Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc. et al

Filing 196

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DISCOVERY ORDER; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM DISCOVERY ORDER. Signed by Judge Maxine M. Chesney on July 18, 2019. (mmclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/18/2019)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GLASS EGG DIGITAL MEDIA,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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GAMELOFT, INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-04165-MMC
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
DISCOVERY ORDER; DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM DISCOVERY ORDER

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Re: Dkt. Nos. 184, 185
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Before the Court are (1) plaintiff Glass Egg Digital Media’s (“Glass Egg”) “Motion

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for Relief from Nondispositive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge” and (2) defendant

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Gameloft SE’s (“GLSE”) “Motion for Relief from Nondispositive Pretrial Order of

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Magistrate Judge,” both filed July 2, 2019, and by which the parties submit their

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respective objections to the Discovery Order filed June 17, 2019, by Magistrate Judge

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Robert Illman. A Response to each said motion has been filed.1
As Judge Illman points out, the instant dispute concerns “the scope of permissible

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jurisdictional discovery under [this Court’s] Order of February 12, 2018” (“February 12

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Order”) (see Disc. Order at 1:23-25), in which Glass Egg was granted leave to conduct

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discovery “pertaining to (a) the size of Gameloft SE’s business in California and (b) the

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identity of the Gameloft entity/entities that operate(s) the website accessible to website

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users within California” (see February 12 Order at 2:1-3). In particular, the parties’

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GLSE’s “Administrative Motion,” filed July 18, 2019, “for Leave to File Reply” is hereby
DENIED, as the factual assertions GLSE seeks to rebut are not relevant to the issue
underlying the instant dispute, namely, as set forth below, the meaning of “size” as used
in this Court’s February 12 Order.
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dispute centers on the definition of “size” as used in said order.

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Regrettably, the parties did not return to this Court for clarification, thereby

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imposing on Judge Illman the unenviable burden of having to rule on close to 400

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disputed requests for discovery.
Given the considerable time and effort Judge Illman expended in resolving those

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matters, it is tempting to accept his reasonable determination that the word “size” coupled

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with the word “business” has a “common understanding.” (See Disc. Order at 4:17-18.)

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In this instance, however, the Court’s intention was not to use such phrase in quite as

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broad a manner as it might otherwise be used, and, consequently, the Court rules as

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follows.2
The February 12 Order was issued following the hearing conducted February 9,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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2018, on GLSE’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. During that hearing,

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the Court granted “limited” jurisdictional discovery (see Hr’g Tr. at 24:11) and Glass Egg

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proposed the now-disputed term, “the size of [GLSE’s] business in California” (see id.

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47:1), which the Court accepted, and to which GLSE made no objection. At the time of

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said ruling, the Court had in mind the test for specific jurisdiction commonly applied to

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claims sounding in tort, specifically, whether a defendant has “(1) committed an

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intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the

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defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state,” see Picot v. Weston, 780

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F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted), the key factor

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here being whether GLSE, by operating its interactive website containing the allegedly

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infringing car models, directly targeted California residents.

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With that understanding, the Court finds the discovery requests seeking

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information as to the revenue GLSE received from the use of its website by California

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Although, ordinarily, a district court may “reconsider [a nondispositive] pretrial matter . . .
where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law,” see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), given the nature of the dispute presented
here, the Court finds such standard inapplicable.
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residents and from entities who directed their advertisements on GLSE’s website to

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California residents, namely, the discovery requests contained in List Nos. (4) through

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(8), (14) through (18), (67) through (72),3 (76), (179), (225), (268), (343), (344), (357),

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(362), (373), (375), and (383) through (385), fall within the scope of the February 12

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Order, and that the remaining disputed requests do not fall within the scope of said order,

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as they seek information concerning revenue sources and activities that, regardless of

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their location, are unrelated to the allegedly infringing conduct.

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Accordingly, for the reasons stated above:

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1. To the extent GLSE seeks modification of the Discovery Order as to the
discovery requests contained in List Nos. (12), (19), (73) through (75), (79)

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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through (82), (206) through (222), (227), (228), (239), (241), (243), (244),

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(267), (269), (270), (276), (278), (347), (349), (353), (355), (367), (370), and

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(376) through (380), GLSE’s Motion for Relief is hereby GRANTED and said

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discovery requests are DISALLOWED; in all other respects, GLSE’s Motion for

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Relief is hereby DENIED.

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2. Glass Egg’s Motion for Relief is hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: July 18, 2019
MAXINE M. CHESNEY
United States District Judge

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In GLSE’s motion, as Glass Egg points out, Judge Illman’s rulings as to discovery
requests (67) through (72) are not listed as challenged, but are so listed in GLSE’s
proposed order.
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