McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC et al

Filing 287

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND VACATING ARBITRAL AWARD by Judge Claudia Wilken denying as moot 263 MOTION to Vacate Arbitral Award, ; granting 273 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 274 Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award; granting 285 Administrative Motion to reconsider, recind the 9/25/2013 order compelling arbitration and vacating arbitral award. (tlS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/2/2017)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STEVEN MCARDLE,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 09-cv-01117-CW

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND VACATING
ARBITRAL AWARD

v.
AT&T MOBILITY LLC; NEW
CINGULAR WIRELESS PCS LLC; and
NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS
SERVICES, INC.,

(Dkt. Nos. 257, 263, 273,
274, 285)

Defendants.
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The Court granted the motion of Defendants AT&T Mobility

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LLC, New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, and New Cingular Wireless

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Services, Inc., to compel arbitration in this case.

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arbitrator has issued a decision.

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moved to vacate the arbitral award and to reconsider the Court’s

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order compelling arbitration.

Defendants have filed a cross-

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motion to confirm the award.

Each motion is opposed and each

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party has filed a reply.

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the record, and relevant authority, the Court grants Plaintiff’s

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motion to reconsider, rescinds the September 25, 2013 order

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compelling arbitration and vacates the arbitral award.

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also denies as moot Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award under

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9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) or (4), and denies Defendants’ motion to

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confirm.

The

Plaintiff Steven McArdle has

Having considered the parties’ papers,

The Court

BACKGROUND

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Defendants provide cellular telephone services.

Plaintiff

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alleges that Defendants deceptively charged exorbitant
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international roaming fees for calls that customers did not
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answer, voicemail they did not check, and calls they did not
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place.

He asserts claims under California law, on behalf of

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himself and all others similarly situated, for false advertising,
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fraud, and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA)
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and Unfair Competition Law (UCL).
United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Plaintiff’s service agreement with Defendants contains a
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provision that requires the parties to the agreement to arbitrate
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“all disputes and claims” between them.

Debra Figueroa Decl. in

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Support of Renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action,
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Ex. 2, § 2.2(1).

More specifically, section 2.0 of the service

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agreement, captioned “How Do I Resolve Disputes With AT&T,”
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relates to dispute resolution.

Id. § 2.0.

Section 2.0 is

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divided into two sections, of which section 2.1 is a summary and
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section 2.2 is captioned “Arbitration Agreement.”

Id. § 2.2.

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Section 2.2, in turn, contains seven numbered subsections, the
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sixth of which provides:
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The arbitrator may award declaratory or injunctive
relief only in favor of the individual party seeking
relief and only to the extent necessary to provide
relief warranted by that party’s individual claim. YOU
AND AT&T AGREE THAT EACH MAY BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE
OTHER ONLY IN YOUR OR ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND NOT
AS A PLAINTIFF OR CLASS MEMBER IN ANY PURPORTED CLASS
OR REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING. Further, unless both you
and AT&T agree otherwise, the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not
otherwise preside over any form of a representative or
class proceeding. If this specific provision is found
to be unenforceable, then the entirety of this
arbitration provision shall be null and void.

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2

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Id. § 2.2(6) (emphasis in original); see also July 1, 2013 Ltr.

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from Defense Counsel, Dkt. No. 245 (conceding that “‘this

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specific provision’ refers to all of Section 2.2(6), that is, all

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three preceding sentences”).
On September 14, 2009, this Court denied Defendants’ motion

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to compel arbitration, finding that the class arbitration waiver

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was unconscionable under Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.

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4th 148 (2005), and Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007).

Because the class

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arbitration provision was expressly not severable from the other

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portions of the arbitration provision, the Court found that the

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arbitration provision as a whole was not enforceable.

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Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal.

Meanwhile, this

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Court granted a stay pending the decision of the United States

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Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333

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(2011).

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Court held that California’s Discover Bank rule was preempted by

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the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Ninth Circuit reversed and

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remanded.

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(9th Cir. 2012). The purpose of the remand was for this Court “to

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consider in the first instance McArdle’s arguments based on

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generally applicable contract defenses.”

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Following the Concepcion decision, in which the Supreme

See McArdle v. AT&T Mobility, 474 F. App’x 515, 516

Id.

On remand, Defendants filed a renewed motion to compel

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arbitration and stay the action.

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September 25, 2013.

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Plaintiff’s arguments that arbitration was foreclosed by

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California’s Broughton-Cruz rule, which prohibits arbitration of

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public injunctive relief claims under the CLRA and UCL, because

The Court granted the motion on

The Court considered and rejected

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such claims are “designed to prevent further harm to the public

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at large rather than to redress or prevent injury to a

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plaintiff.”

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303, 316 (2003); see also Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of

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California, 21 Cal. 4th 1066 (1999).

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Broughton-Cruz rule is not a generally applicable contract

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defense and thus does not survive Concepcion.

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found that the arbitration agreement was not unenforceable under

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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then-applicable law for purporting to bar customers from seeking

10
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Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th

The Court found that the

The Court further

public injunctive relief in any forum.
While the arbitration was pending, the California Supreme

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Court granted a petition for review to assess the enforceability

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of public injunctive relief waivers under California law.

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v. Citibank, 345 P.3d 61 (Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (Mem.).

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requested that the arbitrator stay the arbitration pending

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McGill.

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Kristen Simplicio Decl. in Support of Motion to Vacate Arbitral

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Award ¶ 3 & Ex. B.

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McGill

Plaintiff

The arbitrator denied the request on June 8, 2015.

On September 16, 2016, the arbitrator issued his ruling in

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favor of Defendants.

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individual claims, he found that Plaintiff did not meet his

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burden to prove that Defendants failed to disclose international

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roaming charges before Plaintiff incurred those charges on a trip

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to Italy in 2008.

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decided that it was not necessary to address the additional

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issues raised by the parties, including Plaintiff’s claim for

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injunctive relief.

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Id. ¶ 2 & Ex. A.

Addressing Plaintiff’s

In light of this finding, the arbitrator

On December 16, 2016, Plaintiff timely filed his motion to
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vacate the arbitral award.

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motions to extend the time for Defendants to respond to the

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motion, due to the scheduling needs of counsel and the Supreme

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Court’s impending decision in McGill.

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The Court granted two stipulated

On April 6, 2017, the California Supreme Court decided
McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017).

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decision in McGill, this Court granted leave for Plaintiff to

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file a motion for reconsideration of the order compelling

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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arbitration.

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Plaintiff filed the motion for reconsideration and

Defendants filed a cross-motion to confirm the arbitral award.

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After the

DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
Compelling Arbitration.
A.

McGill Is a Change in Controlling Law that Warrants
Reconsideration.

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s order

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compelling arbitration.

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in bringing the motion” may seek reconsideration of an

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interlocutory order based on “a change of law occurring after the

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time of such order.”

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not dispute Plaintiff’s diligence in bringing the motion promptly

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after McGill was decided.

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A party who shows “reasonable diligence

N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 7-9(b).

Defendants do

McGill constitutes a change in controlling law for the

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purpose of reconsideration.

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order, the Court found that the Broughton-Cruz doctrine applies

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only to arbitration agreements, and thus could not be a generally

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applicable contract defense as contemplated by the FAA.

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McGill, however, the California Supreme Court ruled that

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predispute contracts purporting to waive the right to seek the

In the Court’s September 25, 2013

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In

California statutory remedy of public injunctive relief in any

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forum are contrary to California public policy and thus

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unenforceable under California law, regardless of whether they

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are contained in an arbitration agreement.

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see also id. at 961 (quoting Cal. Civil. Code § 3513 (“Any one

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may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.

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But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened

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by a private agreement.”).

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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does not preempt this rule of California law or require

10

2 Cal. 5th at 951-52;

The court further held that the FAA

enforcement of the waiver provision.

Id. at 951-52, 962-966.

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McGill’s holding that predispute waivers of public

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injunctive relief are contrary to California public policy is

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binding on this Court.

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1174, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In interpreting state law, federal

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courts are bound by the pronouncements of the state’s highest

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court.”).

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that occurred after this Court’s order compelling arbitration.

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Judgment has not been entered in this case, and the Court may

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reconsider its interlocutory order compelling arbitration.

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long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it

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possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind,

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or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be

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sufficient.”

24

Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

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district court had jurisdiction to rescind order certifying

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interlocutory appeal) (quoting Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d

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551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)).

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whether the referral to arbitration was correct.

See Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d

It represents a significant change in California law

“As

City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica

Accordingly, the Court must examine

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B.

The FAA Does Not Preempt the McGill Rule.

On the question of whether the FAA preempts the McGill rule,
2
the Court owes no deference to the state court, and follows
3
federal law.

Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir.

4
2011).

If the FAA preempted McGill, then no reconsideration of

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the Court’s prior order compelling arbitration would be
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warranted, and the Court would proceed to review the arbitral
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award.

The Court finds, however, that the FAA does not preempt

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McGill.
United States District Court
Northern District of California

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In Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir.
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2015),1 the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA does not preempt

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California’s rule, announced in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation
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Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014), barring the predispute
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waiver of representative claims under the Private Attorneys
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General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code. § 2698 et seq.
15
Following the two-step approach used by the Supreme Court in
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Concepcion, the Sakkab court first analyzed whether the Iskanian
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rule falls within the plain language of the FAA savings clause
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for “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
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of any contract.”

9 U.S.C. § 2.

It held that the Iskanian rule

20
is a “generally applicable contract defense,” not a ground for
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revocation of arbitration agreements only.

Sakkab, 803 F.3d at

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433 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343).
23
Second, the Sakkab court turned to the question of whether
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the Iskanian rule conflicts with the FAA’s purposes, applying
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“ordinary conflict preemption principles.”

Id.

It held that the

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Sakkab, like McGill, was decided after this Court’s
September 25, 2013 order.
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Iskanian rule does not “stand as an obstacle to the

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accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”

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(quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343).

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“expresses no preference regarding whether individual PAGA claims

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are litigated or arbitrated.

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representative PAGA claims may not be waived outright.”

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434 (citing Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 384).

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held, the “Iskanian rule prohibiting waiver of representative

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

PAGA claims does not diminish parties’ freedom to select informal

Id. at 427, 433

It held that Iskanian

It provides only that
Id. at

Therefore, the court

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arbitration procedures.”

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procedural device, which, the court explained, imposes burdens on

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arbitration that “diminish the parties’ freedom to select the

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arbitration procedures that best suit their needs.”

14

By contrast, a PAGA action is a statutory action by which an

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employee may seek penalties “as the proxy or agent of the state’s

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labor law enforcement agencies.”

17

59 Cal. 4th at 380).

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procedures, and therefore “prohibiting waiver of such claims does

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not diminish parties’ freedom to select the arbitration

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procedures that best suit their needs.”

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to the requirements of class actions, nothing “prevents parties

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from agreeing to use informal procedures to arbitrate

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representative PAGA claims.”

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Id. at 435.

A class action is a

Id. at 436.

Id. at 435 (quoting Iskanian,

A PAGA action does not require any special

Id. at 436.

In contrast

Id.

The Sakkab court concluded that the potential high stakes of

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a claim, alone, do not interfere with arbitration because the

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parties are free to contract for whatever formal or informal

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procedures they choose to handle the claim.

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FAA was not “intended to require courts to enforce agreements
8

Id. at 437-439.

The

1

that severely limit the right to recover penalties for violations

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that did not directly harm the party bringing the action.”

3

at 440.

4

The same analysis applies here, with equal force.

Id.

The

McGill rule is a generally-applicable contract defense.

6

See 9 U.S.C. § 2.

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do not require burdensome procedures that could stand as an

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obstacle to FAA arbitration.

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

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free to contract for any procedures they choose for arbitrating,

Moreover, claims for public injunctive relief

On the contrary, the parties are

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or litigating, public injunctive relief claims.

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FAA does not preempt California’s McGill rule.

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C.

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Therefore, the

The Arbitration Agreement Is “Null and Void” by Its Own
Terms.

The Court turns to the arbitration agreement in this case.
14
The parties agree that the first sentence of subsection 2.2(6),
15
quoted above, purports to waive the arbitrator’s ability to award
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public injunctive relief.

In combination with the agreement in

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subsection 2.2(1) that all claims and disputes, broadly defined,
18
would be arbitrated, this constitutes a waiver of public
19
injunctive relief in all fora that violates the McGill rule.
20
The Court turns, therefore, to the consequences of this
21
waiver.

Defendants contend that if the arbitrator could not

22
address Plaintiff’s claims for public injunctive relief, then
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this Court could address them after the arbitrator resolved the
24
issues that were within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
25
See Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 937 (9th
26
Cir. 2013) (if arbitrator concludes that it lacks authority to
27
enter injunction, then under language of applicable arbitration
28
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agreement plaintiffs “may return to the district court to seek

2

their public injunctive relief”); see also Wiseman v. Tesla,

3

Inc.,

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(holding that language of agreement allowed arbitrator to decide

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in first instance whether public injunctive relief claims were

6

arbitrable).

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procedure would render Plaintiff’s public injunctive relief claim

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moot, because the arbitrator decided that Plaintiff had failed to

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

meet his burden to prove any of his underlying claims on the

2

No. 17-cv-04798-JFW, at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2017)

Moreover, Defendants argue, following this

10

merits, making it unnecessary to reach the issue of injunctive

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relief.

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This argument does not comport with the language of the

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arbitration agreement in this case.

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here is dictated, not by other courts’ findings regarding the

15

procedures set forth in other arbitration agreements, but by the

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specific procedures contracted to by the parties in the

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arbitration agreement at issue here.

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The procedure to be followed

Plaintiff describes the final sentence of subsection 2.2(6)

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of the parties’ arbitration agreement as a “poison pill.”

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contends that because, under the McGill rule, the first sentence

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of subsection 2.2(6) is unenforceable, the entire arbitration

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provision in the contract (section 2.0) is also “null and void”

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due to the “poison pill,” and no portion of the parties’ dispute

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is subject to arbitration.

He

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27
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2

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ administrative motion for
leave to file a statement of recent decision bringing Wiseman to
the attention of the Court, although it agrees with Plaintiff
that the arbitration agreement in this case is materially
different from that in Wiseman.
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1

Defendants, on the other hand, contend that if the waiver of
any claim is found to be unenforceable, then the arbitration

3

agreement is “null and void” only with regard to that one claim,

4

leaving other claims subject to arbitration.

5

would suggest an approach similar to that taken in Ferguson,

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where the arbitrator would decide all claims subject to

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arbitration, and Plaintiff could then return to this Court for

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adjudication of his claim for public injunctive relief.

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

2

Defendants imply that the language of the “poison pill” is at

This interpretation

10

least ambiguous, and should be construed in favor of permitting

11

arbitration of all issues except public injunctive relief because

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“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be

13

resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is

14

the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation

15

of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”

16

Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25

17

(1983).

18

Moses H.

Defendants are correct that the Court will not deny an order

19

compelling arbitration “unless it may be said with positive

20

assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an

21

interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.

22

be resolved in favor of coverage.”

23

Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting Steelworkers v.

24

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583 (1960)).

25

Here, however, there is no room for doubt.

26

“poison pill” sentence unambiguously provides that “the entirety

27

of this arbitration provision shall be null and void” if

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subsection 2.2(6), waiving claims and relief on behalf of other
11

Doubts should

AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns

The language of the

1

persons, is found to be unenforceable.

2

construction of this sentence ignores the agreement’s use of the

3

word “entirety” and attempts to read in limiting language that

4

does not exist, such as adding the words “as to the specific

5

claim” at the end of the paragraph.

6

Defendants’ earlier position regarding the scope of the “poison

7

pill.”

8
United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Defendants’ proposed

It also is in tension with

It would, of course, have been permissible for the parties
to agree to an arbitration provision that was limited in this

10

way.

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written declares the entire arbitration provision null and void

12

because the waiver of public injunctive relief is unenforceable.

13

The Court notes that although the parties need not have agreed to

14

so broad a “poison pill,” there was reason for them to do so.

15

See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 437 (“The FAA contemplates that parties

16

may simply agree ex ante to litigate high stakes claims if they

17

find arbitration’s informal procedures unsuitable.”).

18

They did not do so, however.

The contract as actually

The McGill rule constitutes a change in controlling law and

19

is not preempted by the FAA.

20

relief in subsection 2.2(6) of the parties’ agreement is

21

therefore unenforceable, and this triggers the “poison pill”

22

rendering the entire arbitration provision null and void.

23

Court must therefore grant reconsideration of, and rescind, its

24

September 25, 2013 order compelling arbitration and vacate the

25

arbitral award.

26

II.

27
28

The waiver of public injunctive

The

The Motions to Vacate or Confirm the Arbitral Award.
Because the Court reconsiders the September 25, 2013 order

granting Defendants’ renewed motion to compel arbitration and
12

1

stay this action, rescinds its prior order compelling arbitration

2

and vacates the arbitral award, the Court denies as moot

3

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)

4

and (4).

5

award.

6

merits of the arbitrator’s decision.

7

The Court also denies Defendants’ motion to confirm the

By this decision, the Court does not reach or review the

Defendants contend that the FAA statutorily bars Plaintiff’s
“attempt to evade confirmation of a final arbitration award”

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

through reconsideration of this Court’s order compelling

10

arbitration.

11

decision, this Court’s review is “both limited and highly

12

deferential.”

13

1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14

The Court “must” confirm and enter judgment on an award “unless

15

the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in

16

sections 10 and 11” of the FAA.

17

Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008) (“There

18

is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally

19

tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one

20

of the ‘prescribed’ exceptions applies.”).

21

Opp. at 20.

When reviewing an arbitrator’s

Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d

9 U.S.C. § 9; see also Hall St.

Here, the Court is not reviewing an arbitral award, and the

22

merits of the arbitrator’s decision are irrelevant to the

23

correctness of this Court’s order compelling arbitration in the

24

first place.

25

reviewed the merits of the arbitrator’s decision based on

26

impermissible grounds.

27

contract that the arbitral award could be vacated if the

28

arbitrator’s findings of fact were not supported by substantial

In Hall Street, by contrast, the district court had

The Hall Street parties had agreed by

13

1

evidence or the arbitrator’s conclusions of law were erroneous.

2

552 U.S. at 579.

3

among the grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award under the FAA.

4

Because the statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive, the

5

district court could not vacate the award based on the

6

contractual grounds.

7

The Supreme Court held that these bases are not

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in a recent unpublished
memorandum disposition that where an arbitrator applies the law

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

as it exists at the time of the arbitral award, an intervening

10

change in law prior to a court’s FAA review does not provide a

11

basis to vacate the award.

12

687 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2017).

13

-not the district court--held that the governing arbitration

14

agreement’s waiver of representative PAGA claims was enforceable.

15

See Wulfe v. Valero Ref. Co.--California, 641 Fed. App’x 758, 761

16

(9th Cir. 2016) (“Wulfe argues that the arbitrator exceeded her

17

powers by allegedly ordering Wulfe to proceed with his PAGA claim

18

on an individual basis because such a right cannot be waived.”);

19

Wulfe v. Valero Ref. Co., No. 12-cv-05971-MWF, 2016 WL 9132900,

20

*1 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2016) (noting that it was “the arbitrator’s

21

order requiring Plaintiff to proceed with his PAGA claims on an

22

individual basis”).

23

California Supreme Court decided Iskanian and the Ninth Circuit

24

decided Sakkab, reaching a different decision about the

25

enforceability of PAGA waivers.

26

change in law did not justify vacating the arbitral award under

27

the rigorous standard of review provided by the FAA.

28

Circuit explained that “the issue is not whether, with perfect

Wulfe v. Valero Ref. Co.--California,
In Wulfe, the arbitrator-

After the award was issued, however, the

The district court held that the

14

The Ninth

hindsight, we can conclude that the arbitrator erred.”

2

687 F. App’x at 648.

3

decision, the Court must consider whether the arbitrator

4

“recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.”

5

(quoting Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,

6

607 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2010)).

7

not act with manifest disregard of any law that existed at the

8

time of the award, and the court therefore confirmed the arbitral

9
United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

award.

10

Wulfe,

Rather, in reviewing an arbitrator’s

The issue here is different.

Id.

In Wulfe, the arbitrator did

The arbitrator was not the one

11

to conclude that Plaintiff’s waiver of public injunctive relief

12

claims was enforceable; it was this Court that made that ruling

13

in the order compelling arbitration.

14

not review the arbitrator’s decision under the FAA, but rather,

15

reconsiders its own interlocutory order.

16

Court’s order compelling arbitration was erroneous in light of

17

the subsequent decisions in McGill and Sakkab, and must be

18

rescinded. The Court, therefore, vacates the arbitral award

19

without reviewing its merits under the FAA.

20
21

The Court therefore does

As discussed, the

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

22

motion for reconsideration of the order compelling arbitration

23

(Docket No. 273), rescinds that prior order (Docket No. 257), and

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VACATES the arbitral award.

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motion to vacate the arbitral award (Docket No. 263); and DENIES

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Defendants’ cross-motion to confirm the arbitral award (Docket

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No. 274).

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motion for leave to file a statement of recent decision (Docket

The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s

The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ administrative

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No. 285).
The Court shall schedule a case management conference by
separate Clerk’s Notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: October 2, 2017
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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