Frye v. Oleshea

Filing 78

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 68 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/20/2012)

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1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 8 KARLOS L. FRYE, Plaintiff, 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OFFICER OLESHEA, et al., Defendants. 12 13 No. C 08-5288 CW ________________________________/ 14 15 Plaintiff Karlos L. Frye, an inmate at Salinas Valley State 16 Prison (SVSP), has filed a civil rights complaint alleging that 17 SVSP correctional officers violated his constitutional rights 18 under the Fourteenth, Eighth and Fourth Amendments by subjecting 19 him to two unclothed body searches and then placing him on 20 contraband watch for approximately forty-eight hours. 1 21 Defendants Correctional Officers D. Oleachea,2 A. Quitevis, J. 22 23 Mora, Greeson, Newby, D. White, Nolta, Milenewicz and William 24 Muniz, Sergeants M. Nilsson and L. Watson and Lieutenant W. 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was dismissed without leave to amend in the Court's September 28, 2010 Order. 2 Defendant Oleachea's name is misspelled as Oleshea in the complaint. 1 Showalter move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. 2 Plaintiff has filed an opposition and Defendants have filed a 3 reply. The motion was taken under submission and decided on the 4 papers. 3 Having considered all the papers filed by the parties, 5 the Court grants the motion for summary judgment. 6 BACKGROUND 7 For his version of events, Plaintiff cites his First Amended 8 9 Complaint (1AC), which is signed under penalty of perjury, and the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 declaration, dated December 11, 2007, he submitted with his 11 administrative 602 appeal, which is attached as Exhibit A to his 12 1AC. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 In his 1AC, Plaintiff states as follows: Six officers rushed in the visiting room led by Officer Oleachea and demanded that I along with my mother come with them and submit to a strip search. I asked Officer why were they doing this strip search and also why were they terminating my visit? Officer John Doe responded by saying that he observed my mother making suspicious movements. At that point my visit was terminated. I was then taken back to the area where inmate visitors are received and made to submit to a strip search. After the strip search produced negative results I asked if I could go back and finish my visit, but I was then aggressively placed in handcuffs and told my visit was terminated. . . . The officers became extremely aggressive and hostile, grabbed me forcefully by the arm and started to escort me from the area. I was escorted back to my housing unit and aggressively put in my cell. Immediately afterwards, the officers came back to my cell and aggressively demanded that I cuff up. I again complied, at which I was again aggressively and forcefully snatched from my cell and taken aggressively to a holding cage at the D facility patio area, where once again I was told to submit to another strip 27 3 28 Defendants' first names are not provided. 2 1 2 search. Approximately 30 to 45 minutes later I was placed in waist restraints with only a pair of underwear. . . . 1AC, Ex. A at 3-4. 3 Plaintiff further states the following. After he was taken 4 5 from the holding cell, he was forced to kneel down on a chair and 6 was placed in leg restraints. 7 unknown officers taped Plaintiff's underwear to his bare skin at 8 the waist and the legs. 9 was then taken outside, where it was cold and windy, to the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Then he was told to stand up. Two Plaintiff, wearing only his underwear, "feces-watch building." 11 In this building, the conditions were harsh and inhumane. 12 13 Plaintiff could see the goose bumps on his arm and legs and he was 14 shaking from the cold. 15 and placed in a cell with only a small wooden bench and a toilet 16 that was covered with plastic bags and masking tape. 17 little flies and bugs in it and the stench was horrible. 18 19 Plaintiff was then taken to the C facility The room had On the first day, Plaintiff was not given a shirt or a mattress. Bright lights were kept on all of the time. Plaintiff 20 tried not to fall asleep, but dozed off while he was sitting on 21 22 23 the bench, fell off the bench and injured his shoulder. Plaintiff was not provided with utensils with which to eat 24 his food nor was he allowed to wash his hands. 25 and leg restraints were not taken off and, in order to eat, he had 26 to place his food tray on the bench and get down on his knees and 27 "eat like a savage animal." Plaintiff's waist There was a foul-smelling bucket in 28 3 1 which Plaintiff relieved himself. 2 Nolte and Milenewicz laughed when the tape was ripped off his skin 3 so that he could relieve himself. 4 toilet paper and, as a result, his hands were smeared with feces. 5 He was not given soap and water to wash his hands and was forced 6 Defendants Mora, Corona, White, Plaintiff was not provided with to eat his food with his dirty hands. Plaintiff was released from 7 these conditions on Tuesday, December 4, 2007 at approximately 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 1:00 pm. Plaintiff had been subjected to these inhumane conditions for almost two days. 11 Plaintiff's fiancée is white and Plaintiff alleges that he 12 was profiled or subjected to race discrimination because he and 13 his fiancée are of different races. 14 alleges that other inmates and visitors in the visiting room, who In his complaint, Plaintiff 15 were not racially mixed, were eating with their families and were 16 not subjected to being searched like he was. However, in the 17 18 declaration he submitted with his 602 appeal, Plaintiff states 19 that he and his family were the only visitors in the visiting 20 room. 21 22 23 Defendants' version of events is as follows. During Plaintiff's visit with his family, Defendant Officer Oleachea observed Plaintiff swallow an item Officer Oleachea believed to be 24 contraband. Other officers noticed Ms. Frye, Plaintiff's mother, 25 26 attempting to conceal unidentified items in her clothing. 27 Officers advised Ms. Frye of their observations and told her to 28 enter the women's restroom. At the same time, Plaintiff was 4 1 escorted to another room for an unclothed body search. 2 rushed ahead of the officers and into the restroom where she 3 started to shake out her clothing. 4 floor from Ms. Frye's clothing. 5 a search, she was escorted to the visiting room and removed from 6 Ms. Frye Several items fell to the When Ms. Frye did not consent to the building. 7 Plaintiff was immediately put on contraband watch. SVSP 8 9 personnel conduct contraband watches in accordance with SVSP United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Operational Procedure 38, which provides for placing the inmate in 11 a holding cell under continuous observation by an officer. 12 inmate is permitted to wear a t-shirt, boxer shorts and socks. 13 The cell is to contain only a mattress and no other 14 accommodations. The The inmate is fed on a paper tray with one 15 plastic utensil. Approximately every thirty minutes, officers 16 record pertinent activities or observations. 17 18 During the time Plaintiff was on contraband watch, a record 19 of his daily activities was maintained by the on-duty officers. 20 Plaintiff was given a t-shirt and a blanket his first night on 21 contraband watch. 22 During the contraband watch, Plaintiff had two bowel movements and 23 On his second night, he was given a mattress. both were negative for contraband. Plaintiff was released into 24 the general population approximately fourteen and one-half hours 25 26 after his first bowel movement. 27 28 5 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and 3 disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the 4 evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is 5 clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. 6 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 7 Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 8 9 1987). The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 11 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); 12 Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 13 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 Matsushita Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment 15 are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 16 outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which 18 facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 19 242, 248 (1986). 17 DISCUSSION 20 21 22 23 I. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim Plaintiff claims that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was placed on contraband watch without notice 24 or a hearing. 25 26 Interests that are procedurally protected by the due process 27 clause may arise from two sources--the due process clause itself 28 and laws of the states. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 6 1 (1976). 2 pertaining to liberty. 3 affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the 4 due process clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by 5 state law. 6 In the prison context, these interests are generally ones Changes in conditions so severe as to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe 7 or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may 8 9 also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 interest only if they impose "atypical and significant hardship on 11 the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 12 Id. 13 14 Whether a restraint is "atypical and significant" under Sandin requires case-by-case consideration. Ramirez v. Galaza, 15 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Typically, a court should 16 consider the following factors: "1) whether the challenged 17 18 condition 'mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in 19 administrative segregation and protective custody,' and thus 20 comported with the prison's discretionary authority; 2) the 21 duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; 22 and 3) whether the state's action will invariably affect the 23 duration of the prisoner’s sentence." Id. at 861. 24 Defendants argue that, even if a liberty interest is 25 26 implicated by placement in contraband-watch, Plaintiff's forty- 27 eight hour placement was too short to trigger due process 28 protection. Defendants cite Meraz v. Reppond, 2009 WL 723841, *2 7 1 (N.D. Cal.), in which the district court found that the 2 plaintiff's seventy-two hour placement on contraband watch did not 3 amount to atypical and significant hardship within the 4 correctional system. 5 in the contraband watch were more onerous than those plaintiff 6 The court stated, "Although the conditions normally faced in prison, his placement was simply too brief to 7 implicate the Due Process Clause." Id. 8 9 Plaintiff cites Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Cir. 1992), where the Ninth Circuit held that the prison's former 11 dry cell watch4 regulation created a liberty interest because it 12 provided particularized standards and criteria for its 13 implementation and duration. 14 Id. The plaintiff was held in a contraband-watch cell for twenty-four hours. Id. The court held 15 that a hearing five days after the watch ended was insufficient to 16 17 18 accord the prisoner due process. Id. at 1431.5 Mendoza is inapplicable here because it was decided before 19 Sandin v. Conner, which changed the analysis for determining due 20 process violations in a prison setting. 21 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit explained that 22 In Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 Sandin overruled Ninth Circuit cases that looked at the language 23 of a prison regulation to determine if it created a liberty 24 25 interest. 26 4 27 The Mujahid court stated: 5 28 This is another name for contraband watch. In a later section, the court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Id. 8 In Sandin, the Court determined that prison regulations on confinement of an inmate did not create a liberty interest. In making its decision the Court did not rely on the language of the regulations . . . Rather the Court focused on the particular discipline imposed and held that "it did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." 1 2 3 4 5 6 Id. The Mujahid court held that there was no liberty interest implicated in being held in disciplinary segregation for fourteen 7 days. Id. 8 Here, Plaintiff was on contraband watch for less than two 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 days. This is less than the three-day contraband watch that the 11 Meraz court found to be too short to implicate the due process 12 clause. 13 duration of Plaintiff's prison sentence. 14 conditions Plaintiff had to endure on contraband watch were harsh, Furthermore, the contraband watch did not affect the Therefore, although the 15 they did not impose the kind of atypical and significant hardship 16 in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life that would 17 18 implicate due process protection. 19 rights were not violated, the Court need not address what process 20 was due. 21 22 23 Because Plaintiff's due process Furthermore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages 24 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 25 26 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 27 would have known." 28 (1982). Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 A defendant may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief 9 1 about the facts or about what the law requires in any given 2 situation. 3 threshold question in qualified immunity analysis is: 4 the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the 5 facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional 6 right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Id. at 201. The "Taken in A court considering a claim of qualified 7 immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the 8 9 deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 right was "clearly established." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 11 223, 231 (2009). 12 certain conduct constitutes a constitutional violation, the 13 defendant cannot be on notice that such conduct is unlawful. 14 Rodis v. City & County of San Francisco., 558 F.3d 964, 970-71 Where there is no clearly established law that 15 (9th Cir. 2009). The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining 16 whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be 17 18 clear to a reasonable defendant that his conduct was unlawful in 19 the situation he confronted. 20 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. On these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 21 Plaintiff, Defendants prevail as a matter of law on their 22 qualified immunity defense because the Court has found no due 23 process violation. However, even if a constitutional violation 24 had occurred with respect to Plaintiff's due process claim, in 25 26 light of clearly established principles at the time of the 27 incident, Defendants could have reasonably believed their conduct 28 was lawful. See Mujahid, 59 F.3d at 932 (fourteen days in 10 1 disciplinary segregation did not implicate due process 2 protection). 3 The Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment on 4 Plaintiff's due process claim. 5 II. Eighth Amendment Claim 6 Plaintiff claims that, by placing him on contraband watch, 7 Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 8 9 cruel and unusual punishment. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the 11 conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny 12 under the Eighth Amendment. 13 (1993). 14 Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment," the 15 not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. Hudson 16 v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Eighth Amendment also 17 18 imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners 19 with the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, 20 shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. 21 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); DeShaney v. Winnebago County 22 Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). 23 Farmer v. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two 24 requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, 25 26 27 objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison 28 11 1 official must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind, id. 2 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 3 In determining whether a deprivation of a basic necessity is 4 sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an 5 Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, 6 nature, and duration of the deprivation. The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 7 8 9 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). Prison conditions that are United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 restrictive and harsh are part of ordinary prison life and do not 11 fall under Eighth Amendment protection. 12 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 13 civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficient to 14 implicate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 Only those deprivations denying the minimal Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see e.g., 15 Johnson, 217 F.3d at 732-733 (substantial deprivations of shelter, 16 food, drinking water and sanitation for four days sufficiently 17 18 serious to satisfy objective component of Eighth Amendment claim); 19 Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005) 20 (allegations of serious health hazards in disciplinary segregation 21 yard for period of nine months enough to state claim of 22 unconstitutional prison conditions). 23 Plaintiff's placement on contraband watch for less than two 24 days was not long enough to rise to the level of an Eighth 25 26 Amendment violation; he was released and returned to the general 27 population as soon as officers were satisfied that he had not 28 hidden contraband in his body. See Meraz, 2009 WL 723841, at *2 12 1 (seventy-two hour contraband watch did not amount to Eighth 2 Amendment violation). 3 Plaintiff endured were not sufficiently serious to implicate the 4 Eighth Amendment. 5 (9th Cir. 1988), judgment vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 6 Furthermore, the types of deprivations that See Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 4124 (1989) (sleeping without a mattress for one night insufficient to 7 state Eighth Amendment violation and no amendment can alter that 8 9 insufficiency); Minifield v. Butikofer, 298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (four-hour deprivation of ventilation and water 11 not an Eighth Amendment violation); Evans v. Fogg, 466 F. Supp. 12 949, 950-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (housing in a refuse-strewn cell for 13 twenty-four hours and in a flooded cell for two days did not 14 amount to cruel and unusual punishment); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 15 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1982) (two days in dirty, hot cell without 16 water did not rise to Eighth Amendment violation). 17 18 Plaintiff cites out-of-circuit cases holding that confinement 19 in a cell with unsanitary conditions constituted an Eighth 20 Amendment violation. 21 confined for a longer period or the conditions were more egregious 22 than in Plaintiff's case. 23 However, in these cases the inmate was See e.g., Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 (3rd Cir. 1992) (unsanitary living conditions for four 24 days constituted Eighth Amendment violation); Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 25 26 27 523 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1975) (pretrial detainee's three days in solitary confinement with no toilet, water or mattress and 28 13 1 where water was thrown on him at night was Eighth Amendment 2 violation). 3 Plaintiff also argues that his placement on contraband watch 4 violated the Eighth Amendment because he and his fiancée are of 5 different races and, thus, Defendants' conduct was motivated by 6 racial discrimination. He concludes that he and his family were 7 targeted on the basis of race because all the other families in 8 9 the visiting room were of the same race, and Plaintiff and his United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 mother were the only people asked to submit to a strip search. 11 However, in the December 11, 2007 declaration attached to his 602 12 appeal, Plaintiff states contradictorily that he, his mother and 13 fiancée were the only visitors in the visiting room when Officer 14 Oleachea demanded that he and his mother submit to a strip search. 15 Thus, Plaintiff presents no evidence to create a dispute of fact 16 that Officer Oleachea, or any officer, was motivated by racial 17 18 animus; Plaintiff cannot create a dispute of fact by contradicting 19 himself. 20 Officer Oleachea explains his motivation by stating that, on 21 December 2, 2007, he was assigned to patrol the SVSP visiting room 22 and was responsible for observing the interactions between inmates 23 and their visitors to ensure that no contraband was passed from 24 the visitor to the inmate. Oleachea Dec. ¶ 5. Officer Oleachea 25 26 observed Plaintiff, in his mother's presence, place an unknown 27 item in his mouth. Oleachea Dec. ¶ 7. 28 may have sought to conceal contraband by ingesting it, Officer 14 Suspecting that Plaintiff 1 Oleachea conducted an unclothed body search of Plaintiff, but did 2 not find any contraband. 3 officer escorted Plaintiff to his cell and, because he had lost 4 visual contact with Plaintiff while Plaintiff was inside his cell, 5 Officer Oleachea conducted another unclothed body search of 6 Id. Officer Oleachea and another Plaintiff, with negative results. Oleachea Dec. ¶ 8. After these 7 two searches, Officer Oleachea was relieved by additional staff 8 9 and had no further dealings with Plaintiff. Id. Thus, Officer United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Oleachea only conducted the strip searches; he was not responsible 11 for the conditions in the contraband watch cell. 12 Accordingly, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were not 13 violated. 14 favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants prevail as a matter of law on Furthermore, viewing the facts in the light most 15 their qualified immunity defense because the record establishes no 16 Eighth Amendment violation occurred. Even if a constitutional 17 18 violation had occurred, in light of clearly established principles 19 at the time of the incident, Defendants could have reasonably 20 believed that placing Plaintiff on contraband-watch, under the 21 conditions he describes, for a two-day period after an officer 22 observed him ingesting what could have been contraband, was 23 lawful. 24 Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on 25 26 Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim is granted. 27 28 15 1 III. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Oleachea and Quitevis 2 Plaintiff claims that Officers Oleachea and Quitevis 3 violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 4 searches when they performed two invasive strip searches without 5 reasonable suspicion. 6 The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and 7 seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Allen v. City of Portland, 73 8 9 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995); Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 875 (9th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Amendment applies to the invasion 11 of bodily privacy in prisons and jails. 12 of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 13 To analyze a claim alleging a violation of this privacy right, the 14 court must apply the test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. Bull v. City and County 15 78, 89 (1987), and determine whether a particular invasion of 16 bodily privacy was reasonably related to legitimate penological 17 18 interests. 19 detainees in institutional settings may be subjected to strip 20 searches and body cavity searches if they are conducted in a 21 reasonable manner. 22 Bell, the court explained the test for reasonableness under the 23 Bull, 595 F.3d at 973. Prisoners and pretrial Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979). In Fourth Amendment "requires a balancing of the need for the 24 particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the 25 26 27 search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification 28 16 1 for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." 2 at 559. 3 Id. In Bell, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of 4 a blanket policy allowing strip searches with visual body cavity 5 inspections, without regard to individualized suspicion, of all 6 inmates at the county jail, including pretrial detainees, after 7 every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. 8 9 Id. at 559-60. The Supreme Court upheld the policy because the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 possibility of smuggling drugs, weapons, and other contraband into 11 the institution presented significant and legitimate security 12 interests. 13 rights of arrestees, placed in custodial housing with the general 14 jail population, are not violated by a practice of strip searching Id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that the 15 each one of them as part of the booking process, provided that the 16 searches are no more intrusive on privacy interests than those 17 18 upheld in Bell, and the searches are not conducted in an abusive 19 manner. 20 state of mind when conducting a search is not relevant to Fourth 21 Amendment analysis; an action is reasonable, regardless of the 22 individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, 23 Bull, 595 F.3d at 980-82. Furthermore, the officer's viewed objectively, justify the action. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 24 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 25 26 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); see also Bull, 595 F.3d at 978 27 (individualized suspicion is not a requirement for a strip search 28 in a prison environment). 17 1 Plaintiff's version of events, taken as true, is insufficient 2 to establish that the two strip searches were unreasonable. 3 First, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 4 controlling contraband within a prison is a legitimate penological 5 interest and the balance between the need for strip searches and 6 the invasion of personal rights that the search entails must be 7 resolved in favor of the prison's security concerns. Second, even 8 9 considering Plaintiff's conclusory statement that Officers United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Oleachea and Quitevis were "aggressive" when they searched him, 11 his description of the actual searches establishes that they were 12 not done in an excessive, vindictive or harassing manner. 13 Plaintiff complains of being placed in waistchains and leg 14 restraints. However, these restraints are required by SVSP 15 Operation Procedure 38, which lists the procedures to be used 16 during a contraband watch. See Respondent's Exhibit A, SVSP 17 18 Operational Procedure 38 at ¶ 38.4. 19 Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. 20 Furthermore, Officers Oleachea and Quitevis are entitled to 21 qualified immunity on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim because 22 no constitutional violation occurred. 23 Even if Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, it would have been reasonable 24 for the officers to have believed that conducting an unclothed 25 26 27 body search of Plaintiff, after observing him ingest what Officer Oleachea thought was contraband, was lawful. 28 18 See Bell, 441 U.S. 1 at 561 (prisoners may be subjected to strip search if conducted in 2 reasonable manner). 3 4 Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is granted. 5 CONCLUSION 6 Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for summary 7 judgment is granted. A judgment in favor of Defendants shall be 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 entered separately. The parties shall bear their own costs of suit. IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 Dated: 3/20/2012 14 15 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19

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