Hill v. Ayers

Filing 312

ORDER REGARDING COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 4/21/2011. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/21/2011)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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MICHAEL HILL,

Case Number 4-94-cv-641-CW

Petitioner,

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ORDER REGARDING COMPETENCY
EVALUATIONS

v.

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DEATH-PENALTY CASE

MICHAEL MARTEL,1 Acting Warden of
San Quentin State Prison,

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Respondent.
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The Court must determine whether Petitioner is competent to

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assist in his federal habeas proceedings.

The Court has reviewed

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the briefs and psychological evaluations.

The Court orders as

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follows.

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In Rohan v. Woodford, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

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Circuit held that a condemned prisoner “has a statutory right to

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competence in his federal habeas proceedings.”

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(9th Cir. 2003).

334 F.3d 803, 817

“[W]here an incompetent capital habeas

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Michael Martel is automatically substituted for Vince Cullen as
Respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

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petitioner raises claims that could benefit from his ability to

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communicate rationally,” federal habeas proceedings “must be

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stayed until [the petitioner] is competent.”

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“relevant question” to determine competence in the federal habeas

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context is “whether [the petitioner] now has the capacity to

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understand his position and to communicate rationally with

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counsel.”

Id. at 819.

The

Id.

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II

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In the present action, the Court found that there was

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“substantial evidence” that Petitioner suffered from delusions

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that rendered him incompetent.

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CW, 2008 WL 683422, at *1 (N.D. Cal.).

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directed that Petitioner “be examined by mental-health experts to

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determine his competence.”

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Hill v. Ayers, No. 4-94-cv-641Accordingly, the Court

Id. at *2.

Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Karen Franklin, interviewed

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Petitioner on November 12, 2008, and issued a forensic

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psychological evaluation of Petitioner shortly thereafter.

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No. 286.)

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diagnostic criteria for Delusional Disorder (Persecutory and

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Grandiose Types).

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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:

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(4th ed. text rev. 2000).

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relatively innocuous, such as his beliefs that Oprah Winfrey was

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his girlfriend, that he had won the Nobel Peace Prize, and that

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he owned the Bank of Fat Michael Hill, with 800 branches.

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No. 286 at 7.)

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(Doc.

Dr. Franklin determined that Petitioner met the

(Id. at 8); see also Am. Psychiatric Ass’n,
DSM-IV-TR

Some of Petitioner’s delusions were

However, many of his

delusional beliefs are inextricably
intertwined with his current legal case. He
believes that he has won his appeal and been
pardoned by the governor. At the present

(Doc.

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time, he holds this belief with an intense,
unshakable degree of conviction.
Furthermore, although he states that he could
set aside this knowledge and continue to work
with his attorneys on an appeal, the basis
for appeal that he focuses on is not
rational. Rather, it is part of his
delusional belief system — that his attorney
was intentionally working for the
prosecution, concealing exculpatory evidence,
and ignoring his successful direct appeal.

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(Id. at 10.)

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delusional beliefs,” Dr. Franklin opined that Petitioner was

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incompetent “due to his mental disorder.”

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In light of “the centrality and intensity of his

(Id.)

However, she

concluded by
recommend[ing] a followup evaluation to
determine whether his delusional belief
system has subsided or become encapsulated to
the point that he is competent to rationally
assist his attorney in his appeal.
Delusional Disorder often waxes and wanes
over time, and indeed this has occurred with
[Petitioner] in the past. [Petitioner] could
regain his competency without a complete
disappearance of his persecutory and
grandiose delusions, so long as these beliefs
subside in intensity and centrality such that
he recovers a factual understanding of his
case and a rational ability to assist his
attorney on his own behalf.
(Id. at 12.)
The Court subsequently issued an Order Setting Procedures

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for Competency Evaluation.

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order, Respondent’s expert, Dr. Paul Good, interviewed Petitioner

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on August 18, 2010.

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Good issued his report on October 14, 2010.

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(Doc. No. 295.)

Pursuant to that

(Doc. No. 299 at 3; Docs. Nos. 302–03.)

Dr.

(Doc. No. 299.)

During their interview, Petitioner told Dr. Good “that Oprah

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was not his girlfriend, that he was not a Nobel Peace Prize

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winner, and that there was no [B]ank of Michael Hill with 800

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branches,” and Petitioner even laughed “in acknowledgment of the

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absurdity of these ideas.”

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refused to discuss his legal matters in any significant way or

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even to answer many of the questions posed by Dr. Good despite

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the efforts of Petitioner’s counsel to have him do so.2

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7, 10, 11.)

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that “he was lied to by his attorneys,” (id. at 10), but not

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“that his attorney is conspiring with the prosecution, concealing

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exculpatory evidence or ignoring his successful appeal,” (id. at

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12).

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(Id. at 8.)

However, Petitioner

(Id. at

Petitioner did indicate that he continued to believe

Dr. Good believed that Petitioner’s refusal to discuss

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“issues which were a matter of public record, and on which his

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attorney gave him freedom to respond . . . seemed irrational.”

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(Id.; see also id. at 12–13 (Petitioner’s “resistance to

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discussing certain issues with me, even after his attorney

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assured him that it would not jeopardize his appeal, may suggest

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a substrate of paranoia.”).)

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[Petitioner] still has paranoid suspicions and that these could

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become problematic under periods of stress.

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make fine distinctions is limited and his judgment is adequate

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but fragile.”

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paranoia lingered in his mind”).)

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Dr. Good’s “sense was that

[His] capacity to

(Id. at 7–8; see also id. at 11 (“a residue of

Dr. Good found that “it appears that [Petitioner’s]

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Delusional disorder is in remission.”

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stated, “At this point, I do not believe [Petitioner’s]

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Delusional disorder in remission is substantially affecting his

(Id. at 12.)

Dr. Good

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Pursuant to the Court’s Order Setting Procedures for Competency
Evaluation, (Doc. No. 295 at 3), one of Petitioner’s attorneys was
available on site during Dr. Good’s interview to consult with
Petitioner.

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capacity.”

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was not completely confident in his findings, he opined that

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Petitioner had regained his competency.

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concluded, “his competency will remain fragile.”

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Indeed,

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Although Dr. Good

“However,” Dr. Good
(Id. at 14.)

As Dr. Franklin pointed out in her report,
Delusional disorders can wax and wane, and
thus it is hard to know how [Petitioner] will
fare going forward. [Petitioner] is still
vulnerable to a decompensation in which his
delusional ideas hijack his thinking
processes and again make him psychotic. In
such a case, his mental disorder would
substantially undermine his competency.

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(Id. (quotation marks omitted).)

(Id. at 13.)

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III

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It is undisputed, and the Court finds, that Petitioner was

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incompetent when Dr. Franklin interviewed him in 2008.

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also undisputed, and the Court finds, that Petitioner’s condition

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improved significantly by the time Dr. Good interviewed him in

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2010.

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by 2010.

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finding that Petitioner no longer held at least some of the

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delusional beliefs that Dr. Franklin described as “inextricably

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intertwined with his current legal case,” such as the beliefs

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that Petitioner’s attorney conspired with the prosecution,

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concealed exculpatory evidence, and ignored his successful

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appeal.

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now competent.

It is

Indeed, Petitioner may well have regained his competency
Of significant import in this regard is Dr. Good’s

Thus, there is substantial evidence that Petitioner is

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Yet substantial evidence of Petitioner’s competency is not

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necessarily sufficient to establish that Petitioner has in fact

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regained his competency.

Cf. Hill, 2008 WL 683422, at *2 (“Of

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course, the [substantial] evidence that suggests that Petitioner

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may be incompetent is insufficient to establish that Petitioner

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is in fact incompetent.”).

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state with a great degree of confidence that Petitioner has

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regained his competency.

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discuss his legal issues with Dr. Good in any significant way —

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apparently as a result of his continuing paranoia — prevented Dr.

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Good from gaining sufficient insight into Petitioner’s

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understanding of his position.

Thus, like Dr. Good, the Court cannot

This is because Petitioner’s refusal to

But Petitioner’s understanding of

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his position is central to any determination of his competency.

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As Petitioner’s counsel notes, the Court should have before it

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clearer evidence regarding “whether Petitioner is able to

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generally identify the claims that he is making, and whether he

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is able to discuss the general categories of information . . .

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that are necessary for him to communicate to his counsel.”

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No. 305 at 10–11.)

(Doc.

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However, Petitioner’s counsel’s suggestion of further

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discussion between Petitioner and Dr. Good to attempt to develop

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sufficient information, (id. at 10), is not well taken.

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already has made valiant efforts — with Petitioner’s counsel’s

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assistance — in that regard, yet he was unable to do so.

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seems more likely that Petitioner’s own expert, Dr. Franklin,

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might succeed, as it does not appear that Petitioner’s paranoia

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necessarily extends to Dr. Franklin.

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counsel may arrange for Dr. Franklin to examine Petitioner to

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develop additional evidence that would assist the Court in

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Dr. Good

It

Accordingly, Petitioner’s

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determining Petitioner’s competency.3

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also submit additional evidence, such as medical records as well

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as appropriate declarations, under seal if necessary, regarding

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their own interactions with Petitioner.

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1058 (“habeas counsel has filed a sealed declaration outlining

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her own difficulties in communicating with” the petitioner); (see

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also Doc. No. 306 at 4 (“[R]espondent can[]not help but note the

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absence of any assertion that [] Petitioner is not presently

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rationally communicating with his attorney or is unable to assist

Petitioner’s counsel may

See Nash, 581 F.3d at

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counsel in the preparation of his Traverse.”)).

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Petitioner’s counsel choose not to do so, for whatever reason,

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the Court will conclude based on the current state of the record

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that Petitioner is now competent.

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counsel should notify the Court of any material change in

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Petitioner’s condition that may indicate that he again becomes

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incompetent.4

However, if

In that event, Petitioner’s

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Respondent correctly points out that Petitioner elected not to
have Dr. Franklin examine Petitioner following the examination by Dr.
Good. (Doc. No. 306 at 3, 4.) Respondent argues that this “decision
seems a clear indication of counsel’s satisfaction with the
sufficiency of the record.” (Id.) However, this Court’s Order
Setting Procedures for Competency Examination authorized
contemporaneous examinations by Drs. Good and Franklin, (Doc. No. 295
at 3; see also id. at 6), not, as Respondent claims, a later
examination by Dr. Franklin “to cure any of the alleged deficiencies
in the assessments for competency used by the State’s experts,” (Doc.
No. 306 at 3.) Moreover, the Court specifically ordered that
Petitioner “shall be permitted to object in this Court to the scope of
the examination conducted [by Dr. Good], prior to any decision by this
Court on the question of his present competence.” (Doc. No. 295 at
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The Court is mindful of one of Petitioner’s attorney’s
unavailability as set forth in the Notice of Unavailability, (Doc. No.
308), as well as both of Petitioner’s attorneys’ obligations in
Johnson v. Martel, No. 3-98-cv-4043-SI, and it will take these
considerations into account in scheduling matters in the instant
action.

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IV
Accordingly, and good cause therefor appearing, within sixty

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days of the entry of present order, Petitioner shall file a

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statement indicating whether Dr. Franklin will reëxamine

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Petitioner.

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thirty days of the filing of such statement, subject to counsel’s

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availability and pursuant to the Court’s prior Order Setting

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Procedures for Competency Examination, (Doc. No. 295).

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Petitioner’s counsel shall file Dr. Franklin’s evaluation and any

Any such examination shall be conducted within

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additional declarations or other evidence no later than thirty

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days from the date of her evaluation.

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choose to arrange for a further evaluation by Dr.

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Court will rule on Petitioner’s current competency based on the

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materials submitted.

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If Petitioner does not
Franklin, the

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED:

4/21/2011
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CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge