Palacios v. Chavez

Filing 54

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton finding as moot 43 Motion for Hearing; denying 46 Motion for Summary Judgment (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/29/2011)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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RAYMUNDO A. PALACIOS,

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Plaintiff,
v.

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 06-7619 PJH
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

L. CHAVEZ,
Defendants.

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This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Plaintiff contends that

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defendant was deliberately indifferent to his safety in exposing him to attack from other

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prisoners after being warned by plaintiff and plaintiff’s mother of a potential threat to his

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safety. Before the court for decision is defendant’s fully submitted motion for summary

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judgment. For the reasons set out below, the motion will be denied.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

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that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may

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affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

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to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

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The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those
portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a

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genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

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Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

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party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

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pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

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is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

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show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

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II.

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Analysis
Plaintiff contends that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his safety needs, a

violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)
(prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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prisoners).

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A.

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The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures for

Standard for Eighth Amendment Safety Claims

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the safety of prisoners. Id. at 832. In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect

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prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833. An Eighth Amendment

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failure-to-protect claim has two elements: (1) the condition complained of must be shown to

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present a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) the defendant must be shown to have

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possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834.

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In prison conditions cases, the necessary state of mind to establish an Eighth

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Amendment violation is one of "deliberate indifference." Id. A prison official cannot be held

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liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of

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confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official must

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know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The official

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must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

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serious harm exists, and he or she must also draw the inference. Id. A detention official's

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knowledge of substantial risk “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual

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ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence . . . . “ Id. at 842 (citations omitted)

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Neither negligence nor gross negligence constitutes deliberate indifference. Id. at

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835-36 & n.4; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (deliberate indifference

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requires more than negligence). “It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error

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in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual

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Punishments Clause.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

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B.

Analysis

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The only materials defendant provides in support of his motion for summary

presents here, and a part of his medical records showing the injury he sustained as a result

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of the stabbing attack. There is no declaration from defendant, and the grievance materials

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For the Northern District of California

judgment are the written record of plaintiff’s grievance in which he raised the claim he

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United States District Court

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contain no admissible evidence as to defendant’s state of mind in refusing to place plaintiff

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in protective segregation. Defendant has not met his burden of production, so the burden

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does not shift to plaintiff to show evidence of deliberate indifference. See Nissan, 210 F.3d

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at 1102-06 (“A moving party may not require the nonmoving party to produce evidence

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supporting its claim or defense simply by saying that the nomoving party has not such

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evidence.”). The motion for summary judgment must be denied.

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CONCLUSION

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Defendant Chavez’s motion for summary judgment (document number 46 on the

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docket) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for a hearing (document number

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43) is DENIED as moot.

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It appears that this case could be decided on a properly-supported motion for

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summary judgment. Therefore, any further dispositive motions shall be filed by October 31,

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2011. Any opposition to such a motion shall be filed within thirty days of the date the

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motion is served. Any reply is due fourteen days from the date the opposition is served.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2011.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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