Stenson v. Saul
Filing
31
ORDER by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granting 28 Motion for Attorney Fees. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/9/2022)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7
G.S.,
Case No. 19-cv-07543-JSC
Plaintiff,
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Re: Dkt. No. 28
Defendant.
12
13
14
Plaintiff's counsel, Katherine Siegfried, moves for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
406(b) for representing Plaintiff in his appeal of the Commissioner of the Social Security
15
Administration’s (“Commissioner's”) denial of social security disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 28.)
16
The Commissioner’s response “takes no position on the reasonableness of [Plaintiff's] request” for
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
fees. (Dkt. No. 30 at 5.) After careful consideration of Plaintiff’s motion and the relevant legal
authority, the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b),
and GRANTS the motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b).
BACKGROUND
This case stems from Plaintiff’s appeal of the Social Security Administration's (“SSA's”)
denial of social security benefits for physical and mental impairments including cervical
radiculopathy with chronic neck and shoulder pain, lumbar facet arthropathy with chronic lumbar
pain and radiculopathy, depression, anxiety, and complications arising from an electrocution. On
January 29, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. (Dkt. No. 22.) On April 28,
2021, the Court awarded Plaintiff’s counsel $12,037.42 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice
1
2
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Dkt. No. 27.)
Following remand, SSA found Plaintiff disabled. (Dkt. No. 28-2.) On March 22, 2022,
3
Plaintiff was notified that he had been awarded disability benefits as of August 2016 and that he
4
would receive $120,932.00 in past due benefits. (Dkt. No. 36-2; Dkt. No. 21-1 at ¶ 6.) Social
5
Security withheld $30,233.03 from Plaintiff’s past due award for attorney’s fees as 25 percent of
6
Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel thereafter filed the now
7
pending motion for attorney’s fees for work performed in this Court under Section 406(b). (Dkt.
8
No. 28.) Pursuant to Plaintiff and his counsel’s contingency fee agreement for this case, counsel
9
may seek fees up to 25 percent of any past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 28-3 at 1.)
Counsel accordingly requests fees in the amount of $30,233 that represents approximately 25
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
percent of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff’s counsel served Plaintiff
12
with a copy of the motion. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 3.) The Commissioner filed a response taking no
13
position on the reasonableness of the fees sought. (Dkt. No. 30.)
14
15
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 406(b) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social
16
security] claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the
17
court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” to claimant’s attorney;
18
such a fee can be no more than 25 percent of the total of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant.
19
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the court’s judgment did not
20
immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court, for instance, remands for
21
further consideration, the court may calculate the 25 percent fee based upon any past-due benefits
22
awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
23
Under Section 406(b), a court must serve “as an independent check” of contingency fee
24
agreements “to assure that they yield reasonable results.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789,
25
807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory
26
ceiling; instead, [Section] 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by
27
those agreements.” Id. at 808-09. The court’s review of a fee agreement is based on the character
28
of the representation and the results achieved, see Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808, and can include
2
1
analyzing: whether counsel provided substandard representation; any dilatory conduct by counsel
2
to accumulate additional fees; whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the
3
benefits achieved; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at
4
1151-52.
5
A court must offset an award of Section 406(b) attorneys’ fees by any award of fees
6
granted under the EAJA. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
7
698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012).
8
9
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated that the amount of fees requested is reasonable for the
services rendered. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. First, while not dispositive, Plaintiff’s and
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
counsel’s contingency fee agreement is within the 25 percent threshold permitted under Section
12
406(b), as the agreement provides that counsel will not ask for a fee of more than 25 percent of the
13
total past-due benefits awarded. (Dkt. No. 28-3.) Second, there is no indication that a reduction in
14
fees is warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel or that counsel delayed these
15
proceedings in an effort to increase the amount of fees awarded. To the contrary, counsel provided
16
substantial work and achieved favorable results for Plaintiff as she succeeded in having the Court
17
remand this matter for further proceedings. Nor is the amount of fees, $30,233, excessive; in fact,
18
the SSA specified that this amount is 25 percent of Plaintiff's past-due benefits. (Dkt. No. 28-2 at
19
4.) See, e.g., Eckert v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-04461-JCS, 2017 WL 3977379, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
20
11, 2017) (awarding $16,566.25 in fees following an award of $66,265 in retroactive benefits);
21
Devigili v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-02237-SI, 2017 WL 2462194, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017)
22
(awarding $15,278.00 in fees following an award of $76,391.00 in retroactive benefits); Conner v.
23
Colvin, No. 13-CV-03324-KAW, 2016 WL 5673297, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (awarding
24
$17,746.00 in fees following an award of $94,987.60 in retroactive benefits). Lastly, the Court
25
finds that Plaintiff’s counsel assumed a substantial risk of not recovering fees when she accepted
26
this case. Plaintiff and counsel entered into the contingency fee agreement prior to the filing of this
27
action. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at ¶ 3.) At that time, the Agency had completely denied Plaintiff any
28
requested benefits, and counsel could not know that the Court would remand to the Commissioner.
3
1
Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of requested fees is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
2
3
For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for fees.
4
The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $30,233,
5
payable to the Law Offices of Katherine Siegfried. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to refund the
6
previously awarded EAJA fees, in the amount of $12,037.42, to Plaintiff.
7
8
9
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 9, 2022
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States District Judge
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?