Pedraza et al v. Alameda Unified School District et al

Filing 250

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken Granting GRANTING DEFENDANTS 222 MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND 223 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTER-CLAIMS. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/29/2011)

1
2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

4
5
6
7
8

LINDA PEDRAZA, et al.,

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12

No. 05-04977 CW

Plaintiffs,
v.
ALAMEDA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et
al.,
Defendants.

13

/

14

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
COUNTER-CLAIMS
(Docket Nos. 222 and
223)

15
16

Defendants California Department of Education (CDE) and the

17

State Superintendent of Public Instruction (together, State

18

Defendants) move for judgment on the pleadings on the claim that

19

they violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

20

(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and Defendants Alameda Unified

21

School District (AUSD) and Alameda Unified School District Board of

22

Education (together, the District) move for summary judgment on the

23

claims that they violated the IDEA and breached a 2003 Settlement

24

Agreement.

25

liability on its counter-claims against Linda and Francisco Pedraza

26

for breach of the 2003 Settlement Agreement and for express

27

indemnity under a provision of that Agreement.

28

The District also moves for summary judgment of

Plaintiff Linda

1

Pedraza has filed oppositions and Defendants have filed replies.1

2

The matters were taken under submission on the papers.

3

considered all the papers filed by the parties, the Court grants

4

State Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and the

5

District’s motion for summary judgment on Linda Pedraza’s claims.

6

The Court also grants summary judgment of liability on the

7

District’s counter-claims against the Pedrazas.

Having

8

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

9

On December 1, 2005, Plaintiffs Linda and Francisco Pedraza

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

individually and as guardians ad litem of their son MP, filed the

11

original complaint in this action and, on February 23, 2006, filed

12

their First Amended Complaint (1AC) which is the subject of State

13

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.

14

claims against State Defendants, the District and individuals who

15

worked for the District.

16

claims against these individual defendants were dismissed and most

17

of the claims against the District were dismissed.

18

claims against the District were those for a breach of the 2003

19

Settlement Agreement regarding MP’s individual education plan (IEP)

20

for the 2003-04 school year (SY) and for violation of the IDEA for

21

the 2003-04 SY based on the breach of the 2003 Settlement

22

Agreement.

23

the exception of a claim for violation of the IDEA based upon State

The 1AC alleged

Pursuant to the Court’s orders, all

The remaining

All claims against State Defendants were dismissed with

24
25
26
27
28

1

The complaint was originally filed by Linda and Francisco
Pedraza, husband and wife, and their minor child, MP. Linda
Pedraza is the only remaining Plaintiff. Counter-Defendant
Francisco Pedraza did not oppose the District’s motion for summary
judgment of liability on its counter-claims against him.
2

1

Defendants’ failure to enforce its own May 10, 2004 Compliance

2

Reconsideration Report which had found that the District had

3

breached certain provisions of the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

4

The District asserted six counter-claims against the Pedrazas:

5

(1) breach of contract based on the Pedrazas’ failure to perform

6

their obligations under the 2003 Settlement Agreement; (2) express

7

indemnity based on a provision in the 2003 Settlement Agreement;

8

(3) implied indemnity; (4) enforcement of a 2007 mediated final

9

agreement; (5) fraud; and (6) recovery of attorneys’ fees.

In an

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

October 19, 2009 Order on the Pedrazas’ motion to dismiss the

11

counter-claims, the Court dismissed the third counter-claim for

12

implied indemnity and found the allegations sufficient to state all

13

other claims.

14

Ms. Pedraza filed two other cases, C 07-4781 and C 07-5989,

15

asserting claims that MP was denied a FAPE as required by the

16

IDEA.2

17

consolidating these cases into C 05-4977 CW.

18

September 30, 2009, the Court issued an order dismissing all claims

19

that Ms. Pedraza had asserted in case C 07-4781, with the exception

20

of one claim against the District: an appeal of the decision of the

21

State Office of Administrative Hearings--Special Education Division

22

(OAH) finding that the District did not deny MP a FAPE during SYs

23

2004-07.

24

Court also dismissed all the claims Ms. Pedraza asserted in case C

On December 18, 2007, the Court issued an order

(Docket No. 196).

(Docket No. 17).

On

In the September 30, 2009 Order, the

25
2

27

Ms. Pedraza filed case number C 07-4781 on her own behalf.
She filed case number C 07-5989 on behalf of MP. Case number C 075989 was originally filed in state court. It was removed to
federal court by the District.

28

3

26

1
2

07-5989 as time-barred.
On July 10, 2008, Plaintiffs’ attorney was permitted to

3

withdraw.

4

prejudice because, as a minor, he could not proceed unless he was

5

represented by counsel.

6

Francisco Pedraza because he failed to appear or otherwise

7

prosecute the action.

8

Plaintiff in this action and is proceeding pro se.

Subsequently, the Court dismissed MP’s claims without

9

The Court also dismissed the claims of

Thereafter, Ms. Pedraza became the sole

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

The facts below are taken from the 1AC, the documents attached

11

to it, documents that are judicially noticed and the Administrative

12

Record (AR) and, except as noted, are undisputed.

13

October 25, 1999 and was later diagnosed with autism.

14

makes him eligible for a FAPE under the IDEA.

15

reside in Alameda, California and, thus, MP is entitled to receive

16

a FAPE from the District.

17

the IEP process, made an offer of placement for MP.

18

refused to accept the District’s offer.

19

District and the Pedrazas entered into the 2003 Settlement

20

Agreement, which set forth an educational plan that the parties

21

agreed constituted a FAPE for MP for the upcoming 2003-04 SY.

22

Ex. 2, July 25, 2003 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5.

23

to include behavioral services through the Center for Autism and

24

Related Disorders (CARD), occupational therapy (OT) through SUMA

25

Kids, speech and language services through Children’s Hospital of

26

Oakland (CHO) and placement at Son Light Preschool with one-to-one

27

aide support.

28

MP was born on
MP’s autism

MP and his parents

In October 2002, the District, through
The Pedrazas

On July 24, 2003, the

MP’s program was

2003 Settlement Agreement, ¶¶ 2.B-2.E.
4

Pl’s

1

The parties dispute what occurred after the 2003 Settlement
Agreement was signed.

3

provide the services to which it agreed.

4

evidence from the administrative record of the subsequent OAH

5

hearing, asserts that it tried to provide behavioral services

6

through CARD, OT services through SUMA Kids, and speech and

7

language services through CHO but that it could not do so because

8

the Pedrazas failed to complete the intake processes for CARD and

9

other behavioral service providers, unilaterally terminated the

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

2

services of SUMA Kids and instructed CHO to bill the Pedrazas’

11

medical insurance carrier and not to bill the District.

12

Ms. Pedraza argues that the District did not
The District, citing

In October 2003, the Pedrazas complained to the CDE that the

13

District had not fulfilled its obligations under the 2003

14

Settlement Agreement and the IDEA.

15

District in compliance but, on May 10, 2004, after the Pedrazas

16

requested reconsideration, the CDE issued a Compliance

17

Reconsideration Report finding that the District was out of

18

compliance with several provisions of the 2003 Settlement

19

Agreement.

20

to take other steps as corrective actions.

21

The CDE originally found the

The CDE ordered the District to hold an IEP meeting and
Pl’s Ex. B at 6.

On June 7, 2004, the parties met for an IEP team meeting and

22

signed an IEP agreement for MP for the 2004-05 SY.

23

2004, the Pedrazas again contacted CDE, stating that the District

24

was not complying with the CDE’s May 10, 2004 Compliance

25

Reconsideration Report.

26

letter stating:

27
28

On November 15,

On February 8, 2005, the CDE issued a

The file regarding the above case has been carefully
5

1

reviewed and completed. As appropriate, all required
corrective actions have been received and duly noted.
Therefore, the case is now closed.

2
3

Doc. # 226, Pl.’s Ex. C at 28.

4

On August 18, 2005, the Pedrazas filed a complaint with the

5

OAH alleging that the District had failed to provide MP with the

6

services set forth in the 2003 Settlement Agreement and, thus,

7

denied him a FAPE during the 2003-04 SY.

8

OAH dismissed the claim regarding the 2003-04 SY, finding that it

9

did not have jurisdiction over a settlement agreement.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

On September 2, 2005, the

Pl.’s Ex.

1.
Subsequently, MP, through Ms. Pedraza, filed, under the IDEA,

12

administrative requests for due process hearings with the OAH,

13

alleging that the District had failed to provide him with a FAPE

14

during the 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 SYs.

15

filed a request for a due process hearing.

16

consolidated and, on April 2 through April 6, and April 17 through

17

April 20, 2007, a nine-day hearing was held, with both sides

18

presenting witnesses and documentary evidence.

19

Ex. A, June 19, 2007 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision at 2.

20

The following issues were before the ALJ: (1) were the District’s

21

triennial assessments of MP in September, October and November,

22

2005 inaccurate?; (2) should the District have reimbursed the

23

Pedrazas for an Independent Educational Assessment (IEA) conducted

24

by Dr. Allison Lowy Apple?; (3) did the District deny MP a FAPE in

25

the 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-7 SYs?; (4) did the District violate

26

the procedural requirements of the IDEA in SY 2006-07 by refusing

27

to convene an IEP meeting from June 20, 2006 to the date of the

28

6

The District also

These requests were

Comp. in C 07-4781,

1

hearing?; (5) did the District offer MP a FAPE for SY 2006-07 by

2

offering to place him in the Special Day Class (SDC) at Haight

3

Elementary School, with related services and supports?; and (6) is

4

the District required to reimburse the Pedrazas for the costs of

5

various services provided to MP and is the District required to

6

immediately convene an IEP meeting?

7

administrative record, consisting of the transcript of the hearing

8

and documentary evidence, is over three thousand pages.

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

The

On June 19, 2007, the ALJ issued a forty-five page decision
finding in favor of the District on all issues.

11
12

Id. at 2-3.

Id. at 45.

LEGAL STANDARD
I. Judgment on the Pleadings

13

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a motion to

14

dismiss for failure to state a claim, addresses the sufficiency of

15

a pleading.

16

moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that

17

no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the

18

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

19

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th

20

Cir. 1989).

21

pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, Durning v. First

22

Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987), and facts which

23

may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court,

24

828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).

Judgment on the pleadings may be granted when the

Hal Roach

The court may consider, in addition to the face of the

25

In testing the sufficiency of a pleading, the well-plead

26

allegations of the non-moving party are accepted as true, while any

27

allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed

28

7

1

to be false.

2

court need not accept conclusory allegations.

3

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

4

facts presented in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

5

non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's

6

favor, General Conference Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists v.

7

Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th

8

Cir. 1989), but need not accept or make unreasonable inferences or

9

unwarranted deductions of fact.

Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

W. Mining Counsel v.

The court must view the

McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501,

504 (9th Cir. 1974).

11

However, the

II. Summary Judgment

12

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

13

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

14

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

15

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law.

16

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

17

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

18

1987).

19

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

20

material factual dispute.

21

the opposing party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or

22

other evidentiary material.

23

815 F.2d at 1289.

24

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.

25

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

26

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

27

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991).

28

Therefore, the court must regard as true

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg,

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

8

1

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

2

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

3

outcome of the case.

4

are material.

5

(1986).

6

III. IDEA

7

The substantive law will identify which facts

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

The IDEA provides federal funding to states for the education
of children with disabilities.

9

states must ensure that all eligible students receive a FAPE, which

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

8

consists of “educational instruction specially designed to meet the

11

unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services

12

as are necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the

13

instruction.”

14

Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

15

20 U.S.C. § 1411.

Participating

Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.

The IDEA requires a team comprised of the student’s parents,

16

qualified professionals and a representative of the local

17

educational agency to meet and develop an IEP, which summarizes the

18

special education and related services which will make up the

19

student’s FAPE.

20

obliged to provide the child with the best possible education, but

21

must provide a “basic floor of opportunity” and “confer some

22

educational benefit.”

23

Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).

24

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).

The school district is not

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200; Gregory K. v.

A state educational agency (SEA) must ensure that programs

25

administered by local educational agencies (LEA) meet the

26

requirements of the IDEA.

27

a public agency may file a due process complaint relating to the

28

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(A).

9

A parent or

1

identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child with

2

a disability or the provision of a FAPE to the child.

3

§ 1415 (b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a).

4

complaint, the SEA must hold an impartial due process hearing, at

5

which a party has the rights, among other things, to be advised by

6

counsel, present evidence, and confront, cross-examine and compel

7

the attendance of witnesses.

8

§§ 300.511, 300.512.

9

process hearing officer.

After receiving such a

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (f), (h); 34 C.F.R.

Any party may appeal the decision of the due
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (g), (i)(A); 34 C.F.R.

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

20 U.S.C.

§ 300.514.

11

a civil action in state or federal court.

12

(i)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516.

13

Any party aggrieved by the appeal has a right to bring
20 U.S.C. § 1415

Any SEA or LEA must establish procedures to allow disputes to

14

be resolved through a mediation process.

15

C.F.R. § 300.506(a).

16

resolution procedure (CRP).

17

through the mediation process, they must execute a legally binding

18

agreement that sets forth that resolution.

19

The written agreement is enforceable in state or federal court.

20

C.F.R. § 300.507(7).

21
22

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e); 34

This is known as an informal complaint
If the parties resolve a dispute

34 C.F.R. § 300.507(6).
34

DISCUSSION
I. State Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

23

In her 1AC, Ms. Pedraza alleges that, after State Defendants

24

issued their May 10, 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report, they

25

violated the IDEA by (1) not investigating or monitoring the

26

District’s continued failure to provide MP with IDEA services

27

required under the 2003 Settlement Agreement and (2) not enforcing

28

10

1

the May 10, 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report, which required

2

the District to hold an IEP meeting and take other corrective

3

actions to fulfill the District’s obligations under the 2003

4

Settlement Agreement.

5

Citing the Court’s September 30, 2009 Order, State Defendants

6

first argue that no claims remain against them.

7

2009 Order concluded that “the case is now limited to plaintiff’s

8

IDEA claims against the district defendants in 05-4977 and 07-4871

9

and plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against the district

The September 30,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

defendants in 05-4977.”

11

fact that, at the beginning of the Order, the Court noted, “The

12

state defendants make no motion on the 05-4977 complaint.”

13

Court’s conclusion summarized the remaining claims against the

14

moving party, which was the District; it was not commenting about

15

the claims against State Defendants because they had not filed a

16

motion for the Court to address.

17

is without merit.

However, State Defendants overlook the

The

State Defendants’ first argument

18

State Defendants argue that there is no private right of

19

action under the IDEA to assert claims challenging the process or

20

decisions made by the parties through mediation under a state’s

21

CRP.

22

U.S.C. § 1415.

23

Ms. Pedraza responds that she can bring a such claim under 20

The parties do not cite any Ninth Circuit cases on this issue,

24

nor could the Court find any.

25

Office of Protection and Advocacy v. Virginia, Department of

26

Education, which concluded that § 1415 does not provide a private

27

right of action to challenge a state’s CRP or its outcome.

28

State Defendants rely on Virginia

11

262 F.

1

Supp. 2d 648, 660 (E.D. Va. 2003).
The court noted that the IDEA provides two avenues for

3

pursuing a grievance: an aggrieved party can initiate a complaint

4

through the state’s CRP under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), or obtain a due

5

process hearing under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f).

6

The court continued that, for a due process hearing, the IDEA

7

expressly delineates an aggrieved party’s rights, such as the right

8

to counsel, to confront, cross-examine and compel the attendance of

9

witnesses, to a verbatim record of the hearing, to a written

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

2

opinion, to appeal, and to bring suit in federal court at the

11

conclusion of the appellate process.

12

(g), (h), (i)(2)).

13

rights for the CRP; it does not provide for the right to appeal or

14

for judicial review of a decision rendered in the CRP.

15

court concluded that, for it to decide “that § 1415, even in its

16

silence, intended to create a private right of action for parties

17

to challenge an otherwise informal complaint resolution process”

18

would defy the “clear statement rule” of Pennhurst State School &

19

Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), and would second-

20

guess the drafters’ intentions.

21

Virginia Office of Protection court distinguished Beth v. Carroll,

22

87 F.3d 80, 86, 88 (3rd Cir. 1996), which concluded that § 1415

23

created a private right of action for plaintiffs alleging that the

24

state had failed to establish a complaint resolution procedure as

25

required by federal regulations implementing the IDEA.

26

n.4.

27
28

Id. at 659-60.

Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415

However, the IDEA provides no such specific

Id. at 559.

Id.

The

In so holding, the

Id. at 559

This Court agrees with the well-reasoned opinion in Virginia
12

1

Office of Protection.

2

a state-wide policy of failing to implement the CRP process itself.

3

Beth is distinguishable because it addressed

Ms. Pedraza argues that her claim does not address the CRP,

4

but rather the CDE’s failure to investigate the District’s non-

5

compliance with the CDE’s May 2004 Compliance Reconsideration

6

Report, and to enforce compliance.

7

under the IDEA, the CDE has “a broad scope of power and authority

8

to use at its discretion when faced with one of its local education

9

agency’s failure to follow its orders,” such as withholding the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

Ms. Pedraza contends that,

District’s funding.
State Defendants respond, citing Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 706 F.

12

Supp. 164, 168-69 (D.Conn. 1989), that a failure-to-monitor claim

13

is cognizable only when the plaintiff alleges that the state agency

14

had a pattern and practice of flagrantly neglecting its general

15

monitoring and supervisory duties.

16

that, in order for the plaintiffs to assert a claim that the state

17

agency failed to enforce a local agency’s compliance with the IDEA,

18

they must allege more than dissatisfaction with the outcome of the

19

CRP; they must show that inadequacies in the procedures or

20

application of the CRP constitute a pattern and practice by the

21

state agency of failing to meet its responsibility to assure that

22

local boards were in compliance with federal law.

In Mrs. W., the court noted

Id. at 169.

23

The 1AC generally alleges that State Defendants “failed to

24

adopt procedures and practices or take necessary measures to ensure

25

that AUSD fulfills its obligations under settlement agreements

26

arising under the IDEA to resolve claims of denials of a FAPE,

27

including the Parents’ settlement agreement.”

28

13

1AC at ¶ 41.

1

However, this conclusory statement is unsupported by any factual

2

allegations; the gravamen of Ms. Pedraza’s claim against State

3

Defendants is that they specifically did not investigate the

4

Pedrazas’ claim that the District had not complied with the 2003

5

Settlement Agreement.

6

opposite to be true.

7

reviewed Ms. Pedraza’s claim that the District was not complying

8

with the 2003 Settlement Agreement, and issued reports based on its

9

findings.

However, the allegations themselves show the
The 1AC alleges that the CDE several times

In the first report, the CDE found that the District had

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

fulfilled its obligations under the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

11

the second report, the May 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report,

12

the CDE found that the District was out of compliance with several

13

provisions, ordered the District to take corrective actions, and

14

required the District to send evidence of its corrective actions to

15

the CDE.

16

that the District had completed all the corrective actions it had

17

been directed to take.

18

Defendants investigated Ms. Pedraza’s complaints regarding the 2003

19

Settlement Agreement and issued findings and reports.

20

may disagree with the CDE’s finding that the District took all

21

corrective actions, but, based on the allegations in the 1AC, she

22

cannot claim that State Defendants did not engage in the

23

investigative process or enforce the corrective actions it ordered.

24

Ms. Pedraza’s argument that the CDE’s closing of her case left her

25

without an avenue to litigate the District’s breach of the 2003

26

Settlement Agreement is without merit; in this complaint Ms.

27

Pedraza’s sues the District for breach of the 2003 Settlement

28

In

Finally, in the February 8, 2005 letter, the CDE found

These allegations indicate that State

14

Ms. Pedraza

1
2

Agreement and failure to provide a FAPE to MP for the 2003-04 SY.
State Defendants’ review of the implementation of the 2003

3

Settlement Agreement, which the Pedrazas and the District entered

4

into in the context of the CRP, amounts to a part of the CRP.

5

2003 Settlement Agreement was not reached in a due process hearing.

6

Thus, section 1415 does not provide a private right of action for

7

Ms. Pedraza’s dissatisfaction with the CRP.

8

were not a part of the CRP, Ms. Pedraza does not provide authority

9

that she has a private right of action to challenge the CDE’s

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

The

Even if the CDE review

decision in federal court under the IDEA.
Therefore, the Court concludes that, based on the face of the

12

pleadings, State Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of

13

law and their motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

14

Furthermore, as discussed below, Ms. Pedraza fails to proffer

15

evidence that the District did not comply with the 2003 Settlement

16

Agreement; therefore, even if State Defendants were not entitled to

17

judgment on the pleadings on the claim that they did not enforce

18

the 2003 Settlement Agreement, Ms. Pedraza’s claim that they did

19

not enforce it would be futile.

20

II. District’s Motion for Summary Judgment

21
22

A. Appeal of OAH Ruling
1. Standard of Review

23

As mentioned above, under the IDEA, a district court is

24

empowered to review a state educational agency’s decisions in due

25

process hearings.

26

reviewing state administrative proceedings “are to ‘receive the

27

records of the administrative proceedings;’ ‘hear additional

28

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

15

Federal courts

1

evidence at the request of a party;’ and ‘grant such relief as the

2

court determines is appropriate’ based on a preponderance of the

3

evidence.”

4

Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887-88 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 U.S.C.

5

§ 1415(i)(2)(C).

6

from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts

7

generally are confined to the administrative record and must accord

8

the agency great deference.

9

Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993)).

Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark County Sch.

Thus, judicial review in IDEA cases is different

Id. (citing Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v.
However, complete de

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

novo review is inappropriate.

11

own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school

12

authorities.

13

have the primary responsibility of formulating each individual

14

child’s education,” a court must give due weight to the state

15

hearing officer’s decision.

16

206-08).

17

matter for the court’s discretion, with greater deference due if

18

the hearing officer’s findings are thorough and complete.

19

State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999).

20

Id.

Id.

Courts cannot substitute their

Because it was Congress’ intent that “the states

Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at

The amount of deference owed to the hearing officer is a

Adams v.

The party challenging an administrative decision in district

21

court bears the burden of proof that the decision should be

22

reversed.

23

1398 (9th Cir. 1994) superceded by statute on other grounds; Hood

24

v. Encinitas Union Sch. Dist., 486 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007).

25
26
27
28

Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396,

2. Analysis
In its motion based on the administrative record, the District
presents detailed arguments, including citations to the
16

1

administrative record, establishing that the hearing officer’s

2

decision was supported by substantial evidence, was well-reasoned

3

and, thus, should be affirmed.

4

motion for summary judgment, Ms. Pedraza asserts that the motion

5

should be denied “based on the fact that: (1) Plaintiff did not

6

receive a ‘fair trial in a fair tribunal;’ (2) the District was a

7

‘party in interest’ to the pending and present lawsuit; and (3) to

8

grant the District’s motion would deny Plaintiff his right to

9

review as an aggrieved party.”

In her opposition to the District’s

Opp. at 10.

Ms. Pedraza’s primary

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

argument is that the District’s removal of case number C 07-59893

11

obstructed her right to the procedural guarantees of 20 U.S.C.

12

§ 1415(i)(2)(A), which provides that an aggrieved party may bring a

13

civil action in state court or federal district court.

14

12.

15

Opp. at 10,

Ms. Pedraza’s arguments are non-responsive to the District’s

16

motion, and are without merit.

17

of the due process hearing decision issued by OAH.

18

correctly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which provides

19

that any action over which district courts have original

20

jurisdiction based on a claim or right arising under the

21

Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States may be removed

22

from state court.

23

district court, as well as a state court, has jurisdiction to hear

24

appeals of state agencies’ decisions after hearings under the IDEA.

Case number C-07-5989 was an appeal
The case was

As indicated in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), a

25
26

3

27

Ms. Pedraza does not specify which case the District removed
from state court. However, only case number C-07-5989 was removed.
It was subsequently dismissed as untimely.

28

17

1

Because this Court has original jurisdiction over Ms. Pedraza’s

2

appeal of the OAH decision, removal was proper.

3

though case number C-07-5989 was subsequently dismissed, it was

4

duplicative of case number C-07-4781, which has been consolidated

5

with this case and which is now addressed in the District’s motion

6

for summary judgment.

7

to present her arguments that the OAH decision was incorrect, but

8

has failed to do so.

Furthermore, even

Therefore, Ms. Pedraza had the opportunity

Ms. Pedraza explains that her argument about the District

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

9

being a “party in interest” means that the State had an interest in

11

the OAH hearing decision such that there was a conflict of

12

interest, and the State should have recused itself and removed her

13

complaint to federal court.

14

the OAH correctly heard Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with

15

statutory and regulatory provisions.

16

This argument is without merit because

As the party challenging the decision, Ms. Pedraza bears the

17

burden of proving that it should be reversed.

18

officer’s decision was thorough and complete, it is deserving of

19

considerable deference.

20

argument explaining why the hearing officer’s decision was

21

incorrect, nor does she make any citations to the administrative

22

record or submit any additional evidence.

23

completely fails to carry her burden of proof that the hearing

24

officer’s decision was incorrect.

25

summary judgment on this claim is granted.

However, Ms. Pedraza does not submit any

26
27
28

Because the hearing

18

Therefore, Ms. Pedraza

The District’s motion for

1

B. Violation of IDEA for 2003-04 SY and Breach of 2003
Settlement Agreement

2
Ms. Pedraza claims that the District is liable for breach of
3
contract and violating the IDEA because it failed to provide MP
4
with the services required under the 2003 Settlement Agreement.
5
The District argues that it attempted to provide all the services
6
to which the parties agreed, but that the Pedrazas refused to
7
participate in the process and to provide the necessary information
8
so that the services could be provided.
9
Under California contract law, a party to a contract has a
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
duty to do everything incumbent upon him or her to accomplish the
11
purpose of the contract, and a duty not to do anything which
12
interferes with the right of the other party to receive the
13
benefits of the contract.

Corson v. Brown Motel Investments, Inc.,

14
87 Cal. App. 3d 422, 427 (1978); Ladd v. Warner Bros.
15
Entertainment, Inc., 184 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1306 (2010).
16
Furthermore, hindrance of the other party’s performance operates to
17
excuse that party’s nonperformance.

Erich v. Granoff, 109 Cal.

18
App. 3d 920, 930 (1980).

In regard to the IDEA claim, a local

19
school district cannot be held liable for failing to provide
20
services to a student when the failure is caused by the parents’
21
lack of cooperation.

Glendale Unified Sch. Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F.

22
Supp. 2d 1093, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (parent exceeded “aggressive
23
advocate” standard by refusing to communicate with school district
24
and withholding student’s records); B.G. v. Cranford Bd. of Educ.,
25
702 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (D.N.J. 1988) (denying reimbursement for
26
private services to parents who disavowed participatory process
27
28

19

1
2

with school authorities).
The District cites many pages of the administrative record to

3

establish that the Pedrazas failed to complete the necessary

4

paperwork.4

5

For instance, CARD began providing behavioral services to MP

6

for the SY 2003-04, but discontinued them “because Plaintiff was

7

not cooperating with them.”

8

replace CARD with the Foundation for Autistic Children Education

9

and Support (FACES), but the Pedrazas did not complete the intake

AR at 2803.

The District offered to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

process.

11

through Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention (LIFE), but the

12

Pedrazas said they preferred the Behavioral Intervention

13

Association (BIA).

14

consent form to release confidential information to the BIA, but

15

then revoked it.

16

BIA refused to proceed with the intake process.

17

67; 2780; 2803-04.

18

LIFE program.

19

the LIFE program and signed a consent form, but they did not

20

complete the intake process.

21

that MP received no behavioral services in the 2003-04 SY, but

22

argues that this was because the Pedrazas did not cooperate in the

23

intake process for any provider.

24

that the Pedrazas’ actions also prevented it from providing

AR 2803; 2159.

The District then offered services

AR 2803; 2145; 2147.

The Pedrazas signed the

AR 1144-45; 2148-49; 2783-84.

As a result, the
AR 2148-49; 2166-

On June 7, 2004, the District again offered the

AR 2150-51; 2803.

The Pedrazas initially accepted

AR 1166-67.

The District concedes

The District provides evidence

25
4

27

Although IDEA services for the 2003-04 SY were not before the
ALJ, he admitted evidence regarding this time period as background
information for the claims alleging that the District failed to
provide services in subsequent years.

28

20

26

1

consistent OT services to MP and paying for speech and language

2

services provided by CHO.

3

Ms. Pedraza fails to counter any of the District’s evidence

4

that it was her and her husband’s actions that caused its inability

5

to provide the services required by the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

6

However, Ms. Pedraza argues three ways in which the District

7

breached the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

8

that the District agreed to provide in-home services through LIFE,

9

which required the District to pay LIFE, but that it then offered a

First, Ms. Pedraza argues

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

“workshop model,” which required the Pedrazas to pay LIFE

11

directly.5

12

afford to pay these fees and that they never agreed to such an

13

arrangement.

14

the administrative record or other evidence to support this

15

argument.

16

material fact that the District either breached the 2003 Settlement

17

Agreement or violated the IDEA because it offered to provide LIFE’s

18

“workshop model” instead of in-home services.

19

Ms. Pedraza states that she and her husband could not

However, Ms. Pedraza does not provide any citation to

Therefore, she fails to raise a triable issue of

Second, Ms. Pedraza argues that the District failed to enter

20

into master contracts and individual service agreements with

21

providers of MP’s speech and language and behavior services.

22

support, she cites Finding of Fact 4 of the CDE’s May 2004

23

Compliance Reconsideration Report.

24

Compliance Reconsideration Report, at 5, Finding of Fact 4.

As

Pl.’s Ex. B, CDE May 2004
Ms.

25
5

27

The Court assumes this means the Pedrazas would initially pay
LIFE for the services provided and then get reimbursed by the
District, as the District had been doing for a variety of services
that had been pre-paid by the Pedrazas.

28

21

26

1

Pedraza also submits evidence that the District did not sign a

2

contract with CHO.

3

In Finding of Fact 4, the CDE found that the District did not

4

have a master contract or individual service agreement with CHO or

5

the autism center for MP when the special education services were

6

initiated for the 2003-04 SY.

7

the CDE found that the District continued to provide services from

8

both institutions pursuant to the 2003 Settlement Agreement until

9

the autism center terminated services to MP on November 3, 2003.

Id.

However, in Finding of Fact 2,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Id.

11

the District did not develop an individual service agreement with

12

CHO and the autism provider in a timely manner, MP received

13

services from both providers.

14

6, the CDE found that the District incorporated the services into

15

the October 14, 2003 IEP as required by the 2003 Settlement

16

Agreement.

17

Likewise, in Finding of Fact 5, the CDE found that, although

Id.

Furthermore, in Finding of Fact

Id.

Ms. Pedraza concludes that, based upon the Findings of Fact in

18

the CDE’s May 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report, the District

19

went “to great lengths to delay and deny Plaintiff the services

20

which they promised him in the settlement agreement.”

21

However, the CDE’s May 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report does

22

not support Ms. Pedraza’s conclusion.

23

even though the contracts with CHO and the autism center were not

24

in place, the CDE found that MP continued to get these services.

Opp. at 6.

She overlooks the fact that,

25

Ms. Pedraza’s last argument is that the District failed to

26

reimburse her and her husband for services to MP for which they

27

paid, as required by the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

28

22

In Finding of

1

Fact 6, the CDE found that the District provided insufficient

2

evidence “to show that reimbursement payments have been made to the

3

parents for pre-school and OT services in a timely manner.”

4

Corrective Action Number 5, the CDE required the District to

5

clarify payment procedures to CHO and to clarify reimbursement and

6

proof of payment procedures to the parents.

7

8, 2005 Letter Regarding Compliance Investigation, submitted by Ms.

8

Pedraza herself, the CDE found that the District had taken all

9

required corrective actions.

In

In the CDE’s February

Absent specific evidence that the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

District did not reimburse her as required under the 2003

11

Settlement Agreement, Ms. Pedraza has failed to raise a triable

12

issue of fact on this issue.

13

Therefore, Ms. Pedraza fails to raise a triable issue of

14

material fact disputing the District’s evidence that it was the

15

Pedrazas’ conduct that prevented it from providing the services

16

required in the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

17

to raise a triable issue of fact that the District otherwise

18

breached the 2003 Settlement Agreement or violated the IDEA.

19

the District’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Pedraza’s claims

20

for breach of contract and violation of the IDEA for SY 2003-04 is

21

granted.

22

III. District’s Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counter-Claims

Ms. Pedraza also fails

Thus,

23

A. Breach of Contract

24

In its counter-claim for breach of contract, the District

25

alleges that Counter-Defendants, Mr. and Ms. Pedraza, breached the

26

2003 Settlement Agreement by preventing the District from providing

27

the services outlined in the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

28

23

The

1

District contends that the Pedrazas breached paragraphs 2.K(2) and

2

11 of the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

3

Paragraph 2.K(2) states that the District’s provision of
services listed in paragraphs B though E are contingent upon the

5

parents providing “a full release to exchange information and

6

documentation between the District and MP’s service providers.”

7

Paragraph 11 provides, “Each party to this Agreement shall

8

cooperate fully in the execution of any and all other documents and

9

the completion of any additional actions that may be necessary or

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

4

appropriate to give full force and effect to the terms and intent

11

of this Agreement.”

12

Citing testimony and evidence submitted in the hearing before

13

the ALJ, the District argues that its ability to perform its

14

obligations under the 2003 Settlement Agreement was contingent upon

15

the Pedrazas cooperating with service providers and that, by not

16

doing so, the Pedrazas did not act in good faith or deal fairly

17

with the District.

18

Ms. Pedraza, citing the findings of the May 2004 Compliance

19

Reconsideration Report, merely reargues that the District breached

20

the 2003 Settlement Agreement because it did not (1) contract with

21

service providers; (2) provide services to MP at no cost to the

22

Pedrazas; (3) ensure that MP received the promised services;

23

(4) redress its continued violation of the IDEA; and (5) implement

24

and follow procedures outlined by the CDE in its May 2004

25

Compliance Reconsideration Report.

26

May 2004 Compliance Reconsideration Report do not avail Ms.

27

Pedraza.

28

24

However, the findings in the

1

First, while the CDE at one point found the District out of

2

compliance with the 2003 Settlement Agreement, it later found that

3

the District had complied.

4

District’s breach of contract claim, the CDE’s reports do not

5

amount to testimonial or documentary evidence to controvert the

6

testimony and documents cited by the District.

7

does not create a disputed issue of material fact.

8

fails to address the District’s evidence that she and her husband

9

breached the 2003 Settlement Agreement by not cooperating with the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

Second, for the purpose of the

Thus, Ms. Pedraza
Ms. Pedraza

service providers obtained by the District.
Therefore, the District, through citations to testimony and

12

documents in the AR, has established its prima facie case that the

13

Pedrazas failed to cooperate with service providers and, thus,

14

breached the 2003 Settlement Agreement.

15

a triable issue of material fact that the District breached the

16

2003 Settlement Agreement and that the Pedrazas did not breach it.

17

Therefore, the District’s motion for summary judgment on its

18

counter-claim against the Pedrazas for breach of contract is

19

granted.

Ms. Pedraza fails to raise

20

B. Express Indemnity

21

Paragraph 6 of the 2003 Settlement Agreement provides that the

22
23
24
25
26

Pedrazas would
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the District . . .
from and against any and all claims . . . arising from
any breach or default in the performance of any
obligation on the Parents’ part to be performed under the
terms of this Agreement, . . . and from any and all
costs, expenses and liabilities incurred in the defense
of any such claim or action or proceeding brought thereon
. . .

27
28

25

1

The District notes that Ms. Pedraza has sued it for breach of

2

the 2003 Settlement Agreement and for violation of the IDEA by

3

failing to provide the services required therein.

4

argues it was prevented from performing its obligations due to the

5

Pedrazas’ failure to cooperate with the requirements of the service

6

providers, as required by ¶¶ 2.K(2) and 11.

7

that, because Ms. Pedraza’s claims arise from the breach of the

8

Pedrazas’ obligations, they fall under paragraph 6 of Agreement

9

and, thus, the Pedrazas have a duty to defend and indemnify it for

The District

The District concludes

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

its attorneys’ fees and costs associated with its defense of Ms.

11

Pedraza’s claims.

12

Ms. Pedraza responds that, because the District breached the

13

2003 Settlement Agreement, it forfeits any right to indemnity.

14

cites paragraph 13, which provides, “Should either party breach any

15

portion of this Agreement, the breaching party shall forfeit any

16

and all consideration promised or received under the terms of this

17

Agreement.”

18

perform ¶¶ 2.K(2) and 11 of the Agreement excused any failure on

19

the part of the District to provide required services.

20

the District did not breach the 2003 Settlement Agreement and the

21

Pedrazas did breach it.

She

However, as discussed above, the Pedrazas’ failure to

Therefore,

22

Ms. Pedraza also argues that the District has retaliated

23

against her for advocating for MP by removing case C-07-5989, which

24

denied her an impartial due process hearing.

25

this argument is without merit.

26

District’s filing of the indemnity claim is an act of retaliation

27

“in an effort to obtain monetary damages.”

28

As discussed above,

She also argues that the

26

There is no evidence

1

that the District’s filing of this counter-claim was retaliatory.

2

Lastly, Ms. Pedraza’s argument that the judge who decided the

3

previous motions filed in this case was biased, and created an

4

obstruction of justice, is without merit.

5

Thus, Ms. Pedraza has failed to raise any triable issue of

6

material fact that she is not liable under the express indemnity

7

clause of the 2003 Settlement Agreement, and Mr. Pedraza did not

8

oppose the motion.

9

District on this claim.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Summary judgment of liability is granted to the

CONCLUSION

11

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants State Defendants’

12

motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 222) and the

13

District’s motions for summary judgment on Ms. Pedraza’s claims

14

(Docket No. 223) and for summary judgment of liability on its

15

counter-claims for breach of contract and express indemnity (Docket

16

No. 223).

17

District did not move for summary judgment on its counter-claims

18

for: (1) enforcement of the 2007 mediated final agreement, under

19

the IDEA and related state law; (2) state law fraud based on the

20

2007 final agreement; and (3) recovery of attorneys’ fees.

21

Therefore, these counter-claims are still pending in this action.

22

Within seven days from the date of this Order, the District shall

23

inform the Court how it proposes to proceed on its claims.

24

//

25

//

26

//

27

//

28

The District’s damages remain to be determined.

27

The

1

Judgment will not be entered until these counter-claims are

2

resolved.

3
4
5

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 9/29/2011
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

6
7
8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

2
3
PEDRAZA et al,

Case Number: CV05-04977 CW

4
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5
v.
6
ALAMEDA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al,
7
Defendant.
8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12

/

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,
Northern District of California.
That on September 29, 2011, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said
envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located
in the Clerk's office.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Francisco Pedraza
22 Souza Court
Alameda, CA 94502
Linda Pedraza
22 Souza Court
Alameda, CA 94502
Dated: September 29, 2011
Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29