Williams v. Williams

Filing 244

ORDER by Judge Claudia WilkenDENYING PLAINTIFFS 238 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/11/2013)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ISAIAH NOEL WILLIAMS,

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No. C 07-4464 CW

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW
(Docket No. 238)

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v.

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D. WILLIAMS,

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Defendant.
________________________________/

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff Isaiah Williams moves for judgment as a matter of

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law or, in the alternative, a new trial.

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opposes the motion.

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and oral argument, the Court denies the motion.

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Defendant Debra Williams

After considering the parties’ submissions

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate in Pelican Bay State Prison’s Security

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Housing Unit (SHU).

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action against Defendant, a Pelican Bay correctional officer,

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alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights.

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In 2007, he filed a pro se complaint in this

Plaintiff alleges that, on August 16, 2006, Defendant opened

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his cell door from a remote control tower while another inmate

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from the same unit was unrestrained outside of Plaintiff’s cell.

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According to Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Defendant knew that

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Plaintiff and the other inmate were members of rival prison gangs

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and should have known that opening Plaintiff’s cell door at that

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moment would expose him to a serious risk of harm.

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asserts that, after Defendant opened the cell door, Plaintiff and

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the other inmate engaged in a physical altercation, during which

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Defendant shot Plaintiff with four 40mm rubber bullets.

The complaint

Plaintiff

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asserts that Defendant’s initial decision to open the cell door

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and subsequent decision shoot him were both motivated by

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retaliatory animus because Plaintiff had threatened to file a

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grievance against her less than a week earlier.

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In July 2012, after granting in part and denying in part

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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court granted

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Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel.

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explained, “although Plaintiff is literate and has prosecuted this

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action competently to this point, the issues that will go to trial

Docket No. 95.

The Court

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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require significant factual and legal development.”

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Accordingly, the Court ordered the appointment of three attorneys

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from Morrison & Foerster LLP pursuant to the in forma pauperis

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(IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

Id. at 2.

Docket No. 96.

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In July 2013, the Court held a four-day jury trial.

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returned a unanimous verdict on July 24 in favor of Defendant.

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Docket No. 226, Jury Verdict.

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retaliated against Plaintiff when she opened his cell door nor

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when she shot him with 40mm rounds; (2) was not deliberately

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indifferent to his safety when she opened his cell door nor when

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she shot him with 40mm rounds; and (3) did not use excessive force

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when she shot him with 40mm rounds.

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of Defendant.

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The jury

It found that Defendant (1) had not

Judgment was entered in favor

This motion followed.
LEGAL STANDARDS

I.

Judgment as a Matter of Law
A motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict

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renews the moving party’s prior Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as

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a matter of law at the close of all the evidence.

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50(b).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Judgment as a matter of law after the verdict may be
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granted only when the evidence and its inferences, construed in

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the light most favorable to the non-moving party, permits only one

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reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.

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443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).

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conflicting evidence, or if reasonable minds could differ over the

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verdict, judgment as a matter of law after the verdict is

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improper.

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772, 775 (9th Cir. 1990); Air–Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia

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Co., 880 F.2d 176, 181 (9th Cir. 1989).

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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II.

Josephs v. Pac. Bell,

Where there is sufficient

See, e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d

New Trial
A new trial may be granted if the verdict is not supported by

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the evidence.

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on such motions.

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Court should grant the motion “[i]f, having given full respect to

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the jury’s findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with

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the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

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committed.”

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833 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11 Wright &

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Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2806, at 48–49).

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There is no easily articulated formula for passing
Perhaps the best that can be said is that the

Landes Constr., Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,

The Ninth Circuit has found that the existence of substantial

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evidence does not prevent the court from granting a new trial if

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the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence.

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833 F.2d at 1371.

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the credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from

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the perspective most favorable to the prevailing party.”

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Therefore, the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the

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evidence is less stringent than that governing the Rule 50(b)

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motions for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict.

Landes,

“The judge can weigh the evidence and assess

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Id.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiff Counsel’s Authority to Appear

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Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s counsel lacks the

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authority to appear on Plaintiff’s behalf now that the trial has

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concluded.

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appointing counsel did not expire upon completion of the trial and

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the IFP statute does not impose any such limitation on the

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duration of counsel’s appointment.

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has recognized that the decision to appoint counsel is “within

This argument is without merit.

The Court’s order

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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‘the sound discretion of the trial court’” and Defendant has not

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presented any evidence or argument suggesting that the Court has

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abused its discretion here.

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F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745

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F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)).

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under the IFP statute from representing clients in post-trial

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matters serves no discernible purpose.

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request to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel is denied.

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II.

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Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390

Preventing counsel appointed

Accordingly, Defendant’s

Judgment as a Matter of Law
Plaintiff moves for judgment as a matter of law with respect

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to two of his claims: his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate

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indifference and his First Amendment claim of retaliation.

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A.

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To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim under the

Deliberate Indifference

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Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant

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consciously “disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his

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action.”

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also Long v. Shah, 2005 WL 994553 (N.D. Cal.) (Henderson, J.) (“A

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valid claim must allege that the prison official ‘consciously

Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997); see

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disregards a substantial risk.’” (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511

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U.S. 825, 847 (1994))).

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this standard “is even higher than gross negligence” because it

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“requires a culpable mental state.”

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F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894,

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898-900 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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trial, the jury was not required to find that Defendant’s conduct

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met this standard.

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The Ninth Circuit has recognized that

Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648

Based on the evidence presented at

Although Defendant admitted that she was aware of the risks

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff faced when she opened his cell door and shot him with

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the 40mm rounds, she also presented evidence to show that she did

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not consciously disregard those risks.

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example, that she “mistakenly opened” Plaintiff’s door after

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“forgetting” that the other inmate was unrestrained on the same

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tier.

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to see the area outside Plaintiff’s cell from her vantage point in

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the control booth.

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Plaintiff’s expert testified that Defendant’s failure to check

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that area before opening his cell was “grossly negligent” and

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constituted a “reckless disregard for established procedures,” id.

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297:8, 297:16, he could not testify that Defendant acted with a

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conscious or reckless disregard for risks to Plaintiff’s “health

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or safety.”

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prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment

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for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the

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official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

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health or safety.” (emphasis added)); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d

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1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the level of culpability

Trial Tr. 453:3-:4.

Defendant testified, for

She also testified that she was unable

Id. 385:16-:21.

Furthermore, while

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“We hold instead that a

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required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation “has been

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defined as being ‘deliberately indifferent’ to an inmate’s health

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or safety” (emphasis added)).

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evidence, could reasonably conclude that Defendant’s conduct in

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opening Plaintiff’s cell door did not constitute deliberate

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indifference.

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A jury, presented with this

The same reasoning applies to Defendant’s decision to shoot
Plaintiff with four 40mm rounds.

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ordered Plaintiff to stop fighting before every shot, Trial Tr.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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412:4-:23, and aimed each shot at Plaintiff’s legs, id. 413:14-

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:15.

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testified that he specifically ordered Defendant to shoot

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Plaintiff in order to stop the fight.

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himself admitted that he continued fighting with the other inmate

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even after he heard the guards yelling at him and realized that

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Defendant had begun shooting.

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244:23-:25.

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support Defendant’s assertion that she was justified in shooting

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Plaintiff with the four 40mm rounds.

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required to find that the shooting constituted deliberate

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indifference.

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Defendant testified that she

Her account was supported by that of her supervisor, who

Id. 461:21-:23.

Plaintiff

Id. 187:10-:15, 243:23-:244:2,

Taken together, this evidence is sufficient to

The jury was therefore not

The trial record contains additional evidence supporting the

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jury’s verdict.

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jury to conclude from the evidence that Plaintiff’s injuries were

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the result of his own actions rather than Defendant’s.

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Circuit has stressed that, in cases where an inmate seeks to hold

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a prison guard individually liable for failing to prevent harm

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from another inmate, the plaintiff must establish a clear line of

For instance, it was not unreasonable for the

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The Ninth

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causation between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s

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injuries.

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1988) (“When plaintiffs, such as the inmates, seek to hold an

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individual defendant personally liable for damages, the causation

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inquiry between the deliberate indifference and the eighth

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amendment deprivation must be more refined. . . . Especially when,

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as in this case, a prisoner seeks to hold a prison employee

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individually liable because another prisoner attacked him, the

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prisoner must establish individual fault.”).

See, e.g., Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.

Here, Plaintiff

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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admitted that he left his cell to engage the other inmate in a

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fight, Trial Tr. 185:6-:19, that he struck the other inmate first,

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id. 235:35-15, that he could not recall the other inmate striking

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him in return, id. 235:23, that he continued fighting even after

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the first three shots were fired, id. 244:23-:25, and that he

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realized Defendant might shoot him with a non-lethal weapon in

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order to stop the altercation, id. 237:11-:14.

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provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that

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Plaintiff failed to establish the requisite level of causation to

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prevail on his deliberate indifference claim.

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must therefore be denied.

These admissions

Plaintiff’s motion

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B.

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The only evidence of retaliation that Plaintiff presented at

Retaliation

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trial was the temporal proximity between the August 16, 2006

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incident and Plaintiff’s alleged threat to file a grievance

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against Defendant.

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protected activity and an alleged act of retaliation is typically

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not sufficient to establish unlawful retaliation.

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City of Napa, 2007 WL 1655624 (N.D. Cal.) (Patel, J.) (“Thus,

On its own, temporal proximity between a

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Cf. Ramadan v.

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because plaintiffs have not offered any support beyond proximity

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in time to meet their burden of showing pretext, defendants are

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entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ retaliation

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claim under Title VII and FEHA.”).

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retaliation is especially weak here, given Defendant’s unrebutted

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testimony that “many inmates” had previously threatened to file

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grievances against her.

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to explain why Plaintiff alone was singled out for retaliation,

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the jury was not required to infer that Defendant’s conduct on

Plaintiff’s evidence of

Trial Tr. 452:20.

Without any evidence

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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August 16, 2006 was motivated by retaliatory animus.

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Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his

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retaliation claim.

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III. New Trial

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Thus,

Plaintiff argues that a new trial should be held for three

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reasons: (1) the jury may have been prejudiced by evidence of his

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alleged membership in a prison gang; (2) the jury may have been

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concerned about Defendant’s ability to pay a verdict; and (3) the

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jury may have expected Plaintiff to produce more evidence in

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support of his claims.

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granting a new trial.

None of these provides a reason for

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First, with respect to the evidence of Plaintiff’s alleged

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gang membership, the Court took several precautions to minimize

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whatever prejudice this evidence might have caused.

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particular, the Court issued a limiting instruction regarding

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Plaintiff’s alleged gang affiliation, excluded all references to

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Plaintiff’s prison nickname, restricted the use of photographs

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depicting Plaintiff’s gang tattoos, and questioned prospective

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jurors during voir dire about their racial attitudes and opinions
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In

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of the criminal justice system.

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Plaintiff’s alleged gang membership altogether was not a feasible

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option.

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Plaintiff’s alleged membership in a white supremacist gang is

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highly relevant in this case because it speaks to the nature of

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the gang rivalry between him and the inmate with whom he fought.

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Docket No. 198, at 2 (“Concealing this fact from the jury would

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deny them access to relevant information while creating

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administrative difficulties for both parties.”).

Omitting references to

As explained in the order on motions in limine,

Thus, in light

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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of the various precautions the Court took to avoid juror

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prejudice, and the relevance of Plaintiff’s alleged gang

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membership, the Court’s decision to admit certain evidence of

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Plaintiff’s alleged gang affiliation does not justify a new trial.

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Nor does the Court’s refusal to issue a limiting instruction

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regarding Defendant’s ability to pay a judgment.

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Mot. JMOL 11.

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request for such an instruction at the close of trial, he never

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explains why the instruction was necessary in the first place.

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fails to cite any authority1 requiring such an instruction and

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does not identify any evidence presented at trial regarding

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Defendant’s ability to pay.

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believe that the jury was actually concerned about this issue.

Docket No. 238,

Although Plaintiff notes that the Court denied his

He

As such, he offers no reason to

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Although Plaintiff contends that his proposed instruction is
“recommended by the Ninth Circuit on this issue,” Docket No. 238, Mot.
JMOL, at 11, the instruction does not appear anywhere in the Ninth
Circuit’s model jury instructions. Indeed, the specific instructions on
damages that Plaintiff cites in his proposed jury instructions make no
mention of a defendant’s finances or ability to pay a judgment. See
Docket No. 172, Pl.’s Proposed Jury Instr., at 69 (citing Ninth Cir.
Model Jury Instr. 5.1-.2).

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Plaintiff’s final argument -- that certain jurors expected

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him to present more evidence at trial -- is similarly unavailing.

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The Court expressly instructed the jury as to Plaintiff’s

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evidentiary burden and provided Plaintiff ample opportunity to

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explain why he believed he met that burden.

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after trial, “two jurors questioned why they did not see more

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photographs, documents, or video footage of the fight,” McCollum

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Decl. ¶ 2, does not demonstrate that the jury misunderstood or

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misapplied the appropriate legal standards.

The mere fact that,

Plaintiff received

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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copies of every photograph and document that he requested during

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discovery and was free to present any of these photographs and

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documents at trial.

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arguing that Defendant’s counsel misrepresented the availability

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of certain documents and photographs before trial, Plaintiff has

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not shown that he was prejudiced by his inability to argue that

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point at trial.

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evidence from Plaintiff, this pre-trial discovery dispute was not

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relevant to Plaintiff’s legal claims and, ultimately, did not

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undermine his ability to present the evidence to the jury.

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Moreover, allowing Plaintiff to argue that Defendant’s counsel

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made certain misrepresentations to the Court during discovery

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would have likely prejudiced the jury against Defendant.

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the Court’s decision to prevent Plaintiff from arguing this point

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does not present grounds for a new trial.

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//

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//

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//

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//

Although the Court precluded Plaintiff from

Even if Defendant initially withheld certain

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Thus,

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for

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judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new

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trial (Docket No. 238) is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 10/11/2013

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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