Yocom v. Grounds et al

Filing 136

ORDER by Judge ARMSTRONG denying 121 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 121 Motion to Alter Judgment; denying 121 Motion for Hearing; denying 127 Motion to Alter Judgment; denying 127 Motion to Amend/Correct ; ; denying 127 Motion to Consolidate Cases (lrc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/13/2012)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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6 MICHAEL ALAN YOCOM,

Plaintiff,

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vs.

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9 RANDY GROUNDS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No: C 10-3609 SBA
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, TO ALTER
OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT
FOR CONSOLIDATION AND FOR
A HEARING
Docket Nos. 121, 127

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The parties are presently before the Court on Plaintiff Michael Alan Yocom's

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motions: (1) for reconsideration, doc. no. 121; (2) to alter judgment, doc. nos. 121 and 127;

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(3) for a hearing regarding judgment, doc. no. 121; (4) to amend or correct the judgment,

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doc. no. 127; and (4) for consolidation, doc. no. 127. Having read and considered the

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papers filed in connection with these matters, the Court hereby DENIES the motions for the

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reasons set forth below. The Court, in its discretion, finds these matters suitable for

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resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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I.

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BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant civil rights action, alleging claims of

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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Wilcox and Siegel, and

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supervisory liability against Defendant Receiver Kelso. In addition, Plaintiff brought

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claims for due process violations against Defendants Palmer, Cowan and Benedetti based

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on three rules violation proceedings.

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On March 30, 2012, the Court issued an Order granting Kelso’s summary judgment

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motion and granting judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining Defendants. Dkt. 118.

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The Court ruled that Plaintiff had failed to provide evidence establishing supervisory

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liability on the part of Kelso and that the claims against the other Defendants were barred

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by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of

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the Court’s March 30, 2012 decision. Dkt. 120.

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On April 20 and May 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed the above-referenced motions. Dkt.

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121, 127.1 Defendants filed oppositions thereto. Dkt. 134. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a

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document entitled, “Notice of Denial of Federal Review of Causes of Action or Writ of

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Habeas Corpus and Request for Writ of Mandate or Prohibition,” which the Court liberally

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construes as a reply brief. Dkt. 135.

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II.

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DISCUSSION
A. Motions for Reconsideration and to Alter or Amend the Judgment

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Motions to reconsider a decision of the court are appropriately brought under Rule

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59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d

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1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991). Generally, a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is

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appropriately brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Backlund v.

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Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1985). Rule 59(e) allows a party to move to “alter

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or amend a judgment….” “There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may

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be granted: 1) the motion is ‘necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which

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the judgment is based;’ 2) the moving party presents ‘newly discovered or previously

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unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to ‘prevent manifest injustice;’ or 4) there

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is an ‘intervening change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co.,

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338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Relief based on this rule generally

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is reserved for “highly unusual circumstances.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v.

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ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

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As to Defendant Kelso, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration does not recite a

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change in the law, newly- discovered evidence or clear error by the Court. Therefore, the

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motion to reconsider the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment for Kelso is denied.

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The appeal is being held in abeyance pending resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. Dkt. 124.
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With regard to the Court’s ruling in favor of Defendants Wilcox and Siegel on

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Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim and in favor of Defendants Palmer, Cowan and

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Benedetti on his Due Process claims, Plaintiff repeats his argument that the doctrine of res

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judicata does not apply because the previous state court judgments were not based on the

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merits of his claims. This contention lacks merit. In its March 30, 2012 Order, the Court

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reviewed the two state court decisions which rejected Plaintiff’s Due Process claims, and

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concluded that they disposed of his claims on the merits. See March 30, 2012 Order at 17.

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Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to reconsider the Order granting judgment to Defendants

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Palmer, Cowan and Benedetti on the Due Process claims is denied.

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However, in relation to the deliberate indifference claim, the Court did not

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specifically analyze the argument that Plaintiff raises here; namely, that the state judgment

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on which the Court relied for application of res judicata was not on the merits on the

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ground that Plaintiff had not exhausted state administrative remedies prior to filing his case

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in state court. The Court addresses this argument here, and begins by first summarizing the

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relevant facts.

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Plaintiff filed habeas petitions in the Monterey County Superior Court (In re Michael

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Alan Yocom, case no. HC 6657), the California Court of Appeal (In re Michael Alan

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Yocom, case no. H035189), and the California Supreme Court (In re Michael Alan Yocom,

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case no. S186028) in which he asserted that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

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serious mental health needs by denying him prescriptions for Seroquel and Wellbutrin. The

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Monterey Superior Court denied the mental health claim on the ground that Plaintiff had

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failed to exhaust administrative remedies. In his petition to the Court of Appeal, Plaintiff

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argued that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement due to the injuries he

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would suffer without proper mental health care. See Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.

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C, Pl’s Pet. in Monterey Court of Appeal at 6 (“Regardless of the fact that petitioner hasn’t

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totally exhausted administrative remedies as is normally required to bring this writ, . . . this

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Court has the discretion to hear this matter now. Injuries have already occurred due to

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negligent medical care (mental health care) here . . . This Court has the power and the
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authority to intervene and order independent evals and/or order the non-formulary meds:

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Seroquel and Wellbutrin be ordered now.”). The Court of Appeal instructed the parties to

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brief the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. B at 7 (March 4, 2010 Letter from

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Court of Appeal). The parties complied with the court’s order and filed briefs on Plaintiff’s

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Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. See Defs.’ Ex. B, Attorney General’s

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informal response; Ex. C, Pl.’s informal response. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal

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issued a one-sentence denial of the petition. See Defs' Ex. D. The California Supreme

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Court also denied Plaintiff’s petition. See Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. H.

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In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendants argued that the appellate

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court judgment denying the petition was a final judgment on the merits for purposes of

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applying res judicata to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim here. Under the doctrine of

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res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action

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precludes the parties or their privies from re-litigating issues that were or could have been

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raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The Federal Full Faith

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and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires that a federal court give to a state court

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judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the

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state in which the judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

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465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).

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In California, a final judgment in state court “precludes further proceedings if they

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are based on the same cause of action.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.

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2009) (quoting Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)). A “cause of

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action is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty

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devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a

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breach of such primary right and duty.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1268 (citation omitted). If

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the cause of action test is satisfied, then claim preclusion applies to the cause of action,

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even if in the later suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different

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forms of relief, or adds new facts supporting recovery. Id. Therefore, a prior judgment is

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not res judicata on a subsequent action unless three elements are satisfied: (1) the issues

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decided in the prior suit must be identical to those presented in the subsequent action;

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(2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the first action; and (3) the party against

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whom the claim is raised was a party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication.

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Consumer Advocacy Gp., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 168 Cal. App. 4th 675, 686 (2008).

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Here, Plaintiff challenges the Court’s ruling only on the ground that there allegedly

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was no final judgment on the merits. That argument is unavailing. It is true that Plaintiff

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did not exhaust remedies before he filed his petition in Monterey Superior Court and that

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the court denied his deliberate indifference claim for failure to exhaust remedies. Thus, the

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state trial court’s decision was not on the merits. The same cannot be said of Plaintiff’s

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appellate petition. When Plaintiff filed his petition with the California Court of Appeal, it

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was a new petition, as opposed to an appeal of the superior court’s judgment. See People v.

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Gallardo, 77 Cal. App. 4th 971, 985-86 (2000) (a petitioner cannot appeal the denial of a

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petition, he must file a new petition in a higher court). Therefore, the superior court’s lack

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of exhaustion ruling was not before the Court of Appeal.

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In his new petition to the Court of Appeal, Plaintiff requested that the court consider

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his mental health deliberate indifference claim, even though he did not exhaust

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administrative remedies. In California, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if

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irreparable harm would result from pursuit of such a remedy. See In re Strick, 148 Cal.

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App. 3d 906, 911 (1983) (noting that exhaustion requirement does not apply if the remedy

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is inadequate). Thus, the California Court of Appeal acted within its discretion in

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instructing the parties to brief the merits of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim,

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irrespective of whether Plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies. Therefore, despite

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the fact that Plaintiff did not exhaust his deliberate indifference claim, the appellate court

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considered the merits of the claim before denying it.

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Furthermore, the fact that the appellate court issued a summary denial does not mean

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that it did not consider the merits of the claim. See In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 769 n.9

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(1993) (summary denial of habeas corpus petition does not mean that the court has not
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considered the claims on their merits; unless a procedural bar is apparent, the court will

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determine whether the petition states facts which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief).

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Therefore, the state appellate court’s rejection of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

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was on the merits and, thus, res judicata precludes litigation of the same claim here.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of this claim is denied.

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B.

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Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if actions before the court

Motion for Consolidation

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involve a common question of law or fact, the court may join for hearing or trial any or all

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matters at issue in the actions or consolidate the actions. Plaintiff argues that this case

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should be consolidated with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Case No. C 10-3806

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EJD (PR), because his habeas petition alleges similar claims to those he presents in this

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civil rights case. However, the law that pertains to federal habeas claims differs from the

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law applicable to civil rights claims. As Petitioner himself acknowledges, his habeas

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petition focuses on the fact that his sentence was increased due to improper prison

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disciplinary procedures. However, whether Plaintiff’s sentence was increased is not

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relevant to whether his constitutional rights were violated. Furthermore, Heck v.

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Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) bars civil rights claims that call into question the

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validity of a state criminal conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can show that the

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criminal conviction has been invalidated. Thus, Plaintiff’s habeas claims, which are aimed

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at reducing his sentence, cannot be consolidated with this now-closed civil rights case.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for consolidation.

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III.

CONCLUSION

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

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1.

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Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration, to alter or amend the judgment, for

consolidation and for a hearing on these motions are DENIED.

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2.

This Order terminates Docket Nos. 121 and 127.

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3.

The Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Order to the Ninth Circuit

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Court of Appeals.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 12, 2012

______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

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G:\PRO-SE\SBA\CR.10\Yocom v. Grounds 10-3609 Recon Deny Footer.dotx.docx

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL ALAN YOCOM,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CTF-SOLEDAD et al,
Defendant.
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Case Number: CV10-03609 SBA

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District
Court, Northern District of California.
That on December 13, 2012, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing
said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by
depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery
receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

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Michael Alan Yocom
20731 Rd. 254
Strathmore, CA 93267
Dated: December 13, 2012
Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
By: Lisa Clark, Deputy Clerk

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