Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc. et al

Filing 1287

CORRECTED ORDER FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 12/15/15. (jebS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/15/2015)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAMUEL KELLER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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v.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION; ELECTRONIC ARTS
INC.; and COLLEGIATE LICENSING
COMPANY,
Defendants.
________________________________/
EDWARD O’BANNON, et al.

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No. C 09-1967 CW

Plaintiffs,
v.

No. C 09-3329 CW
CORRECTED ORDER
FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION; ELECTRONIC ARTS
INC.; and COLLEGIATE LICENSING
COMPANY,
Defendants.
________________________________/
On August 19, 2015, this Court granted final approval of the
class action settlements in the above captioned cases.1

In its

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final approval orders, the Court allocated twenty-nine percent of
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the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) settlement

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fund and thirty percent of the Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA)

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settlement fund for attorneys’ fees, reserving the division of

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On September 16, 2015, Objector Nathan Harris filed a
notice of appeal of the settlement in Keller and Objector Darrin
Duncan filed a notice of appeal of the partial settlement in
O’Bannon. Both appeals were dismissed by stipulation on November
9, 2015.

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those funds among the attorneys.

Class Counsel have filed five

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separate motions for attorneys’ fees and costs.

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Plaintiff class in O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon Plaintiffs) seek

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$8,000,000 in fees from EA.

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Plaintiff class in Keller v. NCAA (Keller Plaintiffs) seek

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Docket No. 1194.

Counsel for the

Counsel for the

$8,580,000 in fees from EA and $5,800,000 in fees from the NCAA.

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Docket Nos. 1196 and 1197.

Current counsel for the Plaintiff

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class in Hart v. EA, D.N.J. Case No. 09-5990, seek $883,177 in

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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fees from EA.

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counsel for the Hart Plaintiffs, seeks $4,620,000 in fees from EA.

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Docket No. 1193.

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each other’s motions for fees.

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Docket No. 1207.

Finally, Timothy McIlwain, former

Counsel for the various Plaintiff groups oppose
Having considered the parties’

papers, oral argument on the motions and the record in this case,

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the Court grants Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel $5,800,000 in
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attorneys’ fees and $224,434.20 in costs from the NCAA fund.

In

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addition, the Court grants the following from the EA fund:

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$5,046,000 in fees and $224,434.20 in costs to Keller Plaintiffs’

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counsel; $4,000,000 in fees and $1,819,964 in costs to O’Bannon

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Plaintiffs’ counsel2; $260,000 in fees and $12,367.59 in costs to

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In addition, the Court directs that $2,000,000 in fees
shall be held in escrow, pending the resolution O’Bannon
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees from the NCAA.
If O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel are paid their fees by the NCAA,
the $2,000,000 will be paid to counsel for Keller Plaintiffs. If
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel are not paid their fees by the NCAA,
the $2,000,000 will be paid to them.
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current counsel for Hart; and $694,000 in fees and $45,810.58 in
costs to former counsel for Hart.

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BACKGROUND
I.

Keller v. EA, No. 09-1967, and O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. 09-3329
On May 5, 2009, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP filed Keller

v. EA, 09-1967, as a putative class action, naming EA, the NCAA

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and Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) as Defendants and alleging
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the unlawful use of college student athletes’ names, images, and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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likenesses in NCAA-branded football and basketball videogames

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produced and sold by EA.

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statutory right-of-publicity (ROP) claims, a California Unfair

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Competition Law claim and various other common law claims.

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The case asserted common law and

On July 21, 2009, Hausfeld LLP filed O’Bannon v. NCAA, 09-

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3329 as a putative class action, alleging that the NCAA, its
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members, EA and CLC conspired to suppress to zero the amounts paid
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to Division I football and men’s basketball players for the use of

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their names, images and likenesses, in violation of the Sherman

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Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

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Plaintiffs Keller and O’Bannon’s joint motion to consolidate their

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cases along with several other related actions pending before the

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Court.

On January 15, 2010, the Court granted

O’Bannon Docket No. 139.

On that date, the Court

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appointed Hausfeld LLP and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as co25
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lead counsel in the consolidated cases, with Hausfeld taking
primary responsibility for the O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ claims and

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3

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Hagens Berman taking primary responsibility for the Keller
Plaintiffs’ claims.

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On February 8, 2010, in Keller, the Court denied EA’s so-

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called “Anti-SLAPP” motion, one pursuant to California Code of

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Civil Procedure section 425.16, which addresses Strategic Lawsuits

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Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

Keller Docket No. 150.

The

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Court rejected EA’s argument that its games were transformative
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works protected by the First Amendment, noting that “EA’s

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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depiction of Plaintiff in ‘NCAA Football’ is not sufficiently

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transformative to bar his California right of publicity claims as

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a matter of law.”

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rejected EA’s argument that “the videogame, taken as a whole,

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Docket No. 150 at 9.

The Court further

contains transformative elements,” finding that the “Court’s focus

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must be on the depiction of Plaintiff in ‘NCAA Football,’ not the
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game’s other elements.”

Id. at 10.

EA filed an interlocutory

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appeal of the order, which resulted in an automatic stay of

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Keller, including a stay of discovery by Keller Plaintiffs against

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EA.

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Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 2009 WL 4907433, at *2 n.2 (N.D.

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Cal.)).

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See Docket No. 253 at 6 (citing All One God Faith, Inc. v.

During this time, Keller Plaintiffs and O’Bannon Plaintiffs

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worked together to seek discovery from Defendants NCAA, CLC and
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relevant third parties.

Both O’Bannon Plaintiffs and Keller

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Plaintiffs served discovery requests and obtained and indexed

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documents, and took and defended many depositions.
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Keller

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Plaintiffs acknowledge that “most of the depositions covered

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antitrust topics unrelated to ROP claims,” but state that they

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“monitored each deposition to identify ROP issues and protect the

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interests of the putative class.”

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Fees from EA, Docket No. 1196 at 5.

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Keller Plaintiffs’ Motion for

In addition, O’Bannon Plaintiffs sought discovery from

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Defendant EA, which it provided to Keller Plaintiffs.

Keller

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Plaintiffs assert that they reviewed these materials and coded and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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indexed the information relevant to their case “to minimize

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discovery on remand.”

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of this work, they had “sufficient documentary evidence to move

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for class certification and proceed to trial against the NCAA by

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Id.

Keller Plaintiffs state that, because

March 23, 2015,” the Keller trial date set by the Court.

Id. at

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6.
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At the end of August 2012, O’Bannon Plaintiffs filed their
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motion for class certification.

Instead of opposing the motion

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for class certification, all three Defendants filed individual

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motions to strike it, arguing that O’Bannon Plaintiffs raised a

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new theory of liability in the motion.

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opposed the motions to strike.

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O’Bannon Plaintiffs

The Court denied the motions,

finding that Defendants’ arguments in support of their motions to

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strike were “more properly considered as arguments supporting
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denial of the motion for class certification on its merits.”

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Docket No. 673 at 1.

Accordingly, the Court construed the motions

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to strike as Defendants’ oppositions and set a further briefing
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schedule, allowing O’Bannon Plaintiffs to file a reply and

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Defendants to file a sur-reply.

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took the motion for class certification under submission on June

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20, 2013.

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The Court heard oral argument and

Docket No. 829.

On July 31, 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s
order denying EA’s Anti-SLAPP motion.

In re: NCAA Student-Athlete

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Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir.
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2013).3

The Ninth Circuit rejected EA’s argument that its games

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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were protected by the First Amendment and affirmed this Court’s

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finding as a matter of law that EA was not entitled to the

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transformative use defense.

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II.

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Id. at 1279.

Hart v. EA, D.N.J. No. 09-5990
On June 15, 2009, the then-existing law firm McKenna McIlwain

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LLP had filed a putative class action on behalf of Plaintiffs Ryan
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Hart and Troy Taylor in New Jersey state court, alleging New

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Jersey state law, California state law, and common law claims

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against EA.

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complaint including only Mr. Hart as named Plaintiff and

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eliminating the California state law claim.

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On October 26, 2009, the firm filed an amended

EA subsequently

removed the case to the federal court for the District of New

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Jersey and filed a motion to dismiss.

The District of New Jersey

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court dismissed all of the claims with prejudice except the right
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Following the preliminary approval of this settlement, the
parties stipulated to dismissal of EA’s petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Electronic Arts Inc. v. Keller,
135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
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of publicity claim, which it dismissed without prejudice.

On

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October 12, 2010, Mr. Hart filed a second amended complaint

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alleging only the right of publicity claim and, on November 12,

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2010, EA moved for summary judgment.4

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EA argued that the First

Amendment prohibited the right of publicity claim.

On September

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9, 2011, the New Jersey court granted EA’s motion for summary
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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judgment, finding that EA was entitled to assert a First Amendment
defense.

Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757

(D.N.J. 2011).
On October 5, 2011, Mr. Hart filed a notice of appeal to the

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Third Circuit.

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McIlwain and Altshuler Berzon LLP.

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On appeal, Mr. Hart was represented by McKenna
On January 25, 2012, Keith

McKenna filed a notice of substitution of attorney, substituting

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the McKenna Law Firm, LLC for McKenna McIlwain.

On February 10,

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2012, one day before Mr. Hart’s opening brief was due, Mr.

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McIlwain filed another notice of substitution of attorney,

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substituting himself, Timothy McIlwain, Attorney at Law, LLC, for

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McKenna McIlwain.

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withdrawal of appearance.

The McKenna Law Firm filed a notice of

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While EA’s motion for summary judgment was under
submission, the Keller Plaintiffs filed a motion before the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer Hart and
Hubbard v. EA, E.D. Tenn. No. 09-234, to this Court to be
consolidated with Keller and other cases then pending. Mr. Hart,
Mr. Hubbard and EA opposed the motion and, on February 4, 2011,
the MDL Panel denied the motion to transfer. MDL No. 2212, Docket
No. 38.
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In his opening brief, Mr. Hart relied on California’s

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transformative use test, arguing that EA’s use of his identity was

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not transformative.

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transformative use section of Mr. Hart’s brief noted that he

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argued “the precise conclusion” reached by this Court in Keller.

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The concluding paragraph of the

Hart v. EA, 3d Cir. Case No. 11-3750, Brief Filed 2/10/2012 at 48

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n.13.
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On May 21, 2013, a panel of the Third Circuit reversed the

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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District of New Jersey court’s grant of summary judgment and

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remanded the case.

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test was “the proper analytical framework to apply to cases” such

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as Hart.

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The panel held that the transformative use

Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d

Cir. 2013).

Applying the transformative use test, the panel held

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that the videogames at issue did not “sufficiently transform [Mr.
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Hart’s] identity to escape the right of publicity claim.”

Id. at

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170.

The Third Circuit panel noted that Keller “is simply [Hart]

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incarnated in California” but declined to “rely too heavily” on

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this Court’s decision which was then on appeal to the Ninth

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Circuit.

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Id. at 163 n.28.

In August 2013, Mr. McIlwain associated attorneys from the
Lanier Law Firm, PC as co-counsel for Mr. Hart.

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III. Joint Efforts to Settle Claims Against EA
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The parties in Keller, O’Bannon and Hart had all attempted to

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reach settlements in their respective cases as early as 2011.

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However, those efforts were unsuccessful.
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On September 10, 2013,

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the three cases proceeded to a joint mediation before Randy Wulff.

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During that session, Plaintiffs in all three cases reached a

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settlement in principle with EA that also released claims against

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CLC.

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settlement).

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(In this order, this settlement is referred to as the EA
At the time of the mediation, Mr. Hart was

represented by Mr. McIlwain.

However, following the mediation,

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Mr. Hart rejected the settlement and replaced his counsel, re8
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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hiring the McKenna Law Firm along with Lum, Drasco & Positan LLC
(collectively, Hart Plaintiffs’ counsel).
After further negotiations, Mr. Hart agreed to a settlement

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under terms Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel describe as “substantively

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analogous” to those reached at the September 10, 2013 mediation.

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Carey Dec. at ¶ 52.

The parties continued to work with Mr. Wulff

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to resolve issues related to the allocation of the proposed
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settlement fund.

Part of the resolution included an agreement

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that Hagens Berman, counsel for Keller Plaintiffs, would pay

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current counsel for Hart Plaintiffs, the McKenna Law Firm and Lum,

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Drasco & Positan, $300,000 of any fee received from the

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settlement.

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any lodestar amount claimed by current counsel for the Hart

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Hagens Berman also agreed that it would not object to

Plaintiffs but indicated that it would respond to any questions

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from the Court regarding Hart Plaintiffs’ contribution to the
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settlement.
In May 2014, the parties filed their proposed settlement
papers with the Court.

Keller Plaintiffs and EA also filed a
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joint motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 and

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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1 for an indicative ruling.

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On July 16, 2014, the Court granted the joint motion and indicated

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that it would preliminarily approve the settlement, allowing for a

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limited remand from the Court of Appeals.

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The Ninth Circuit

granted the limited remand on July 24, 2014 and this Court finally

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approved the settlement on August 19, 2015.
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IV.

Continued Litigation Against and Partial Settlement with NCAA
While settling their claims against EA, O’Bannon Plaintiffs

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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continued to litigate their case against the NCAA.

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2013, the Court granted in part and denied in part O’Bannon

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Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying a class of

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In November

current and former Division I football and men’s basketball

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players whose names, images, likenesses may be, or have been,
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included in game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by the
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NCAA.

Docket No. 893.

However, the Court declined to certify a

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damages sub-class, finding that O’Bannon Plaintiffs failed to

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present a feasible method for determining which players appeared

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in videogames and were therefore eligible for monetary damages.

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O’Bannon Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and
opposed the NCAA’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

On April

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11, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part O’Bannon
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Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted in part and
denied in part the NCAA’s cross-motion.

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10

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While the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment in

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O’Bannon were under submission, Keller Plaintiffs and O’Bannon

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Plaintiffs attended two settlement conferences with Magistrate

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Judge Cousins in an unsuccessful attempt to settle their claims

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against the NCAA.

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Keller Plaintiffs continued to negotiate with

the NCAA and reached an agreement in principle, which they

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announced on June 9, 2014, the first day of O’Bannon Plaintiffs’
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bench trial against the NCAA.
LEGAL STANDARD

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

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“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable

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attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or

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by the parties' agreement.”

Attorneys’ fees provisions included

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in proposed class action agreements must be “fundamentally fair,
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adequate and reasonable.”

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964

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(9th Cir. 2003).
In “common fund cases,” a court has discretion to award

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attorneys’ fees either as a percentage of such common fund or by

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using the lodestar method.

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the “benchmark” for attorneys’ fees in common fund class actions

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Id. at 967–968.

is twenty-five percent of the common fund.

In the Ninth Circuit,

Id. at 968. “The

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benchmark percentage should be adjusted . . . when special
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circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be

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either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the

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case or other relevant factors.”

Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona
11

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Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).

“A fee award

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of 30 percent is within the ‘usual range’ of fee awards that Ninth

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Circuit courts award in common fund cases.”

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Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 2010 WL 1687829, *1 (N.D. Cal.) (citing

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Vizcaino v. Microsoft, 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Garner v. State Farm

If the plaintiffs seeking fees in a class action settlement

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jointly propose an allocation of those fees among co-counsel, a
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court may consider “the relative efforts of, and benefits

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

conferred upon the class by, co-counsel” when deciding whether to

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accept the proposal.

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469, 474 (9th Cir. 1997).

13

when no such agreement exists.

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In re FPI/Agretech Sec. Litig., 105 F.3d
A court may consider the same factors
See, e.g., In re Critical Path,

Inc., 2002 WL 32627559 at *10 (N.D. Cal.) (Awarding higher fees to

15
the firm that “undertook most of the work (including document
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review and negotiation with defendants) that actually delivered
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real benefit to the classes” and lower fees to the firm that “rode

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its coattails and received a (close to) free ride to settlement”).

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DISCUSSION

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I.

Fees to be Awarded
The Court’s order preliminarily approving these class action

settlements allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel in the NCAA settlement to

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seek up to twenty-nine percent of the NCAA settlement fund, or
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12

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$5,800,000, in attorneys’ fees.5

The order further allowed

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Plaintiffs’ counsel to seek up to thirty-three percent of the EA

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settlement fund, or $13,200,000, in attorneys’ fees.

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5

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel seek the full $5,800,000 in fees
from the NCAA fund.

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel also request

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$8,580,000 in fees from the EA fund, for a total of $14,380,000 in
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requested fees from both Defendants.
claim a lodestar of $6,771,390.75.

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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request $8,000,000 in fees from the EA fund and claim a lodestar

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of $33,938,865.72, representing $33,438,899.20 in fees incurred as

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to the NCAA, EA and CLC until September 19, 2013, the date of the

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successful mediation, plus $544,966.52 in fees incurred

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negotiating the settlement agreement, preparing the preliminary

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approval motion and other EA-specific tasks following the
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mediation.

Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel, (the McKenna Law

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Firm and Lum, Drasco & Positan) claim a lodestar of $883,177 and

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request that amount in fees from the EA fund.

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McIlwain claims a lodestar of $3,026,005 and requests $4,620,000

21

in fees from the EA fund.

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Finally, Mr.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit look to the following factors

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when determining the proper percentage for an award of attorneys’
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5

Only Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel seek fees from the NCAA
settlement fund. The NCAA was not a defendant in the Hart case.
O’Bannon Plaintiffs did not settle with the NCAA. The NCAA’s
motion for de novo review of Magistrate Judge Cousins’ report and
recommendation granting in part O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
motion for fees from the NCAA is currently pending.
13

1

fees: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risks of litigation;

2

(3) whether there are benefits to the class beyond the immediate

3

generation of a cash fund; (4) whether the percentage rate is

4

above or below the market rate; (5) the contingent nature of the

5

representation and the opportunity cost of bringing the suit;

6

(6) reactions from the class; and (7) a lodestar cross-check.

7
Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1048–52.
8
9

Here counsel obtained a combined $60,000,000 common fund for

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

the settlement classes.

11

litigated and all work was performed on a contingency basis.

12

There were only three objections to the settlements, none of which

13

was meritorious, and 29,182 individuals filed timely claims.

14

Moreover, these cases were heavily

In

addition, a lodestar cross-check supports an allocation above the

15
twenty-five percent benchmark.

Accordingly, an allocation of the

16
requested twenty-nine percent of the common fund for attorneys’
17
18

fees in the NCAA settlement is fair and reasonable.

See In re

19

Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995)

20

(affirming attorneys’ fees comprising thirty-three percent of the

21

common fund when justified by the complexity of the issues and the

22

risks undertaken by counsel).

23

Only Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel

seek fees under the NCAA settlement.

Accordingly, Keller

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Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion for fees from the NCAA settlement is
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27
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GRANTED.

Docket No. 1197.

Plaintiffs’ counsel request thirty-three percent of the
common fund for attorneys’ fees in the EA settlement.
14

The Court

1

finds that an attorneys’ fee award of thirty percent of the common

2

fund in the EA settlement is fair and reasonable.

3

allocation of that amount among the attorneys claiminig it is

4

addressed in the next section.

5

II.

6

Id.

The

Allocation of EA Fees Among Plaintiffs’ Counsel
Counsel for the cases settled against EA have not reached an

7
agreement on the proper allocation of the available fees.
8
9

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they should be awarded

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

the majority of the fees from the EA settlement because the Ninth

11

Circuit’s opinion in Keller was the catalyst for the settlement

12

against EA.

13

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel’s lodestar is significantly higher

14

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that, although

than Keller Plaintiffs’ counsels’, much of that work concerned

15
discovery and focused on preparation for the trial against the
16
NCAA and was not useful to the settlement.

According to Keller

17
18

Plaintiffs’ counsel, the potential liability EA and CLC faced

19

based on the right of publicity claims far outweighed the

20

liability they faced based on O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ claims.

21

Moreover, Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they faced greater

22

risks litigating their class’s claims because of the mandatory fee

23

shifting provisions in California’s Anti-SLAPP and right of

24
publicity statutes.

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel further argue that

25
26
27

Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel and Mr. McIlwain should be
limited to a maximum of $700,000 in fees because their

28
15

1
2
3

participation in the settlement negotiations negatively impacted
Keller Plaintiffs’ bargaining power in those negotiations.
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they should be

4

awarded the majority of the fees from the EA settlement because

5

they did the majority of the work prior to settlement.

6

Because

the Keller Plaintiffs’ claims against EA were subject to a

7
statutorily mandated stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision on
8
9

the appeal of the denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and because

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

O’Bannon Plaintiffs were preparing to go to trial, O’Bannon

11

Plaintiffs’ counsel were responsible for almost all of the

12

discovery leading up to the settlement.

13

counsel further argue that their work was the catalyst for the

14

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

settlement, noting that EA did not express interest in settling

15
the case until after the Court took the O’Bannon motion for class
16
certification under submission.

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel also

17
18

point out that EA would have faced treble damages under the

19

Clayton Act if a damages class had been certified.

20

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that their clients’ claims

21

against NCAA also contributed to the NCAA’s decision to settle

22

with Keller Plaintiffs, noting that the settlement between those

23

Finally,

parties was announced just as O’Bannon went to trial.6

24
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26
27
28

6

Although O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel do not seek fees from
Keller Plaintiffs’ settlement with the NCAA, they argue that they
should receive more of the EA fees than Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel
based, in part, on their asserted contribution to the EA
settlement.
16

1

Accordingly, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they should

2

receive two-thirds of the total EA fees, while Keller Plaintiffs’

3

counsel and current and former Hart counsel should share the

4

remaining third.

5
6

Mr. McIlwain argues that he should be awarded over $4,000,000
in fees for the work he performed in Hart.7

He contends that it

7
8
9

was the Third Circuit’s decision in Hart that was the catalyst for
the EA settlement.

Mr. McIlwain notes that the Ninth Circuit

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

panel that affirmed this Court’s ruling in Keller cited and relied

11

upon the Third Circuit’s opinion in Hart.

12

argues that, while he was representing the Hart class, he and

13

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel reached an agreement that any fees

14

Moreover, Mr. McIlwain

awarded as part of the settlement of the right of publicity claims

15
asserted in Hart, Keller and Alston should be split with sixty
16
17
18

percent of the fees going to Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel and forty
percent going to Mr. McIlwain.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

7

Mr. McIlwain also moves to intervene in this case in order
to seek attorneys’ fees. In order to intervene as a matter of
right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), “an
applicant must claim an interest the protection of which may, as a
practical matter, be impaired or impeded if the lawsuit proceeds
without” the applicant. Forest Conservation Council v. United
States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). Mr.
McIlwain has no personal interest in the subject matter of this
lawsuit and is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right in
this case. Moreover, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to permit him to intervene. Nevertheless, the Court
allows Mr. McIlwain to move for attorneys’ fees for the work he
performed on behalf of the Hart Plaintiffs to the extent that that
work contributed to the creation of the common fund.
17

1

Finally, Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel seek a total of

2

$1,183,177.00 in fees, representing their lodestar of $883,177,

3

which they seek from the EA fund, plus the $300,000 they will

4

receive from Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel.

5

counsel do not state an opinion on how the remainder of the fees

6

Hart Plaintiffs’ current

should be allocated, except to argue that Mr. McIlwain should not

7
be entitled to any fees.
8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

A.

Allocation of Fees between O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ Counsel
and Counsel for Plaintiffs Alleging ROP Claims

The Court must first determine how to allocate fees between

11
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel and counsel for Plaintiffs alleging
12
13

right of publicity claims.

The Court considers several factors in

14

weighing the contribution of each set of Plaintiffs’ counsel to

15

the settlement.

16

1.

Value of the Plaintiff Classes’ Claims and
Likelihood of Liability for Defendants

17
18

Each of the groups of Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that their

19

clients’ claims exposed EA to the most liability and that activity

20

in their respective case was the catalyst for the EA settlement.

21
22
23

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that, if they were
successful, Keller Plaintiffs would be entitled to statutory
damages of $750 to $1000 per player in addition to disgorgement,

24
fees, costs and punitive damages for each publication of the
25
26

games.

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.

Moreover, Keller Plaintiffs’

27

counsel argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in their case took

28

away EA’s only viable defense to the right of publicity claims,
18

1

which pushed EA to settlement.

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel further

2

note that if EA had succeeded on its First Amendment defense, the

3

antitrust claims “would have been worthless because the

4

competitive market value of student-athlete images in videogames

5

would have been zero.”

6

Keller Plaintiffs’ Opp. to O’Bannon

Plaintiffs’ Motion, Docket No. 1212 at 7.

Accordingly, Keller

7
Plaintiffs’ counsel assert that the Ninth Circuit’s July 13, 2013
8
9

opinion affirming this Court’s February 8, 2010 denial of EA’s

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Anti-SLAPP motion contributed to EA’s desire to settle not only

11

the right of publicity claims, but O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ claims as

12

well.8

13
14

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel respond that, at the time of
settlement, EA faced the risk of a certified damages class, which

15
would have exposed EA to treble damages.

However, as Keller

16
17

Plaintiffs’ counsel point out, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ own expert

18

stated that ninety-nine percent of their damages were attributable

19

to live broadcasts, not to videogames.

20

counsel assert that EA could have been held jointly and severally

21

liable for such damages as part of an antitrust conspiracy.

22

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

However, even assuming that EA would face such liability, O’Bannon

23
24
25
26
27
28

8

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that the Ninth Circuit
opinion could have been reversed by the Supreme Court, noting that
EA had a pending petition for writ of certiorari at the time of
the settlement. However, as Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel argue,
this is speculative. Moreover, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ arguments
rely on an equally uncertain outcome, the potential of a favorable
ruling on its motion for class certification.
19

1

Plaintiffs’ counsel do not respond to Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

2

argument that, even when trebled, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ claims were

3

worth less than Keller Plaintiffs’ claims.

4
5
6

The settlement’s apportionment of funds to class members
demonstrates that the California right of publicity claims raised
by Keller Plaintiffs exposed EA to the greatest liability.

7
Assuming a 100 percent claims rate for purposes of this analysis,
8
9

a class member with only an antitrust claim would receive $45.88

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

for each time his name appeared on a school roster, while a class

11

member with both an antitrust claim and a California right of

12

publicity claim would receive $302.83 for each time he appeared in

13

a videogame.

14

In other words, class members with California right

of publicity claims would receive $256.95 more than class members

15
with only antitrust claims, for every relevant season.

9

16
17

Similarly, a class member with only a New Jersey right of

18

publicity claim as raised in Hart, would receive $82.59 per season

19

from EA.

20

No. 1214, ¶ 22.

See Carey Dec. ISO Keller Plaintiffs’ Opposition, Docket

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

9

Mr. McIlwain argues that O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee
award should be based only on the $5,000,000 allocated to the
Antitrust-Roster-Only Subclass in the May 2014 version of the
settlement agreement, before the parties created a single
settlement distribution plan for Plaintiffs raising antitrust and
ROP claims, which allocated settlement funds by a point system.
However, Mr. McIlwain’s proposal fails to recognize that some
individuals who have antitrust claims also have right of publicity
claims. Accordingly, it would be improper to base O’Bannon
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees on the potential recovery of class
members who only have antitrust claims.
20

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel also note that this Court took

1
2

their motion for class certification under submission in June

3

2013, shortly before the parties reached their settlement with EA,

4

and argue that “EA had every reason to settle the O’Bannon claims

5

before a class certification was issued, as defendants typically

6

do.”

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ Reply ISO Motion for Fees at 6.

7
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel further note that EA faced the risk
8
9

of an imminent antitrust trial in O’Bannon and feared allowing

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

“bad precedent to be set in the O’Bannon case that would have

11

opened it up to further exposure in the Keller or Hart cases.”

12

Id.

13

the threat of class certification and the upcoming trial in that

14

Accordingly, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that it was

case that caused EA to settle.

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel counter

15
that O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments in favor of
16
certification of a damages class were weak and EA’s arguments
17
18
19

opposing certification were strong.10
The value of Keller Plaintiffs’ California right of publicity

20

claims and the likelihood that EA’s strongest defense to Keller

21

Plaintiffs’ claims would be unavailable to it weigh in favor of a

22

finding that Keller Plaintiffs’ case made a more significant

23
10

24
25
26
27
28

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel attempt to discount the value
of Keller Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that Keller Plaintiffs would
have faced barriers to class certification similar to those that
O’Bannon Plaintiffs faced for their damages class. However,
Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel have developed a player database that
they could have used to support a motion for class certification.
Indeed, the parties are using Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel’s
database to assist in the administration of the settlement.
21

1

contribution to the settlement fund than did O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

2

or Hart Plaintiffs’.

3

and, as discussed below, the work O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel

4

contributed to advance that case while Keller and Hart were stayed

5

must also be recognized.

6

2.

However, EA faced imminent trial in O’Bannon

Time Spent on Litigation

7
It is undisputed that O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel spent many
8
9

more hours prosecuting O’Bannon through the date of the settlement

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

in principle than Plaintiffs’ counsel spent in the other cases,

11

claiming a $33,938,865.72 lodestar as compared to Keller

12

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s $6,771,390.75 lodestar, Hart Plaintiffs’

13

current counsel’s $883,177 lodestar and Mr. McIlwain’s $3,026,005

14

lodestar.

While Plaintiffs’ counsel all agree that the percentage

15
of the fund method is the most appropriate method for awarding
16
fees in this case, the claimed lodestars are relevant as a cross17
18
19
20
21
22
23

check of the reasonableness of the percentage of the fund awarded
to each set of Plaintiffs’ counsel.
3.

Risk Undertaken

As noted above, Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel’s arguments
include that they were exposed to an additional risk beyond taking
the case on a contingency basis because they were subject to

24
mandatory fee-shifting under California’s right of publicity and
25
26
27
28
22

1
2

anti-SLAPP statutes.

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 and Cal. Code Civ.

P. § 425.16.11

3

4.

4

Potential for O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ Counsel to
Recover Fees from NCAA

5

The Court must also consider that O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

6

counsel may recover from the NCAA most of the fees they now seek.

7

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel claim a lodestar of $33,438,899.20

8

for work done against the NCAA, EA and CLC until the date of the

9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

settlement in principle, which includes $3,550,840.15 in fees
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel were able to identify as specific to

11
claims against EA and CLC.

In addition, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

12
13
14

counsel claim $544,966.52 in fees incurred to finalize the
settlement and seek the Court’s approval.
In their litigation against the NCAA, O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

15
16

counsel have already claimed their lodestar, including the amount

17

they attribute to litigating against only EA and CLC, and

18

excluding only the amount related to the finalization of the

19
settlement.

As discussed above, Magistrate Judge Cousins issued a

20
21

report and recommendation that the Court grant O’Bannon

22

Plaintiffs’ counsel $44,422,856.04 in attorneys’ fees from the

23

NCAA.

24

counsel are able to collect the fees awarded from the NCAA, the

See O’Bannon Docket No. 405.

If O’Bannon Plaintiffs’

25
26
27
28

11

Although Keller Plaintiffs themselves would be liable under
the fee-shifting provisions, they had an agreement with their
counsel that counsel would be responsible for any fees awarded
under those provisions. See Transcript, Docket No. 1240 at 14.
23

1

equity of awarding them fees from this settlement will be reduced.

2

However, there is no guarantee that they will be paid.

3

this Court must consider the NCAA’s objections to Magistrate Judge

4

Cousins’ report and recommendation, and the NCAA may appeal any

5

fee awarded.

6

First,

In addition, on September 30, 2015, a panel of the

Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s finding of antitrust liability

7
and affirmed in part the remedy ordered.

However, O’Bannon

8
9

Plaintiffs have filed a petition for rehearing en banc.

The Ninth

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Circuit panel called for a response and the NCAA has filed an

11

opposition to the petition.

12

mandate has not entered and either party could eventually petition

13

for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.

14

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit

Balancing all of the factors discussed above, the Court finds

15
that, if they are unable to recover their fees from the NCAA,
16
O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel are entitled to half of the fees to
17
18

be awarded from the EA settlement.

To account for the uncertainty

19

regarding the fees to be awarded from the NCAA, the Court orders

20

that $4,000,000 in fees be paid to O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel at

21

this time.

22

NCAA pays the fee award related to the O’Bannon trial, the

23

Two million dollars shall be placed in escrow.

$2,000,000 will be paid to Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel.

If the

If the fee

24
award related to the O’Bannon trial is not paid by the NCAA, the
25
26

$2,000,000 will be paid to O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel.

27
28
24

B.

1
2

Allocation of Fees among Counsel for Plaintiffs Raising
Right of Publicity Claims

Next the Court must determine the proper allocation of the

3
remaining $6,000,000 in fees among counsel for the Keller
4
5

Plaintiffs, the Hart Plaintiffs and Mr. McIlwain.

The majority of

6

these fees will be allocated to Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel to

7

compensate them for the outstanding result they secured in this

8

case and the risk they faced in litigating it.

9

little evidence that the Hart litigation contributed to the common

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

fund.

The Court finds

The Court awards some fees to compensate current and former

11
counsel for Hart Plaintiffs for their work.

However, as discussed

12
13

below, the Court finds insufficient evidence to support the

14

lodestars claimed by current and former counsel for Hart

15

Plaintiffs.

16
17
18
19

1.

Keller Plaintiffs’ Counsel

As discussed above, the Court finds that the California right
of publicity claims raised in Keller exposed EA to the greatest
liability in this litigation.

Moreover, the substance and timing

20
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision as it affected the settlement
21
22

weighs in favor of a finding that Keller Plaintiffs’ claims

23

produced the greatest benefit for the settling class.

24

Accordingly, the Court grants Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel

25

$5,046,000 in fees from the EA fund, in addition to the fees they

26

will recover from the NCAA fund.

27
28
25

1

Taking into account the $5,800,000 Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel

2

will recover from the NCAA fund, Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel will

3

receive a total of $10,846,000, representing a 1.6 multiplier of

4

their $6,771,390.75 lodestar.

5

presented evidence that they have devoted 20,061.3 hours of time

6

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel have

since the case began, which the Court finds to be reasonable given

7
the more than six years counsel for Keller Plaintiffs have worked
8
9

on the case.

Counsel responded to the motions to dismiss and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

motions to strike, defended this Court’s order on those motions on

11

appeal, took discovery from the NCAA and created the player

12

database being used to administer this settlement.

13

further finds that Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rates are

14

The Court

reasonable in light of their experience, as reflected in their

15
declarations.

Moreover, the Court finds that the 1.6 multiplier

16
is reasonable and justified in light of the risk undertaken by
17
18

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel and the results obtained.12
2.

19
20
21
22

Current Counsel for Hart Plaintiffs

The Court awards current counsel for Hart Plaintiffs
$260,000.

Hart Plaintiffs’ counsel claim a lodestar of $883,177,

representing 2,012 hours of work at rates ranging from $105 per

23
hour to $450 per hour for the McKenna Law Firm and 646.70 hours of
24
25
26
27
28

12

If the NCAA pays the fees sought from it by O’Bannon
Plaintiffs’ counsel and Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel receive the
$2,000,000 to be held in escrow, Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel will
receive a total of $12,846,000, representing a 1.9 multiplier.
This multiplier would also be reasonable and justified in light of
the risk undertaken and the results obtained.
26

1

work at rates ranging from $250 per hour to $550 per hour for Lum,

2

Drasco & Positan.

3

$300,000 they will receive from Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel under

4

the agreement discussed above, for a total of $1,118,177 in fees.

5
6

They seek this lodestar in addition to the

In their initial submissions, Hart Plaintiffs’ counsel failed
to support their motion for fees with adequate time records,

7
simply providing a summary of the total hours spent and the rate
8
9

claimed for each person.

The Court allowed counsel to submit

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

declarations itemizing the hours claimed by each individual by the

11

tasks completed.

12

attaching contemporaneous time records.

13

time records submitted by Lum, Drasco & Positan support an award

14

In response, counsel submitted declarations
The Court finds that the

of the $238,124.50 lodestar claimed.

15
However, the documents submitted by the McKenna Law Firm are
16
replete with excessive time claimed for various tasks.

The

17
18

Court’s ability to assess the extent of the excessive time claimed

19

is hampered by the fact that the time records submitted by the

20

McKenna Law Firm are block billed.

21

keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the

22

total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing

23

“Block billing is the time-

the time expended on specific tasks.”

Welch v. Metropolitan Line

24
Ins. Co., 380 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
25
26
27

quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has

recognized that “block billing makes it more difficult to

28
27

1
2
3

determine how much time was spent on particular activities.”

Id.

at 948.
For example, the records claim over 140 hours devoted solely

4

to preparing the 900 page appendix for the appeal to the Third

5

Circuit.

6

See McKenna Decl., Docket No. 1274, Ex. A at 19-21,

Entries for work performed 12/15/2011-2/6/2012.

Over eighteen

7
hours of additional block-billed entries include work on the
8
9

appendix, along with other tasks.

Id.

The 140 hours is itself

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

excessive, and it is impossible for the Court to determine how

11

much of the other block-billed time is related to the appendix.13

12
13
14

Another example of excessive billing compounded by block
billing is the time spent by Mr. McKenna reviewing and responding
to EA’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Mr. McKenna claimed

15
eight hours on January 14, 2010 to “Review EA’s motion to
16
17

dismiss.”

He claimed six more hours on January 15 to “Continued

18

review of motion to dismiss.”

19

six hours on January 16 for “Continued review of motion to

20

dismiss” for a total of twenty hours reviewing a thirty-five page

21

motion with one supporting declaration that was less than forty

22

Finally, he claimed an additional

pages long, including exhibits.

In addition, Mr. McKenna had a

23
block-billed entry on January 18, claiming four hours to “Research
24
25
26
27

13

The Court notes that Mr. McKenna’s former law partner, Mr.
McIlwain, seeks fees for an additional twenty-four hours of work
by paralegal Katie Saluzzi for the preparation of the Appendix.
See Declaration of Katie Saluzzi, Docket No. 1276-7, Ex. B at 1.

28
28

1

case law cited in motion to dismiss; communication with Rosen re:

2

scheduling and settlement.”

3

5, 2010, Mr. McKenna had block-billed entries claiming over eighty

4

five additional hours for tasks primarily related to the

5

opposition to the motion to dismiss.

6

From January 25, 2010 through March

Other McKenna Law Firm time-

keepers claimed more than fifty additional hours related primarily

7
to reviewing the motion to dismiss and preparing the opposition to
8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

it, in addition to the time claimed by Mr. McKenna.14
An example of excessive time spent on tasks that likely had

11

little impact on the success of the litigation is the more than

12

111 hours claimed in June and July 2009 to creating the website

13

“youareinthegame.org.”15

The website contains a brief paragraph

14
describing the use of names, images and likenesses in videogames,
15
16

three side-by-side comparisons of game photos to images from

17

videogames, links to two articles about the Hart and Keller

18

litigation, and a form where college athletes can fill in their

19

information “to be added to the list for consideration in this

20

case.”

21

14

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Not only is the amount of time devoted to creating the

In addition, Mr. McKenna’s former law partner, Mr.
McIlwain, seeks fees for other people for over 100 hours of work
on the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jorgensen Dec., Docket No.
1276-4 at Ex. A (claiming sixty-five hours of work in February
2010, primarily related to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to
dismiss); Mullen Dec., Docket No. 1276-5 at ¶ 3 (claiming at least
62.5 hours of work related to motion to dismiss).
15

The Court notes that Mr. McKenna’s former law partner, Mr.
McIlwain, seeks fees for an additional thirty-five hours of work
by law student Alex Settle for the creation of this website. See
Declaration of Alex Settle, Docket No. 1276-8 at ¶ 2.
29

1

website excessive, but there is no evidence that information

2

gathered from the website contributed to the success of the

3

litigation in any manner.

4
5
6

These are only examples of excessive time entries.
many more.

There are

See, e.g., June 22, 2009 Entry (claiming eight hours

to “Supervise law clerk and paralegals re: organization of legal

7
research, investigation material and file material”); February 19,
8
9

2010 Entry (claiming four hours to “Review FRCP re: pleading

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

standard); October 13, 2010 Entry (claiming one hour to “Emailed

11

copy of second amended complaint to opposing counsel); November

12

16, 2010 Entry (claiming four hours to “Printed documents from ECF

13

system online and filed in binder for KAM” when there were only

14

thirty-six entries on the ECF docket as of that date); December

15
23, 2010 Entry (claiming one hour to “Send in proof of service for
16
Filing 24”); October 15, 2011 Entry (claiming one hour by a
17
18
19

partner to “E-filed notice of appeal”).
In addition to the block-billed and excessive entries, the

20

McKenna time records include many vague entries.

21

entries contain over 140 hours of time claimed for unspecified

22

legal research and memo writing.

23

For example, the

See also, e.g., June 4, 2009

Entry (claiming six hours for “Continued research into EA’s use of

24
player likeness); June 6, 2009 Entry (claiming eight hours by a
25
26

partner to “Review data, documents and internet material re: EA’s

27

marketing a video game”); October 9, 2010 Entry (claiming two

28

hours to, among other things, “review blogs”); November 18, 2011
30

1

Entry (claiming one hour to “Prepared index of box); January 20,

2

2014 Entry (claiming two hours to “Research docket sheet re: CA

3

Action”).

4

Because the McKenna Law Firm’s records are replete with

5

excessive and vague entries, the evaluation of which is made even

6

more difficult by block billing, the Court reduces the lodestar

7
claimed by the firm by sixty percent to $258,021.

Accordingly,

8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

the total lodestar for Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel is
$496,145.50.
Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel further argue that they

12

should receive their lodestar in addition to the $300,000 they

13

will be paid by Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel under the agreement

14

discussed above.

Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel argue that the

15
$300,000 payment should be in addition to their lodestar because
16
the agreement with Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel “acknowledges the
17
18

overlap of the classes between the Keller and Hart matters and was

19

intended to recognize New Jersey ROP Class Counsel’s contribution

20

[to] the class as a whole, beyond the class members whose claims

21

arose only under New Jersey’s Right of Publicity law.”

22

Dec., Docket No. 1274 at ¶ 2.

23

McKenna

However, as noted above, the Court

finds little evidence that the Hart litigation contributed to the

24
common fund and that Hart Plaintiffs’ current and former counsel
25
26

are only entitled to some fees to compensate them for the work

27

performed.

Accordingly, the Court will deduct from the lodestar

28

the $300,000 that current counsel for Hart will receive from
31

1
2

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel for a total award of $260,000 from the
EA fund.

3
4
5
6

3.

Former Counsel for Hart Plaintiffs

Finally, the Court awards former Hart counsel, Mr. McIlwain,
the individuals he claims to have supervised and his co-counsel,
the Lanier Law Firm, $694,000 in fees.16

7
a.

8
9

Mr. McIlwain

Mr. McIlwain claims a lodestar of $2,070,175, representing

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

2,453.20 hours billed at a rate of $850 an hour.

11

McIlwain does not provide any evidence that $850 is his customary

12

hourly rate.

13

McIlwain filed in support of his motion for fees, states Mr.

14

However, Mr.

Indeed, the declaration of Michael Rubin, which Mr.

Rubin’s belief that Mr. McIlwain’s “lodestar adopts and applies an

15
hourly rate of $750 per hour.”

Rubin Dec. at ¶. 8.

In addition,

16
17

Mr. McIlwain’s former partner Mr. McKenna claimed an hourly rate

18

of $450.

19

rate to $550, with a corresponding lodestar reduction to

20

$1,349,260.

21
22

Accordingly, the Court reduces Mr. McIlwain’s hourly

Moreover, the Court notes that Mr. McIlwain’s records claim
time for travel with no apparent relevant purpose.

For example,

23
16

24
25
26
27
28

In his supplemental declaration, Mr. McIlwain states that
he welcomes an order that payment from the EA fund be made
directly to the individuals on whose behalf he seeks fees. To the
extent the Court awards fees to the individuals Mr. McIlwain
claims to have supervised, the Court orders that the fees shall be
paid directly to them. Within one week of the date of this order,
Mr. McIlwain shall provide counsel for EA with the necessary
information for those payments to be made.
32

1

the records claim 8.30 hours of time for “Travel from NYC to Los

2

Angeles” on November 24, 2010.

3

subsequent time entries that indicates a case-related reason for

4

Mr. McIlwain’s trip.

5

e.g., id. at 5 (11.80 hours claimed on February 10, 2009 for

6

However, there is nothing in the

McIlwain Decl., Ex. A at 19.

See also,

“Travel from Newark to Los Angeles”); id. at 19 (6.20 hours

7
claimed on April 28, 2009 for “Travel to California”).

In

8
9

addition, Mr. McIlwain’s time record includes hundreds of hours

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

for entries that claim “research and discuss” or “review” a single

11

case.

12

October 3, 2009 to “Research and Discuss Namath v. Sports

13

Illustrated.”

14

For example, Mr. McIlwain claims 3.10 hours of time on

Id. at 12.

It is not clear why this short New York

state court opinion warranted 3.10 hours of research and

15
discussion.

See also, e.g., id. at 6 (claiming 2.50 hours to

16
“Research and discuss White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.”;
17
18

claiming 3.40 hours to “Research and Discuss Kimbragh v. Coca-

19

Cola/USA”).

20

to be excessive time for simple tasks, see, e.g., id. at 27

21

(claiming 4.20 hours on January 13, 2012, to “Research the rules

22

for admission to the 3rd circuit court of appeals and conference

23

In other instances, Mr. McIlwain claims what appears

with paralegal to put task together for admission”), or work that

24
does not appear to be reasonably related to the settlement in this
25
26

case, see, e.g., id. at 25 (claiming 2.30 hours to “Investigate

27

talent agency addresses and lead agents”; claiming 6.20 hours to

28

“Research games that are similar to movies; analysis [sic] films
33

1

that could become video games; research the sales of war video

2

games like ‘Call of Duty’; Watch Oceans 13; imdb actors in Oceans

3

13 movie”; claiming 3.40 hours to

4

Clooney; Don Cheatle; Bernie Mack; Ellen Barkin; Andy Garcia; Brad

5

Pitt background”; claiming 3.70 hours to “Analysis [sic]

6

“Research Matt Damon; George

biographical information for Matt Damon; George Clooney; Don

7
Cheadle; Bernie Mack; Ellen Barkin; Andy Garcia; Al Pacino; Brad
8
9

Pitt; image in Oceans 13 movie and correlate likeness to new video

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

game”).

11

has numerous entries for “memo to file” without a topic.

12

also, e.g., id. at 26 (claiming 3.20 hours to “Review file

13

contents”).

14

Still other entries are vague.

For example, Mr. McIlwain
See

The Court also notes that between April 18, 2013 and May 17,

15
2013, while the case was under submission with the Third Circuit,
16
Mr. McIlwain billed a total of 9.80 hours to multiple entries
17
18

labeled as “Conference call with Katie Saluzzi re: Status of Case”

19

but performed no other work on the case.

20

was a paralegal working with Mr. McIlwain on the case.

21

records show similar time entries for these phone calls, but also

22

show no other work on the case.

23

Id. at 42.

Ms. Saluzzi
Her time

Saluzzi Dec., Docket No. 1276-7,

Ex. B at 3 (billing a total of 10.75 hours for phone calls with

24
Mr. McIlwain during the same time period).

It is not clear how

25
26

approximately ten hours of conversations between an attorney and a

27

paralegal that neither stemmed from tasks performed nor led to

28

tasks being performed during a time period when there was no
34

1
2
3

activity in the case could be reasonably related to the litigation
or successful resolution of the case.
Finally, as discussed more fully below, Mr. McIlwain claims

4

almost $500,000 in fees on behalf of paralegals, law students and

5

attorneys who he claims to have supervised.

6

As will be discussed

below, it appears that there is little basis for either the hours

7
or the hourly rates he claims for those individuals.

The Court

8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

finds that Mr. McIlwain’s willingness to seek those fees calls
into question the reliability of his own time records.
Because Mr. McIlwain’s time records are replete with entries

12

that are not reasonably related to the litigation or settlement of

13

the case and because the Court questions the reliability of the

14

records, the Court reduces his adjusted lodestar by an additional

15
seventy percent.

The Court awards Mr. McIlwain $405,000 in

16
attorney’s fees.
17
18
19

b.

Work Supervised by Mr. McIlwain

Mr. McIlwain also claims a lodestar of $491,360 on behalf of

20

other attorneys, law students and paralegals he supervised,

21

representing 1,169.7 hours of time billed at rates ranging from

22

$215 per hour to $850 per hour.

23

In his original filing, Mr.

McIlwain did not provide sufficient evidence to support a finding

24
that the hourly rates claimed were reasonable, nor did he provide
25
26

time records for any of the individuals.

In addition, Mr.

27

McIlwain declared that he is a “solo lawyer” and stated that he

28

was claiming time for individuals he “employed and was associated
35

1

with for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting the Hart

2

case.”

3

provided no evidence that he paid these individuals the amounts he

4

claimed on their behalf, or that he had been authorized to seek

5

fees on their behalf and would pay any fees ordered over to them

6

McIlwain Dec. at ¶ 1, 19.

Noting that Mr. McIlwain

in full, the Court directed Mr. McIlwain to file declarations by

7
each of these individuals which itemize the hours claimed by the
8
9

tasks completed and state the hourly rate or rates the individual

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

actually charged Mr. McIlwain for the work he or she performed and

11

the number of hours for which the individual was actually paid by

12

Mr. McIlwain.

13
14

Mr. McIlwain has now filed declarations from nine of these
ten individuals.

Because Mr. McIlwain did not submit a

15
declaration from Rachel Cook, the Court will not award the $16,900
16
of fees Mr. McIlwain claims on her behalf.

Each of the

17
18

declarations states that the declarant has not been paid by Mr.

19

McIlwain but that he or she performed work for Mr. McIlwain with

20

the understanding that he would pay him or her “upon the

21

successful conclusion of the case.”

22

further states that he or she had an understanding that “if Mr.

23

Each of the declarants

McIlwain received an excellent result, he would pay [him or her] a

24
bonus or multiplier” so that he or she would receive an amount
25
26
27

greater than a lodestar calculated with his or her usual hourly
rate.

28
36

1

Having reviewed the declarations of these individuals, only

2

one of whom was able to provide a time record adequately itemizing

3

the hours claimed by the tasks completed, the Court is troubled by

4

Mr. McIlwain’s original claim of fees on their behalf.

5

McIlwain claimed specific amounts of time that appear to have no

6

basis in fact.

Mr.

For example, Mr. McIlwain claimed 34.8 hours of

7
time on behalf of Kris Nejat.

However, Mr. Nejat’s declaration

8
9

provides no itemization of time and states that he “worked well in

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

excess of 100 hours on the Hart matter.”

11

1276-6 at ¶ 5.

12

(stating that the total work performed was well in excess of

13

thirty-five hours while Mr. McIlwain claimed 51.40 hours of time

14

Nejat Decl., Docket No.

See also, Settle Decl., Docket No. 1276-8 at ¶ 2

on Mr. Settle’s behalf); Amadeo Decl., Docket No. 1276-1 at ¶ 5

15
(stating that the total work performed exceeded 300 hours while
16
Mr. McIlwain claimed 120.20 hours on Mr. Amadeo’s behalf).

Mr.

17
18

McIlwain provides no basis for the hours he claims on behalf of

19

the individuals he purportedly supervised.

20

for these claims also calls into question the reliability of his

21

own time records.

22

i.

23

The lack of foundation

Katie Saluzzi

Mr. McIlwain claims $48,375 of fees on behalf of paralegal

24
Katie Saluzzi for 225 hours of work performed at a rate of $215
25
26

per hour.

In her declaration, Ms. Saluzzi states that she worked

27

“with Mr. McIlwain as a paralegal consultant” but that she “was at

28

no time considered his employee,” paid a salary or paid an hourly
37

1

rate.

Saluzzi Dec., Ex. 1276-7 at ¶ 2.

Ms. Saluzzi further

2

declares that she prepared a “Certification of Services” for the

3

Hart case that itemizes her time by the tasks completed and

4

submitted it to Mr. McIlwain with the understanding that “upon the

5

successful conclusion of the case” she would be paid $48,735.17

6
Id. at ¶ 3.

Ms. Saluzzi declares that she had worked on other

7
8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

matters with Mr. McIlwain and billed him at a rate of $215 per
hour.

Id.
Neither Ms. Saluzzi nor Mr. McIlwain provides any support for

11

Ms. Saluzzi’s claimed hourly rate.

12

McKenna Law Firm claimed an hourly rate of $105 for its paralegals

13

and Hagens Berman claimed rates of $150-$190 per hour for

14

The Court notes that the

paralegals with much more experience than Ms. Saluzzi.

15
Accordingly, the Court reduces Ms. Saluzzi’s hourly rate to $105,
16
17
18

with a corresponding lodestar reduction to $23,625.
In addition, the Court will make reductions to the hours

19

claimed on Ms. Saluzzi’s behalf.

20

time record sixty-one hours of work performed after September 30,

21

2013, when Mr. McIlwain was informed by Mr. Hart that he was no

22

Ms. Saluzzi has included in her

longer authorized to work on the case.

These fees cannot

23
reasonably be related to the successful litigation and settlement
24
25
26
27
28

17

Although Ms. Saluzzi states that the “Certification of
Services” was prepared for the Hart litigation and the document is
printed with the District of New Jersey caption for the case, it
is not clear that the document was requested by the New Jersey
court or filed on Hart docket.
38

1

of the case.

Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar by

2

$6,405 to account for these hours.

3

above, Ms. Saluzzi and Mr. McIlwain both billed for numerous phone

4

conferences “re: status” while the case was under submission

5

before the Third Circuit.

6

In addition, as discussed

These fees are not reasonably related

to the successful litigation and settlement of the case.

Ms.

7
Saluzzi billed 10.75 hours of time for these telephone calls.

The

8
9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

Court will reduce her lodestar by $1130 to account for this time.
Ms. Saluzzi’s reduced lodestar is $16,090.
In addition, Ms. Saluzzi’s time records overstate her

12

contribution to the litigation of Hart in other ways.

13

recorded her time in quarter-hour increments.

14

First, she

The time record

includes many entries for filing or telephone calls that likely

15
took one or two tenths of an hour instead of a quarter hour.

In

16
addition, Ms. Saluzzi billed for clerical tasks.

See, e.g.,

17
18

Saluzzi Dec., Docket No. 1276-7, Ex. B at 4 (claiming time for

19

making travel arrangements).

20

tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate or lawyer’s rate,

21

regardless of who performs them.”

22

976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins,

23

“[P]urely clerical or secretarial

Davis v. City of San Francisco,

491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989)) (internal alteration marks

24
omitted).

Finally, a large percentage of Ms. Saluzzi’s time

25
26

entries are for meetings or telephone calls which do not appear to

27

be related to work performed.

The Court will reduce the remaining

28

lodestar by fifteen percent to account for these factors.
39

The Court will award Ms. Saluzzi $13,700.

1

ii.

2
3

Joseph Cane

Mr. McIlwain claims $178,500 in fees on behalf of Joseph

4

Cane, representing 210 hours of work at a rate of $850 per hour.

5

Mr. Cane declares that he “was a consistent and constant

6

consultant” to Mr. McIlwain throughout his representation of Mr.

7
Hart.

Cane Dec., Docket No. 1276-2 at ¶ 4.

8
9

Despite the Court’s instructions, Mr. Cane’s declaration does

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

not state what his standard hourly rate was, or any rate agreed

11

upon between him and Mr. McIlwain.

12

only the most general summary of his time.

13

states, “During the period from November through December, 2007, I

14

In addition, Mr. Cane provides
For example, he

spent over 18 hours conferring with Tim McIlwain about researching

15
the theories of liability to be asserted in the Hart case, about
16
Troy Taylor’s participation as a class representative, about the
17
18

merit of including other and multiple athletes as class

19

representatives, and about the differences in various states’ laws

20

governing the rights of publicity.”

21

not provide any information about how, eight years later, he is

22

able to remember how many hours he spent assisting Mr. McIlwain

23

Id. at ¶ 5.

during those months or the tasks he performed.

Mr. Cane does

The Court finds

24
that Mr. Cane’s declaration is not adequate to support an award of
25
26
27

fees and declines to award any of the fees claimed on his behalf.
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (“Where the documentation of hours is

28
40

1
2

inadequate, the district court may reduce the award
accordingly.”).

3
4
5
6

iii. Corrine Mullen
Mr. McIlwain claims $52,700 in fees on behalf of Corrine
Mullen, representing sixty-two hours at a rate of $850 per hour.
Ms. Mullen, however, declares that her standard hourly rate is

7
$450 per hour.
8
9

Ms. Mullen declares that her “work on the Hart case with Mr.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

McIlwain involved the research and drafting of points and

11

authorities in opposition to EA’s motion to dismiss or in the

12

alternative motion for summary judgment” between December 10 and

13

December 23, 2010, preparation for oral argument on the motion and

14

drafting supplemental letter briefs filed in July 2011.

Mullen

15
Dec., Docket No. 1276-5 at ¶ 3.

Ms. Mullen does not provide any

16
further itemization of her time, but states that she “spent at
17
18

least 62.5 hours on that work.”

Id.

Ms. Mullen does not state

19

how she is able to state with certainty that she spent the amount

20

of time claimed on these tasks.

21

declaration is not adequate to support an award of fees and

22

declines to award any fees claimed on her behalf.

23

The Court finds that Ms. Mullen’s

See Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433.

24
iv.

Amber Jorgensen

25
26

Mr. McIlwain claims $101,855 in fees on behalf of Amber

27

Jorgensen, representing 287 hours at a rate of $355 per hour.

28

Jorgensen declares that her standard hourly rate is $355.
41

The

Ms.

1

Court notes that Ms. Jorgensen was a law student for part of the

2

time that she worked on the case but that she states a single

3

hourly rate.

4

appropriate for Ms. Jorgensen’s work.

5

Ms. Jorgensen states that she expected Mr. McIlwain to pay her for

6

The Court finds that an hourly rate of $275 is more
Like the other declarants,

her time “upon the successful conclusion of the case.”

Jorgensen

7
Dec., Docket No. 1276-4 at ¶ 10.

However, Ms. Jorgensen also

8
9

states that “some unallocated portion” of a $3,000 payment from

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Mr. McIlwain to her was for work related to Hart.

11

She states that the payment “was not intended to relate solely or

12

predominantly” to her work on Hart because she worked on other

13

matters for Mr. McIlwain during the same time period.

14

Id. at ¶ 11.

Id.

Ms. Jorgensen attaches a document she prepared for purposes

15
of this fee request, which she declares summarizes work done “to
16
the extent I can readily verify by written record, including,
17
18

without limitation, a description of the documents reviewed and

19

written by me (in whole and in part), the topics of research, a

20

general acknowledgment of communications in which I participated.”

21

Id. at 8.

22

through July 2013 and include a total number of hours for each

23

The tasks are grouped by month from February 2010

month ranging from a low of one-quarter of an hour in May 2011 to

24
a high of sixty-five hours in February 2010.

Id. at Ex. A.

The

25
26

summary includes a total of 232.25 hours of claimed work.

Ms.

27

Jorgensen further declares that due to the passage of time she is

28

unable to describe further details of the work she performed, but
42

1

she estimates that she spent more than 300 hours in total on the

2

case.

3

her time summary, the Court finds that her monthly estimates of

4

time spent make it difficult to assess the reliability of the

5

estimated time spent.

6

Although Ms. Jorgensen relied on written records to compile

Moreover, in some months, the only time Ms.

Jorgensen billed was for reviewing case documents and telephone

7
calls or emails, not for the creation of any work product.

See,

8
9

e.g., Entries for January 2011, February 2011, March 2011, May

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

2011, November 2011, December 2011, January 2012, February 2012,

11

April 2012.

12

on the summary by eighty percent to a total of forty-six hours.

13

The Court will not award any fees for time not documented on the

14

summary.

Accordingly, the Court will reduce the time claimed

In addition, the Court will reduce the amount to be

15
awarded to Ms. Jorgensen by $3,000, the amount previously paid by
16
Mr. McIlwain to Ms. Jorgensen.

The Court awards Ms. Jorgensen

17
18

$10,900 in fees.
v.

19

William Amadeo

20

Mr. McIlwain claims $42,671 in fees on behalf of William

21

Amadeo, representing 120.20 hours at a rate of $355 per hour.

22

Amadeo declares that his usual hourly rate is $355 per hour.

23

Mr.
Mr.

Amadeo attaches to his declaration a summary of time he spent

24
working on Hart and another purportedly related case, Brown.
25
26

However, the summary is entirely unreliable.

Most of the entries

27

are for at least six hours, and some are for as many as forty-four

28

hours.

The descriptions for many of the tasks are vague.
43

See,

1

e.g., Entry for October 3, 2008 (claiming eight hours to “Review

2

what users came up with”); Entry for December 26, 2008 (claiming

3

eight hours to “Organization of research for TM”); Entry for

4

January 21, 2009 (claiming eight hours to “Research done for

5

appeal process”).

6

Other entries are clearly excessive.

See,

e.g., Entries for October 1, 2008, October 2, 2008, October 3,

7
2008, February 20, 2009 and February 21, 2009 (claiming a total of
8
9

forty-six hours to research and write a memo on a single case);

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Entries for January 22, 2009 and February 15, 2009 (claiming a

11

total of twenty-two hours to research the relevance of the Class

12

Action Fairness Act to the case).

13

purports to have worked as many as twenty billable hours.

14

On several days, Mr. Amadeo
See,

e.g., Entries for October 3, 2008 (twenty hours); Entries for

15
October 2, 2008 (sixteen hours); Entries for October 22, 2008
16
(eighteen hours).

Other entries are clearly erroneous if not

17
18

false.

See, e.g., January 11, 2009 Entry (claiming eight hours to

19

“Did research on O’Bannon Class” although O’Bannon was not filed

20

until July 2009).

21

The Court finds that Mr. Amadeo’s declaration is not adequate

22

to support an award of fees and declines to award any fees claimed

23

on his behalf.

See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

24
vi.

Kris Nejat

25
26

Mr. McIlwain claims $12,354 in fees on behalf of Kris Nejat,

27

representing 34.80 hours at a rate of $355 per hour.

28

does not provide his usual hourly rate or the hourly rate he
44

Mr. Nejat

1

agreed to bill Mr. McIlwain.

In addition, Mr. Nejat provides only

2

the most general description of the work he performed with the

3

rough estimate that he “worked well in excess of 100 hours on the

4

Hart matter.”

5

finds that Mr. Nejat’s declaration is not adequate to support an

6

Nejat Dec., Docket No. 1276-6 at ¶ 5.

The Court

award of fees and declines to award any fees claimed on his

7
behalf.

See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

8
vii. Alex Settle

9

Mr. McIlwain claims $13,107 in fees on behalf of Alex Settle,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11

representing 51.40 hours of work at a rate of $255 per hour.

12

Settle does not provide his usual hourly rate or the hourly rate

13

he agreed to bill Mr. McIlwain.

14

Mr.

Moreover, Mr. Settle’s general

description of the tasks he completed does not support an award of

15
fees.

Mr. Settle declares that he worked in “excess of 35 hours”

16
on various tasks.

His descriptions of some tasks, such as “there

17
18

were numerous discussions and meetings that involved the case” and

19

“I was involved in additional legal research and writing for the

20

briefs in the case,” are vague.

21

at ¶ 2.

22

the website youareinthegame.org.

23

Settle Decl., Docket No. 1267-8

Mr. Settle also states that he worked on the creation of
However, as discussed above,

there is no evidence that the website contributed to the

24
successful litigation or settlement of Hart.

The Court finds that

25
26
27

Mr. Settle’s declaration is not adequate to support an award of
fees and declines to award any fees claimed on his behalf.

28
45

viii.

1

Katrina Yu

Mr. McIlwain claims $6,120 in fees on behalf of Katrina Yu,

2
3

representing 24.50 hours of work at a rate of $250 per hour.

4

Yu does not provide her usual hourly rate or the hourly rate she

5

agreed to bill Mr. McIlwain.

6

Ms.

Ms. Yu declares that her

approximately twenty-five hours of work on the case was limited to

7
attending a seminar at which an EA executive was a panelist.

Mr.

8
9

McIlwain directed Ms. Yu to take notes and to ask certain

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

questions.

11

seminar contributed to the successful litigation or settlement of

12

Hart.

13

behalf.

14

It is not clear that Ms. Yu’s attendance at the

Accordingly, the Court will not award fees on Ms. Yu’s

ix.

Ron Chini

15
Mr. McIlwain claims $18,748 in fees on behalf of Ron Chini,
16
representing 87.20 hours of work at a rate of $215 per hour.

Mr.

17
18

Chini does not provide his usual hourly rate or the hourly rate he

19

agreed to bill Mr. McIlwain.

20

more than 100 hours working on Hart between January and April

21

2009.

22

videogames, in an attempt to find instances of recognizable

23

Mr. Chini declares that he spent

It appears from Mr. Chini’s declaration that he reviewed EA

individuals in the games, and summarized other law students’ work

24
on the same project.

Because neither Mr. McIlwain nor Mr. Chini

25
26
27

provides any basis for the rate claimed on Mr. Chini’s behalf and
Mr. Chini provides no basis for his estimate of the number of

28
46

1
2

hours claimed, the Court will not award any fees on Mr. Chini’s
behalf.

3
4
5
6

c.

The Lanier Firm

Finally, Mr. McIlwain initially claimed a lodestar of
$464,470 on behalf of attorneys from the Lanier Firm, representing
over 600 hours of time billed at rates ranging from $500 per hour

7
to $900 per hour.

The Court directed Mr. McIlwain to submit a

8
9

supplemental declaration from Eugene Egdorf to support these fees.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Mr. McIlwain has submitted a declaration from Mr. Egdorf in which

11

he reduces the rates claimed to a range of $350 per hour to $900

12

per hour for a reduced lodestar of $313,838.18

13
14

The Court finds that the time records submitted by Mr. Egdorf
generally support an award of fees for the hours claimed in the

15
lodestar.

However, Mr. Egdorf has included 23.25 hours of work

16
17

performed after September 30, 2013, when his firm and Mr. McIlwain

18

were informed by Mr. Hart that they were no longer authorized to

19

represent him.

20

related to the successful litigation and settlement of the case.

21

Accordingly, the Court reduces the lodestar by $20,076 to account

22

These fees cannot reasonably be understood to be

for these hours.

More importantly, the Court finds that the

23
evidence submitted does not support a finding that the reduced
24
25

hourly rates claimed are reasonable.

For example, Mr. McIlwain

26
18

27
28

The Court notes that the supplemental declaration also
reduces the number of hours claimed by Ryan Ellis from 151 to
fifty-one.
47

1

seeks a rate of $500 per hour for a senior legal research

2

associate who graduated from law school in 2003 and who “works on

3

commercial litigation cases, with an emphasis on bankruptcy-

4

related lititgation.”

5

at ¶ 22 and Ex. C (claiming a rate of $500 for a senior litigation

6

Egdorf Dec. at Ex. D; see also, e.g., id.

associate who graduated from law school in 2005 and whose

7
“practice centers on bankruptcy-related litigation as well as all
8
9

stages of the commercial chapter 11 and chapter 7 process”).

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Accordingly, the Court will reduce the lodestar claimed by an

11

additional ten percent, for a total of $264,400.

12
13
14

Accordingly, the Court awards former Hart counsel a total of
$694,000 in fees.
III. Costs

15
The NCAA settlement agreement allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel to
16
seek up to $500,000 in costs and expenses.

The EA settlement

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18

agreement allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel to seek up $2,500,000 in

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costs and expenses.

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Plaintiffs is less than the maximum permitted under the settlement

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agreements.

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would typically be billed to paying clients in non-contingency

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matters.

The total amount of costs requested by

Attorneys may recover their reasonable expenses that

See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).

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The costs claimed here are recoverable to the extent they were
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26
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necessary to secure the resolution of the litigation and are

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reasonable in amount.

3

F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177-78 (S.D. Cal. 2007); In re Media Vision

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Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

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6

A.

See In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 497

Keller Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel seek a total of $448,868.40 in

7
costs, half of which they seek from the NCAA and half of which
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9

they seek from EA.

The Court finds that Keller Plaintiffs’

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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counsel have sufficiently documented their requested costs and

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established that they were necessary to secure the resolution of

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the litigation.

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counsel’s request for $224,434.20 in costs from the NCAA fund and

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Accordingly, the Court grants Keller Plaintiffs’

$224,434.20 in costs from the EA fund.

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B.

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ Counsel

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O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel requested $1,836,505.89 in
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costs, which they now agree should be reduced by $16,541.89 to

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$1,819,964.

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O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel in their motion for fees from the

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NCAA and awarded in Magistrate Judge Cousin’s July 13, 2015 order.

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See O’Bannon Docket No. 405.

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This reduction represents the amount claimed by

The Court finds the costs to be

sufficiently documented and necessary to secure the resolution of

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the litigation.

The Court grants O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

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request for $1,819,964 in costs from the EA fund.

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2

C.

Hart Plaintiffs’ Current Counsel

Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel seek $13,741.77 in costs.

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As discussed above, Hart Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee request was not

4

properly documented.

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Accordingly, the Court reduces the request by ten percent and

6

This extends to their request for costs.

awards $12,367.59 in costs to Hart Plaintiffs’ current counsel

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from the EA fund.

See Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d

8
9

1006, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing trial court to “impose a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

small reduction, no greater than 10 percent--a ‘haircut’--based on

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its exercise of discretion and without a more specific

12

explanation”).

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14

D.

Former Counsel for Hart Plaintiffs

Mr. McIlwain seeks $76,209.91 in costs on behalf of himself

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and co-counsel, the Lanier Law Firm.

The Court awards a total of

16
$45,810.58.

As discussed above, Mr. McIlwain’s records filed in

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18

support of his request for fees and costs include entries for

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travel without a stated purpose.

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costs related to such travel.

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that this travel was reasonable or necessary to secure the

22

resolution of this litigation.

23

The Court declines to award

Mr. McIlwain has not demonstrated

In addition, Mr. McIlwain’s

records include unexplained charges at various stores, including

24
office supply stores.

Again, Mr. McIlwain’s records do not

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26

demonstrate that these costs were reasonable or necessary.

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Moreover, office supplies are overhead that should not ordinarily

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be billed to a client.

See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 296
50

1

(1989) (“[A] prudent attorney customarily includes . . . office

2

overhead . . . in his own hourly billing rate.”).

3

McIlwain includes significant expenses related to payments to

4

individuals with no explanation for who those individuals are or

5

why their employment was reasonable or necessary.

6

Finally, Mr.

Accordingly,

the Court reduces Mr. McIlwain’s expenses by $27,851.73 and awards

7
him $22,882.18 in costs.
8
In addition, the expenses claimed by the Lanier Law Firm are

9

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

not itemized or supported by an adequate declaration.

11

Accordingly, the Court reduces the Lanier Law Firm’s request by

12

ten percent and awards $22,928.40 in costs from the EA fund.

13

Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112 (allowing a ten percent “haircut”).

14

See

CONCLUSION

15
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Keller
16
Plaintiffs’ counsel’ motion for $5,800,000 in attorneys’ fees and
17
18

$224,434.20 in costs under the NCAA settlement.

In addition, the

19

Court GRANTS Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel $5,046,000, O’Bannon

20

Plaintiffs’ counsel $4,000,000, current counsel in Hart $260,000,

21

and former counsel in Hart $694,000 in attorneys’ fees from the EA

22

fund.

23

Two million dollars will be held in escrow, to be paid to

O’Bannon Plaintiffs’ counsel if they are not paid their fees by

24
the NCAA and to be paid to Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel if O’Bannon
25
26

Plaintiffs’ counsel are paid by the NCAA.

Finally, the Court

27

GRANTS grants Keller Plaintiffs’ counsel $224,434, O’Bannon

28

Plaintiffs’ counsel $1,819,964, current counsel in Hart
51

1
2
3

$12,367.59, and former counsel in Hart $45,810.58 in costs from
the EA fund.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 15, 2015

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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