Eeon v. United States of America Department of Agriculture et al

Filing 58

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. Signed by Judge James Donato on 2/21/2019. (jdlc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/21/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EEON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 3:18-cv-03449-JD
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.

Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 53
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Pro se plaintiff Eeon has sued a number of banks, loan servicers, and local, state, and
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federal government entities to enjoin foreclosure proceedings for multiple properties. Dkt. No. 5.
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Defendant Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC (“Rushmore”) moves to dismiss pursuant

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to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, joined by defendant JPMorgan Chase
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Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). Dkt. Nos. 13 and 50. Defendant Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (“Caliber”)

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filed a separate motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). Dkt. No. 53. Eeon filed
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opposition briefs. Dkt. Nos. 30 and 31.
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A pro se complaint is liberally construed, but it still must allege facts sufficient to state a
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plausible claim. Lee v. State of Washington, 690 Fed. App’x 974 (9th Cir. 2017). That means the
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complaint must provide “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), including “enough facts to state a claim . . . that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face if,

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accepting all factual allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff, the Court can reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plausibility analysis is “context-specific” and not

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only invites but “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

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sense.” Id. at 679.

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The amended complaint is a 43-page document that is largely unintelligible. No specific
claim or cause of action is discernible in its rambling narrative. At best, it appears that Eeon is

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attempting to challenge certain mortgage loans and foreclosure proceedings under a “vapor

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money” theory that the banks did not provide consideration for the loans. The amended complaint

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fails to allege facts showing that Eeon is in any way personally connected to the loans or

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foreclosures. But even giving Eeon the benefit of every doubt, he cannot state a plausible claim

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on a “vapor money” theory. Courts in this circuit have consistently dismissed the “vapor money”

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theory as frivolous. See, e.g., Borsotti v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. CV 17-7193 DMG (JCX),

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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2018 WL 4855265, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018); Ananiev v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. C

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12-2275 SI, 2012 WL 2838689, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012); Frances Kenny Family Tr. v.

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World Sav. Bank FSB, No. C 04-03724 WHA, 2005 WL 106792, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2005)

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(stating that the theory “has been squarely addressed and rejected by various courts throughout the

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country for over twenty years”). These well-reasoned decisions are persuasive here, and so the

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amended complaint is dismissed.

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The remaining question is whether Eeon should be allowed to amend again. The Court

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declines to permit that. Eeon has already had two opportunities to state a plausible claim. After

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reviewing the prior complaints, it is clear that further amendment will not meet the required Rule 8

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standards.

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Consequently, the case is dismissed with prejudice. All other pending motions are denied
as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 21, 2019

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JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

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