Rattler v. MH Sub I, LLC et al

Filing 25

ORDER by Judge Edward M. Chen Granting 20 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (emcsec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/8/2021)

Case 3:21-cv-01492-EMC Document 25 Filed 09/08/21 Page 1 of 4

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KIM RATTLER,
Plaintiff,

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Docket No. 20

MH SUB I, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO REMAND

v.

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Case No. 21-cv-01492-EMC

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For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff Kim Rattler’s pending motion to

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remand this case to Alameda County Superior Court. See Docket No. 20 (“Mot.”).

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I.
A.

BACKGROUND

First Action

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Plaintiff alleges that, when she applied to work for Defendants, they provided her a

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disclosure and authorization form to perform a background check that “contained extraneous and

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superfluous language that does not consist solely of the disclosure as required by the FCRA and/or

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is not clear and conspicuous.” See Docket No. 1, Ex. A (“Compl.”) ⁋⁋ 21–22. Plaintiff does not

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allege that she was confused or otherwise harmed by the authorization form. Id.

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On Mach 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court raising a

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single cause of action against Defendants for willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

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(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681. See Rattler v. MH Sub I, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-02444 (“Rattler I”),

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Docket No. 1-1, Ex. A (“Compl.”). On April 9, 2020, Defendants removed the action to this

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Court on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.

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On August 27, 2020, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to remand in a minute order

Case 3:21-cv-01492-EMC Document 25 Filed 09/08/21 Page 2 of 4

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because “the complaint makes no allegation that plaintiff suffered a concrete injury and, therefore,

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this Court lacks Article III standing.” Rattler I, Docket No. 44 (“Min. Order”) (citing Syed v. M-I,

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LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017).

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B.

Instant Action

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On February 2, 2021, Defendants’ counsel asked Plaintiff during her deposition if she

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“believe[d] that [she was] wronged by something Demandforce did,” to which she responded:

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“yes, I do.” Rattler v. MH Sub I, LLC, 3:21-cv-1492 (“Rattler II”), Docket No. 1-1, Ex. E

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(“Rattler Dep.”) at 110:09–14. When asked to elaborate, Plaintiff explained as follows:

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I feel like—I feel like I was—I was prejudged based on my
background. The conversation that took place in the physical
interview, and the prepping me for Monday, and pretty much
assuring me, that, you know, they'll see me Monday morning, and
declining other options, then to get a call at the last minute on a
Friday, yeah, I definitely feel like I was wronged. I feel like I was
judged based on my background.

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Id. at 110:18–24. Defendants then confirmed that Ms. Rattler sought to be compensated “for that

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wrong” as part of this lawsuit. Id. at 110:25–111:2. Counsel for Defendants then asked whether

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Plaintiff was “seeking compensation for [emotional distress] as part of this lawsuit,” to which she

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responded:

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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I try not to put emotion in it, but I’m a very emotional person, and I
don’t think they understood what not being able to go to work did.
The not knowing how you’re going to feed your kid, or pay the bills,
or the rent, and you take care of your mother, and you’re the sole
provider for everyone. And I know it’s not their problem, but—it
just—it just, it took a lot. I wasn’t asking for a handout. I’ve never
asked for a handout. I’ve always worked for everything I had.

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So, again, it was a last minute decision to tell me I’m not going to
work after I spent money that I didn’t have for work clothes, and
expecting to, you know, make a certain amount of money to be able
to take care of your kid, your family. And it just be gone in a blink
of an eye. It was a lot of emotional distress, a lot.

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Id. at 111:03–21. Ms. Rattler was referring to Defendants’ decision not to hire her.

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Based on this testimony, Defendants again removed the action to this Court on March 2,

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2021. Rattler II, Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). Plaintiff filed the pending motion to

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remand this case on August 12, 2021. Mot.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Provincial

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Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). “The removal

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statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor

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of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). A suit

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may be removed from state court to federal court only if the federal court would have had subject

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matter jurisdiction over the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.

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386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court

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may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”). If it appears at any time before final
judgment that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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action to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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III.

DISCUSSION

Federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions where a plaintiff lacks

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Article III standing. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). The

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“irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing requires that a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered

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an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that

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is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (“Spokeo II”),

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136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). These three elements are referred to as, respectively, injury-in-fact,

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causation, and redressability. Planned Parenthood of Greater Was. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of

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Health & Human Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020). The party invoking federal

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jurisdiction bears the burden of “clearly . . . alleg[ing] facts demonstrating each element.” Spokeo

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II, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).

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Defendants’ second removal of this case is wholly meritless. They contend Plaintiff’s

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testimony regarding the emotional distress she suffered from not getting hired by Demandforce

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means she “alleged a concrete injury that she believes was caused by Demandforce’s conduct.”

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See Docket No. 23 (“Opp’n”) at 4. But the “conduct” Plaintiff complained about in her deposition

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was that Defendants did not hire her, not that they provided her with a background check

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disclosure and authorization form with extraneous and superfluous language in violation of the
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Case 3:21-cv-01492-EMC Document 25 Filed 09/08/21 Page 4 of 4

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FCRA, which is her only cause of action in this case. See Compl. ¶¶ 21–22. It is therefore

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obvious that the emotional distress Plaintiff described in her deposition is not “fairly traceable to

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the challenged conduct of the [D]efendant[s].” Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (emphasis added).

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Defendants do not contend Plaintiff alleged or testified that the deficient disclosure and

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authorization form caused her confusion, let alone emotional distress. See Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853

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F.3d 492, 499 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A plaintiff who alleges a ‘bare procedural violation’ of the FCRA,

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‘divorced from any concrete harm,’ fails to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”

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(quoting Spokeo II, 136 S.Ct. at 1549)). There is no colorable argument that Plaintiff’s emotional

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distress was caused by Defendants’ failure to provide her an FCRA-compliant authorization and

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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disclosure form.
Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have Article III standing.
IV.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court again GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand this
case to Alameda County Superior Court.
The Court further reminds Defendants and their counsel that they should only file removal

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notices that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), are “warranted by existing law or

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by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing

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new law.” Otherwise Defendants risk being sanctioned by this Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

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This order disposes of Docket No. 20.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 8, 2021

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______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge

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