Armstrong, et al v. Davis, et al
Filing
2035
ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING IN PART, AND DENYING IN PART, 1978 MOTION TO CORRECT OR MODIFY, DENYING 1985 MOTION TO STAY AND GRANTING 2019 MOTION TO STRIKE.(ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/11/2012)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JOHN ARMSTRONG, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,
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No. C 94-2307 CW
Defendants.
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ORDER GRANTING IN
PART, AND DENYING
IN PART, MOTION TO
CORRECT OR MODIFY,
DENYING MOTION TO
STAY AND GRANTING
MOTION TO STRIKE
(Docket Nos. 1978,
1985 and 2019)
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Defendants seek to modify or correct the Court’s January 13,
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2012 Order, in which the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to
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require Defendants to track and accommodate the needs of Armstrong
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class members housed in county jails and to provide access to a
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workable grievance procedure.
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order pending the Court’s decision on their motion to modify or
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correct or pending a subsequent appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court
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of Appeals.
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considered the papers filed by the parties and their arguments at
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the hearing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to stay and
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GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART their motion to modify or
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correct.1
Defendants also seek to stay that
Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motions.
Having
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Defendants also seek to strike portions of Plaintiffs’
Objections to Defendants’ Reply Evidence. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs include with their objections further argument on
Defendants’ motions, in violation of Local Rule 7-3(d). The Court
GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike (Docket No. 2019) and hereby
strikes lines 1:10-11, 2:25-3:15, 3:26-4:24 and 5:19-23 of
Plaintiffs’ Objections to Defendants’ Reply Evidence.
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I.
Defendants’ Motion to Modify or Correct
The Court finds many of Defendants’ arguments that the
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January 13, 2012 Order was in error to be unavailing.
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declines to read the words “sole” or “exclusive” into the text of
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California Penal Code section 3056 before the words “legal custody
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and jurisdiction of local county facilities.”
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Defendants’ characterization, the word “supervision” does not have
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the same meaning as “jurisdiction.”
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statutory text stating that “parolees shall be returned to the
The Court
Contrary to
The clear meaning of the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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parole supervision” of the state is simply that parolees are not
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terminated from parole when they violate the terms of their
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supervision and serve a revocation term in county jail, but
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instead must continue on parole supervision afterwards.
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finds that the legislative intent in amending section 3056 was not
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to abdicate the state’s responsibility toward Armstrong class
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members for compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act
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(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and transfer it to the
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counties, but rather to limit the physical location where state
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parolees, whose parole is revoked, may be housed to county jails,
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to facilitate reentry and reintegration into the community.
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find otherwise would require this Court to consider whether
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section 3056 is void, which it declines to do given that the more
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reasonable construction of section 3056 is consistent with
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legislative intent.
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The Court
To
Further, although state law prevents Defendants from housing
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certain parolees in state prisons upon revocation of parole,
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Defendants point to no part of state law that restricts their
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discretion in determining in which county jail they may house that
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parolee.
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choose to house parolees with disabilities in county jails that do
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not provide adequate accommodations to them.
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State law does not appear to require Defendants to
The Court does find cause to modify its prior order to
clarify or correct certain items.
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Court mistakenly referred to sections 30025 and 30029(c) as
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California Penal Code sections.
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Code sections.
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that, while the funding amounts allocated to each county are fixed
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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for the current year, because the allocations were determined by a
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formula that takes into account the number of prisoners that a
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county was expected to supervise and house, future funding to a
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county could be reduced if Defendants are expected to house fewer
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parolees in that county.
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On page 17 of the order, the
They are California Government
However, the Court does not modify its conclusion
Defendants believe that, on page 16 of the order, the Court
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cited abrogated authority in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843
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(2006), for the proposition that, after realignment, parolees
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remain in Defendants’ continuing custody and control.
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the Court cited Samson for its reference to the former section
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3056.
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following the citation to read as follows:
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Instead,
To clarify this, the Court modifies the parenthetical
(noting, prior to realignment, that “an inmate-turnedparolee remains in the legal custody of the California
Department of Corrections through the remainder of his
term”).
Defendants also argue that the Court mis-stated the contents
of their memorandum setting forth their policies implementing
realignment.
Specifically, the Court stated that, if county jail
staff denied a medically cleared parole violator booking into a
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county jail, Defendants’ policies required Defendants to maintain
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custody of the person.
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require Defendants to maintain custody while the Agent of Record
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contacts his or her supervisor for further instruction, the Court
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replaces its reference to Defendants’ policies on page 16 of the
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order with the following:
Under Defendants’ implementing policies, county jails
are not typically permitted to turn away parolees who
have been medically cleared and whom Defendants bring to
the county jails, but if they do so, Defendants must
“maintain custody” of the parolee while Defendants
determine how to resolve the situation. Grunfeld Reply
Decl., Ex. K at 4. State law does not appear to prevent
Defendants from then placing the parolee in a different
county jail. Further, under Defendants’ policies, when
county authorities release a parolee before revocation
processing is complete, Defendants retain the discretion
to return the parolee to custody or to allow the parolee
to remain in the community. Grunfeld Reply Decl., Ex. L
at 4.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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To clarify that Defendants’ policies
II.
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Defendants’ Motion to Stay
“‘A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
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might otherwise result.’”
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(2009) (quoting Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658,
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672 (1926)).
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and “the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the
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circumstances of the particular case.”
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quotation and alteration marks omitted).
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bears the burden of justifying the exercise of that discretion.
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Id.
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succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
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harm in the absence of relief, that the balance of equities tip[s]
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in his favor, and that a stay is in the public interest.”
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Soc. of U.S. v. Gutierrez, 558 F.3d 896, 896 (9th Cir. 2009); see
Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1760
Instead, it is “an exercise of judicial discretion,”
Id. (citation and internal
The party seeking a stay
“A party seeking a stay must establish that he is likely to
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Humane
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also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (N.D.
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Cal. 2010).
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Defendants have not demonstrated a likelihood of success in
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overturning this Court’s order finding that system-wide relief is
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necessary.
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that addressed state parolees and prisoners that are held in
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county jails for reasons other than section 3056, such as
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contracts or to participate in In-Custody Drug Treatment Programs
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(ICDTPs), and they still do not dispute that there will continue
They do not challenge the portion of the Court’s order
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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to be at least some class members in county jails.
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the Court’s order of January 13, 2012, the Ninth Circuit has
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repeatedly held in prior decisions related to this case that “‘if
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the injury is the result of violations of a statute . . . that are
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attributable to policies or practices pervading the whole system
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(even though injuring a relatively small number of plaintiffs),’
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then ‘[s]ystem-wide relief is required.’”
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Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
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Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 870 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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Defendants do not dispute that there are currently class members
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still housed in county jails or that Defendants’ system-wide
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policies and practices have caused, and continue to cause,
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substantial injury to class members.
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successfully challenge the portion of the Court’s prior order
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related to state parolees housed in county jails pursuant to
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section 3056, they will nevertheless be required to formulate a
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plan to carry out the prescribed injunctive relief for the
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remaining individuals for whom they are indisputably responsible.
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As noted in
Armstrong v.
Thus, even if Defendants
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While the Court is skeptical of the accuracy of the
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unsupported estimate provided by Defendants’ declarant that the
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economic burden of complying with the prior order will be “in the
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millions of dollars,” even assuming that this estimate is correct,
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Plaintiffs’ strong showing of ongoing and substantial harm to
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class members--including class members for whom Defendants do not
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dispute they have responsibility--outweighs these financial
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concerns.
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support of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court already found
Based on the declarations that it was presented with in
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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“overwhelming and disturbing evidence” of ongoing and extreme
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rights deprivations suffered by class members in county jails,
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which was chronicled in detail in the January 13, 2012 Order.
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class members will continue to suffer substantial harm for each
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day that their disabilities are not accommodated.
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against the speculative administrative and monetary arguments and
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evidence presented by Defendants, the balance of harms clearly
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favors Plaintiffs.
The
Balanced
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CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
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DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to correct or amend (Docket No.
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1978), DENIES Defendants’ motion to stay (Docket No. 1985) and
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GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike (Docket No. 2019).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: 4/11/2012
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge
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