Lewis et al v. Wells Fargo & Co.

Filing 98

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken denying 75 MOTION to Dismiss For Failure To State A Claim Pursuant To FRCP 12(b)(6), Or, In The Alternative, For A More Definite Statement Pursuant to FRCP 12(e (scc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/16/2009)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v. WELLS FARGO & CO., Defendant. / MARTIN LEWIS, et al., Plaintiffs, No. C 08-02670 CW ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiffs Martin Lewis, Aaron Cooper and Anissa Schilling, on behalf and themselves and a class of those similarly situated, allege that they were misclassified under federal and state wage and hour laws. Defendant Wells Fargo & Co. has filed a motion to

dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (SAC), or in the alternative, for a more definite statement. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs'

proposed class definition is too vague to serve as the basis for any of Plaintiffs' causes of action. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

The Court has taken the matter under submission at the request of

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the parties.

Having considered the papers submitted and the

applicable law, the Court denies Defendant's motion. BACKGROUND Defendant Wells Fargo is an international corporation providing banking services throughout the United States and the world. SAC ¶ 25. Plaintiffs and the proposed class members

provide the installation, maintenance and support of Defendant's technical infrastructure. They are located primarily within

Defendant's Technology Information Group (TIG). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on May 28, 2008 "on behalf of themselves and all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Wells Fargo nationwide as technical support workers with the primary duties of installing, maintaining, and/or supporting software and/or hardware, including but not limited to network engineers, but excluding PC/LAN Engineers (collectively, the `Class Positions') . . . who were, are, or will be misclassified by Wells Fargo as exempt from overtime pay" under federal and state wage and hour laws. SAC ¶ 9.

Pre-class-certification discovery began in this case on July, 2008. On February 6, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended

Complaint (FAC), which added Plaintiff Anissa Schilling and claims under the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act. The class definition On

in the FAC was identical to that in the initial complaint.

March 2, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their SAC, which made minor changes to a few paragraphs in response to Defendant's comments to the FAC. The class definition did not change in the SAC.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I.

LEGAL STANDARD Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Civ. P. 8(a). Fed. R.

On a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached documents, such documents are deemed part of the complaint and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th NL See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

Cir. 1987). II. Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a party may move for a more definite statement when a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Where a pleading "fails to specify the allegations in a

manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e)." N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper 3

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"where the complaint is so general that ambiguity arises in determining the nature of the claim or the parties against whom it is being made." Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, A Rule 12(e) motion is also appropriate

1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

where it is not clear from the complaint what the legal nature of the claim is or if an employee is asserting a common law or statutory claim. 1996). DISCUSSION I. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' proposed class definition is so overbroad and ambiguous that it fails to state a cognizable claim or theory upon which relief can be granted. Defendant's McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.

motion reads more like a motion opposing class certification than a motion to dismiss. Defendant cites numerous cases that describe

the contours of a proper class definition to warrant class certification, but no cases supporting the assertion that this case should be dismissed on the pleadings because the class is not narrowly defined. As noted above, Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This rule is to be

interpreted liberally.

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (holding a

complaint sufficient under "liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a)"). At this stage of the case, the class definition adequately describes the class members' job duties and injuries suffered. Plaintiffs' class definition properly identifies a specific class of Defendant's employees, technical support workers, according to 4

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the job duties they primarily perform: installation, maintenance, and/or support. Plaintiffs are still in the process of attempting

to obtain discovery from Defendant in order to narrow the definition to identify class members by specific job title or position within Defendant's corporate structure. Plaintiffs are

entitled to develop their claims, class or otherwise, through discovery. Defendant also argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint because Lewis, Cooper and Schilling could never be proper class representatives. Defendant asserts that

Plaintiffs, who were "network engineers," cannot adequately represent other "technical support workers" with "primary duties of installing, maintaining, and/or supporting computer software and/or hardware." SAC ¶ 9. However, Defendant does not cite any case for

the proposition that a named plaintiff with one job title cannot represent a class of individuals with other job titles. Further,

at this point in the proceedings, Defendant has not proven that Lewis, Cooper and Schilling do not have the same interests and suffer the same injuries as the members of the proposed class. East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiffs' class definition has led to discovery abuses and a violation of Proposition 64. Proposition 64 requires that only an individual

who has suffered an injury in fact may file a lawsuit under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Defendant asserts that

Plaintiffs included a claim under the UCL to abuse precertification discovery to "shop for unspecified potential new 5

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clients, classes or claims." supports this assertion.

Motion at 20.

Nothing in the record

The discovery propounded by Plaintiffs to

date has been relevant and within the scope of the alleged claims. Further, Plaintiffs Lewis and Cooper have standing to bring claims under the UCL because they allegedly suffered direct injuries by Defendant's actions.1 II. Motion For a More Definite Statement Defendant asserts that, if the Court does not grant the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs should at least be required to provide a more definite statement concerning the proposed class definition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Here, the proposed class definition is not

so vague or ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably prepare a response to Plaintiffs' SAC. The SAC specifies the allegations in The nature of

a manner that puts Defendant on sufficient notice.

Plaintiffs' claims and the party against whom they are being made are readily determinable. The proposed class definition need not Pre-

be in its final form at this point in the litigation.

certification discovery is ongoing and Plaintiffs are in the process of obtaining more information which, if provided, will allow them further to define the precise job duties and titles of the class members. The Court concludes that the class definition

is sufficiently clear and precise that Defendant can participate in discovery and prepare for certification briefing. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion

Lewis and Cooper were employed by Wells Fargo in Roseville, California. SAC ¶¶ 21-22. Schilling was employed by Wells Fargo in Minneapolis, Minnesota. SAC ¶¶ 23. 6

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to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement (Docket No. 75). Defendant must answer the SAC twenty days from

the date of this order. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/16/09

CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge

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