejecting Dr. Snyder’s assessment — that Mr. Grant fell asleep 27 during cognitive testing — is not (given the circumstances of the overall assessment) a legitimate 28 reason supported by substantial evidence in the record for disregarding Dr. Snyder’s entire ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 41 1 diagnosis. Dr. Snyder accounted for the “falling asleep” issue twice in her summary, writing the 2 following about her assessment about cognition: “considering he fell asleep several times during 3 the testing, please interpret with caution.”373 And her psychological evaluation was based on 4 (again) her own observations and included her assessment that Mr. Grant’s issues were primarily 5 medical. She administered other tests, considered other medical and personal history, reviewed 6 medical records, and made other diagnoses beyond the diagnosis about cognition.374 The ALJ’s fourth reason for discounting Dr. Snyder — that there are no records of mental- 7 health treatment — also is not a specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence 9 because it is inaccurate. At the July 20, 2015 hearing, Dr. Todd mentioned Mr. Grant’s visit with 10 Ms. Madison.375 The ALJ then asked Mr. Grant whether he “went back to [Ms. Madison] or saw 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 some other counselor,” and Mr. Grant testified that he received counseling at Lifelong Medical 12 Center.376 Contrary to the ALJ’s assertion that “there is no evidence of any mental health 13 treatment,”377 Mr. Grant’s testimony was accurate, as records submitted after the July 20, 2015 14 hearing show that he sought counseling at Lifelong Medical Center from Ms. Madison and Ms. 15 Wachter and had home visits with other Lifelong social workers.378 Moreover, records submitted 16 before the July 20, 2015 hearing indicate that Mr. Grant received “psychological and emotional 17 support” during his visits with Dr. Baldwin, including prescription medication for his “severe 18 anxiety spells.”379 Dr. Heath also noted that Mr. Grant had an appointment with a physician 19 concerning his anxiety and depression and that Mr. Grant would benefit from medication.380 20 21 22 373 AR 801. 374 23 AR 798–802. 375 AR 66. 24 376 AR 68–69. 377 AR 35. 25 378 26 See, e.g., AR 1550–59 (counseling with Ms. Wachter), 1560–66 (home visits with social workers from Lifelong Medical Center) 1567–70 (counseling with Ms. Madison). 28 379 AR 1068–69. 380 27 AR 959, 971. ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 42 1 Lastly, treating physicians at Alta Bates Summit Medical Center diagnosed Mr. Grant with 2 depression and prescribed medication.381 Given the court’s remand on other grounds, and Dr. Snyder’s overall comprehensive 3 4 assessment, the ALJ can reconsider Dr. Snyder’s assessment on remand. Dr. Wu — Treating 5 1.2 6 Mr. Grant argues that the ALJ erred when he attributed “little weight” to Dr. Wu’s RFC 7 assessment: 8 12 I accord the assessment of Dr. Serena Wu little weight because it is inconsistent with the preponderance of the longitudinal medical evidence of record as a whole. There is little basis for Dr. Wu to conclude [Mr. Grant] is unable to at least sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and that [Mr. Wu] is likely to be absent from work about 2 days per month. Her statement is conclusory and she did not cite specific findings or studies. Most tellingly, she failed to mention the likely pervasive adverse effects of [Mr. Grant’s] substance abuse on his physical functioning. The foregoing leads me to conclude her statement amounts to mere advocacy rather than objective analysis.382 13 Without specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s first 14 reason for rejecting Dr. Wu’s assessment — that it is “inconsistent with the longitudinal medical 15 evidence of [the] record as a whole”— is boilerplate and insufficient. The ALJ failed to point to 16 any particular parts of the record that were inconsistent with Dr. Wu’s assessment. Garrison, 759 17 F.3d at 1012–13. This conclusion is supported by Sorrell v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-04874-SI, 2015 WL 18 1152781, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015). In Sorrell, the ALJ rejected an RFC assessment by a 19 treating physician, which was contradicted by a non-examining ME, on the ground that it was 20 inconsistent with “the objective medical evidence of record.” Id. The court held that this reason 21 was insufficient because the ALJ did not explain how the treating physician’s assessment 22 conflicted with the medical evidence in the record. Id. Here too, the ALJ failed to “set forth his 23 own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d 24 at 725 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–22 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 25 26 381 27 AR 1605, 1627. 382 AR 40. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 43 Second, the ALJ rejected Dr. Wu’s opinion concerning Mr. Grant’s inability to sit for at least 1 2 six hours in an eight-hour workday and the likelihood that he would be absent from work 3 approximately two days per month on the ground that “her statement is conclusory and she did not 4 cite specific findings or studies.”383 This also is insufficient to reject her opinion. Treating sources 5 cannot be rejected solely because they “are not well supported by medically acceptable clinical 6 and laboratory . . . techniques.” SSR 96-2p.384 7 10 Adjudicators must remember that a finding that a treating source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to "controlling weight," not that the opinion should be rejected. Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927. 11 See also Bennett v. Colvin, 202 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that a “fail[ure] 12 to reveal the type of significant and laboratory abnormalities one would expect if the claimant 13 were in fact disabled” did not constitute a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting a physician’s 14 opinion because the ALJ failed to “specify which clinical and laboratory abnormalities one should 15 expect” or “any other support for this conclusion”). 8 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 It is important that Dr. Wu was part of Mr. Grant’s treatment team at Lifelong Medical Center. 16 17 While she saw him only once before she conducted the RFC assessment, she reviewed his 18 extensive prior treatment with Lifelong, including his visits with her colleague (and his prior 19 primary-care physician) Dr. Heath. This is why she recorded that the first patient contact was 20 December 26, 2012.385 The length of the treatment relationship is relevant in that “the longer a 21 treating source has treated [a claimant] and the more times [that claimant] has been seen by a 22 treating source, the more weight [the Social Security Administration] will give to the source’s 23 medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i). Even a physician’s “limited” contact with a 24 25 26 27 383 Id. 384 SSR 96-2p has since been rescinded (as of March 27, 2017) but was in effect at the time of Mr. Grant’s ALJ hearing. 385 AR 1035. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 44 1 patient can be sufficient for that physician to be considered a treating source, provided that “the 2 claimant must have seen ‘the source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice 3 for the type of treatment and/or evaluation required for [a claimant’s] medical conditions.” Benton 4 v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502). Dr. Wu was in 5 the same practice as Dr. Heath, who saw Mr. Grant many times before Dr. Wu became Mr. 6 Grant’s primary-care physician.386 Indeed, Dr. Wu’s initial assessment of Mr. Grant’s medical 7 condition recognized that Dr. Heath was Mr. Grant’s physician,387 referenced Mr. Grant’s chronic 8 medical issues,388 and was predicated not only on her observations and tests but also on Mr. 9 Grant’s medical records reflecting medical assessments, treatment, and tests conducted by Dr. Heath, other physicians, pharmacists, and other providers.389 Her assessment cannot be divorced 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 from Mr. Grant’s overall treatment at Lifelong, and thus she is a treating physician. Benton, 331 12 F.3d 1038–39 (explaining that “nothing forecloses” a physician from completing an RFC 13 assessment “on behalf of [a] treatment team”). The ALJ’s third reason for rejecting Dr. Wu’s opinion — that she “failed to mention the likely 14 15 pervasive effects of the claimant’s substance abuse” — also does not constitute a specific and 16 legitimate reason to discount Dr. Wu’s RFC assessment. See Bustamante 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th 17 Cir. 2001) (holding that an ALJ must complete the five-step framework before looking to see 18 whether a claimant would still be disabled if he or she were to cease from using drugs or alcohol); 19 Eckermann v. Astrue, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Idaho 2011) (holding that “the ALJ’s 20 repeated reference to Petitioner’s substance use as a reason for rejecting the opinions of 21 Petitioner’s treating and examining medical sources constituted legal error” because the 22 “implementing regulations contemplate that the ALJ will make an initial disability determination 23 386 24 See, e.g., AR 876–84, 897–908, 912–44, 969–980, 984–92, 1224–27, 1234–42, 1247–59, 1263–66, 1269–72, 1277–79. 25 387 AR 1221. 388 Id. 26 27 389 See, e.g., AR 926–50 (tests ordered by Dr. Heath), 873–75, 891–93 (visits with Dr. Fueller at Lifelong Medical Center), 894–96 (medical reconciliation visit with Kristin Wong, Pharm.D., and Shadi Doroudgar, Pharm.D.). 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 45 1 without regard to substance abuse”); accord Nieves, 2008 WL 4277995 at *4 (discussed above). 2 Moreover, Dr. Wu listed Mr. Grant’s chronic impairments, including chemical dependency and 3 alcohol abuse.390 4 In sum, the ALJ did not have specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Wu’s opinion. 5 1.3 6 The ALJ gave the greatest weight to Dr. Todd’s opinion: 7 Dr. Todd — Non-Examining In reaching my RFC determination herein, I rely for the most part on the assessment of Dr. Todd, according his opinion great weight because it is consistent with the preponderance of the longitudinal medical evidence of record as a whole. In addition, Dr. Todd is the only physician in this case to have reviewed the entire medical evidence of record (except for Exhibit 19F submitted post-closing, which adds little substantively). 391 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 The ALJ’s reasons for attributing “great weight” to Dr. Todd’s opinion are insufficient. 12 Initially, the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Todd was only physician to review the entire record392 13 is inconsistent with the submission of numerous exhibits after the July 20, 2015 hearing. At the 14 July 20, 2015 hearing, Dr. Todd testified that he had reviewed Exhibits 1–18F,393 and the ALJ 15 asserted that the only remaining medical evidence Exhibit was 19F.394 But the medical evidence 16 consists of Exhibits 1F–23F, meaning that Dr. Todd apparently did not review five exhibits that 17 make up over a third of the pages of medical evidence in the record.395 18 Dr. Todd misreported some exhibits that he did review, and the exhibits submitted after the 19 hearing also are at odds with some of his findings. He testified that Mr. Grant suffered from six 20 medical conditions: chronic pain, respiratory issues/chronic heart failure, morbid obesity, 21 22 23 390 See AR 1221. 24 391 AR 40. 392 Id. 393 AR 60. 26 394 AR 40. 27 395 25 The medical evidence in the record totals 1386 pages. See AR 414–1781. Exhibits 19F–23F total 495 pages. See AR 1286–1781. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 46 1 polysubstance abuse, depression, and a global left ventricular ejection fraction. His conclusions 2 were inconsistent with the record with respect to five of them. First, Dr. Todd testified that Mr. Grant suffered from “pain in various parts of his body, and 3 4 particularly in a non-healing fracture of the right ankle, but there’s no documentation by physical 5 therapy, or whether he uses a device, or a walker, or what he does.”396 But as discussed above, Mr. 6 Grant’s treatment included physical therapy with Mr. Joson at Eden Medical Center.397 As Mr. 7 Grant testified,398 Mr. Grant attended physical therapy sessions that involved treatment in a 8 pool.399 Moreover, in Exhibit 17F, which was available for Dr. Todd’s review,400 treating 9 physician Dr. Baldwin indicated in February 2015 that Mr. Grant’s “ankle is unstable and causes him to lose his balance and sometimes fall” and that “[h]e is required to use a cane to assist in 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 ambulation.”401 Other medical records in the administrative record also show that at times, Mr. 12 Grant needed to use a cane or a walker. For instance, January 2015 progress notes from Eden 13 Medical Center reflect that Mr. Grant used a single-point cane.402 Ms. Madison noted in July 2015 14 that Mr. Grant “report[ed] increased falls” when he did not use his cane.403 Treating physician Dr. 15 Heath reported in August 2013 that Mr. Grant had fallen recently and occasionally used a cane.404 16 Lastly, as discussed above, treating physician Drs. Fakiri and Cheng reported in March 2011 that 17 Mr. Grant used a walker during a hospital visit and that he typically wore “hardware” on his right 18 ankle.405 19 20 396 AR 61. 397 See AR 1383–84, 1402–03, 1425–27, 1458–60, 1479–81. 22 398 AR 74. 23 399 AR 1402–03, 1425–27, 1458–60, 1479–81. 400 AR 60. 401 AR 1074. 25 402 AR 1299. 26 403 AR 1550. 404 AR 891. 405 AR 415–17. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 47 1 Second, Dr. Todd testified that Mr. Grant suffered from breathing problems, including acute 2 respiratory failure and shortness of breath, maybe congestive heart failure, and “lung disease by 3 pulmonary function test.”406 He testified that “it would appear that he’s relatively well as far as his 4 lungs and his heart” following his recovery in June 2013.407 As discussed above, records 5 submitted after the hearing show that Mr. Grant also suffered from breathing issues and congestive 6 heart failure after June 2013. For instance, he was hospitalized beginning in March in 2015 in 7 significant respiratory distress and suffering from acute diastolic congestive heart failure.408 He 8 was in a state of “hypertensive emergency” and was admitted to the intensive-care unit.409 August 9 2015 medical records document visits with Dr. Wu and report that Mr. Grant was suffering from 10 congestive heart failure and shortness of breath.410 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Third, Dr. Todd testified that Mr. Grant suffered from morbid obesity and that Mr. Grant’s 12 weight was “well into the 200s,”411 but as discussed above, the record demonstrates that Mr. Grant 13 weighed substantially more than that throughout the relevant time. For example, in April 2015, he 14 weighed 384 pounds.412 In August 2015, records submitted after the hearing show that he weighed 15 405 pounds.413 Fourth, concerning Mr. Grant’s substance abuse, Dr. Todd testified that Mr. Grant’s substance 16 17 abuse was the cause of his falling asleep during his medical appointments: 18 ME: As a medical doctor, when patients are so sleepy like this we know the problem is substance abuse, and so his sleepiness is a marker of active substance abuse, which could be just alcohol, it could be additional Oxycodone or Cocaine, so that’s a problem. 19 20 21 22 406 AR 61. 23 407 Id. 408 See AR 1685–1723. 409 See AR 1708. 25 410 See, e.g., AR at 1593. 26 411 AR 61. 412 AR 1166. 413 AR 1729. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 48 1 ALJ: Of course he’s claiming it’s sleep apnea that causes him to be sleepy during the day. 2 ME: Well, yeah, but not so sleepy you can’t sign permission for a doctor to treat you. I mean you don’t fall asleep when you’re in a doctor’s room. Even though you might be tired, you’re not going to fall asleep. There is a very rare condition that, you know—paroxysmal—what do they call it? Narcolepsy. He doesn’t have that. It’s not mentioned anywhere in the record.414 3 4 5 But in fact, Mr. Grant’s treating physicians have attributed his falling asleep during the day, 6 7 even during his medical appointments, to both obstructive sleep apnea and narcolepsy. For 8 example, in February 2013, Dr. Heath noted that he had observed Mr. Grant experience two 9 episodes of obstructive sleep apnea in while he was at Dr. Heath’s office and referred Mr. Grant for a sleep study.415 In August 2014, Dr. Heath noted a direct correlation between Mr. Grant’s 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 ability to stay awake during an appointment and his use of his CPAP machine to treat his 12 obstructive sleep apnea: “This is the first visit I have had with this patient in which he remained 13 awake throughout. Praised and urged to continue CPAP.”416 Additionally, while Mr. Grant was 14 hospitalized at San Leandro Hospital in July 2013, Dr. Williams suspected that Mr. Grant was 15 very lethargic and sleepy because his CPAP machine was leaking.417 After Mr. Grant was placed 16 on a hospital BiPAP machine, his “condition improved and he actually woke up.”418 These 17 instances, contained in exhibits available for Dr. Todd’s review, indicate that Mr. Grant’s treating 18 physicians believed there was a correlation between their ability to effectively treat his obstructive 19 sleep apnea and his falling asleep frequently during the day. Moreover, in an exhibit submitted 20 after the hearing, a physician at Eden Medical Center observed that it was “[d]ifficult [for Mr. 21 Grant] to remain awake due to sleep apnea.”419 Finally, despite also having this portion of the 22 record available for his review, Dr. Todd asserted that there was no evidence in the record that Mr. 23 414 AR 67. 415 AR 992. 25 416 AR 1266. 26 417 AR 1014. 418 Id. 419 AR 1292. 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 49 1 Grant had narcolepsy.420 But treating physician Dr. Baldwin diagnosed Mr. Grant with “severe 2 narcolepsy.”421 Fifth, Dr. Todd testified that Mr. Grant “has a depression problem,” and Mr. Grant was “not on 3 4 any antidepression medications.”422 He further testified that, while Mr. Grant had seen Ms. 5 Madison once, he was unsure if he ever saw her or obtained other treatment following that one 6 visit.423 As discussed above, and as Mr. Grant testified, records submitted after the hearing show 7 that Mr. Grant saw social workers at Lifelong Medical Center for his polysubstance abuse, 8 depression, and anxiety.424 Moreover, as shown in an exhibits available for Dr. Todd’s review, Dr. 9 Baldwin provided Mr. Grant with “psychological/emotional support” and prescribed medication “for severe anxiety spells.”425 Dr. Heath also noted that Mr. Grant had an appointment with a 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 physician concerning his anxiety and depression and that Mr. Grant would benefit from 12 medication.426 Lastly, exhibits submitted after the hearing indicate that treating physicians at Alta 13 Bates Summit Medical Center diagnosed Mr. Grant with depression and prescribed medication.427 14 In sum, the ALJ’s reasons for attributing great weight to Dr. Todd’s opinions are insufficient. 15 1.4 16 The ALJ gave less weight to the medical opinions of Drs. Saphir, Mansour, and Giorgi “to the Dr. Saphir and Dr. Mansour — Non-Examining 17 extent they are inconsistent with the assessment of Dr. Todd.”428 Mr. Grant argues that the ALJ 18 committed legal error by giving any — even partial — weight to the opinions of Drs. Saphir and 19 Mansour because they gave “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Frank Chen.429 The Court agrees. 20 420 AR 67. 421 AR 1067, 1070. 22 422 AR 62. 23 423 AR 66–68. 424 See, e.g., AR 1550–59 (counseling with Ms. Wachter), 1567–70 (counseling with Ms. Madison). 425 AR 1068, 1071. 25 426 AR 959, 971. 26 427 AR 1605, 1627. 428 AR 40. 429 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 13–14. 21 24 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 50 Dr. Chen evaluated Mr. Grant, and was subsequently removed from the Disability 1 Determination Services (DDS) panel for his “unprofessional manner and failure to adequately 3 correct deficiencies in his CE reports.”430 The ALJ assigned gave no weight to Dr. Chen’s 4 opinion.431 The question remains, however, whether the examinations by Drs. Saphir and Mansour 5 are so tainted by their reliance on Dr. Chen’s findings that they ALJ should not have given them 6 any weight. In Kernan v. Berryhill, another judge in this district addressed a similar set of facts. 7 No. 16-cv-02923-JSC, 2017 WL 3232517, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2017). In Kernan, the ALJ 8 gave no weight to Dr. Chen’s assessment but nonetheless relied on another non-examining 9 assessment that had, in turn, relied on Dr. Chen’s findings. Id. The Kernan judge held that the 10 “ALJ erred in according ‘great weight’” to the non-examining physician who had relied on Dr. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 2 Chen’s findings. Id. at *8. Because “the ALJ placed ‘great weight’ on [the non-examining 12 doctor’s] opinion, [and because that non-examining doctor] relied on Dr. Chen’s discredited 13 opinion, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could 14 perform medium work. Thus, remand is required for further development of the record regarding 15 Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.” Id. Here, like the ALJ in Kernan, the ALJ attributed no 16 weight to Dr. Chen’s assessment. And like the ALJ in Kernan, the ALJ relied on the findings of 17 other non-examining physicians who relied on Dr. Chen’s assessment. 18 The court concludes that the ALJ erred by relying on the findings of Drs. Saphir and Mansour 19 because, “[a]s [Dr. Saphir and Dr. Mansour] did not examine [Mr. Grant], it is unclear what parts 20 of [Dr. Saphir and Dr. Mansour’s] assessment[s] are based on Dr. Chen’s previous analysis and 21 what is based on [their] review of other records.” Id. at *8. Dr. Baldwin — Treating 22 1.5 23 The ALJ erred by failing to address Dr. Baldwin’s findings. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized 24 the high standard required for an ALJ to reject an opinion from a treating or examining doctor, 25 even where the record includes a contradictory medical opinion: 26 430 27 AR 40 n. 1 (quoting third and final “Corrective Action” letter). 431 Id. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 51 1 4 Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs. See Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996). In other words, an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it very little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion. See id. 5 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012–13. The ALJ’s crediting of non-examining medical expert Dr. Todd’s 6 opinion (which contradicted treating physician Dr. Baldwin’s findings) is error because the ALJ 7 did not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to reject Dr. 8 Baldwin’s opinion. Id.; see also Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2015) 9 (“Because a court must give ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ for rejecting a treating doctor’s 2 3 opinions, it follows even more strongly that an ALJ cannot in its decision totally ignore a treating 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 doctor and his or her notes, without even mentioning them.”). The ALJ did not address Dr. 12 Baldwin’s treatment notes, and instead only cited them as an exhibit number in a string cite with 13 many other exhibits as evidence of Mr. Grant’s chronic conditions.432 Under the circumstances — 14 including the ALJ’s failure to mention Dr. Baldwin by name and the fact errors discussed in this 15 order — the court concludes that the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for 16 ignoring Dr. Baldwin’s findings and crediting instead Dr. Todd. * 17 * For the reasons discussed above, the court remands so that the ALJ may consider the medical- 18 19 * opinion evidence in this case. 20 21 22 2. Whether the ALJ Erred at Step Two by Failing to Evaluate Mr. Grant’s Depression, Edema, and Congestive Heart Failure Mr. Grant argues that the ALJ erred by not finding that depression, bilateral edema, restrictive 23 24 lung disease, and congestive heart failure are severe impairments.433 The court finds that the ALJ 25 26 432 27 AR 37. 433 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 14–18. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 52 1 erred at step two for failing to list Mr. Grant’s depression, congestive heart failure, and restrictive 2 lung disease as “severe” impairments. At step two of the five-step sequential inquiry, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a 3 4 medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 5 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must consider the record as a whole, including evidence that both 6 supports and detracts from its final decision. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). 7 An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit the claimant’s mental or physical 8 abilities to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a).434 Basic work activities are “abilities 9 and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” including, for example, “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). To determine 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 the severity of a mental impairment specifically, the ALJ must consider four broad functional 12 areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, and pace; 13 and (4) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. “[T]he step two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 14 15 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290 (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 at 153–54 (1987)). Thus, “[a]n 16 impairment or combination of impairments can be found ‘not severe’ only if the evidence 17 establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual[‘]s ability 18 to work.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing SSR 85–28; Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 19 303, 306 (9th Cir.1988)). 20 Concerning the ALJ’s failure to list bilateral edema at step two, any error is harmless because 21 the ALJ discussed Mr. Grant’s bilateral edema later in the decision,435 curing any error. See Lewis 22 v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that even if the ALJ erred at step two for 23 failure to list a medical condition, the error was harmless because the ALJ discussed the medical 24 condition later in the five-step framework). 25 434 26 27 The Social Security Administration promulgated new regulations, including a new § 404.1521, effective March 27, 2017. The previous version, effective to March 26, 2017, governs based on the date of the ALJ’s hearing, May 29, 2015. 435 AR 39. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 53 The ALJ erred, however, when he found that Mr. Grant’s depression did not constitute a 1 2 “severe” impairment. Concerning Mr. Grant’s depression, the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion 3 of Dr. Snyder and also found that there was “no evidence of any mental health treatment.”436 As 4 discussed above, and as Mr. Grant testified, he saw social workers at Lifelong Medical Center for 5 his polysubstance abuse, depression and anxiety.437 Dr. Heath also noted that Mr. Grant had an 6 appointment with a physician concerning his anxiety and depression and that Mr. Grant would 7 benefit from medication.438 Moreover, the record shows that treating physicians at Alta Bates 8 Summit Medical Center diagnosed Mr. Grant with depression and prescribed medication.439 The 9 analysis at step two is built on the ALJ’s weighing of the medical evidence. Here, the record as a whole shows that Mr. Grant’s mental health conditions were more than a “slight abnormality.” See 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. 12 The ALJ also erred by failing to list restrictive lung disease and congestive heart failure as 13 “severe” impairments. While the ALJ did discuss some of Mr. Grant’s cardiac and pulmonary 14 conditions later in the five-step framework, he did not address congestive heart failure or 15 restrictive lung disease. Physicians diagnosed Mr. Grant with restrictive lung disease on multiple 16 occasions when Mr. Grant was in the hospital and having difficulty breathing,440 and congestive 17 heart failure is one of Mr. Grant’s most persistent chronic health problems in the record.441 18 Accordingly, these conditions are more than a “slight abnormality” and be considered at step two. 19 See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. * 20 * * 21 22 23 436 AR 35. 24 437 See, e.g., AR 1550–59 (counseling with Ms. Wachter), 1567–70 (counseling with Ms. Madison). 438 AR 959, 971. 439 AR 1605, 1627. 26 440 See, e.g., AR 769, 1013–14. 27 441 25 See, e.g., AR 415, 582, 786, 992, 1067, 1070, 1167, 1175–76, 1184, 1192, 1199, 1216, 1579, 1586, 1593. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 54 For the reasons discussed above, the ALJ erred at step two. On remand, the ALJ can consider 1 2 the significance of Mr. Grant’s depression, restrictive lung disease, and congestive heart failure. 3 4 3. Whether the ALJ Adequately Considered Listings of Impairments at Step Three 5 Mr. Grant contends that the ALJ erred at step three by not considering whether his 6 impairments met the severity requirements of Listings 4.11 and 12.04.442 The court agrees. At step three of the five-step framework, “[i]f a claimant has an impairment or combination of 7 8 impairments that meets or equals a condition outlined in the “Listing of Impairments,” then the 9 claimant is presumed disabled.” Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)). “An ALJ must evaluate the relevant evidence before concluding that a claimant’s impairments do not meet 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 or equal a listed impairment. A boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion that a 12 claimant’s impairment does not do so.” Id. (citing Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 13 1990)). “Medical equivalence will be found ‘if the medical findings are at least equal in severity 14 and duration to the listed findings.’” Marcia, 900 F.2d at 175–76 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526). 15 Accordingly, at step three, “the ALJ must explain adequately his evaluation of the alternative tests 16 and the combined effects of the impairments” to determine whether a claimant equals a Listing. Id. 17 at 176. Listing 4.11 states: 18 19 Chronic venous insufficiency of a lower extremity with incompetency or obstruction of the deep venous system and one of the following: 20 A. Extensive brawny edema (see 4.00 G3) involving at least two-thirds of the leg between the ankle and knee or the distal one-third of the lower extremity between the ankle and hip. 21 22 OR 23 B. Superficial varicosities, stasis dermatitis, and either recurrent ulceration or persistent ulceration that has not healed following at least 3 months of prescribed treatment. 24 25 26 27 442 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 21–22. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 55 1 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 4.11. “Brawny edema,” as outlined in Listing 4.00G3, is: 4 characterized as “swelling that is usually dense and feels firm due to the presence of increased connective tissue; it is also associated with characteristic skin pigmentation changes. It is not the same thing as pitting edema. Brawny edema generally does not pit (indent on pressure), and the terms are not interchangeable. Pitting edema does not satisfy the requirements of 4.11A. 5 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 4.00G3. As discussed above, physicians have characterized 6 Mr. Grant’s edema as “pitting edema,”443 which does not satisfy the requirements of Listing 4.11. 7 But practitioners diagnosed Mr. Grant with lymphedema.444 While lymphedema “does not meet 8 the requirements of [Listing] 4.11, . . . it may medically equal the severity of that listing.” 20 9 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 4.00G4. Given that the ALJ found that Mr. Grant suffered from 2 3 lymphedema at step two of the five-step framework and that lymphedema may equal the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 requirements of Listing 4.11, the court finds that remand is appropriate. The ALJ should have 12 addressed whether Mr. Grant’s lymphedema was sufficiently severe to equal the requirements of 13 Listing 4.11 and “explained adequately his evaluation of the alternative tests and the combined 14 effects of the impairments” to determine whether Mr. Grant’s impairments equal the requirements 15 of the Listing. Marcia, 900 F.2d at 176. The “paragraph B” criteria of Listing 12.04 requires that Mr. Grant satisfy least two of the 16 17 following: 18 1. Marked restriction of activities of daily living; or 19 2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or 20 3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence , or pace; or 21 4. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 22 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.04. As discussed above, Dr. Snyder found that Mr. Grant 23 suffered from only mild to moderate impairments.445 Fully crediting her testimony alone would be 24 insufficient to warrant a remand. Given the other instances in the record where physicians 25 27 443 See, e.g., AR 1176–78. 444 26 See, e.g., AR 1176, 1188, 1300, 1308–09, 1392–94, 1583–85, 1641. 445 AR 802. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 56 1 diagnosed Mr. Grant with depression and prescribed him medication after Dr. Snyder’s 2 evaluation,446 however, the court concludes that further administrative review is needed to 3 determine whether the ALJ’s failure to consider Listing 12.04 was, in fact, harmless. See Molina, 4 674 F.3d at 1115 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit applies “harmless error principles” by 5 “look[ing] at the record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case”). * 6 * * 7 For the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the ALJ erred at step three. On 8 remand, the ALJ can consider whether Mr. Grant’s impairments meet or equal Listings 4.11 and 9 12.04. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 4. Whether the ALJ Erred by Finding Mr. Grant’s Reports of His Own Symptoms Not Credible Mr. Grant contends that the ALJ erroneously discredited his testimony. In assessing a 13 14 claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must make two determinations. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. “First, 15 the ALJ must determine whether there is ‘objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment 16 which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting 17 Ligenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, if the claimant produces that 18 evidence, and “there is no evidence of malingering,” the ALJ must provide “specific, clear and 19 convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s 20 symptoms. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “At the same time, the ALJ is not 21 ‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be 22 available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).’” Id. (quoting Fair 23 v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a 24 claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between 25 testimony and conduct, daily activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek 26 27 446 See, e.g., 1605, 1627. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 57 1 treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation 2 marks omitted). “[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 3 undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) 4 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834) ; see, e.g., Morris v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-0674-JSC, 2016 WL 5 7369300, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016). The ALJ found the following about Mr. Grant’s testimony: 6 7 Finally, I find [Mr. Grant’s] allegation of complete debilitation not generally credible. As previously noted, Dr. Todd stated [Mr. Grant’s] physical functioning would be greatly enhanced if he were to cease substance abuse. In addition, there is extensive evidence of non-compliance with medications and diet in the record. [Mr. Grant], who admitted to being an alcoholic, continues to drink around 1–2 pints of vodka daily, and even works at a liquor store. Also, he was noted to be a poor historian, and his claims of abstinence from cocaine and reducing drinking conflict with most of the record.447 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 The ALJ satisfied the first step of the two-step inquiry when he determined that Mr. Grant’s 12 13 medically determinable impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause some of the 14 symptoms alleged.”448 See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112. But the ALJ did not provide any evidence or 15 find that Mr. Grant was a malingerer. Accordingly, he needed to provide “specific, clear and 16 convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of Mr. Grant’s 17 symptoms. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because the ALJ discredited Mr. 18 Grant’s testimony in part on his assessment of the medical-opinion evidence, including Dr. Todd’s 19 testimony, the court remands on this ground too. The ALJ can reassess Mr. Grant’s credibility in 20 context of the entire record. 21 22 23 24 25 26 447 27 AR 40. 448 AR 37. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 58 1 2 5. Whether the ALJ’s Determination of Mr. Grant’s RFC Was Supported by Substantial Evidence Mr. Grant contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the whole of the medical record and 3 4 thereby arrived at an erroneous RFC that is not supported by substantial evidence.449 “[T]he ALJ 5 is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. 6 Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 7 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (“it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s 8 physician, to determine residual functional capacity”). The ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s 9 RFC must be based on the medical opinions and the totality of the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 404.1546(c). Moreover, the ALJ is responsible for “‘resolving conflicts in medical 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d 12 at 1039). In weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire case record, 13 including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 14 C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire 15 record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting 16 evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ALJ relied in part on his findings at prior steps within the five-step framework. Because 17 18 the court found errors in these findings, and because the ALJ’s RFC was predicated on these 19 findings, the court remands on this basis too. 20 21 6. Whether the ALJ Erred at Step Five by Relying on an Erroneous RFC Because the court remands on issues such as the ALJ’s weighing and evaluation of the medical 22 23 records and Mr. Grant’s testimony (predicates for the RFC determination and application of the 24 Medical-Vocational Guidelines), the court remands this issue too for reconsideration based on the 25 full record. 26 27 449 Mot. – ECF No. 18 at 16–17. 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 59 1 2 3 7. Whether the Court Should Remand for Further Proceedings or Immediately Award Benefits The court has “discretion to remand a case either for additional evidence and findings or for an 4 award of benefits.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Smolen, 5 80 F.3d at 1292); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The decision whether 6 to remand for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of [the] 7 court.”) (citing Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). Generally, “‘[i]f additional 8 proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceeding, a social security case 9 should be remanded.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)) (alteration in original); see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative proceedings would 12 serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide benefits.”); McCartey, 298 13 F.3d at 1076 (remand for award of benefits is discretionary); McAllister, 888 F.2d at 603 (remand 14 for award of benefits is discretionary); Connett, 340 F.3d at 876 (finding that a reviewing court 15 has “some flexibility” in deciding whether to remand). 16 For the reasons described above, the court finds that remand is appropriate so as to “remedy 17 defects in the original administrative proceeding.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Lewin v. 18 Schweiker, 654 F.2d at 635 (alteration in original)). 19 20 21 CONCLUSION The court grants Mr. Grant’s motion for summary judgment, denies the Commissioner’s cross- 22 motion for summary judgment, and remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this 23 order. 24 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: September 24, 2018 ______________________________________ LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge 27 28 ORDER – No. 17-cv-03423-LB 60

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