Hastens Sangar AB v. The Garrigan Group, LLC

Filing 42

Order by Judge Vince Chhabria granting 25 Motion to Dismiss. (vclc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/21/2022)

Case 3:22-cv-03623-VC Document 42 Filed 11/21/22 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HÄSTENS SÄNGAR AB,

Case No. 22-cv-03623-VC

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

v.
THE GARRIGAN GROUP, LLC, et al.,

Re: Dkt. No. 25

Defendants.

The motion to dismiss is granted. The Garrigan Group is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in California. Even if it were, venue is improper in this district.1
Hästens’s argument for personal jurisdiction is that the Garrigan Group listed the
allegedly infringing sofa on a marketplace based in California, and that on two occasions in the
past five years it sold and shipped other items to California customers through that marketplace.
This is barely a colorable argument. Chairish, the marketplace, may be headquartered in
California, but it is available online to anyone with internet access anywhere. The Garrigan
Group did not purposefully direct its activities towards California (or any other state, for that
matter) when it listed the sofa on such a widely available platform. And Hästens points to no
facts that suggest the Garrigan Group otherwise targeted California. Indeed, the Garrigan Group
did not advertise, sell, or ship the sofa to anyone in California.
The two prior California sales likewise fail to suggest purposeful direction. Those sales
make up less than 0.02% of the Garrigan Group’s total gross revenue since it started listing items

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This order assumes that the reader is familiar with the case.

Case 3:22-cv-03623-VC Document 42 Filed 11/21/22 Page 2 of 3

on Chairish. And the fact that the purchasers were in California seems entirely incidental, not
purposeful. As with the sofa, the Garrigan Group listed the relevant items on a platform available
anywhere with internet access. California customers were not specifically targeted for those
sales, nor did the sales create for the Garrigan Group any “‘substantial connection’ or ongoing
obligations” in California. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008).
In any event, even if those two sales somehow suggested purposeful direction and thus
constituted “forum-related activities,” Hästens cannot seriously argue that its claim here “arises
out of or relates to” those activities. See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co. Ltd., 851 F.3d 1015,
1023 (9th Cir. 2017). Those sales were for non-furniture items that bear no relation to the
trademark claims or issues in this case.
This Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be fair and
reasonable. Id. It would be neither fair nor reasonable to allow Hästens to drag a modest Texasbased operation to court in a state where it has directed no efforts to market, sell, or distribute the
allegedly infringing item, and where it has otherwise made only two sales that make up an
insignificant fraction of its overall activities. The extraneous fact that the Garrigan Group has
agreed to resolve any disputes with Chairish under California law does not begin to tip the scales
towards reasonableness.
Venue is also improper in this district. The Garrigan Group does not reside in the
Northern District of California; it resides in Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). And no part of
the events giving rise to the claim in this case occurred in the Northern District of California. See
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The sofa was commissioned by a Texas-based company, manufactured
in North Carolina, and currently sits in a showroom in Texas. It has never been advertised in,
sold in, or shipped to the Northern District of California. In fact, it appears the Garrigan Group
has not advertised or sold any items in this district, as the two previous California sales that
Hästens points to occurred in Los Angeles.
Section 1391(b)(3) of the venue statute does not help Hästens either. As discussed, the
Garrigan Group is not subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction here. See 28 U.S.C. §

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Case 3:22-cv-03623-VC Document 42 Filed 11/21/22 Page 3 of 3

1391(b)(3). Moreover, there is a “district in which an action may otherwise be brought as
provided in this section.” Id. Indeed, there is an action already pending in one such district. If
Hästens wishes to pursue trademark infringement claims against the Garrigan Group, it should
do so in the Northern District of Texas, where the parties are already embroiled in litigation over
the same facts.
It is difficult to imagine how Hästens could amend the complaint to rectify these
deficiencies consistent with its Rule 11 obligations, especially since it has already tried once.
But, in an abundance of caution, the dismissal is with leave to amend. The amended complaint is
due 21 days from the date of this order, and any response from the Garrigan Group is due 21
days after the filing of the amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 21, 2022
______________________________________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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