Kinney v. Cuellar et al

Filing 44

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen ranting 8 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/1/2018)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

CHARLES G KINNEY,

Case No. 18-cv-01041-EMC

Plaintiff,

8

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

9
10

MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR, et
al.,

11

Docket No. 8

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants.
12
13

I.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Charles Kinney1 has filed this action against current and former California

14
15

Supreme Court justices, three state court appellate judges, and a California superior court judge —

16

Defendants Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, the Honorable Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, the

17

Honorable Carol A. Corrigan, the Honorable Goodwin H. Liu, the Honorable Leondra R. Kruger, the

18

Honorable Ming W. Chin, the Honorable Kathryn M. Werdegar, Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild

19

of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One; Associate Justice Victoria

20

Gerrard Chaney, Associate Justice Jeffrey W. Johnson, and the Honorable Barbara M. Scheper (all

21

defendants collectively referred to as ―Defendants‖). Mr. Kinney alleges that the Defendants have (i)

22

violated the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2., (ii) committed RICO violations, 18 U.S.C. §

23

1961, (iii) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, (iv) failed to provide

24
25
26
27
28

1

Mr. Kinney is a disbarred lawyer who has been declared a vexatious litigant by multiple courts.
See Kinney v. Cantil-Sakauye, No. C-17-1607 JST (DMR) (Docket No. 14) (R&R at 3) (in R&R,
subsequently adopted by district court, noting instances in which Mr. Kinney was declared a
vexatious litigant – by a Los Angeles superior court, by a state appellate court, and by a federal
district court); Kinney v. Clark, 12 Cal. App. 5th 724, 727 (2017) (noting the same – ―[t]he Los
Angeles Superior Court, this court, and the Central District of California all have declared Kinney
to be a vexatious litigant‖).

1

―honest services‖, (v) committed Bankruptcy Fraud, (vi) violated his civil and constitutional rights,

2

and seeks damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. See Docket No. 5 (―FAC‖).

3

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Kinney‘s first amended complaint (―FAC‖), asserting

4

that his claims are barred by, inter alia, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. Having

5

reviewed the parties‘ submissions, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss for

6

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

7

II.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Mr. Kinney and Kimberley Kempton purchased certain real property in Los

9

Angeles from Michele Clark. See Kinney v. Clark, 12 Cal. App. 5th 724, 727 (2017). ―The

10

purchase agreement governing the transaction (the Agreement) included a prevailing party

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

attorney fees clause.‖ Id.

12

In 2006, Mr. Kinney and Ms. Kempton began to file lawsuits concerning the property in

13

Los Angeles superior court. Id. One of the lawsuits was No. BC354136. See FAC ¶ 9. In this

14

action, Mr. Kinney sued his new neighbor, Ms. Cooper, because she had built a fence on the real

15

property back in 1991 (albeit with Ms. Clark‘s oral permission). Ms. Cooper countersued

16

(presumably, to maintain the fence and access to the property), and then Mr. Kinney filed a cross-

17

complaint against Ms. Clark because the lease or easement she gave to Ms. Cooper was not

18

recorded. See FAC ¶ 9.

19

The Los Angeles superior court judge presiding over the case was Defendant Barbara

20

Scheper. See FAC ¶ 12. After Mr. Kinney lost his case against Ms. Clark, Ms. Clark moved for

21

attorney‘s fees as the prevailing party under the purchase agreement. In December 2008, Judge

22

Scheper granted the motion. See FAC ¶¶ 11, 15; see also Kinney v. Clark, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 726

23

(noting that ―Kinney has been challenging Clark‘s entitlement to fees and costs in this action since

24

2008, when the trial court first awarded Clark attorney fees and costs under a residential purchase

25

agreement to which she and Kinney were parties‖); id. at 728 (noting that, ―[o]n December 15,

26

2008, the trial court granted [Clark‘s] motion [for fees under the Agreement as the prevailing party

27

in the lawsuit] and awarded $9,349 in attorney fees‖). Kinney appealed the judgment and on

28

February 3. 2010, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the fee award. Id. at 728.
2

1

In or about July 2010, Ms. Clark declared bankruptcy. See FAC ¶ 11. Apparently, ―‗[t]he

2

expense of defending against Kinney‘s claims was a substantial factor leading to Clark‘s

3

bankruptcy.‘‖ Kinney v. Clark, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 728.

4

Approximately two years later, in July 2012 (i.e., while the bankruptcy proceeding was

5

still pending), the Los Angeles superior court awarded Ms. Clark additional attorney‘s fees

6

(hereafter known as the ―July 2012 fee award‖) for work performed in defending Mr. Kinney‘s

7

appeal of the December 2008 fee award. See Kinney v. Clark, No. B272408, 2017 Cal. App.

8

Unpub. LEXIS 7563, at *3. (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017).

9

Subsequently, Ms. Clark was discharged from bankruptcy. In an order issued in October
2012, the bankruptcy court stated that ―‗Kempton and Kinney are not creditors of this estate‘‖ and

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

that all of Ms. Clark‘s ―‗right to recovery [of] attorneys‘ fees and costs from Kempton and Kinney

12

arising from litigation concerning the Fernwood Property are deemed to have been abandoned by

13

the Trustee.‘‖ Kinney v. Clark, 12 Cal. 4th at 729. This left Ms. Clark free to pursue collection of

14

fees owed by Mr. Kinney. The bankruptcy court also stated that fees, if recoverable under the

15

purchase agreement and California law, would be adjudicated in state court. See id.

16

In 2013, Ms. Clark began to try to enforce the December 2008 fee award and, in 2014, she

17

began to try to enforce the July 2012 fee award. See id. at 728-30. In 2015, Ms. Clark was

18

awarded additional fees by the superior court for work performed in trying to enforce the fee

19

award(s). See Kinney v. Clark, No. B272408, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7563, at *1, 5 (Cal.

20

Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017).

21

In March 2016, the superior court awarded Ms. Clark additional fees for work related to

22

enforcement of the fee awards. See id. at *1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017). In June 2016, the

23

superior court imposed monetary sanctions on Mr. Kinney for filing a frivolous motion for

24

reconsideration of the March 2016 fee award. See id. at *2, 7.

25

Mr. Kinney appealed the March 2016 and June 2016 rulings, which resulted in two appeals

26

– i.e., No. B272408 and B276290. See FAC ¶ 9. The state appellate court judges presiding over

27

the appeals were Defendants Frances Rothschild, Victoria Chaney, and Jeffrey Johnson. See FAC

28

¶ 13. In November 2017, the appellate court ruled against Mr. Kinney. See generally Kinney v.
3

1
2

Clark, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7563.
Subsequently, Mr. Kinney petitioned the California Supreme Court for review (No.

3

S245892 and No. S246379). See FAC ¶ 14. The petitions were denied in January and February

4

2018. See FAC ¶¶ 15-16; see also Kinney v. Clark, No. S245892, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 259 (Cal. Jan.

5

17, 2018); Kinney v. Clark, No. S246379, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 1440 (Cal. Feb. 14, 2018).

6

In the instant action, Mr. Kinney now sues Judge Scheper, the three state appellate court

7

judges identified above, and the California Supreme Court justices (current and former) who

8

denied his petitions for relief. Mr. Kinney‘s theory seems to be (at least in part) that he should not

9

have had to pay any fee awards granted to Ms. Clark before she filed her bankruptcy petition (in
July 2010) because such awards were for debts that Ms. Clark owed her attorneys and the

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

bankruptcy discharge eliminated all of Ms. Clark‘s prepetition debts, thus undermining the basis

12

for the fee awards against Kinney. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 24. The Court of Appeal rejected that

13

argument. Kinney v. Clark, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7563, at *9 (noting that, in a prior

14

decision, ―[w]e also rejected Kinney‘s argument (again repeated here) that Clark was not entitled

15

to collect on a pre-discharge fee award because her debt to her attorneys was discharged in

16

bankruptcy[;] [w]e explained that this argument was not before us on appeal because we were

17

reviewing a post-bankruptcy award of attorney fees (as we are here) and, in any event, Kinney

18

lacked standing to challenge what Clark owes her attorneys and what she chooses to pay them‖).

19

Mr. Kinney also suggests that other fee awards are invalid because the bankruptcy discharge made

20

prepetition contracts – including the 2005 purchase agreement between himself and Ms. Clark –

21

unenforceable. This is a recycled argument, which was addressed by state courts. See Kinney v.

22

Clark, 12 Cal. App. 5th 724, 733 (noting that ―Clark‘s bankruptcy did not eliminate her

23

entitlement to attorney fees and costs under the [prepetition contract]‖). See FAC ¶ 24.

24

According to Mr. Kinney, all Defendants knew about Ms. Clark‘s bankruptcy and therefore their

25

judicial decisions granting or affirming fee awards violated his rights.

26
27
28

III.

DISCUSSION

As indicated by the above, all Defendants in this case are judges, and all have been sued
based on decisions they made as judges. Defendants have moved to dismiss, asserting that all of
4

1

Mr. Kinney‘s claims for relief are barred because of one or more of the following reasons:

2

(1) The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

3

(2) All Defendants have judicial immunity from the claims asserted.

4

(3) All claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

5

(4) All claims are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2283).

6

(5) Mr. Kinney has failed to state a claim for relief.

7

A.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Applies to Kinney‘s Requests for Injunctive and Declaratory

8

Relief

9

The Court finds that Mr. Kinney‘s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2 See FAC at 19 (Mr. Kinney seeks a ―declaration of rights,

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

duties, obligations and legal relations‖ of the issues in the FAC and a ―temporary and/or

12

permanent declaratory relief, injunctive relief and/or equitable relief‖). The ―Rooker–Feldman

13

[doctrine] prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit

14

that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.‖ Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136,

15

1139 (9th Cir. 2004). The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed the ―narrow‖ scope of the Rooker–

16

Feldman doctrine, emphasizing that it ―is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine

17

acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

18

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

19

court review and rejection of those judgments.‖ Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

20

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

21

The Ninth Circuit explained what may constitute a ―forbidden de facto appeal‖ by way of

22

two examples. The first is an action in which ―the federal plaintiff may complain of harm caused

23

by a state court judgment that directly withholds a benefit from (or imposes a detriment on) the

24

federal plaintiff, based on an allegedly erroneous ruling by that court.‖ Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d

25

1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). The second example is an action where the ―federal plaintiff may

26

complain of a legal injury caused by a state court judgment, based on an allegedly erroneous legal

27
2

28

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two cases, Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
5

1

ruling, in a case in which the federal plaintiff was one of the litigants.‖ Id.
If the action is, in part, a de facto appeal of a state court decision or judgment, then a

3

federal district court ―must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal.‖ Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. ―As part

4

of that refusal, [a federal district court] must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is

5

‗inextricably intertwined‘ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.‖ Id.; see

6

also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, n.16 (1983) (stating that ―[i]f the

7

constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court are inextricably intertwined with

8

the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for admission

9

to the state bar, then the [d]istrict [c]ourt is in essence being called upon to review the state court

10

decision,‖ which the ―[d]istrict [c]ourt may not do.‖). Claims are inextricably intertwined ―where

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

2

the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void

12

its ruling.‖ Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation

13

marks omitted); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,

14

concurring) (explaining that a ―federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court

15

judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the

16

issues before it‖).

17

While Mr. Kinney fails to specify what declaratory relief he seeks from this court, it

18

appears that Mr. Kinney‘s requests for declaratory relief against the Defendants essentially asks

19

this Court to conclude that previous state court rulings (including the March 2016, June 2016 and

20

November 2017 rulings) were erroneous, that the California Supreme Court wrongly denied his

21

petitions for review, and that Kinney suffered harm as a result of those allegedly erroneous

22

decisions. See FAC at ¶¶ 9, 14–19. Mr. Kinney alleges that the Defendants had issued improper

23

rulings, on the grounds that (i) the Defendants ―blatantly ignor[ed] bankruptcy law‖, and

24

―violat[ed] the Supremacy Clause with respect to bankruptcy law‖, id. at ¶ 17, (ii) the California‘s

25

vexatious litigant statute only applies to pro se litigants, id. at ¶ 19, (iii) the Defendants ―unjustly

26

enrich[ed] discharged bankruptcy debtor Clark‖ and his attorneys, id., and (iv) that Defendants

27

violated his ―state and/or federal constitutional and civil rights.‖ Id. Mr. Kinney thus directly

28

challenges the state court rulings issued by the defendant judges.
6

1

Mr. Kinney‘s requests for declaratory relief essentially asks this Court to (i) overturn state

2

court decisions which have awarded Ms. Clark more fees for work related to enforcement of the

3

fee award(s), see Kinney v. Clark, No. B272408, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7563, at *1, 6

4

(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017), (ii) declare that state court‘s imposition of monetary sanctions on

5

Mr. Kinney was invalid, see id. at *2, 7, (iii) declare that the subsequent California Court of

6

Appeal decision, which affirmed the fee award and monetary sanctions, was invalid, see generally

7

Kinney v. Clark, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7563, and (iv) declare that Mr. Kinney has a right

8

to petition for review, even though the California Supreme Court denied his petitions for review,

9

see Kinney v. Clark, No. S245892, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 259 (Cal. Jan. 17, 2018); see also Kinney v.

10

Clark, No. S246379, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 1440 (Cal. Feb. 14, 2018).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

As alleged in the FAC, Mr. Kinney directly attacks the state court decisions; this amounts

12

to a forbidden de facto appeal of state court decisions barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Bianchi v.

13

Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Mr. Kinney‘s claims are ―inextricably

14

intertwined‖ with the state courts‘ decisions ―such that the adjudication of the federal claims

15

would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws

16

or procedural rules‖ and as such, his ―complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

17

jurisdiction.‖ Id.

18

With respect to his request for injunctive relief, Mr. Kinney fails to specify anywhere in

19

the FAC precisely what injunctive relief he seeks and for which he claims. The closest request for

20

injunctive relief is Mr. Kinney‘s allegation in his RICO claim, which appears to ask the Court to

21

enjoin, prohibit and/or reverse the state court orders in order to prevent the continued violation of

22

Mr. Kinney‘s federal statutory and constitutional rights. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 42 (RICO claim)

23

(alleging that ―[u]nless the conduct of the defendants, and each of them, is restrained, prohibited

24

and/or reversed, plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm including but

25

not limited to the prevention of plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment rights to redress of

26

grievances, to free speech, and/or to freedom of association in regards to the subject appeal‖).

27

This amounts to a request to enjoin (and effectively overturn) the state court orders that Mr.

28

Kinney contends were wrongly decided. Again, such a request is barred by Rooker-Feldman. See
7

1

Cooper, 704 F.3d at 777–78 (―To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we

2

‗pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.‘‖) (quoting Bianchi v.

3

Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Kinney v. Cantil-Sakauye, No. 17-1607

4

JST (DMR) (Docket No. 14) (where Mr. Kinney sought the same form of injunctive relief in a

5

prior action in this district, and failed to specify the precise form of injunctive relief he seeks.).

6

Mr. Kinney contends that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because there has not been a
trial or hearing on the merits on any of the issues, including Mr. Kinney‘s vexatious litigant status,

8

the issue of attorneys‘ fees, the elimination of Clark‘s obligations under her prepetition contracts

9

and the state court‘s jurisdiction after Clark‘s bankruptcy. See Docket No. 15 at 8–9. Whether or

10

not the state court rulings followed a trial or hearing on the merits is immaterial to the application

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

7

of Rooker-Feldman. Id. Under Rooker-Feldman, a ―losing party in state court is thus barred from

12

seeking what in substance would be appellate review of a state judgment in federal district court,

13

even if the party contends the state judgment violated his or her federal rights.‖ See ScripsAm.,

14

Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

15

B.

16

Judicial Immunity
In addition to requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, Mr. Kinney seeks damages but

17

the Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity for all claims for which Mr. Kinney seeks

18

damages. ―Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial acts.‖

19

See, e.g., Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); see

20

also Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that state

21

court judges are generally entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken within their jurisdiction).

22

A given action is judicial in nature if ―‗it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

23

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his [or her] judicial

24

capacity[.]‘‖ Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Stump v.

25

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). Judicial acts, even when made in error, maliciously or

26

corruptly, do not deprive judicial officers of immunity. See Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d

27

962, 965 (9th Cir.1999). The law strips a judge of immunity only if he or she acts ―in the clear

28

absence of all jurisdiction.‖ Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
8

1

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57) (quotation marks omitted).
The allegations in the FAC make clear that Mr. Kinney is suing the Defendants for acts

2
3

committed in their capacity as judges. Specifically, Mr. Kinney is suing the Defendants because

4

they issued adverse orders against him, and they denied his petition for review.3 See FAC ¶¶ 9–

5

19. Mr. Kinney claims that judicial immunity does not apply because these Defendants were

6

acting in their ―individual capacities‖ since they were acting ―as a prosecutor and not as a neutral

7

arbitrator.‖ See FAC ¶¶ 19–22. Mr. Kinney claims further that judicial immunity does not apply

8

because the judicial defendants are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. See

9

Docket No. 15 at 7.
However, there are only two situations where a judicial officer will not be entitled to

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

judicial immunity. ―First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e.,

12

actions not taken in the judge‘s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions,

13

though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.‖ Mireles v. Waco, 502

14

U.S. 9 at 11–12 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Mr. Kinney does not allege ―non-judicial‖ acts. Instead, the FAC complains about

15
16

the judgment and orders rendered by Judge Scheper, the opinions and orders issued by Justice

17

Rothschild, Justice Chaney and Justice Johnson in Kinney‘s appeals, and the denials of Kinney‘s

18

petitions for review by the Chief Justice and Justice Cuéllar, Justice Corrigan, Justice Liu, Justice

19

Kruger, Justice Chin and Justice Werdegar. See FAC at ¶¶ 19–22. Further, Mr. Kinney does not

20

allege that the Defendants were acting ―in complete absence of all jurisdiction.‖ All acted ―within

21

the jurisdiction of his or her court.‖ Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). The

22

Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity for all claims asserted by Mr. Kinney for which he

23

seeks damages.

24

C.

Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2283)
Finally, Mr. Kinney‘s claims for injunctive relief are also barred by the Anti-Injunction

25
26
3

27
28

The FAC complains about the judgment and order rendered by Judge Scheper, the appellate
opinions by Justice Rothschild, Justice Chaney and Justice Johnson in Kinney‘s appeals, and the
denials of Kinney‘s petitions for review by the Chief Justice and Justice Cuéllar, Justice Corrigan,
Justice Liu, Justice Kruger, Justice Chin and Justice Werdegar.
9

1
2
3
4

Act (AIA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which provides that:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments.

5

28 U.S.C. § 2283. As Mr. Kinney seeks injunctive relief to abate enforcement of the sanctions

6

fees ordered by state courts against Mr. Kinney, the AIA bars this Court from granting such relief.

7

Mr. Kinney fails to establish any applicable exception to the AIA here.
IV.

8

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, (A) Mr. Kinney‘s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (B)

10

the Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity, and (C) the AIA bars this Court from granting

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

Mr. Kinney the relief he seeks.

12
13
14

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants‘ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
This order disposes of Docket No. 8.

15
16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18
19
20

Dated: June 1, 2018
______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10