Doe v. State Farm General Insurance Company

Filing 82

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY SEPTEMBER 23, 2024 ORDER. Signed by Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley on 11/26/2024. (ahm, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/26/2024)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES DOE,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 23-cv-04734-JSC

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STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

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Defendant.

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO STAY SEPTEMBER 23, 2024
ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 75

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Plaintiff filed his complaint under a pseudonym. The Court subsequently issued an order

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requiring Plaintiff to proceed using his actual name. (Dkt. No. 68.) Plaintiff appealed that order,

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and he now seeks to stay the Court’s order while his appeal is pending. Having considered the

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parties’ written submissions, the Court concludes oral argument is not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ.

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L.R. 7-1(b), and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay the Court’s order requiring him to proceed

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under his actual name. Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable

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injury.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges State Farm “improperly and in bad faith denied coverage for his claim”

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involving a lost wristwatch that retails at approximately $30,300. (Dkt. No. 10-1 ¶¶ 6, 7, 45.) He

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filed his complaint under the pseudonym “James Doe,” insisting a pseudonym was necessary “to

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protect his privacy, his family, his reputation, and his livelihood, because he has been struggling

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with mental illnesses.” (Id. at 2.) The Court initially granted his request over State Farm’s

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objection. (Dkt. Nos. 10 at 13 n.1; 22 at 3.) The Court cautioned that “as more evidence comes to

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light,” proceeding anonymously “may no longer be justified.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 3.)

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In August 2024, the Court issued an order to Plaintiff to show cause why he should not

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proceed under his actual name, since “any discussion of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment or

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diagnosis can be redacted from the public docket.” (Dkt. No. 56.) On September 23, 2024,

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having considered Plaintiff’s response, the Court rescinded its order permitting Plaintiff to proceed

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anonymously. (Dkt. No. 68.) Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the Ninth Circuit challenging the

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September 23, 2024 order requiring Plaintiff to proceed under his actual name. (Dkt. No. 69.)

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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On October 10, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on State Farm’s motion for summary

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judgment via Zoom video. (Dkt. No. 72.) Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeared at the hearing.

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The Court informed Plaintiff his actual name “appear[ed] on the Zoom” screen. (Id. at 3.)

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Although Plaintiff had yet to file a motion to stay the Court’s order requiring him to proceed under

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his actual name, the Court said it would call Plaintiff ‘“Mr. Doe’ for the moment.” (Id.) The

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Court informed Plaintiff if he wished to seek a stay, he must move by October 17, 2024. (Id.)

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The Court referred to Plaintiff as “Mr. Doe” in its October 11, 2024 summary judgment

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order. (Dkt. No. 74.) The Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on Plaintiff’s

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claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and

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defamation. (Id. at 8-13.) The Court denied State Farm’s motion as to the breach of contract and

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wrongful policy cancellation claims. (Id. at 5-8.) Jury trial is scheduled to commence in May

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2025. (Dkt. No. 57.)

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On October 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to stay the order requiring him to
proceed under his actual name. (Dkt. No. 75.)
DISCUSSION

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The Court has discretion to grant a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
433 (2009). Four factors come into play:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.

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Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).

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“The first two factors . . . are the most critical”; the last two are reached only “[o]nce an applicant
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satisfies the first two factors.” Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-

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35). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an

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exercise of that discretion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34.

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I.

In the Ninth Circuit, parties may “use pseudonyms in the unusual case when nondisclosure

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

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of the party’s identity is necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or

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personal embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th

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Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff asserts two justifications for anonymity,

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neither raises “a fair prospect of success.” See Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.

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2011) (explaining the “minimum quantum of likely success necessary to justify a stay” could be

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articulated as “reasonable probability,” “fair prospect,” or “a substantial case on the merits”).
First, Plaintiff argues anonymity is necessary because he “has revealed highly sensitive and

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personal matters about himself, his mental illnesses and physical injuries” in the course of the

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case. (Dkt. No. 75 at 6.) But he does not identify where in the record those highly sensitive

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matters are discussed. In his pleadings he repeatedly, and without support, states he suffers from

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“mental illnesses” without further elaboration. And, as the Court observed in its order to show

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cause, “[t]o the extent there is any discussion of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment or diagnosis,

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such discussion can be redacted from the public docket.” (Dkt. No. 56.) In his response to the

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order to show cause, Plaintiff did not argue such redactions would be insufficient. (Dkt. No. 65.)

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His present motion also fails to address why the presence of sensitive health information warrants

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anonymity rather than redactions, the latter being a common occurrence in federal court. See, e.g.,

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Heldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2018 WL 5920029, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (granting

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motion to seal documents “containing specific medical information”); Lombardi v. TriWest

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Healthcare All. Corp., No. CV-08-02381-PHX-FJM, 2009 WL 1212170, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 4,

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2009) (granting motion to seal as to “documents contain[ing] sensitive personal and medical

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information”). To this day, Plaintiff has not sought to redact any portions of his filings, assuming

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anything in them may be concealed from the public. So, Plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on this

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theory.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Second, Plaintiff argues anonymity is necessary because the accusation of insurance fraud

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will “ruin[] [his] reputation for honesty before a jury has passed judgment on his credibility and

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honesty at trial.” (Dkt. No. 75 at 10.) Plaintiff states the case “involves grave social

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stigmatization to Plaintiff” because he has been accused “of committing or seeking to commit

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insurance fraud.” (Id. at 9-10.) But Plaintiff has not demonstrated by a reasonable probability

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that an insurer’s material misrepresentation defense transforms a breach of contract claim into “a

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matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.” See Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068.

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No case supports Plaintiff’s surprising assertion.

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The two cases Plaintiff cites are factually distinguishable; in both, it was not the accusation

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of insurance fraud but the sensitive nature of the insurance claim itself that justified anonymity. In

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KHB, the plaintiff filing suit against his insurer sought coverage for the wilderness recovery

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program he enrolled in after being “hospitalized due to a second attempt to commit suicide.”

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K.H.B. by & through K.D.B. v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., No. C 18-04175 WHA, 2018 WL

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4053457, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018). The plaintiff was a minor when he attended the

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program but filed suit as an adult. Id. The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed under his

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initials. Id. at *2. That the plaintiff “had more than one suicide attempt, was diagnosed with

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several mental illnesses, and had issues with substance abuse”—coupled with the fact that these

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events occurred when he was a minor—“create[d] an interest for plaintiff that this history should

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not follow plaintiff for the rest of his life.” Id. at *1. The court added that denying the plaintiff’s

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request to proceed anonymously “would incentivize insurance providers to implement a business

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strategy that tilts towards denying socially stigmatizing claims, forcing claimants to litigate the

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stigmatizing claims publically or elect to not pursue recovery.” Id. at *2.

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Similarly, in Doe v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 23-CV-02307-JST, 2023 WL

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5919287, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2023), the complaint alleged the plaintiff “suffer[ed] from

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severe major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, severe cannabis use disorder,

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opioid use disorder, and insomnia.” Id. at *1. The court concluded “[a]ssociating Plaintiff with

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this combination of conditions, especially his substance use disorders, through disclosure of his

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identity would necessarily expose Plaintiff to social stigma and would threaten future job
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opportunities that he may pursue.” Id.
This case, in contrast, does not involve a “socially stigmatizing claim[].” Id. Whereas the

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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insured in KHB sought coverage for an addiction recovery program, Plaintiff here is seeking

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coverage for a lost wristwatch. And whereas the plaintiff’s complaint in United listed specific

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mental health conditions, Plaintiff’s complaint here refers generally (and without evidentiary

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support) to “mental illnesses”—which he alleges “vastly impacted his mental state and memory

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during the relevant time period” when State Farm investigated his insurance claim—without

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elaboration. (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 2 n.1.) The lack of specificity in Plaintiff’s complaint is telling; it

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suggests the mental health issues are ancillary to his complaint rather than the core of the dispute.

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Moreover, the KHB court found it significant the key facts occurred when the plaintiff was a

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minor, which is not the case for Plaintiff here.

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KHB and United demonstrate that proceeding anonymously against an insurer is

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appropriate when the breach of contract claim involves sensitive and stigmatizing information.

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But to extend that rationale to the claim here—a contract dispute about a luxury watch—is

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inconsistent with the “presumption that parties’ identities are public information.” See Advanced

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Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068. If an accusation of insurance fraud were sufficiently stigmatizing to

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warrant anonymity, then plaintiffs could proceed anonymously virtually anytime they challenge an

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insurer’s denial of coverage on the basis of a material misrepresentation, which would be contrary

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to the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that parties “use pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case.’” Id. at 1067.
In sum, because Plaintiff has not shown he “has a substantial case for relief on the merits,”

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this factor weighs against a stay. See Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968.

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II.

IRREPARABLE INJURY

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Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated he will be irreparably injured absent a stay.

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Plaintiff asserts harm to his reputation, arguing he “fears that people who know him will shun and

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ostracize him because he would be seen and perceived as dishonest for being accused of

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committing or seeking to commit insurance fraud.” (Dkt. No. 75 at 9.) As an initial matter, the

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injury Plaintiff fears has already occurred to some extent by Plaintiff’s own doing. He appeared at

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a public hearing using his actual name. (Dkt. No. 76.) Although the Court informed Plaintiff his
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name was visible on the screen, Plaintiff proceeded without adjustment. (Dkt. No. 76 at 3.)
Further, in its recent summary judgment order, the Court concluded there was a dispute of

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fact as to whether Plaintiff intentionally concealed or misrepresented a material fact or

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circumstance relating to his insurance. (Dkt. No. 74 at 5.) So, at this point in this proceeding,

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there has been no finding of insurance fraud. And Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support

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his assertion an insurer’s accusation of fraud—in the form of a material misrepresentation

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defense—inflicts injury.

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In the absence of precedent demonstrating irreparable injury, and given Plaintiff himself

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proceeded at a public hearing without taking steps to prevent the very disclosure he claims is so

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injurious, Plaintiff has not met his burden on the irreparable injury factor.
Because Plaintiff does not meet his burden on the first two factors, the Court need not

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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consider whether a stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding and

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where the public interest lies. Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1006–07 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434)

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(the last two factors are reached only “[o]nce an applicant satisfies the first two factors.”). The

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Court notes, however, that as summary judgment was denied on the breach of contract claim, the

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case is proceeding to trial. The public interest lies in transparent and public court proceedings,

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especially trials.
For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay the order requiring

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Plaintiff to proceed under his actual name.

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III.

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ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION RE SEALING
When State Farm moved for summary judgment, it filed an accompanying administrative

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motion to consider whether another party’s material should be sealed. (Dkt. No. 49.) At that time,

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the Court had not yet ordered Plaintiff to proceed under his actual name. So, in its publicly filed

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compendium of evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, State Farm filed all

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exhibits under seal. (Dkt. No. 49 at 5.) Plaintiff, the designating party, did not respond to State

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Farm’s administrative motion regarding sealing.

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There is a presumption of public access to judicial records and documents. Nixon v.

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Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Courts generally apply a “compelling
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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reasons” standard when considering motions to seal documents, recognizing that “a strong

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presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447

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F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, Civil Local

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Rule 79-5 requires the parties to “narrowly tailor” their requests only to the sealable material.

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Although sometimes it may be appropriate to seal a document in its entirety, whenever possible a

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party must redact. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 (noting a preference for redactions so long as

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they “have the virtue of being limited and clear”).

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As observed above, while Plaintiff’s identity is not confidential, he has a privacy interest in

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his medical and mental health information. So, Plaintiff has until December 6, 2024 to respond to

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State Farm’s administrative motion. In his response, Plaintiff should designate which documents

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or portions of documents he seeks to seal and compelling reasons for doing so.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to stay its order

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requiring Plaintiff to proceed under his actual name.

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This Order disposes of Docket No. 75.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 26, 2024

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JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States District Judge

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