Nunn et al v. State of California et al
Filing
74
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge William H. Orrick on 03/14/2019. (jmdS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/14/2019)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
GERALD NUNN, et al.,
7
Plaintiffs,
8
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
v.
9
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
10
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Case No. 18-cv-03862-WHO
Re: Dkt. No. 66
Defendants.
12
Plaintiffs Gerald and Judith Nunn, in their first amended complaint (“FAC”), again seek
13
14
injunctive and declaratory relief to stop an unlawful detainer proceeding against them in state
15
court. The FAC names Gavin Newsom, in his official capacity as governor of California; Xavier
16
Becerra, in his official capacity as state attorney general of California; and JP Morgan Chase
17
Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) as defendants. 1 On January 25, 2019, I granted Chase’s motion to dismiss
18
the Nunns’ claims against it with prejudice. Newsom and Becerra (the “State Defendants”) now
19
move to dismiss the Nunns’ remaining claims for a variety of reasons, at least two of which are
20
dispositive: the Eleventh Amendment and the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine bars them.
21
Those arguments are correct. This case is dismissed with prejudice.
22
BACKGROUND
23
The Nunns filed their initial complaint against Chase and the State of California on June
24
27, 2018. [Dkt. No. 1]. Shortly after, the Nunns moved for a permanent injunction [Dkt. No. 8]
25
on July 11, 2018 and a temporary restraining order [Dkt. No. 10] on July 12, 2018. I denied both
26
27
28
1
As the successor in office to Edmund G. Brown Jr., Gavin Newsom is automatically
substituted as a party-defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
1
motions, holding that under the Anti-Injunction Act divested me of the power to enjoin the Napa
2
County Superior Court or the State of California, that Chase was not responsible for the existence
3
of the allegedly unconstitutional unlawful detainer statutes, and that the Nunns were not entitled to
4
injunctive relief based on the record. [Dkt. No. 30]. Chase and the State of California then moved
5
to dismiss the initial complaint. [Dkt. Nos. 31, 35]. The Nunns moved to voluntarily dismiss the
6
State of California pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. [Dkt. No. 44]. I then granted
7
Chase’s motion to dismiss, the Nunns’ motion to dismiss the State of California, and denied the
8
State of California’s motion to dismiss as moot. [Dkt. No. 47]. In granting Chase’s first motion to
9
dismiss, I held that the Anti-Injunction Act still applied, and that Chase could not be liable for
10
federal or state constitutional claims because it was not a state actor. Id.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
On November 20, 2018, the Nunns filed the operative FAC against the State Defendants
12
and Chase, seeking essentially the same relief as articulated in their initial complaint. [Dkt. No.
13
53]. The Nunns contend that the expedited procedures under California’s unlawful detainer laws
14
deprive them, and other mortgagors, of equal protection and procedural due process under the
15
federal and California constitutions because unlawful detainer plaintiffs cannot challenge their
16
right to title within the compressed unlawful detainer hearing schedule. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 29.
As the FAC has already been dismissed with prejudice as to Chase for the same reason as
17
18
the initial complaint, only the State Defendants remain. [Dkt. No. 69]. The State Defendants now
19
move to dismiss, arguing that the Nunns’ claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, comity
20
and abstention require dismissal, the fifth amendment claim does not apply to state action, the
21
Anti-Injunction Act bars all of the Nunns’ non § 1983 claims, and that the FAC fails as a matter of
22
law.2 Defendants Gavin Newsom’s and Xavier Becerra’s Notice of Motion and Motion to
23
Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (the “MTD”) [Dkt. No. 66].
24
LEGAL STANDARD
25
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint
26
if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
27
28
2
The State Defendants ask that I take judicial notice of two bills in the State legislature. As I do
not rely on them, the State Defendants’ request is denied as moot.
2
1
dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
2
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
3
the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
4
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation
5
omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
6
While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts
7
sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
8
In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
10
plaintiff. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court is
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
12
fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.
13
2008). If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to
14
amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured
15
by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
16
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court's subject
17
matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited
18
jurisdiction,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.
19
Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the
20
federal court bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter
21
jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Id.
22
A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d
23
1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is confined to the
24
allegations pled in the complaint. See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
25
The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient “on their face” to
26
invoke federal jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
27
2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true
28
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See Wolfe, 392 F.3d
3
1
at 362.
“By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by
2
themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. To resolve
4
this challenge, the court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id.
5
(citation omitted). Instead, the court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without
6
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted).
7
Once the moving party has made a factual challenge by offering affidavits or other evidence to
8
dispute the allegations in the complaint, the party opposing the motion must “present affidavits or
9
any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses
10
subject matter jurisdiction.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989); see also
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
3
Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
12
13
DISCUSSION
I.
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
14
A.
15
The State Defendants move to dismiss all of the Nunns’ claims against them for lack of
The Nunns’ Federal Constitution Claims
16
jurisdiction because the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
17
Constitution. MTD at 5-7. They argue that although the Ex parte Young exception permits “suits
18
for prospective and injunctive relief against state officers, sued in their official capacities, to enjoin
19
an alleged ongoing violation of law[,]” the State Defendants are not the correct state officials from
20
whom relief may be sought. Id. at 6.
21
“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an
22
unconsenting state. Though its language might suggest otherwise, the Eleventh Amendment has
23
long been construed to extend to suits brought against a state by its own citizens, as well as by
24
citizens of other states.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th
25
Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for
26
prospective declaratory or injunctive relief for violations of federal law against state officials in
27
their official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Idaho v.
28
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997); see also Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123
4
1
(1908). In order to fall within the Ex parte Young exception, the Nunns would need to allege that
2
defendants Newsom and Becerra have a “direct connection” to enforcing the challenged act. Ass'n
3
des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013). A
4
“generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible
5
for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Los Angeles Cnty. Bar
6
Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
7
The only allegation made against Governor Newsom is that “it is his responsibility
8
to ensure the laws of the State of California are property enforced.” FAC at ¶ 18. Similarly, the
9
only allegation against Attorney General Becerra is that it “is his duty to see that the laws of the
State are uniformly and adequately enforced.” Id. at ¶ 19. This sort of general supervisory power
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
or general duty is insufficient to constitute the direct connection required under Ex parte Young.
12
Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir. 1992) (general supervisory powers of the
13
attorney general are insufficient to establish the required connection with enforcement); Litmon v.
14
Brown, No. 10-cv-3894-EMC, 2011 WL 4079227, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (same, as to
15
the general responsibilities of a governor).
16
In opposition, the Nunns argue that the State Defendants cannot invoke the protections of
17
the Eleventh Amendment because “the Governor and State Attorney General are the ultimate
18
authority on enforcement of state laws, whether it be through the state courts or any other agency
19
of the state.” Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants, Gavin Newsom and Xavier Becerra’s Motion
20
to Dismiss at 14-15 (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 70]. This is an unsupported and incorrect statement of
21
law. In the absence of any “direct” allegations that Newsom or Becerra have an active role with
22
respect to the California’s unlawful detainer statutes (or the application of the unlawful detainer
23
statutes against the Nunns), the Nunns’ claims based on the federal Constitution against the State
24
Defendants must be dismissed with prejudice.
25
B.
26
The State Defendants also move to dismiss the Nunns’ claims based on alleged violations
The Nunns’ State Constitution Claims
27
of the California Constitution because (i) state law claims are not cognizable under § 1983, (ii) this
28
court lacks jurisdiction over such a supplemental state law claim, and (iii) they are barred by the
5
1
Eleventh Amendment. MTD at 7-8. The State Defendants are correct. A violation of state law
2
may not form the basis of a claim under § 1983. Hume v. Maynard, 108 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997)
3
(finding an alleged violation of state law to be an inadequate basis to support a § 1983 action)
4
(internal citations omitted). The Nunns’ claims for violation of the California Constitution are
5
supplemental state law claims to which Ex parte Young does not apply. Pennhurst State Sch. &
6
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119-121 (1984). Because Ex parte Young does not apply to the
7
Nunns’ supplemental state law claims, they too are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
8
II.
PRIOR EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
Even if the Nunns were able to identify the correct defendants for the purposes of the Ex
10
parte Young exception, the State Defendants argue that the Nunns’ claims would necessarily fail
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
under the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, which holds that “when one court is exercising in
12
rem [or quasi in rem] jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction
13
over the same res.” Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011)
14
(citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006)). The doctrine applies “where parallel
15
state and federal proceedings seek to determine interests in specific property as against the whole
16
world (in rem), or where the parties' interests in the property . . . serve as the basis of the
17
jurisdiction for the parallel proceedings (quasi in rem).” Id. at 1044 (internal quotation marks and
18
citations omitted); see also Knaefler v. Mack, 680 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Where
19
concurrent proceedings in state and federal court are both suits in rem or quasi in rem, the court
20
first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the
21
exclusion of the other.”). Although the doctrine is judge-made, and not statutory, it is a
22
“[mandatory] common law rule of judicial abstention.” Sexton v. NDEX W., LLC, 713 F.3d 533,
23
536 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). The Nunns did not respond to this argument.
24
In California, foreclosure actions are considered in rem. See Cent. Bank v. Super. Ct., 106
25
Cal. App. 3d 913, 917 (1973). Unlawful detainer actions are considered quasi in rem. Gustafson
26
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 16-cv-1733-BTM(KSC), 2016 WL 7438326, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 27,
27
2016) (internal citation omitted).
28
The Nunns have two parallel cases in state court, both of which were filed before this
6
1
action. In the first case, the Nunns filed their third amended complaint on September 27, 2017 in
2
the Superior Court of Napa County for cancellation of instruments, wrongful foreclosure, slander
3
of title, quiet title, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. Ex.
4
F, Request for Judicial Notice in Support of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion to Dismiss the
5
First Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 58-1].3 In the second case, the Superior Court of Napa
6
County assumed quasi in rem jurisdiction over the subject property on February 26, 2018, when
7
Chase filed its unlawful detainer action against the Nunns. FAC at 8. The Nunns filed their
8
complaint in this action on June 27, 2018, over four months after the initiation of the unlawful
9
detainer case and nine months after the third amended complaint in their other state case for,
among other claims, wrongful foreclosure. [Dkt. No. 1]. Because both state court actions were
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
filed first and are based on in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, the prior exclusive jurisdiction
12
doctrine applies. Chapman, 651 F.3d at 1045; Gatpandan v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y FSB,
13
No. 17-cv-04001-LB, 2017 WL 5751208, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (dismissing claims in
14
federal court in favor of prior-filed state unlawful-detainer action and civil action to quiet title).
15
As a result, the Nunns are barred from asserting their claims in federal court as a matter of law.
16
CONCLUSION
17
Although the Nunns argue that this court “has the omnipresent authority and duty to
18
protect the citizens’ rights[,]” Oppo. at 5, in fact, “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
19
They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at
20
377 (internal citations omitted). The Eleventh Amendment and the prior exclusive jurisdiction
21
doctrine doom the Nunns’ claims. Therefore, I need not consider the State Defendants’ other
22
meritorious arguments concerning comity, abstention, the Anti-Injunction Act, or the merits of the
23
Nunns’ legal theory.
The law in this case is quite clear. Amendment would be futile, so the State Defendants
24
25
are dismissed with prejudice. I have previously dismissed Chase with prejudice. Judgment in
26
27
28
3
State court filings are appropriate for judicial notice. See Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport
Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998). It is unclear when the initial
complaint in this case was filed, but it is necessarily before September 22, 2017.
7
1
2
3
favor of all defendants and against the Nunns will be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 14, 2019
4
William H. Orrick
United States District Judge
5
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?