J.R. et al v. Lakeport Unified School District et al

Filing 62

ORDER DENYING 37 MOTION TO DISMISS. By Judge Alsup.(whalc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/10/2019)

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12

J.R., a minor, by and through her parent and
Guardian ad Litem, S. Ringer, and O.G., a
minor, by and through his parent and Guardian
ad Litem, A. Valdenegro,
Plaintiffs,

13
14
15
16

No. C 18-06211 WHA

v.
LAKEPORT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
KELSEYVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

ORDER DENYING
LAKEPORT UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants.

17

/

18
INTRODUCTION

19
20
21

In this action brought by parents of two middle-school students against a school district,
the district moves to dismiss. The district’s motion is DENIED.
STATEMENT

22
23

Plaintiffs O.G. and J.R., both minors, bring this action through their parents and

24

guardians ad litem, against defendants Kelseyville Unified School District and Lakeport Unified

25

School District. A prior order stated the facts as alleged against Kelseyville Unified School

26

District (Dkt. No. 53). The facts alleged against Lakeport Unified School District are as

27

follows.

28

“Bully,” a middle-school student in the Lakeport Unified School District had a known
history of sexually inappropriate behavioral issues. For example, Bully would openly

1

masturbate on the bus in-front of other students, poke other children with pencils in the anus

2

region, and would shine mirrors up girls’ skirts. The administrators at the middle school even

3

kept a binder of complaints against Bully in the campus office (Dkt. No. 22 at ¶ 24).1
Throughout the 2014–2015 school-year, Bully’s actions towards plaintiff O.G., a male

4
5

middle-school student, age twelve, with special needs, included repeated sodomization in the

6

school’s restroom. Plaintiff O.G. disclosed the abuse to his mother at the end of the school

7

year, who immediately reported it to the school. The school took no further action. Plaintiff

8

O.G. subsequently transferred to another middle school in the Kelseyville Unified School

9

District (id. at ¶¶ 21–23, 25–27).
The following school year, Bully became progressively more aggressive towards

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

plaintiff J.R. In February 2016, J.R. reported to the yard duty that Bully grabbed at her breast,

12

buttocks, and genital areas. The yard duty informed the school principal. Bully was thereafter

13

suspended from the middle school (id. at ¶¶ 28–31).2

14

Through their parents and guardians ad litem, plaintiffs commenced this action against

15

both Kelseyville Unified School District and Lakeport Unified School District in the Superior

16

Court for the County of Lake in October 2018. Defendant Kelseyville removed (Dkt. No. 1).

17

After plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that raised numerous state causes of action and

18

federal claims (Dkt. No. 22), an order stayed plaintiffs’ state law claims against both defendants

19

(Dkt. No. 54). Another order granted in part and denied in part defendant Kelseyville’s motion

20

to dismiss as to the federal claims asserted against defendant Kelseyville (Dkt. No. 53).

21

As alleged against defendant Lakeport Unified School District, the amended complaint

22

alleges four claims, three of which have been stayed (Dkt. No. 54). The sole remaining claim is

23

an alleged Title IX claim. Thus, although Lakeport Unified School District now moves to

24
25
26
27

1
For the purposes of this order, “Bully” refers to the harassing minor. The complaint does not provide
Bully’s legal name.
2

28

The amended complaint does not specify the age of plaintiff J.R. or whether or not she was a student
in the middle school at the time of these assaults. Subsequent filings have indicated that plaintiff J.R. was
twelve years old.

2

1

dismiss all claims, this order only discusses the amended complaint’s Title IX claim. This order

2

follows full briefing and oral argument.

3
4

ANALYSIS
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be

5

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

6

under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §

7

1681(a). To be liable for harassment under Title IX, the recipient of federal funds — here,

8

defendant Lakeport Unified School District — must have actual notice of, and be deliberately

9

indifferent to, the harassment. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277
(1998). Title IX liability for student-to-student harassment is limited “to circumstances wherein

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the

12

known harassment occurs.” Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526

13

U.S. 629, 644–45 (1999). Under Title IX, a school district can be held liable for peer-to-peer

14

harassment where a student is subject to harassment “that is so severe, pervasive, and

15

objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational

16

opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Id. at 650. The operative complaint has

17

alleged sexual assault against both O.G. and J.R. with sufficient detail to plausibly demonstrate

18

severe and offensive peer-to-peer harassment depriving O.G. and J.R. access to the educational

19

opportunities provided by a middle school.

20

Turning to whether or not defendant Lakeport had actual notice and acted with

21

deliberate indifference, because liability may only arise from a recipient’s “own misconduct,”

22

the recipient’s deliberate indifference must “subject its students to harassment. That is, cause

23

students to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it.” In this vein, school

24

officials are generally accorded flexibility to respond to harassment without being “second

25

guess[ed],” as long as their response is not “clearly unreasonable.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–45,

26

648–49.

27
28

Before Bully began harassing J.R., O.G.’s mother informed the school principal that
Bully had been sodomizing her son in the school bathrooms for the past several months. With
3

1

this information in hand, the school not only allowed Bully to remain in school, but did not

2

appear to take any other remedial action. The lack of response to such predatory behavior is

3

clearly unreasonable and plausibly subjected J.R. to the harassment. Thus, at this stage, there is

4

no doubt that the school was on notice and acted with deliberate indifference as to plaintiff J.R.

5

As to plaintiff O.G., the operative complaint alleges that Lakeport kept a binder of

when the binder began to be assembled or what the binder of complaints against Bully

8

contained. On a motion to dismiss, however, it is unfair to insist that a plaintiff plead specific

9

facts that reside only in the secret files of a defendant and which, prior to discovery, can only be

10

referenced on information and belief. Discovery will tease out the facts of what Lakeport knew

11
For the Northern District of California

complaints against Bully in the campus office. True, the operative complaint never specifies

7

United States District Court

6

about Bully and when they knew it. In light of the vast and detailed “known” history of

12

bullying alleged in the operative complaint (such as poking children with pencils in the anus

13

region and shining mirrors up girls’ skirts), school administrators plausibly knew that Bully

14

presented a substantial risk of abuse to other students, including O.G.

15

Defendant Lakeport unpersuasively highlights Bully’s track record of abuse towards

16

both male and female victims to argue that Bully, and by extension defendant Lakeport, did not

17

discriminate. This absurd argument is the equivalent to arguing that one is not racist for

18

discriminating against all other races. Taken to its logical conclusion, anyone could escape

19

Title IX requirements by ensuring they discriminated “equally.”

20

Moreover, defendant Lakeport glosses over that Bully did plausibly target plaintiffs for

21

sexual assault because of J.R.’s gender and Bully’s perception that O.G. did not conform to a

22

gender stereotype (Bully would call O.G. “gay”). The middle school, and by extension

23

defendant Lakeport, therefore plausibly “on the basis of sex . . . excluded from participation in .

24

. . denied the benefits of, or . . . subjected to discrimination” plaintiffs J.R. and O.G. “under any

25

education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

26
27

The operative complaint also satisfied the Rule 8(a) requirement to include a short and
plain statement of the Title IX claim showing that plaintiffs are entitled to relief.

28
4

1

CONCLUSION

2

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Lakeport Unified School District’s motion to

3

dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is DENIED AS MOOT.

4
5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6
7

Dated: January 10, 2019.

WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5