Wright v. Hedgepath et al

Filing 55

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken granting in part and denying in part 48 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and referring case to Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program (cwlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/30/2012)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. C 09-4358 CW (PR)
DEMETRIUS AHMED WRIGHT,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
Plaintiff,
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
v.
AND REFERRING CASE TO PRO SE
PRISONER SETTLEMENT PROGRAM
A. HEDGEPETH, et al.,
(Docket no. 48)
Defendants.
_______________________________/
INTRODUCTION

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff Demetrius A. Wright, a state prisoner incarcerated
at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), filed the above-titled pro
se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In response to the Court’s order for service of the second
amended complaint (SAC), Defendants have filed a motion for
summary judgment.

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Defendants,

although directed to do so in the order of service, have not filed
a reply.
For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff has opposed the motion.

The Court draws the following facts from the allegations in
Plaintiff’s verified SAC and his opposition and declaration filed
in response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion.1
See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding verified complaint may be used as opposing
affidavit under Rule 56); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,
1090 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)
(treating allegations in prisoner’s verified amended complaint as
opposing affidavit); Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1400 (9th
Cir. 1998) (treating allegations in verified motion as opposing
affidavit).
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Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim.

Since his arrival at SVSP

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he has been, and continues to be, denied access to a properly

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prepared, nutritionally adequate and medically sound Halal diet,

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or, alternatively, to a Kosher diet.

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For the entire month of November 2009, he was denied access

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to all Muslim services, and on multiple other occasions he has

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been, and continues to be, denied the ability to attend Islamic

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services including Ta’leem (educational services), Jumu’ah

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(mandatory Friday congregational prayer services), and to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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celebrate the Eid festival twice a year.

He maintains that one of

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the reasons for these denials is prison officials’ reliance upon

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inaccurate information about Muslim religious requirements

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provided by the Muslim clergyman, Chaplain Landau, who practices a

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version of Islam that is widely regarded by most traditional

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Islamists (such as Plaintiff) as unacceptable.

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Plaintiff further maintains that the prison’s Religious

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Review Committee, which includes several Defendants, has allowed

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only two outside companies to provide religious artifacts to

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Muslim inmates, but these companies have taken money without

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providing items that have been ordered and their selection does

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not provide for the religious needs of all Muslims, including

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Plaintiff.

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because he is indigent and is not allowed to receive donations of

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approved religious artifacts.

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He states this burdens the practice of his religion

Plaintiff claims the above restrictions on his religious

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practices violate his rights under the Free Exercise and

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Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, his right to equal

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protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the statutory
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protections afforded to him under the Religious Land Use and

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Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).2

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relief and damages.
DISCUSSION

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He seeks injunctive

I.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is only proper where the pleadings,

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discovery and affidavits show there is “no genuine issue as to any

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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

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a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Material facts are

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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those that may affect the outcome of the case.

Anderson v.

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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A dispute as to a

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material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable

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jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

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Id.

The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who

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fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

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an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

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will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson, 477 U.S.

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at 248 (holding fact to be material if it might affect outcome of

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suit under governing law).

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burden of identifying those portions of the record that

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

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burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the

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pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

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The Court previously dismissed from the SAC Plaintiff’s
Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims, which were based on
allegations concerning the degradation of his Qur’an by
correctional officers, being searched by a female correctional
officer, and threats of violence by correctional officers.

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Celotex Corp. v.

The moving party bears the initial

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The

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answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate

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‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

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party; if, as to any given fact, evidence produced by the moving

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party conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the

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court must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the

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nonmoving party with respect to that fact.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).

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a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility

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determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a

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disputed material fact.

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Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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II.

See Leslie v. Grupo
The court’s function on

See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec.

Analysis

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A.

Claims Barred by Eleventh Amendment

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Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to all

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claims brought against them in their official capacities.

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Specifically, they seek summary judgment as to all claims against

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Warden Hedgepeth, Correctional Administrator Moore, Chaplain Young

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and Chief of Inmate Appeals Grannis, whom they maintain Plaintiff

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sues only in their official capacities.

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Plaintiff does not dispute that the Eleventh Amendment bars a

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suit for damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

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See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

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(1989).

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official seeking prospective injunctive relief from

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unconstitutional state action is not a suit against the state,

He correctly notes, however, that a suit against a state

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even if the state is the real party in interest.

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Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

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123, 159-60 (1908).

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claims for damages and prospective injunctive relief against all

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Defendants who are being sued in both their official and

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individual capacities, and may proceed with his claim for

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prospective injunctive relief against Warden Hedgepeth, the only

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Defendant who is sued solely in his official capacity.

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See Kentucky v.

Consequently, Plaintiff may proceed with his

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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respect to damages claims brought against Defendants Hedgepeth,

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Moore, Young and Grannis in their official capacities is GRANTED.

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Summary judgment is DENIED as to all prospective injunctive relief

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claims brought against these Defendants in their official

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capacities and any damages claims brought against them in their

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individual capacities.

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B.

Claims Against Defendants Grannis, Lewis, Hedrick,
Moore and Bonnifield

Defendants Grannis, Lewis, Hedrick, Moore and Bonnifield

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argue they are entitled to summary judgment because their only

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role in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

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was their denial of Plaintiff’s administrative grievances.

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In response, Plaintiff argues that his claims against these

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Defendants are not subject to dismissal because he is not claiming

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that they failed to process his appeals but, rather, that they

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have the authority to remedy the violations of which he complains

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and have failed to do so.

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Defendants rely on two Ninth Circuit cases in support of the
proposition that the processing of administrative grievances
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cannot form the basis of a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983.

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Ninth Circuit held that a state’s unpublished policy statements

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establishing a grievance procedure did not create a

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constitutionally protected liberty interest.

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Circuit did not discuss the plaintiff’s claim in the context of

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any specific constitutional right, state-created liberty interests

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are an element of Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.

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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

In Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), the

Although the Ninth

See

In Ramirez v. Galaza,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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334 F. 3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that

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“inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific

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prison grievance procedure,” and applied that proposition to

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reject “Ramirez’s claimed loss of a liberty interest in the

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processing of his appeals . . . .”

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The holdings in Mann and Ramirez do not stand for the broad

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proposition that the processing of an administrative appeal

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cannot, under any circumstance, form the basis of a claim to

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relief under § 1983.

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prisoner has no substantive right to a prison grievance system

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and, therefore, due process claims based on the denial of or

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interference with a prisoner’s access to a prison grievance system

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are not cognizable.

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prisoner’s appeals had the authority and opportunity to prevent an

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ongoing constitutional violation, he may be able to establish

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liability by alleging that they knew about an existing or

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impending violation and failed to prevent it.

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880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisory official liable

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under § 1983 if he knew of a violation and failed to act to

Instead, they are limited to holding that a

However, if the individuals who deny a

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See Taylor v. List,

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prevent it); see also Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087,

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1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (supervisor who signed internal affairs

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report dismissing complaint against officer despite evidence of

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officer’s use of excessive force may be liable for damages).

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Here, Plaintiff expressly states in his opposition that he is

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not claiming his right to due process was violated by the denial

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of his administrative appeals or obstructed access to a prison

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grievance system.

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his appeals violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth

Rather, he claims that Defendants’ denials of

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For the Northern District of California

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Amendments and RLUIPA because they had the authority to remedy the

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ongoing violations of his religious rights but failed to do so.

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Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in favor

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of Defendants Grannis, Lewis, Hedrick, Moore and Bonnifield with

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respect to their denials of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals is

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DENIED.

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C.

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Defendants Sgt. Best and Sgt. Galloway argue that they are

Claims Against Defendants Best and Galloway

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entitled to summary judgment in their favor with respect to

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Plaintiff’s claims that Sgt. Best is responsible for denying him

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access to all Islamic religious services for the entire month of

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November 2009, and that Sgt. Galloway has denied him access to

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Islamic religious services on numerous occasions.

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argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal link between the

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actions of Sgt. Best and Sgt. Galloway and the denial of

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Plaintiff’s access to religious services because the undisputed

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facts show that he was denied such access because the inmate clerk

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who was responsible for preparing the list of inmates permitted to

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attend the services either 1) omitted his name from the monthly
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Defendants

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list, 2) failed to prepare the list, or 3) failed to get the

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required signatures of correctional personnel to authorize the

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list.

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In response, Plaintiff argues that he has raised a genuine

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issue of material fact as to whether his inability to attend

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services was caused by the inmate clerk’s omissions or by the

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actions of Defendants Best and Young, who were charged with

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checking the accuracy of the list prepared by the inmate clerk and

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were aware Plaintiff’s name should be on the list, but failed to

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For the Northern District of California

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correct the error.

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be denied access to religious services because of Defendants’

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failure to comply with requisite procedures.

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Additionally, Plaintiff states he continues to

Based on the above, the Court finds Plaintiff has presented

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evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether

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Defendants Best and Young prevented him from attending religious

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services on the noted occasions.

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for summary judgment on this claim is DENIED.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion

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D.

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Plaintiff claims the violation of his religious rights based

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on prison officials’ reliance upon incorrect information provided

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to them about the religious practices of the vast majority of

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Muslims - including Plaintiff and other inmates who have provided

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declarations - by Chaplain Landau, the clergyman for SVSP’s Muslim

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inmates.

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Claims Concerning Chaplain Landau

Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim on the

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ground that Plaintiff is not entitled to a religious clergyman of

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his own choosing and his disagreement with Chaplain Landau

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concerning their respective views of Islam does not establish a
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constitutional violation.

In support of their argument,

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Defendants cite Ninth Circuit cases which hold that a prisoner is

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not entitled to have the clergyman of his choice provided for him.

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In Reimers v. State of Oregon, 863 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1988), the

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plaintiff complained that he was not able to engage in the

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religious practices of his Pentecostal faith because a particular

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clergyman had been banned from the prison.

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827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987), the plaintiffs complained that they

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were not able to practice their Native American faith because

In Allen v. Toombs,

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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prison officials would not allow an inmate to lead the Pipe

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Ceremony when no outside volunteer was available to do so.

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both cases, the Ninth Circuit found that denying the plaintiffs’

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specific requests did not prevent them from practicing their

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religion.

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In

Plaintiff’s claim here is distinguishable because he does not

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complain that he is unable to practice his religion as the result

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of being been denied access to a specific clergyman.

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claims that prison officials are preventing him from practicing

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the requirements of his faith by relying on the opinions of a

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Muslim chaplain who represents the religious viewpoints of a small

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sect of Muslims and not the traditional Islamic teachings adhered

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to by Plaintiff and other Muslim prisoners.

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Rather, he

The Court finds applicable the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in

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Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993), in which that court

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found that the plaintiff’s religious practices had been

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“dramatically curtailed” because the evidence showed that he was

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required to eat non-Kosher food, did not have access to an

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Orthodox Jewish rabbi, and was unable to participate in religious
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services of his Orthodox Jewish faith.

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the prison had provided testimony from an Orthodox Jewish rabbi

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that private prayer is a significant aspect of the Jewish

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religion, the Ninth Circuit found such evidence inadequate to show

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that the plaintiff had alternative ways to practice his faith.

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Id.

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determine the alternatives available to the plaintiff by making

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further findings “as to what is or is not forbidden by [the

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plaintiff’s] religion.”

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For the Northern District of California

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It therefore remanded the matter to the district court to

Id. at 878.

Specifically, the Ninth

In making these findings, it will be appropriate for the
district court to consider [plaintiff’s] challenge to
the orthodoxy of the rabbi who testified on behalf of
the state. In religious matters, we take judicial
notice of the fact that often the keenest disputes and
the most lively intolerance exists among persons of the
same general religious belief, who, however, are in
disagreement as to what that faith requires in
particular matters. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 715–16, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1431, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624
(1981). In this case, [plaintiff] is entitled to argue,
with appropriate authorities, that his religious belief
is different from the interpretation provided by the
witness for the state.

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Although

Circuit held,

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Id. at 877-78.

Id.
Similarly, in the present case, the Court finds that

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Plaintiff is entitled to argue that his religious belief is

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different from the interpretation provided by Chaplain Landau,

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which has been relied upon by prison officials to deny him access

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to practices mandated by his faith.

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motion for summary judgment on this claim is DENIED.

Accordingly, Defendants’

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E.

Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

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For the reasons discussed above, the Court has denied summary
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judgment to Defendants based on their arguments that 1) Plaintiff

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cannot proceed with any claims against them in their official

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capacities; 2) they cannot be held liable for decisions they made

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during the administrative grievance process; 3) there is no causal

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link between their actions and the denial of Plaintiff’s access to

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religious services; and 4) Plaintiff cannot complain about the

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interpretation of Islamic religious practices provided by Chaplain

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Landau to prison officials.

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the SAC remain to be resolved: the violation of Plaintiff’s

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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federal constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments and the violation of his federal statutory rights under

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RLUIPA.

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Consequently, the following claims in

Accordingly, the Court REFERS the case to the Pro Se Prisoner
Settlement Program, as set forth below.
CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

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Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants

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Hedgepeth, Moore, Young and Grannis as to all damages claims

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brought against them in their official capacities.

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2.

Summary judgment is DENIED as to all other claims and

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Defendants.

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3.

The Northern District of California has established a

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Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program.

Certain prisoner civil rights

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cases may be referred to a Magistrate Judge for a settlement

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conference.

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Plaintiff’s federal constitutional and statutory claims have

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survived summary judgment.

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Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas for a settlement conference.

The Court finds that a referral is in order now that

Thus, this case is REFERRED to

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The conference shall take place within one-hundred and twenty

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days of the date of this Order, or as soon thereafter as is

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convenient to the Magistrate Judge’s calendar.

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Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for the conference with all

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interested parties and/or their representatives and, within ten

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days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the Court a

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report of the result of the conference.

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The Clerk shall provide an electronic copy of this Order to
Magistrate Judge Vadas.

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

Magistrate Judge

This Order terminates Docket no. 48.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 30, 2012

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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