Daria v. Sapient, Inc. et al

Filing 128

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND VACATING JUDGMENT by Judge Alsup. (whalc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/25/2018)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HALEY DARIA,
No. C 17-05453 WHA

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
VACATING JUDGMENT

v.
SAPIENT INC, et al.
Defendants.
/

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Pro se plaintiff Haley Daria moves for reconsideration of an order dismissing this action

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for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff also moves to set aside the judgment entered in

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favor of defendants. The background of this action is found in prior orders (see, e.g., Dkt. Nos.

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16, 96). In brief, this case is part of a long-running saga of state and federal actions brought by

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plaintiff concerning her ownership interest in a company known as Web Associates, Inc.

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Plaintiff filed the amended complaint in December 2017, after an order dismissed the original

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complaint sua sponte. Although difficult to comprehend, the amended complaint appeared to

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challenge two settlement agreements by her and litigation conduct connected to various court

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proceedings in which plaintiff challenged those agreements.

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The amended complaint asserted claims for: (1) abuse of process/malicious prosecution,

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(2) promissory estoppel, (3) unjust enrichment, and (4) declaratory relief. An order dated

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March 16, 2018, concluded that although the amended complaint made vague references to

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various federal laws (including, for example, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and 42
U.S.C. § 1983), it did not actually assert claims under those statutes. The March 16 order

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further found that the allegations in the amended complaint did not support diversity

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jurisdiction and accordingly granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

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jurisdiction. The Court did not reach defendants’ motions to declare plaintiff a vexatious

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litigant. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on March 23 (Dkt. Nos. 22, 96, 98).

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Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the March 16 order and

of motions for reconsideration only with respect to interlocutory orders made prior to the entry

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of final judgment. Plaintiff’s post-judgment motion for reconsideration is therefore construed

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as a motion for relief from the March 16 order and the March 23 judgment under FRCP 60(b).

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FRCP 60(b) provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown:

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For the Northern District of California

for relief from the March 23 judgment. In this district, Civil Local Rule 7-9 allows for the filing

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United States District Court

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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which

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by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud by

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the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other

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reason justifying relief. FRCP 60(b); School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

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Cir. 1993). Although difficult to understand, plaintiff appears to set forth five primary

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arguments as to why the March 16 order and March 23 judgment should be set aside.

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First, plaintiff argues that the Court improperly took judicial notice of and relied upon

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falsified documents — various filings from state and federal court proceedings — submitted in

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connection with defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiff further argues that the March 16

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order improperly considered these materials without converting defendants’ FRCP 12(b)(6)

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motions into motions for summary judgment. These contentions are incorrect. Although the

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March 16 order granted defendants’ requests for judicial notice in connection with defendants’

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motions to dismiss and to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant, the dismissal order did not rely

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on the submitted documents in dismissing the complaint.

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Second, plaintiff argues that federal-question jurisdiction existed because “S.E.C. act

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10b violations were extensively delineated throughout the record.” As the March 16 order

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explained, the amended complaint made references to the Exchange Act but did not actually

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assert claims under that statute. The authorities in plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration support
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this conclusion. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,

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1568 (2016), the Supreme Court disagreed that federal jurisdiction would be proper where a

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complaint asserted “a simple state-law action for breach of contract, in which the plaintiff

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alleges, for atmospheric reasons, that the defendant’s conduct also violated the Exchange Act —

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or still less, that the defendant is a bad actor who infringed that statute on another occasion.”

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The Supreme Court went on to explain that such a suit would be “‘brought to enforce’ state

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contract law, not the Exchange Act — because the plaintiff can get all the relief he seeks just by

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showing the breach of an agreement, without proving any violation of federal securities law.”

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So too here.
Third, plaintiff argues that federal-question jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Contract Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law

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impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 10. Plaintiff fails to point to

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where in the amended complaint she asserted such a claim or against which defendant. Again,

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the March 16 order concluded that although the amended complaint made vague references to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983, it did not actually assert a claim under that statute. Plaintiff fails to identify

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any new basis or facts that would warrant reconsideration of this conclusion.

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Fourth, plaintiff claims that diversity jurisdiction existed because “World Wide Web

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Associates LLC” had members who are citizens of Utah. Notably, however, “World Wide Web

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Associates LLC” is not a party to this action, and plaintiff fails to explain its relevance to the

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instant motion. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments concerning the March 16 order similarly lack

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merit.

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Fifth, plaintiff argues that the March 23 judgment is void if the Court lacks subject-

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matter jurisdiction. A final judgment is “void” for purposes of FRCP 60(b)(4) “only in the rare

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instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a

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violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” United

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Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010). This order accordingly agrees

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that judgment was incorrectly entered in favor of defendants given the Court’s lack of subject-

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matter jurisdiction. The March 23 judgment is accordingly VACATED. For the reasons
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discussed above, however, plaintiff’s motion for relief from the March 16 dismissal order is

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DENIED.

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Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED. Plaintiff’s various requests for an in

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camera inspection of documents and an evidentiary hearing are also DENIED. Pursuant to Civ.

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L.R. 7-1(b), this order finds plaintiff’s motions suitable for submission without oral argument

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and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for July 5. No further filings will be entertained in

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this closed action.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Dated: June 25, 2018.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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