(PC) Saelor v. Napa State Hospital et al

Filing 24

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Signed by Judge James Donato on 1/7/2022. (lrc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/7/2022)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

NAI FEUY SAELOR,
Plaintiff,

8
9
10

ORDER RE DISMISSAL

v.
NAPA STATE HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 20-cv-05376-JD

12
13

Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under

14

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and

15

plaintiff has filed a third amended complaint.
DISCUSSION

16
17

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

19

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

20

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims

21

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

22

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

23

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

24

Cir. 1990).

25

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

26

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed

27

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

28

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

1

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

2

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

3

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

4

face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face”

5

standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

6

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

7

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

8

to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

9

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

12

LEGAL CLAIMS

13

Plaintiff says that she was harassed and her religious rights were violated. Allegations of

14

verbal harassment and abuse generally do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Freeman

15

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Shakur v.

16

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th

17

Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and assaultive comments by

18

prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment).

19

Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)

20

provides: “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

21

residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state prisons,

22

state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results from a rule of general

23

applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1)

24

is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of

25

furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies

26

“in any case” in which “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives

27

Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). RLUIPA also includes an express

28

private cause of action that is taken from RFRA: “A person may assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as
2

1

a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42

2

U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a); cf. § 2000bb-1(c). For purposes of this provision, “government” includes,

3

inter alia, states, counties, municipalities, their instrumentalities and officers, and “any other

4

person acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A).

5

To establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant burdened the

6

practice of his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological

7

interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner is not required

8

to objectively show that a central tenet of his faith is burdened by a prison regulation to raise a

9

viable claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 884-85. Rather, the test of whether the
prisoner’s belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief” determines the Free Exercise

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Clause inquiry. Id. (finding district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming halal meat

12

is required of Muslims as a central tenet of Islam, rather than on whether plaintiff sincerely

13

believed eating kosher meat is consistent with his faith). The prisoner must show that the religious

14

practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered belief must be sincerely held and (2) the

15

claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns. Malik v.

16

Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited with approval in Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884).

17

In the second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged claims connected to her religious

18

beliefs. The allegations were factually lacking, and plaintiff was advised to provide more

19

information and describe how her constitutional rights were violated in a third amended

20

complaint.

21

The third amended complaint has not improved the situation. It mentions an incident

22

involving a haircut but does not say how that might relate to plaintiff’s Buddhist beliefs. Plaintiff

23

also says she is a Jehovah’s Witness, in addition to embracing Buddhism, and that an unnamed

24

defendant would not let her bring a camera into Jehovah’s Witness services. How this is

25

connected to plaintiff’s religious practices is not stated, and it is not at all clear to the Court that it

26

plausibly does.

27
28

After several opportunities to amend the complaint, plaintiff has not been able to plausibly
allege a RLUIPA claim. Consequently, the Court concludes that further amendment would be
3

1

futile, and the case is dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION

2
3

1.

The complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

4

2.

The Clerk is requested to CLOSE this case.

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6

Dated: January 7, 2022

7
8
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4