Trujillo v. Jacquez et al

Filing 158

ORDER by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granting 134 Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint; ; Plaintiff is required to E-FILE the amended document; denying as moot 150 Stipulation to modify pretrial schedule. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/26/2014)

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NOT FOR CITATION1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARIO TRUJILLO,

Case No.: 10-CV-5183 YGR

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Plaintiff,

Northern District of California

United States District Court

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v.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND DENYING AS MOOT STIPULATION TO
AMEND

FRANCISCO JACQUEZ, et al.,

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Defendants.

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For the reasons stated on the record in open court on June 23, 2014, and those set forth in this

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Order, the Court GRANTS the motion of plaintiff Mario Trujillo for leave to file his First Amended

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Complaint (Dkt. No. 134) and DENIES AS MOOT the parties' stipulation to modify the pretrial

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schedule (Dkt. No. 150).

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I.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that courts "should freely give leave [to

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amend] when justice so requires." This standard is liberal. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.

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Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). That said, "leave to amend is not to be granted

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automatically." Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). Rather, the Court

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weighs the following factors in ruling on a motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith; (2) undue delay;

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(3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of the amendment; and (5) whether the movant has

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See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-14.

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previously amended its pleadings. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

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Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Of these factors, "consideration of prejudice to the

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opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

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1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). Indeed, "[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining

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Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend." Id.

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(emphasis in original).

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Here, defendants do not overcome the presumption in favor of granting leave to amend. Their

rights litigation. With respect to Avila, if any prejudice flows from his being renamed as a defendant

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following his previous dismissal , it is mitigated by the undisputed facts that: Avila already has been

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deposed (Dkt. No. 144, Ex. B); he wrote a report contemporaneous to the incident which can be used

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Northern District of California

showing of prejudice is insubstantial, consisting merely of the routine expenses of prisoner civil-

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United States District Court

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to refresh his recollection (Dkt. No. 149-4 at 38 of 90); and the extension of discovery referenced in

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Section II below will afford Avila an opportunity to participate in this litigation.

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Defendants' showing of undue delay is minimal: defendants argue, in essence, that plaintiff

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knew or should have known not only about the facts underpinning the new claims he seeks to assert

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in his First Amended Complaint, but also how to articulate them in a legal pleading. That argument

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ignores the Court's appointment of pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff, an appointment made

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precisely because a pro se prisoner plaintiff presumptively does not possess the legal acumen

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necessary to prosecute a federal lawsuit meaningfully.

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Finally, defendants' showing of futility is, at best, merely colorable. Where, as here, "a

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prison's grievance procedures are silent or incomplete" as to the level of factual specificity required in

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a prisoner grievance, the Ninth Circuit's backstop standard requires the prisoner's grievance only to

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"alert[] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought." Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d

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1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A grievance is not required to

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"contain every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim." Id. In this case, the

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evidence demonstrates that the prison had actual notice of the nature of the wrongs asserted by

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plaintiff. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 149-1, Ex. K (Director's Level Appeal Decision issued by prison on

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August 24, 2009, which states: "It is the appellant's position that on February 16, 2009, Correctional

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Sergeant Polk, Correctional Officer Reynoso, and another unidentified officer utilized excessive force

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against him during an escort, and finally retaliated against him by placing him on Contraband

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Surveillance Watch (CSW).") (emphasis supplied).) Such evidence sufficiently undercuts defendants'

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proffered showing of futility such that the Court cannot deem it the sort of "strong showing" that

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would overcome the presumption in favor of granting leave to amend. See Eminence Capital, 316

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F.3d at 1052.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion and gives plaintiff leave to amend his

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pleading. The proposed First Amended Complaint shall be deemed filed as June 23, 2014. Plaintiff

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shall file that document in the electronic docket of this case forthwith.

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II.

STIPULATION TO MODIFY PRETRIAL SCHEDULE

Northern District of California

In light of the imminent filing of the First Amended Complaint, the Court, on June 23, 2014,

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United States District Court

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set forth a modified pretrial and trial schedule, which shall be reduced to writing in a separately filed

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order. This new pretrial and trial schedule moots the parties' stipulation to modify the former pretrial

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schedule. (Dkt. No. 150.) Accordingly, that stipulation is DENIED AS MOOT.

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This Order terminates Dkt. Nos. 134 and 150.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Date: June 26, 2014

_______________________________________
YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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