Graham-Sult et al v. Clainos et al
Filing
142
ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING DEFENDANTS 98 , 105 , 110 MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/23/2012)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ALEXANDER GRAHAM-SULT and DAVID
GRAHAM,
Plaintiffs,
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v.
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Defendants.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND COSTS
NICHOLAS P. CLAINOS, RICHARD L.
GREENE, LINDA McCALL, GREENE
RADOVSKY MALONEY SHARE & HENNIGH
LLP, BILL GRAHAM ARCHIVES LLC,
d/b/a WOLFGANG’S VAULT, NORTON
LLC and WILLIAM E. SAGAN,
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No. CV 10-4877 CW
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________________________________/
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Defendant Nicholas P. Clainos and Defendants Richard Greene,
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Linda McCall and Greene Radovsky Maloney Share & Hennigh LLP
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(collectively, Greene Defendants) move for an award of attorneys’
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fees and costs pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
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section 425.16, commonly known as California’s Anti-Strategic
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Lawsuit Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute.
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Defendants Bill Graham Archives LLC, Norton LLC and William E.
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Sagan (collectively, BGA Defendants) move for an award of
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attorneys’ fees and costs under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
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§ 505.
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all three motions.
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Plaintiffs Alexander Graham Sult and David Graham oppose
After a full consideration of the evidence and declarations
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filed in support and in opposition, the Court GRANTS Clainos’s
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Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards him $126,431.50 in
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fees incurred and reasonable fees for the reply; GRANTS Greene
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Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards them
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$240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable “fees on fees”; and
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GRANTS BGA Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and
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awards them $134,243.25 in fees and $3,819.95 in costs incurred,
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and reasonable “fees on fees.”
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BACKGROUND
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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In its Order of June 24, 2011, the Court granted Clainos’s
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and Greene Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions to strike and for
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attorneys’ fees.
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for an award of attorneys’ fees and fees incurred in filing
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motions for anti-SLAPP fees (i.e. “fees on fees”) pursuant to
Clainos and Greene Defendants now move the Court
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California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c), which
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permits a prevailing defendant to recover his or her attorneys’
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fees and costs.
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amounts of $133,431.50 and $260,506.50, respectively.
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oppose both motions on the ground that the fees requested are
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unreasonably high.
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Clainos and Greene Defendants are requesting
Plaintiffs
Clainos argues that an award of $133,431.50 for attorneys’
fees and costs is reasonable.
The $133,431.50 figure comprises
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$92,640.00 (approximately 235 hours) for the anti-SLAPP motion,
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$20,118.50 incurred with respect to indemnity issues, $1,945.50
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for case management matters, $11,727.50 for the fee request and an
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estimated $7,000 for the reply.
Clainos submits detailed billing
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records and declarations attesting to the reasonableness of the
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rates of Clainos’s attorneys.
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Dec., Ex. A; Stratton Dec. and Stumpf Dec.
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Norman Dec., Ex. A; Norman Supp.
Greene Defendants request $240,506.50 in attorneys’ fees and
an estimated $20,000 for “fees on fees.”
Greene Defendants submit
records and declarations in support of charges by their attorneys
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at the Howard Rice and Hinshaw law firms.
Falk Dec.; Hughes Dec.;
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Mallen Dec. and Chivers Dec.
Plaintiffs argue that the amounts requested by Clainos and
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Greene Defendants are unreasonably high.
With respect to
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Clainos’s motion, Plaintiffs contend that 235 hours spent on an
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anti-SLAPP motion is excessive.
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argue that Clainos should be entitled to fees only for the motion
Olson Dec. ¶ 14.
Further, they
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to strike.
They contend that an award in excess of $71,857.50
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would be improper.
Johnston Dec. ¶ 5.
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Plaintiffs advance similar arguments in opposing Greene
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Defendants’ motion.
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unreasonably high because of Greene Defendants’ decision to retain
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both the Howard Rice and Hinshaw law firms.
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that the involvement of the Howard Rice law firm was unnecessary
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They claim that the amount requested is
Plaintiffs allege
and, further, that the collaboration between the Howard Rice and
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Hinshaw law firms created inefficiency.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs
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argue that the fees incurred by the Howard Rice law firm or
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incurred as a result of the collaboration between the Howard Rice
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and Hinshaw law firms should be excluded.
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Olson Dec. ¶¶ 7-13.
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Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should not award fees
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for tasks not related directly to the motion to strike, notably
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the motion to dismiss.
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$15,000 would be a more reasonable amount for “fees on fees.”
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In the Order of June 24, 2011, the Court granted BGA
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Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that $10,000 to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiffs
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invoked federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1338(a)) and
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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brought five claims against BGA Defendants: conversion, unjust
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enrichment, promissory estoppel, copyright infringement and
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declaratory relief.
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leave to amend.
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of the Copyright Act, for an award of attorneys’ fees in the
The Court dismissed all five claims without
BGA Defendants now move, pursuant to section 505
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amount of $177,366.75 (including $43,123.50 in “fees on fees”) and
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costs in the amount of $3,819.95.
Ranahan Dec. and Ranahan Sec.
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Supp. Dec.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
They contend that BGA
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Defendants are not entitled to a recovery of attorneys’ fees and
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costs under the Copyright Act because the only issue adjudicated--
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ownership and title to the poster copyrights--does not arise under
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the Copyright Act.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue, the
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Court should grant BGA Defendants fees incurred with respect only
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to defending the copyright claim.
Plaintiffs contend that the
Court should reduce the fee request by at least ninety percent.
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DISCUSSION
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I. Legal Standard
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California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides that “a prevailing
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defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to
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recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”
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Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 425.16(c); see also Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed. of
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Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 360-367 (2004) (explaining policy
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behind mandatory fees and costs provision of anti-SLAPP statute).
In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys’ fees are
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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determined by first calculating the “lodestar.”
Jordan v.
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Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987).
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‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the
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prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a
“The
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reasonable hourly rate.”
Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d
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359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996).
There is a strong presumption that the
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lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee.
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1262.
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Jordan, 815 F.2d at
In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine both a
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reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate for each
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attorney.
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Morales, 96 F.3d at 363.
In calculating a reasonable
number of hours, the applicant must justify his or her claim by
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submitting detailed time records.
The court may adjust these
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hours down if it believes the documentation to be inadequate, if
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the hours were duplicative, or if the hours were either excessive
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or unnecessary.
Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,
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1210 (9th Cir. 1986).
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appropriate only in extraordinary cases, such as when the
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attorneys faced exceptional risks of not prevailing or not
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recovering any fees.
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An upward adjustment of the lodestar is
Id. at 1212.
Determining a reasonable hourly rate is also a critical
inquiry.
Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465
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U.S. 886, 895 n.11).
In establishing the reasonable hourly rate,
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the district court should take into account (1) the novelty and
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of
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counsel, (3) the quality of representation, (4) the results
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obtained and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement.
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of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992).
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factors are subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation, and
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These
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should not serve as independent bases for adjusting fee awards.
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Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64.
Reasonable fees are generally
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calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the forum
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district.
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1992).
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Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir.
The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is
appropriate for the district court to exercise its discretion in
determining an award of attorneys’ fees, it remains important for
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the court to provide “a concise but clear explanation of its
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reasons for the fee award.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
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437 (1983); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985)
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(in computing an award, the district court should provide a
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“detailed account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for
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‘the number of hours reasonably expended’ and ‘a reasonable hourly
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rate’”) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898).
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Under the Copyright Act, an award of attorneys’ fees to the
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prevailing party is within the Court’s discretion: “In any civil
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action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
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recovery of full costs by or against any party . . . .
[T]he
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court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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party as part of the costs.”
17 U.S.C. § 505.
In Fogerty v.
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Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994), the Supreme Court held,
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“Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated
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alike.”
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guide the trial court’s discretion in determining whether to award
The Court approved a list of “nonexclusive” factors to
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attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a copyright infringement
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action: “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness
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(both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and
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the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
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compensation and deterrence.”
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Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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Court stressed that such factors may be used so long as they are
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Id. at 534 n.19 (quoting Lieb v.
The
“faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act and are applied to
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prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded manner.”
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Id.
The Supreme Court confirmed that an award of attorneys’ fees
pursuant to section 505 is within the discretion of the trial
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court: “‘There is no precise rule or formula for making these
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determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion should be
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exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have identified.’”
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Id. at 534 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37).
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The Ninth Circuit applies the factors prescribed by the Court
in Fogerty, noting that trial courts should focus on the “purposes
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of the Copyright Act (to promote creativity for the public good)
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and apply the factors in an evenhanded manner to prevailing
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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plaintiffs and prevailing defendants alike.”
Jackson v. Axton, 25
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F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994).
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another factor to consider, “the degree of success obtained,” id.
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at 890, and has stressed that “blameworthiness” or “exceptional
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circumstances” are not necessary for an award of attorneys’ fees
The Ninth Circuit has also added
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to a defendant, see Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558,
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559 (9th Cir. 1996);1 Historical Research v. Cabral, 80 F.3d 377,
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378 (9th Cir. 1996).
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the prevailing party in a copyright action may recover attorneys’
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fees in defending that claim or any related claims.
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Cat Ass'n, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 340 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2003).
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II.
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Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that
Traditional
Clainos and Greene Defendants
A. Reasonable Hours
With respect to Clainos’s motion, upon a thorough review of
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the billing records and declarations, the Court finds that the 235
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This case stems from the Supreme Court’s remand to the
Ninth Circuit, and subsequent trial and appellate proceedings.
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hours Clainos’s attorneys spent on the anti-SLAPP motion is not
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unreasonably high.
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Ex. A.
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convincingly that Clainos’s attorneys should have spent fewer
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hours on the anti-SLAPP motion.
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See Norman Dec., Ex. A and Norman Supp. Dec.,
Plaintiffs do not offer specific evidence to demonstrate
Their assumption that Clainos’s
attorneys could have benefitted from work done by Greene
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Defendants’ attorneys who filed their motion first is speculative.
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Plaintiffs have not demonstrated persuasively that the fee award
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Clainos is requesting is unreasonably high in light of the facts
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of this particular case.
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With respect to Greene Defendants’ motion, the Court finds
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that the time expended by the attorneys involved is not
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unreasonable.
It is possible that the collaboration between the
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two law firms may have led to duplication in some instances.
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Here, however, Plaintiffs do not offer concrete examples or
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evidence to show persuasively that the work of the Howard Rice law
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firm was unnecessary or that the collaboration between the Howard
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Rice and Hinshaw law firms created inefficiency.
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satisfied with Greene Defendants’ explanation and justification
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that the involvement of the Howard Rice law firm was essential
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The Court is
and, further, that the collaboration between the Howard Rice and
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Hinshaw law firms did not create inefficiency.
See Falk Dec.,
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Hughes Dec., Mallen Dec. and Chivers Dec.
Plaintiffs also argue that Clainos and Greene Defendants
should be entitled to fees incurred only with respect to the
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motion to strike.
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recover fees not incurred directly on the anti-SLAPP motion if the
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work done is “based entirely on a common factual scenario” and the
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issues are “inextricably intertwined.”
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Lardner, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
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The Court disagrees.
A prevailing party can
Kearney v. Foley &
Here,
Clainos and Greene Defendants defended successfully against a
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SLAPP suit.
Order Granting Clainos’s and Greene Defendants’ Anti-
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SLAPP Motions to Strike and for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket No. 93 at
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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20:2 and 21:14-15.
The Court finds that the work of Clainos’s
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attorneys on indemnity and case management issues, as well as the
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work of Greene Defendants’ attorneys on the motion to dismiss, is
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“based entirely on a common factual scenario” and “inextricably
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intertwined” with the anti-SLAPP motion.
See Kearney, 553 F.
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Supp. 2d at 1184.
Accordingly, Clainos and Greene Defendants’
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reasonable defense fees are recoverable.
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B. Reasonable Hourly Rates
Plaintiffs do not object to the hourly rates of Clainos and
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Greene Defendants’ attorneys.
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submitted by Clainos and Greene Defendants, the Court is satisfied
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that the hourly rates of the attorneys involved are reasonable for
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attorneys with comparable levels of experience working on similar
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Upon a review of the declarations
issues in this market.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions for
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attorneys’ fees and costs.
The Court awards Clainos $126,431.50
in fees incurred and reasonable fees for the reply.
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The Court
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awards Greene Defendants $240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable
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“fees on fees.”
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III. BGA Defendants
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Based on the Fogerty factors, and an equitable exercise of
discretion, the Court finds that an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs to BGA Defendants is warranted.
BGA Defendants defended
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successfully against an action brought under the copyright laws by
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securing a dismissal without leave to amend.
The fact that
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Plaintiffs brought this action under the copyright laws even
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though they did not own the copyrights in question does not prove
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that Plaintiffs filed this action frivolously or that their motive
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was improper.
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unreasonable because Plaintiffs could not meet the elements of a
Nevertheless, this action is objectively
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copyright infringement claim or allege facts to demonstrate an
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actual case or controversy with respect to the other four non17
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copyright claims.
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Defendants will help deter similarly unreasonable lawsuits.
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An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to BGA
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Court determines that
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BGA Defendants may recover all reasonable defense fees because the
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copyright infringement claim is related to the claims of
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conversion, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel and declaratory
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relief. See Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc., 340 F.3d at 833.
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Plaintiffs have failed to show that the four non-copyright claims
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are unrelated to the copyright infringement claim.
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claims stem from the same set of facts and relate to the core
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All five
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issue of ownership of the copyrights in question.
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awards fees to BGA Defendants for their successful defense of the
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copyright infringement and related non-copyright claims.
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The Court
Upon a careful review of the records submitted by BGA
Defendants, the Court is satisfied that the amount requested
represents a reasonable “lodestar” figure.
The number of hours
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BGA Defendants’ attorneys expended on this litigation is not
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excessive; and the hourly rate is reasonable because the evidence
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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indicates that the blended rate reduced the attorneys’ fees by
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approximately $30,000.
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Dec.
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necessary costs for their successful defense.
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See Ranahan Dec. and Ranahan Sec. Supp.
Furthermore, BGA Defendants can recover “fees on fees” and
Thus, the Court awards BGA Defendants $134,243.25 in fees and
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$3,819.95 in costs incurred, and reasonable “fees on fees.”
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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Clainos’s Motion
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for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards him $126,431.50 in fees
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incurred and reasonable fees for the reply; GRANTS Greene
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Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards them
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$240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable “fees on fees”; and
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GRANTS BGA Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and
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awards them $134,243.25 in fees and $3,819.95 in costs incurred,
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and reasonable “fees on fees.”
Within seven days, Clainos shall
submit documentation for fees incurred for the reply and Greene
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Defendants and BGA Defendants shall submit documentation for fees
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incurred for “fees on fees.”
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If necessary, Plaintiffs may file a response of five pages or
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less, seven days thereafter, addressing only the reasonableness of
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the additional hours claimed, without repeating their arguments.
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Defendants may file a reply with the same restrictions.
A further
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order will issue thereafter.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 3/23/2012
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge
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