Graham-Sult et al v. Clainos et al

Filing 142

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING DEFENDANTS 98 , 105 , 110 MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/23/2012)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 5 ALEXANDER GRAHAM-SULT and DAVID GRAHAM, Plaintiffs, 6 7 v. 10 Defendants. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS NICHOLAS P. CLAINOS, RICHARD L. GREENE, LINDA McCALL, GREENE RADOVSKY MALONEY SHARE & HENNIGH LLP, BILL GRAHAM ARCHIVES LLC, d/b/a WOLFGANG’S VAULT, NORTON LLC and WILLIAM E. SAGAN, 11 No. CV 10-4877 CW 12 ________________________________/ 13 14 Defendant Nicholas P. Clainos and Defendants Richard Greene, 15 Linda McCall and Greene Radovsky Maloney Share & Hennigh LLP 16 (collectively, Greene Defendants) move for an award of attorneys’ 17 fees and costs pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 18 section 425.16, commonly known as California’s Anti-Strategic 19 Lawsuit Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute. 20 21 Defendants Bill Graham Archives LLC, Norton LLC and William E. 22 Sagan (collectively, BGA Defendants) move for an award of 23 attorneys’ fees and costs under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 24 § 505. 25 all three motions. 26 Plaintiffs Alexander Graham Sult and David Graham oppose After a full consideration of the evidence and declarations 27 filed in support and in opposition, the Court GRANTS Clainos’s 28 1 Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards him $126,431.50 in 2 fees incurred and reasonable fees for the reply; GRANTS Greene 3 Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards them 4 $240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable “fees on fees”; and 5 GRANTS BGA Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and 6 awards them $134,243.25 in fees and $3,819.95 in costs incurred, 7 and reasonable “fees on fees.” 8 BACKGROUND 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 In its Order of June 24, 2011, the Court granted Clainos’s 11 and Greene Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions to strike and for 12 attorneys’ fees. 13 for an award of attorneys’ fees and fees incurred in filing 14 motions for anti-SLAPP fees (i.e. “fees on fees”) pursuant to Clainos and Greene Defendants now move the Court 15 California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c), which 16 permits a prevailing defendant to recover his or her attorneys’ 17 18 fees and costs. 19 amounts of $133,431.50 and $260,506.50, respectively. 20 oppose both motions on the ground that the fees requested are 21 unreasonably high. 22 23 Clainos and Greene Defendants are requesting Plaintiffs Clainos argues that an award of $133,431.50 for attorneys’ fees and costs is reasonable. The $133,431.50 figure comprises 24 $92,640.00 (approximately 235 hours) for the anti-SLAPP motion, 25 26 $20,118.50 incurred with respect to indemnity issues, $1,945.50 27 for case management matters, $11,727.50 for the fee request and an 28 estimated $7,000 for the reply. Clainos submits detailed billing 2 1 records and declarations attesting to the reasonableness of the 2 rates of Clainos’s attorneys. 3 Dec., Ex. A; Stratton Dec. and Stumpf Dec. 4 5 6 Norman Dec., Ex. A; Norman Supp. Greene Defendants request $240,506.50 in attorneys’ fees and an estimated $20,000 for “fees on fees.” Greene Defendants submit records and declarations in support of charges by their attorneys 7 at the Howard Rice and Hinshaw law firms. Falk Dec.; Hughes Dec.; 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Mallen Dec. and Chivers Dec. Plaintiffs argue that the amounts requested by Clainos and 11 Greene Defendants are unreasonably high. With respect to 12 Clainos’s motion, Plaintiffs contend that 235 hours spent on an 13 anti-SLAPP motion is excessive. 14 argue that Clainos should be entitled to fees only for the motion Olson Dec. ¶ 14. Further, they 15 to strike. They contend that an award in excess of $71,857.50 16 would be improper. Johnston Dec. ¶ 5. 17 18 Plaintiffs advance similar arguments in opposing Greene 19 Defendants’ motion. 20 unreasonably high because of Greene Defendants’ decision to retain 21 both the Howard Rice and Hinshaw law firms. 22 that the involvement of the Howard Rice law firm was unnecessary 23 They claim that the amount requested is Plaintiffs allege and, further, that the collaboration between the Howard Rice and 24 Hinshaw law firms created inefficiency. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 25 26 argue that the fees incurred by the Howard Rice law firm or 27 incurred as a result of the collaboration between the Howard Rice 28 and Hinshaw law firms should be excluded. 3 Olson Dec. ¶¶ 7-13. 1 Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should not award fees 2 for tasks not related directly to the motion to strike, notably 3 the motion to dismiss. 4 $15,000 would be a more reasonable amount for “fees on fees.” 5 In the Order of June 24, 2011, the Court granted BGA 6 Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that $10,000 to Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 7 Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs 8 9 invoked federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1338(a)) and United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 brought five claims against BGA Defendants: conversion, unjust 11 enrichment, promissory estoppel, copyright infringement and 12 declaratory relief. 13 leave to amend. 14 of the Copyright Act, for an award of attorneys’ fees in the The Court dismissed all five claims without BGA Defendants now move, pursuant to section 505 15 amount of $177,366.75 (including $43,123.50 in “fees on fees”) and 16 costs in the amount of $3,819.95. Ranahan Dec. and Ranahan Sec. 17 18 19 Supp. Dec. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They contend that BGA 20 Defendants are not entitled to a recovery of attorneys’ fees and 21 costs under the Copyright Act because the only issue adjudicated-- 22 ownership and title to the poster copyrights--does not arise under 23 the Copyright Act. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue, the 24 Court should grant BGA Defendants fees incurred with respect only 25 26 27 to defending the copyright claim. Plaintiffs contend that the Court should reduce the fee request by at least ninety percent. 28 4 DISCUSSION 1 2 I. Legal Standard 3 California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides that “a prevailing 4 defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to 5 recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” 6 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c); see also Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed. of 7 Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 360-367 (2004) (explaining policy 8 9 behind mandatory fees and costs provision of anti-SLAPP statute). In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys’ fees are United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 determined by first calculating the “lodestar.” Jordan v. 12 Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the 14 prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a “The 15 reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 16 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is a strong presumption that the 17 18 lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. 19 1262. 20 Jordan, 815 F.2d at In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine both a 21 reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate for each 22 attorney. 23 Morales, 96 F.3d at 363. In calculating a reasonable number of hours, the applicant must justify his or her claim by 24 submitting detailed time records. The court may adjust these 25 26 hours down if it believes the documentation to be inadequate, if 27 the hours were duplicative, or if the hours were either excessive 28 or unnecessary. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 5 1 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). 2 appropriate only in extraordinary cases, such as when the 3 attorneys faced exceptional risks of not prevailing or not 4 recovering any fees. 5 6 An upward adjustment of the lodestar is Id. at 1212. Determining a reasonable hourly rate is also a critical inquiry. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 7 U.S. 886, 895 n.11). In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, 8 9 the district court should take into account (1) the novelty and United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 complexity of the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of 11 counsel, (3) the quality of representation, (4) the results 12 obtained and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement. 13 of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992). 14 factors are subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation, and City These 15 should not serve as independent bases for adjusting fee awards. 16 Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64. Reasonable fees are generally 17 18 calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the forum 19 district. 20 1992). 21 22 23 Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is appropriate for the district court to exercise its discretion in determining an award of attorneys’ fees, it remains important for 24 the court to provide “a concise but clear explanation of its 25 26 reasons for the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 27 437 (1983); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) 28 (in computing an award, the district court should provide a 6 1 “detailed account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for 2 ‘the number of hours reasonably expended’ and ‘a reasonable hourly 3 rate’”) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898). 4 Under the Copyright Act, an award of attorneys’ fees to the 5 prevailing party is within the Court’s discretion: “In any civil 6 action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the 7 recovery of full costs by or against any party . . . . [T]he 8 9 court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In Fogerty v. 11 Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994), the Supreme Court held, 12 “Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated 13 alike.” 14 guide the trial court’s discretion in determining whether to award The Court approved a list of “nonexclusive” factors to 15 attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in a copyright infringement 16 action: “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness 17 18 (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and 19 the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 20 compensation and deterrence.” 21 Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)). 22 Court stressed that such factors may be used so long as they are 23 Id. at 534 n.19 (quoting Lieb v. The “faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act and are applied to 24 prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded manner.” 25 26 27 28 Id. The Supreme Court confirmed that an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 505 is within the discretion of the trial 7 1 court: “‘There is no precise rule or formula for making these 2 determinations,’ but instead equitable discretion should be 3 exercised ‘in light of the considerations we have identified.’” 4 Id. at 534 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37). 5 6 The Ninth Circuit applies the factors prescribed by the Court in Fogerty, noting that trial courts should focus on the “purposes 7 of the Copyright Act (to promote creativity for the public good) 8 9 and apply the factors in an evenhanded manner to prevailing United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 plaintiffs and prevailing defendants alike.” Jackson v. Axton, 25 11 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994). 12 another factor to consider, “the degree of success obtained,” id. 13 at 890, and has stressed that “blameworthiness” or “exceptional 14 circumstances” are not necessary for an award of attorneys’ fees The Ninth Circuit has also added 15 to a defendant, see Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558, 16 559 (9th Cir. 1996);1 Historical Research v. Cabral, 80 F.3d 377, 17 18 378 (9th Cir. 1996). 19 the prevailing party in a copyright action may recover attorneys’ 20 fees in defending that claim or any related claims. 21 Cat Ass'n, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 340 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 II. 23 24 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has stated that Traditional Clainos and Greene Defendants A. Reasonable Hours With respect to Clainos’s motion, upon a thorough review of 25 the billing records and declarations, the Court finds that the 235 26 27 28 1 This case stems from the Supreme Court’s remand to the Ninth Circuit, and subsequent trial and appellate proceedings. 8 1 hours Clainos’s attorneys spent on the anti-SLAPP motion is not 2 unreasonably high. 3 Ex. A. 4 convincingly that Clainos’s attorneys should have spent fewer 5 hours on the anti-SLAPP motion. 6 See Norman Dec., Ex. A and Norman Supp. Dec., Plaintiffs do not offer specific evidence to demonstrate Their assumption that Clainos’s attorneys could have benefitted from work done by Greene 7 Defendants’ attorneys who filed their motion first is speculative. 8 9 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated persuasively that the fee award United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Clainos is requesting is unreasonably high in light of the facts 11 of this particular case. 12 With respect to Greene Defendants’ motion, the Court finds 13 that the time expended by the attorneys involved is not 14 unreasonable. It is possible that the collaboration between the 15 two law firms may have led to duplication in some instances. 16 Here, however, Plaintiffs do not offer concrete examples or 17 18 evidence to show persuasively that the work of the Howard Rice law 19 firm was unnecessary or that the collaboration between the Howard 20 Rice and Hinshaw law firms created inefficiency. 21 satisfied with Greene Defendants’ explanation and justification 22 that the involvement of the Howard Rice law firm was essential 23 The Court is and, further, that the collaboration between the Howard Rice and 24 Hinshaw law firms did not create inefficiency. See Falk Dec., 25 26 27 28 Hughes Dec., Mallen Dec. and Chivers Dec. Plaintiffs also argue that Clainos and Greene Defendants should be entitled to fees incurred only with respect to the 9 1 motion to strike. 2 recover fees not incurred directly on the anti-SLAPP motion if the 3 work done is “based entirely on a common factual scenario” and the 4 issues are “inextricably intertwined.” 5 Lardner, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 6 The Court disagrees. A prevailing party can Kearney v. Foley & Here, Clainos and Greene Defendants defended successfully against a 7 SLAPP suit. Order Granting Clainos’s and Greene Defendants’ Anti- 8 9 SLAPP Motions to Strike and for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket No. 93 at United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 20:2 and 21:14-15. The Court finds that the work of Clainos’s 11 attorneys on indemnity and case management issues, as well as the 12 work of Greene Defendants’ attorneys on the motion to dismiss, is 13 “based entirely on a common factual scenario” and “inextricably 14 intertwined” with the anti-SLAPP motion. See Kearney, 553 F. 15 Supp. 2d at 1184. Accordingly, Clainos and Greene Defendants’ 16 reasonable defense fees are recoverable. 17 18 19 B. Reasonable Hourly Rates Plaintiffs do not object to the hourly rates of Clainos and 20 Greene Defendants’ attorneys. 21 submitted by Clainos and Greene Defendants, the Court is satisfied 22 that the hourly rates of the attorneys involved are reasonable for 23 attorneys with comparable levels of experience working on similar 24 Upon a review of the declarations issues in this market. 25 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motions for 26 27 28 attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court awards Clainos $126,431.50 in fees incurred and reasonable fees for the reply. 10 The Court 1 awards Greene Defendants $240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable 2 “fees on fees.” 3 III. BGA Defendants 4 5 6 Based on the Fogerty factors, and an equitable exercise of discretion, the Court finds that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to BGA Defendants is warranted. BGA Defendants defended 7 successfully against an action brought under the copyright laws by 8 9 securing a dismissal without leave to amend. The fact that United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Plaintiffs brought this action under the copyright laws even 11 though they did not own the copyrights in question does not prove 12 that Plaintiffs filed this action frivolously or that their motive 13 was improper. 14 unreasonable because Plaintiffs could not meet the elements of a Nevertheless, this action is objectively 15 copyright infringement claim or allege facts to demonstrate an 16 actual case or controversy with respect to the other four non17 18 copyright claims. 19 Defendants will help deter similarly unreasonable lawsuits. 20 An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to BGA Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the Court determines that 21 BGA Defendants may recover all reasonable defense fees because the 22 copyright infringement claim is related to the claims of 23 conversion, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel and declaratory 24 relief. See Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc., 340 F.3d at 833. 25 26 Plaintiffs have failed to show that the four non-copyright claims 27 are unrelated to the copyright infringement claim. 28 claims stem from the same set of facts and relate to the core 11 All five 1 issue of ownership of the copyrights in question. 2 awards fees to BGA Defendants for their successful defense of the 3 copyright infringement and related non-copyright claims. 4 5 6 The Court Upon a careful review of the records submitted by BGA Defendants, the Court is satisfied that the amount requested represents a reasonable “lodestar” figure. The number of hours 7 BGA Defendants’ attorneys expended on this litigation is not 8 9 excessive; and the hourly rate is reasonable because the evidence United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 indicates that the blended rate reduced the attorneys’ fees by 11 approximately $30,000. 12 Dec. 13 necessary costs for their successful defense. 14 See Ranahan Dec. and Ranahan Sec. Supp. Furthermore, BGA Defendants can recover “fees on fees” and Thus, the Court awards BGA Defendants $134,243.25 in fees and 15 $3,819.95 in costs incurred, and reasonable “fees on fees.” 16 CONCLUSION 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Clainos’s Motion 19 for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards him $126,431.50 in fees 20 incurred and reasonable fees for the reply; GRANTS Greene 21 Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and awards them 22 $240,506 in fees incurred and reasonable “fees on fees”; and 23 GRANTS BGA Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and 24 awards them $134,243.25 in fees and $3,819.95 in costs incurred, 25 26 27 and reasonable “fees on fees.” Within seven days, Clainos shall submit documentation for fees incurred for the reply and Greene 28 12 1 Defendants and BGA Defendants shall submit documentation for fees 2 incurred for “fees on fees.” 3 If necessary, Plaintiffs may file a response of five pages or 4 less, seven days thereafter, addressing only the reasonableness of 5 the additional hours claimed, without repeating their arguments. 6 Defendants may file a reply with the same restrictions. A further 7 order will issue thereafter. 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 3/23/2012 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13

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