Chavez v. Grounds

Filing 8

ORDER DENYING HABEAS PETITION AND GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Juan M. Chavez, ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on 4/18/11. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(nah, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/18/2011)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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JUAN M. CHAVEZ,
Petitioner,

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vs.

ORDER DENYING
HABEAS PETITION AND
GRANTING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY

RANDY GROUNDS, Warden,
Respondent.

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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No. C 10-1818 PJH (PR)

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This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

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The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted.

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Respondent has filed an answer with supporting record and a memorandum of points and

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authorities. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the reasons set out below, the

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petition is denied.

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BACKGROUND
In 1993, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to

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prison for fifteen years to life. This petition is directed to a denial of parole on March 5,

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2009. Petitioner has exhausted these claims by way of state habeas petitions.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

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the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

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adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

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Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

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unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

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proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

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mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

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while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

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Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

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first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

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reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

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differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”

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Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application
of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

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“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

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federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

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in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

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established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

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be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.
When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

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petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

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501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

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Cir.2000). Here, the Superior Court for Los Angeles County provided the only reasoned

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ruling. Resp’t Answer, Ex. 1.
DISCUSSION

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I.

Merits
Petitioner presents two issues, that (1) there was not “some evidence” to support the

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denial; and (2) the Board’s application of “Marsy’ Law” to set his next parole hearing for a

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date five years in the future violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

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The United States Supreme Court has recently held: “In the context of parole . . .
the procedures required [by the due process clause] are minimal . . . an opportunity to be
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heard and . . . a statement of the reasons why parole was denied . . . ‘[t]he Constitution . . .

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does not require more.’” Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (quoting

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Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)).

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That is, there is no due process requirement that a parole denial be supported by “some

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evidence.” As a result, petitioner’s first issue is without merit.
As to the second issue, the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the grant of a preliminary

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prevail on the merits of their claim that Marsy’s Law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and

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that as a result the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

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See Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 198435 at *8 (Jan. 24, 2011). Gilman’s holding

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For the Northern District of California

injunction against enforcement of Marsy’s Law, holding that the plaintiffs were not likely to

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United States District Court

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that the plaintiffs there were not likely to prevail on the merits makes clear that the state

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court’s rejection here of the Marsy’s Law claim could not have been unreasonable.

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Petitioner’s second claim also is without merit.

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II.

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Certificate of Appealability
The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

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been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

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certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28

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U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009).

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A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

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without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of

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probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge shall

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grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

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the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate must indicate

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which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has

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rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

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straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

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district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
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Because the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly held that Marsy’s Law does not violate

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the Ex Post Facto Clause – in Gillman it held only that the plaintiff’s were not likely to

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prevail on the merits of that claim – reasonable jurists could find the court’s ruling on that

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issue debatable. A certificate of appealability thus will be granted on that issue only.

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Petitioner is advised that despite the grant of a COA, if he wishes to appeal he must file a

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notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the judgment is entered. See Rule 11(b),

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Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
CONCLUSION

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A COA is GRANTED on the
Marsy’s Law issue. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 18, 2011.
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge

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