Yates et al v. East Side Union High School District et al
Filing
22
ORDER RE 8 MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge James Donato on 2/20/2019. (jdlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/20/2019)
1
2
3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5
6
HALEY YATES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
7
8
9
10
Case No.18-cv-02966-JD
ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS
v.
Re: Dkt. No. 8
EAST SIDE UNION HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
Plaintiff Haley Yates alleges that she was bullied, harassed, and sexually abused while she
14
was a student at Piedmont Hills High School (“Piedmont Hills”) in the East Side Union High
15
School District (“the District”). She and her parents sue the District, one of her fellow students,
16
and District employees under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, the Americans with Disabilities Act
17
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the California
18
Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), among other claims. Dkt. No. 1.
19
While the complaint does not specify the basis of federal jurisdiction, the Title IX, ADA, and
20
Rehabilitation Act claims present a federal question, and the Court has supplemental jurisdiction
21
over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a).
22
Two of the defendants, the District and Traci Williams, the principal at Piedmont Hills at
23
the time of the events, move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24
12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 8. The motion is denied.
25
26
BACKGROUND
As alleged in the complaint, Dkt. No. 1, Yates was a student with special needs at
27
Piedmont Hills. She was bullied by three male students, which caused her to attempt suicide. She
28
was also in a relationship with a fellow student who turned abusive and “raped her multiple times
1
and videotaped parts of the rape.” Some of the alleged abuse occurred on the Piedmont Hills
2
campus, and photos and videos showing Yates without clothes on were circulated among the
3
campus’s students.
4
When teachers and Yates’ mother learned of these incidents, they reported them to school
5
supervisors, including Williams. The complaint alleges that Williams ignored them to protect a
6
student with whom she had a family connection. The District investigated the situation and found
7
that Williams had not followed District procedures in handling these incidents but otherwise
8
denied plaintiffs any material relief. One student was arrested and pleaded guilty in connection
9
with these events.
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under familiar standards, a claim must provide “a short and plain statement . . . showing
12
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), including “enough facts to state a
13
claim . . . that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A
14
claim is plausible on its face if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing them in the
15
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court can reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for
16
the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court will not treat as
17
fact or accept as true allegations that are bare legal conclusions, recitations of elements or
18
unwarranted deductions. Id.; In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
19
The plausibility analysis is “context-specific” and not only invites but “requires the reviewing
20
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
21
DISCUSSION
22
Defendants ask to dismiss only the Unruh Act claim. The Unruh Act guarantees all
23
persons in California, regardless of sex or disability, “the full and equal accommodations,
24
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishment of every kind
25
whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Act also states that “[a] violation of the right of any
26
individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall constitute a
27
violation of this section.” Id. § 51(f). Plaintiffs allege that Yates, based on her disability and
28
gender, was deprived of the “advantages, privileges, and services” of Piedmont Hills. Dkt. No. 1
2
1
¶ 96. But Defendants say the Unruh Act does not apply to public schools because they are not
2
“business establishment[s].”
3
While the California Supreme Court has not definitively said whether the Act applies to
4
public schools, it has explained that the term “business establishment” should be construed “in the
5
broadest sense reasonably possible.” Ibister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 78
6
(1985) (quotation and citation omitted). The Act applies to an organization that is “classically
7
‘public’ in its operation,” namely one that “opens its . . . doors to the entire youthful population”
8
of a city, or a “broad segment of the population,” with “no attempt to select or restrict membership
9
or access on the basis of personal, cultural, or religious affinity, as private clubs might do.” Id.
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
at 81, 84 (emphasis omitted).
In keeping with this broad reading, California courts have applied the Act not just to for-
12
profit commercial establishments but also to nonprofit institutions. See, e.g., Warfield v.
13
Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 10 Cal. 4th 594, 619-20 (1995); O’Connor v. Village Green
14
Owners Assn., 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796 (1983) (“Nothing in the language or history of its enactment
15
calls for excluding an organization from its scope simply because it is a nonprofit.”). But the Act
16
generally does not apply to a private social club, such as a private, religious school that is “an
17
expressive social organization whose primary function is the inculcation of values in its youth
18
members,” and whose admission policies are “effectively selective and based on these values.”
19
Doe v. California Lutheran High School Assn., 170 Cal. App. 4th 828, 838 (2009) (quoting
20
Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 699 (1998)).
21
In essence, like the ADA, the Act is concerned with equal access to places of public
22
accommodation. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872
23
(9th Cir. 2004); Warfield, 10 Cal. 4th at 598. Defendants do not dispute the Piedmont Hills school
24
is a public operation that “provides educational services to the local community at no cost to the
25
individuals it serves.” Dkt. No. 8 at 5-6. There is also no doubt that Piedmont Hills does not, nor
26
as a public school could it, cater to private religious or other expressive social values, or select
27
students for admission on that basis.
28
3
Even so, defendants proffer a strict reading of “business establishment” and insist that a
1
public school does not qualify as such for purposes of the Unruh Act. The point is not well taken.
3
Warfield, on which the Defendants rely, and other California state court decisions have applied the
4
Unruh Act to nonprofit organizations. See Warfield, 10 Cal. 4th at 599; Curran, 17 Cal. 4th
5
at 696-97. Defendants’ citations to other cases finding that certain public institutions are not
6
subject to the Unruh Act are readily distinguishable. These cases did not involve public schools
7
with their quintessential character of providing public accommodations and services to students.
8
See, e.g., Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage, 243 Cal. App. 4th 162, 175-76 (2015) (rejecting
9
challenge to city ordinance); Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim, 187 Cal. App. 4th 734,
10
764-65 (2010) (same); Carter v. City of Los Angeles, 224 Cal. App. 4th 808, 825 (2014) (dictum)
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
2
(casting doubt on challenge to city’s sidewalk construction).
Consequently, the Court concludes that the Unruh Act cause of action here states a
12
13
plausible claim. A broad array of district courts have reached the same result. See Z. T. by &
14
through Hunter v. Santa Rosa City Sch., No. 17-CV-01452-WHA, 2017 WL 4418864, at *6 (N.D.
15
Cal. Oct. 5, 2017) (and cases cited therein). This conclusion also squares with the ADA, which
16
unquestionably applies to public schools. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749
17
(2017); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1094 n.1 (9th
18
Cir. 2013) (“[A] violation of the ADA is, per se, a violation of the Unruh Act.”) (quotation
19
omitted).
Defendants next argue that even if the Unruh Act applies to public schools, it does not
20
21
reach their employees. This too is not well taken. “[L]iability under the Act for denying a person
22
the ‘full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services’ of a business
23
establishment . . . extends beyond the business establishment itself to the business establishment’s
24
employees responsible for the discriminatory conduct.” N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc.
25
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145, 1154 (2008). Williams and other District employees
26
allegedly responsible for violating Yates’ rights under the Unruh Act are proper defendants on this
27
claim.
28
4
1
2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 20, 2019
3
4
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge
5
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?