Cornejo et al v. Moran et al

Filing 21

ORDER by Judge Breyer granting 19 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, denying 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Dismissing Case WITH PREJUDICE. (crblc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/1/2017)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARIMAR CORNEJO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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v.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 17-cv-04664-CRB

TERESA MORAN, et al.,

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Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
[DKT. 2], GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS ALL CLAIMS [DKT. 19],
AND DISMISSING WITH
PREJUIDICE

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Plaintiffs Marimar Cornejo and Jamil Bey (“Plaintiffs”) filed for a temporary

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restraining order (“TRO”) or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction (“PI”) (dkts. 2–4),

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alleging that the City of San Francisco (“City”) improperly impounded their vehicle (dkt. 1

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(“Compl.”)). They seek the return of their car, as well as damages resulting from the

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impound. The Court denied their motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on

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August 15, 2017. Dkt. 9. The City has since filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. Finding

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that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court

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DENIES the motion for PI and GRANTS the motion to dismiss.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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The City booted and towed Cornejo’s car in July 2017 on the ground that she had

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failed to pay a number of parking citations. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiffs challenged the

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decision to impound at an administrative hearing. Compl. ¶ 21. They apparently did not

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prevail. Compl. ¶ 99. They then filed the complaint in the instant case and sought a TRO

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and PI, as well as leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkts. 2–4. On Aug. 15, the

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Court granted the motions to proceed IFP, denied the motion for TRO, and ordered the

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City to respond to the motion for PI. Dkt. 9. In lieu of a response, the City filed a motion

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to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt.

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19. Plaintiffs failed to meet the deadline to respond to the motion to dismiss. They

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subsequently failed to respond to an order to show cause why their case should not be

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dismissed for failure to prosecute. See dkt. 20.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must

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contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

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relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Dismissal may be based on either “the

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lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a
cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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1990). A court “must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw

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all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of L.A., 828

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F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the facts pleaded must make the claim

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“plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Following dismissal, a court “should liberally allow a party to amend its pleading.”

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Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir.

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2013). However, it need not grant leave to amend if there is no set of facts under which

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the plaintiff can state a valid and sufficient claim. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833

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F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987).

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III.

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DISCUSSION
The City argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails on two independent grounds: they did not

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exhaust their administrative remedies, and they did not state a cognizable claim that the

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administrative hearing violated their constitutional right to procedural due process. The

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Court need not reach these arguments, however, because it lacks subject-matter

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jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal

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district courts from hearing appeals or de facto appeals from state-court judgments. See
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