Petersen v. AGT Crunch Acquisition, LLC et al

Filing 34

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS CRUNCH POLK STREET, DANIEL E. ESPINO AND TYLER HANSENS 22 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/30/2011)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 ERIK PETERSEN, 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 No. C 10-02493 CW Plaintiff, v. AGT CRUNCH ACQUISITION, LLC; DANIEL E. ESPINO; AGT CRUNCH SAN FRANCISCO, LLC; CRUNCH POLK STREET, LLC; TYLER HANSEN, Defendants. ________________________________/ ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS CRUNCH POLK STREET, DANIEL E. ESPINO AND TYLER HANSEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 22) 11 12 Defendants Crunch Polk Street (CPS), Daniel E. Espino and 13 Tyler Hansen1 move for summary judgment on Plaintiff Erik 14 Petersen’s claims against them. 15 The motion was heard on August 25, 2011. 16 Plaintiff opposes the motion. Plaintiff asserts three sets of causes of action under the 17 California Family Rights Act (CFRA) and the federal Family Medical 18 Leave Act (FMLA): (1) failure to reinstate him to an equivalent 19 position following protected leave, Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(a) 20 and 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); (2) retaliation for taking protected 21 leave, Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(l) and 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); and 22 (3) retaliation for complaining about unlawful practices, Cal. 23 Gov. Code § 12940(h) and 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). 24 claims under California Government Code section 12940(a) for He brings two 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants AGT Crunch Acquisition, LLC, and AGT Crunch San Francisco, LLC, are presently in bankruptcy proceedings and have not appeared in this action. The Clerk has entered default against them. 1 “gender/family status discrimination,” alleging that he was not 2 promoted and was subsequently terminated because he has a child. 3 1AC at 12. 4 asserts a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 5 policy. 6 California Labor Code section 203. 7 claims against CPS. 8 only his claims under the FMLA.2 9 Based on his alleged unlawful discharge, Plaintiff Finally, Plaintiff seeks waiting-time penalties under Plaintiff asserts all of his Against Espino and Hansen, Plaintiff asserts The Court grants Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s two United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 claims under section 12490(a). 11 not respond to Defendants’ argument that these claims fail as a 12 matter of law. 13 In his opposition, Plaintiff did The Court also grants Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s 14 claim for waiting-time penalties under California Labor Code 15 section 203. 16 employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are 17 due and payable immediately.” 18 who fail to comply with this provision are subject to waiting-time 19 penalties, as provided under section 203. 20 letter to Plaintiff stated, 21 22 23 24 California law holds, “If an employer discharges an Cal. Lab. Code § 201(a). Employers A September 11, 2009 Your employment with Crunch has been terminated effective Tuesday 09/15/09, however you are instructed not to report to work in the meantime. Your last paycheck containing all owed wages, commissions and earned bonuses earned up to your separation date will be available to be picked up . . . after noon on Tuesday 09/15/09. 25 26 27 28 2 Civil actions under the FMLA may be brought against “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). 2 1 Dretizer Decl., Ex. N. 2 paid wages for the days he was scheduled to work between September 3 11 and September 15. 4 available on September 15. 5 received the letter on September 11 and did not receive his final 6 paycheck that day, he is entitled to waiting-time penalties. 7 However, Plaintiff offers no authority to support his position. 8 The effective date of Plaintiff’s dismissal was September 15, 9 2009, and his paycheck was available on that date. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was Nor does he dispute that his paycheck was Plaintiff contends that, because he See Smith v. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Superior Court, 39 Cal. 4th 77, 84 (2006) (explaining that one 11 meaning of “discharge,” in the context of section 201, “is ‘to end 12 formally the service of’”). 13 is not entitled to waiting-time penalties. 14 On these undisputed facts, Plaintiff Summary judgment is not warranted as to Plaintiff’s other 15 claims. 16 entitled to be reinstated to the “same or a comparable position 17 upon the termination of the leave.” 18 The FMLA affords a similar reinstatement right, entitling the 19 employee to “be restored by the employer to the position of 20 employment held by the employee when the leave commenced” or “an 21 equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and 22 other terms and conditions of employment.” 23 § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B). 24 are considered to determine whether the employee was reinstated to 25 an appropriate position. 26 C.F.R. § 825.215(e). 27 taking protected leave, Plaintiff was reinstated to a membership 28 director position without managerial duties. Employees who take protected leave under the CFRA are Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(a). 29 U.S.C. Under both statutes, an employee’s duties Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(c)(4); 29 The parties do not dispute that, after 3 However, there is a 1 dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff had managerial duties 2 prior to going on protected leave. 3 be denied as to Plaintiff’s claims for a violation of his 4 reinstatement rights under the CFRA and the FMLA. 5 Thus, Defendants’ motion must Likewise, Defendants’ motion must be denied as to Plaintiff’s 6 CFRA and FMLA claims for alleged retaliation for taking protected 7 leave and for opposing practices prohibited under the respective 8 statutes. 9 business reasons for his discharge, Plaintiff adduces United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Although Defendants present evidence of legitimate circumstantial evidence of causation and pretext. Finally, because there is a triable issue as to whether 12 Plaintiff’s discharge violated the CFRA and the FMLA, summary 13 judgment is not warranted on his claim for wrongful termination in 14 violation of public policy to the extent it is based on these 15 statutes. 16 Plaintiff’s claims under California Government Code section 17 12940(a), the Court summarily adjudicates that his wrongful 18 termination claim cannot be based on them. 19 However, because summary judgment is warranted as to For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 20 motion in part and DENIES it in part. 21 summary judgment is warranted on Plaintiff’s claims under section 22 12940(a) and for waiting-time penalties. 23 adjudicates that Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim cannot be 24 based on his claims under section 12940(a). 25 respects, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 26 (Docket No. 22.) In sum, The Court also summarily In all other Plaintiff states that he intends to seek default judgment 27 against Defendants AGT Crunch Acquisition and AGT Crunch San 28 Francisco. Plaintiff maintains that his claims against these 4 1 Defendants arose after they entered bankruptcy and, as a result, 2 are not subject to the automatic stay provisions under the 3 Bankruptcy Code. 4 judgment shall be filed only after Plaintiff’s claims against CPS, 5 Espino and Hansen have been resolved. 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 See 11 U.S.C. § 362. The parties will be referred to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference. A final pretrial conference is scheduled for November 29, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. A five-day jury trial is set to begin on December 12, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 14 Dated: 8/30/2011 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 cc: EDL Any motion for default 28 5

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