Bunkley-v-Verber et al

Filing 37

ORDER GRANTING 16 MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge William H. Orrick. Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to all causes of action in the Complaint, which is DISMISSED. Bunkley may amend the Complaint within 20 days of the date below. (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/9/2018)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

JEFFREY BUNKLEY,
Plaintiff,

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Case No. 17-cv-05797-WHO
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

v.
NICHOLAS VERBER, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 16

Defendants.

12

INTRODUCTION

13

Plaintiff Jeffrey Bunkley was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for “Jeffrey

14

Binkley” and booked by County of San Mateo deputies Nicholas Verber and Randolph Cousenes

15

(together, the “County Deputies”). He brings suit against the County Deputies and the County of

16

San Mateo alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest and

17

detention and his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as

18

several state law claims, including negligence, negligent training and supervision, assault and

19

battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California Civil Code § 52.1.

20

Because the County Deputies had probable cause to believe that Bunkley was the person described

21

in the arrest warrant, none of his causes of action states a claim for relief and the Complaint is

22

DISMISSED with leave to amend.

23
24

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeffrey Bunkley was at home on September 8, 2016, when the County Deputies

25

knocked on his door and informed plaintiff that they intended to arrest him on an outstanding

26

arrest warrant for Jeffrey Binkley. See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 9 [Dkt. No. 1]. The arrest warrant

27

stated that Jeffrey Binkley was also known as “Jeffrey Michael Bunkley.” See Defs.’ Request for

28

Judicial Notice (“RJN”) [Dkt. No. 17], Ex. B. Plaintiff denied that he was Jeffrey Binkley. See

1

Compl. ¶ 9. He also denied that he had ever lived in Gilroy or worked in Redwood City, pursuant

2

to the County Deputies’ questions. Id. The County Deputies nonetheless placed plaintiff under

3

arrest and transported him to the Maguire Correction Facility in Redwood City, California, where

4

he was booked. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD

5

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it

6
7

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

8

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

9

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation

12

omitted). While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must

13

allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

14

555, 570. In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,

15

the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of

16

the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The court is

17

not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

18

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.

19

2008).

20

If the court dismisses a complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to

21

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured

22

by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In making

23

this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue

24

delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments,

25

undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” See Moore v.

26

Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).

27
28
2

DISCUSSION

1

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

I.

3

Defendants request judicial notice of two documents, the misdemeanor complaint in

4

People v. Jeffrey Binkley, as well as the February 18, 2014, arrest warrant for Jeffrey Binkley. “As

5

a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a

6

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). A district

7

court may nonetheless consider certain materials––“documents attached to the complaint,

8

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice”––at the

9

pleadings stage. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants contend

10

that these documents are matters of judicial notice because they are matters of public record. See

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

2

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689; see also Neylon v. Cty. of Inyo, No. 1:16-cv-0712, 2016 WL 6834097, at *4

12

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (“Courts may properly take judicial notice of a bench warrant as a

13

matter of public record.”); Ferguson v. United States, No. 15cv1253, 2016 WL 4793180, at *3

14

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) (taking judicial notice of arrest warrant because it was a “matter[] of

15

public record, and the parties d[id] not dispute [its] authenticity”). Bunkley does not dispute these

16

documents’ authenticity, but argues that I may only take judicial notice of the fact that these two

17

documents were filed, not their contents.

18

While I may take judicial notice of matters of public record, I may not take judicial notice

19

of any fact that is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Thus, in Lee, the Ninth

20

Circuit held that the district court had erred in judicially noticing not just “the fact of the

21

extradition hearing” or “the fact that a Waiver of Extradition was signed by [a person],” but also

22

“the validity of [the person’s] Waiver of Extradition in dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims at the

23

pleading stage.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689–90 (emphasis in original). In so doing, the district court

24

had impermissibly accepted the validity of the person’s waiver, which was in direct dispute due to

25

his mental incapacity. Id. at 690.

26

Here, Bunkley argues that I may not consider the contents of the documents because he

27

disputes “that Jeffrey Binkley had an ‘AKA’ of Jeffrey Michael Bunkley.” Opp. at 6. But

28

Defendants do not argue that any “Jeffrey Binkley” was also known as “Jeffrey Michael
3

Bunkley,” or vice versa. Instead, Defendants request judicial notice of these documents only for

2

the fact that the phrase appears on them, not for the truth of that phrase. Because plaintiff does not

3

dispute the existence or authenticity of the warrant itself,1 nor the fact that this phrase appears on

4

the warrant’s face, this is not a fact subject to reasonable dispute, and I may take judicial notice of

5

the arrest warrant and that it was issued for “Jeffrey Binkley,” “also known as: Jeffrey Michael

6

Bunkley.” See RJN, Ex. B. On the other hand, I decline to take judicial notice of the

7

misdemeanor complaint at this time, as it does not provide any relevant information beyond that

8

contained in the arrest warrant. See Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1410 n.2 (9th

9

Cir. 1990) (declining to take judicial notice of another action “not relevant” to the case); Neylon,

10

2016 WL 4793180, at *4 (“[I]f an exhibit is irrelevant or unnecessary to deciding the matters at

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

issue, a request for judicial notice may be denied.”).
II.

12

Motion to Dismiss
A. Whether the County Deputies Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity from

13

Bunkley’s Section 1983 Claim

14

The County Deputies claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Bunkley’s

15
16

Section 1983 claims. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

17

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

18

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

19

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The County Deputies argue

20

that plaintiff fails to allege facts showing the violation of a constitutional right. Bunkley contends

21

that his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful arrest was violated when the County Deputies

22

entered his home and arrested him on an outstanding warrant for someone with a different name,

23

despite his protestations of innocence.
Bunkley alleges in his Complaint that:
Plaintiff answered the door and was informed by Defendants VERBER and COUSENES
that they intended to arrest Plaintiff on an outstanding arrest warrant for Jeffrey Binkley.

24
25
26
27
28

1

Indeed, Bunkley incorporates the arrest warrant by reference in his Complaint. See Compl. ¶ 9
(“Plaintiff answered the door and was informed by Defendants VERBER and COUSENES that
they intended to arrest Plaintiff on an outstanding arrest warrant for Jeffrey Binkley.”).
4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Plaintiff denied that he was Jeffrey Binkley. The Defendants asked Plaintiff whether he
had ever lived in Gilroy or worked in Redwood City. Plaintiff told them he had not.
Despite his denials and without probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was Jeffrey
Binkley, the Defendants handcuffed Plaintiff, placed him under arrest on the outstanding
warrant for Jeffrey Binkley, and transported him to the Maguire Correctional Facility in
Redwood City, California, where he was booked on that warrant.
Compl. ¶ 9. Bunkley appears to argue that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to
arrest him because he is named “Jeffrey Bunkley” rather than “Jeffrey Binkley.” The arrest
warrant, however, clearly states that “[t]he above-named person [i.e., Jeffrey Binkley] is also
known as: Jeffrey Michael Bunkley.” RJN, Ex. B. Given that the officers had an arrest warrant
for either a “Jeffrey Binkley” or “Jeffrey Michael Bunkley,” they had probable cause to arrest
Bunkley. No constitutional violation occurred.
Bunkley relies on Lee, where the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff had adequately alleged
a constitutional violation where no reasonable police officer could have believed that the arrested
individual, Kerry Sanders, was the fugitive Robert Sanders, given Kerry Sanders’s “obvious
mental incapacity” and “the fact that Kerry Sanders’s fingerprints and other identifying
characteristics did not match those of Robert Sanders.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 685. That case is
distinguishable because the two individuals did not share the same name or other known names, as
is the case here. Moreover, Bunkley does not identify other obvious distinguishing characteristics,
such as mental incapacity, fingerprints, or other physical features, that the officers could have used
to differentiate him from Binkley.
Instead, ample case law, including Supreme Court precedent, holds that “[t]he Constitution
does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of
action for every defendant acquitted––indeed, for every suspect released.” Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). In Baker, the Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment or other
constitutional violation when someone was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant despite his
claim of mistaken identity, detained for three days, and later found to be innocent. Id. at 144; see
also Rivera v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 391 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Rivera has not presented
any evidence that the Counties knew that Rivera was not the true subject of the warrant. Nor do
the circumstances of this case suggest that further investigation into Rivera’s identity was

28
5

1
2

required.”).
Because the County Deputies had probable cause to arrest Bunkley based on a valid arrest

3

warrant, he suffered no constitutional violation and the County Deputies are entitled to qualified

4

immunity from his Section 1983 claim. This claim for relief is DISMISSED as to the County

5

Deputies.

6
7
8
9

B. Whether the County of San Mateo is Immune from Bunkley’s Section 1983
Claim Pursuant to Monell
The County of San Mateo also contends that it is immune from Bunkley’s Section 1983
claim. Pursuant to Monell, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

12

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

13

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”

14

Id. “A local governmental entity’s failure to train its employees can also create § 1983 liability

15

where the failure to train ‘amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons’ with whom

16

those employees are likely to come into contact.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 681 (citing City of Canton,

17

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989)). Bunkley argues that the County of San Mateo

18

failed to train and supervise the County Deputies, resulting in the deprivation of plaintiff’s

19

constitutional rights.

20

In order to prevail on his Section 1983 claim, Bunkley therefore must sufficiently allege

21

that: “(1) [he was] deprived of [his] constitutional rights by defendant[] and [its] employees acting

22

under color of state law; (2) that the defendant[] ha[s] customs or policies which amount to

23

deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies are the moving

24

force behind the constitutional violations.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 681–82 (internal quotation marks and

25

alterations omitted). Given that Bunkley fails to allege a constitutional violation by the County

26

Deputies, his Section 1983 claim against the County itself necessarily fails as well. His Section

27

1983 claim against the County of San Mateo is DISMISSED.

28
6

C. Bunkley’s Remaining Claims

1

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to California Civil Code

2
3

Section 43.55,2 which provides that “[t]here shall be no liability on the part of, and no cause of

4

action shall arise against, any peace officer who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest

5

regular upon its face if the peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in the

6

reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant.” Cal. Civ. Code §

7

43.55(a). As already discussed, based on the arrest warrant, the County Deputies had a reasonable

8

belief that Bunkley was the person referred to in the warrant. They are entitled to immunity from

9

Bunkley’s causes of action for negligence, assault and battery, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Bunkley agreed in opposition that these causes of action against the County of

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

San Mateo should be dismissed, and they are hereby DISMISSED.
Bunkley’s cause of action for negligent training and supervision against the County of San

12
13

Mateo fails to state a claim because it is based on the conduct of the deputies in executing the

14

search warrant, which was reasonable for the reasons discussed above. He also voluntarily

15

dismisses his Bane Act claim and requests leave to amend, which I GRANT.
CONCLUSION

16
17

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to all causes of action in

18

the Complaint, which is DISMISSED. Bunkley may amend the Complaint within 20 days of the

19

date below.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

20
21

Dated: March 9, 2018

22
23
William H. Orrick
United States District Judge

24
25
26
27
28

2

Defendants also argue that California Penal Code Section 847, known as the “false arrest
immunity,” also applies, but plaintiff has not brought any claim for false arrest or false
imprisonment.
7