Shotwell v. Brandt et al

Filing 50

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING 40 REQUEST TO SCREEN COMPLAINT; DISMISSING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE; DENYING ( 42 , 43 ) MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT; GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT RAISING NEW CLAIMS. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/17/2012)

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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Plaintiff, 5 6 7 Case No.: C 10-5232 CW (PR) MANUEL E. SHOTWELL, ORDER GRANTING REQUEST TO SCREEN COMPLAINT; DISMISSING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE; DENYING MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT; GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT RAISING NEW CLAIMS v. S. BRANDT, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 11 (Docket nos. 40, 42, 43) 12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley 14 State Prison (SVSP), filed the instant pro se civil rights action 15 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of the violation of his 16 constitutional rights by prison officials at SVSP. 17 paid the full filing fee and attempted to serve Defendants. 18 his attempts were unsuccessful, the Court directed the Clerk of 19 the Court to mail to Defendants a Notice of Lawsuit and Request 20 for Waiver of Service of Summons. 21 22 25 When Defendants have waived service and move the Court to screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1 23 24 Plaintiff STANDARD OF REVIEW A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity 26 1 27 28 Defendants are not required to respond to the complaint prior to screening by the Court; accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for the entry of default judgment against Defendants because they have not responded to the complaint is DENIED. 1 or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 2 § 1915A(a). 3 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, 4 malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 5 or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief. 7 liberally construed. 8 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 28 U.S.C. In its review, the court must identify any Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 11 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 12 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 13 under the color of state law. 14 (1988). 15 16 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 DISCUSSION I. Background 17 Plaintiff alleges the following: Defendants found two 18 inmate-manufactured weapons in his cell and issued a rules 19 violation report (RVR) against him even though his cellmate 20 confessed to ownership of the weapons; they held him in 21 administrative segregation pending investigation of the RVR, 22 wrongfully found him guilty of the RVR, sentenced him to a term 23 in the secured housing unit (SHU) and assessed a loss of 360 days 24 of credits; they continued to hold him in administrative 25 segregation after the finding of guilt was overturned for 26 procedural and evidentiary reasons on administrative appeal; they 27 reissued the RVR and held a second disciplinary hearing; and, 28 they did not release him from administrative segregation until 2 1 after he was found not guilty at the second hearing based on a 2 lack of evidence. 3 Plaintiff claims the above events violated his right to due 4 process under the Fourteenth Amendment and amounted to cruel and 5 unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 6 II. Due Process Violation 7 The requirements of due process apply only to the 8 deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 9 Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents United States District Court Northern District of California 10 v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 11 may be created either by the Due Process Clause of its own force 12 or by states through statutes or regulations. 13 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 14 law may amount to deprivation of a protected liberty interest if 15 the deprivation is one of “real substance,” that “imposes 16 atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 17 the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 18 or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 19 487. 20 A protected liberty interest Sandin v. Connor, A deprivation authorized by state Plaintiff complains that his right to due process was 21 violated because he was charged with a RVR that was 22 unsubstantiated and ultimately dismissed. 23 constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or 24 wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of 25 a protected liberty interest. 26 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 27 (2d Cir. 1986). 28 been innocent of disciplinary charges brought against him and A prisoner has no See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d Consequently, the fact that a prisoner may have 3 1 incorrectly held in administrative segregation does not raise a 2 due process issue. 3 error-free decision-making. 4 1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th 5 Cir. 1983). The Constitution demands due process, not See Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 6 Plaintiff further maintains that his right to due process 7 was violated because he was held in administrative segregation 8 pending investigation of the unsubstantiated charges against him. 9 The hardship associated with placement in administrative United States District Court Northern District of California 10 segregation, such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative 11 programs or confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of 12 time, is not so severe as to violate the Due Process Clause 13 itself. 14 Cir. 1986) (applying Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). 15 inmate’s placement in segregation pending investigation of 16 disciplinary charges does not present a constitutionally 17 cognizable claim unless the deprivation suffered is one of “real 18 substance” as defined in Sandin. 19 443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th An See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d Here, the Court need not decide whether the facts alleged by 21 Plaintiff show that his placement in administrative segregation 22 pending investigation of the disciplinary charges against him 23 amounted to a deprivation of real substance because, even if it 24 did, he does not allege facts that show he was denied due 25 process. 26 initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for 27 administrative reasons due process requires that they comply with 28 the following procedures: (1) they must hold an informal non- The Ninth Circuit holds that when prison officials 4 1 adversarial hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner 2 is segregated, (2) the prisoner must be informed of the charges 3 against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and 4 (3) he must be allowed to present his views. 5 F.2d at 1100. 6 decision to place a prisoner in segregation for administrative 7 reasons. 8 9 See Toussaint, 801 Additionally, “some evidence” must support the Id. at 1104. The facts alleged by Plaintiff show that he was not denied due process when he was placed and retained in administrative United States District Court Northern District of California 10 segregation pending disposition of the initial RVR. 11 Specifically, he alleges that “immediately” after the two inmate- 12 manufactured weapons were found in his cell on February 18, 2009, 13 both he and his cellmate “were advised of the findings,” they 14 were rehoused in administrative segregation, and they were issued 15 CDC Form 114-D “lock-up” orders based on the possession of an 16 inmate manufactured weapon, in violation of California Code of 17 Regulations, Title 15 § 3006(a).2 18 he alleges that the next day he was interviewed by Defendant W. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. Additionally, 19 2 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3336 provides, “The reasons for ordering an inmate's placement in administrative segregation will be clearly documented on a CDC Form 114-D (Order and Hearing on Segregated Housing).” Further, § 3338 provides that a hearing must be held on the segregation order within ten days of the inmate’s placement in segregation. When the reason for an inmate’s initial placement in administrative segregation is a disciplinary matter and likely to result in a formal report of violation of institution rules on a CDC Form 115, “the hearing will assume the alleged misconduct or criminal activities to be factual as reported in the segregation order. The hearing will not consider evidence or information relating to the guilt or innocence of the inmate. The only determination to be made is whether the inmate needs to be retained in administrative segregation . . . pending resolution or disposition of disciplinary issues.” § 3338(e). 5 1 Muniz, the facility captain, about the CDC Form 114-D order, 2 “during the CDC 114-D hearing” his cellmate took responsibility 3 for possession of the weapons, and he and his cellmate both were 4 issued RVRs on February 27, 2009. 5 such allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff was provided with the 6 process required by Toussaint. 7 Compl. ¶¶ 10-13. Based on Further, the Court finds no claim for the violation of due 8 process based on Plaintiff’s retention in administrative 9 segregation from November 9, 2009 -- the date on which the United States District Court Northern District of California 10 results of the first disciplinary hearing were vacated -- until 11 December 8, 2009 -- the date on which he was found not guilty of 12 the reissued charges at the second disciplinary hearing. 13 California state prison regulations allow for the reissuance and 14 rehearing of disciplinary charges after a prior hearing is found 15 procedurally inadequate. 16 § 3312(b)(1). 17 process, which requires that a violation of procedural due 18 process be corrected procedurally, not by reinstatement of the 19 substantive right. 20 another hearing. See Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 21 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, due process was satisfied when the 22 results of the first disciplinary hearing were vacated, the RVR 23 was ordered reissued and reheard, Plaintiff was found not guilty 24 at the second hearing, and he was released from administrative 25 segregation and not subjected to credit loss or any other form of 26 punishment. 27 process to which he was entitled.3 28 3 See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 This complies with the demands of federal due That is, the remedy for an unfair hearing is Consequently, Plaintiff was provided with all of the No due process claim is alleged for the second hearing. 6 1 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 2 allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 3 granted for the violation of his right to due process, and that 4 granting him further leave to amend the complaint would be 5 futile. 6 III. Eighth Amendment Violation 7 Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free 8 from cruel and unusual punishment was violated by his placement 9 in administrative segregation for more than six months because of United States District Court Northern District of California 10 the above events. 11 upon which relief may be granted, however, because an inmate’s 12 transfer to administrative segregation pending the investigation 13 and resolution of disciplinary charges against him does not 14 constitute punishment: “[T]he transfer of an inmate to less 15 amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is 16 well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a 17 prison sentence.” 18 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (contemporary 19 standards of decency are not violated by classification programs 20 which pursue “important and laudable” goals and are instituted 21 under the state's authority to operate correctional facilities). 22 Further, the usual hardships associated with administrative 23 segregation do not violate the Eighth Amendment. 24 Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); see Anderson v. 25 County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (no contact 26 with any other inmate in administrative segregation, either for 27 exercise, day room access or otherwise not cruel and unusual 28 punishment). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); cf. 7 Toussaint v. 1 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 2 allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 3 granted for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be 4 free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that granting him 5 further leave to amend the complaint would be futile. 6 Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 7 IV. 8 9 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Supplemental Complaint Plaintiff has submitted a supplemental complaint for the Court’s review. Docket no. 49. The district court may permit a party to serve supplemental 11 pleadings “setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 12 which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be 13 supplemented.” 14 supplemental pleadings is discretionary, to be exercised “upon 15 such terms as are just.” 16 supplemental complaint must have some relation to the claim set 17 forth in the original pleading. 18 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988). 19 to introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action. 20 Planned Parenthood of So. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 21 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Id. The power to allow Matters newly alleged in a See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d Supplemental pleadings cannot be used See Here, Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaint alleges 23 that, from September 2010 to the present, prison officials have 24 improperly processed and denied his administrative appeals and 25 mishandled and tampered with his incoming and outgoing mail. 26 maintains that such actions are in retaliation for his having 27 filed the instant lawsuit and for filing administrative appeals. 28 He describes numerous incidents and names several alleged 8 He 1 responsible individuals. 2 Although Plaintiff alleges that the instant lawsuit was, in 3 part, the genesis of the actions complained of in the 4 supplemental complaint, the allegations are conclusory and 5 introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action for 6 retaliation that is not related to the due process and Eighth 7 Amendment claims raised in the original complaint. 8 the claims are not properly raised in a supplemental complaint 9 and leave to file a supplemental complaint is DENIED. Accordingly, Plaintiff, United States District Court Northern District of California 10 however, may raise these claims in an amended complaint, which 11 will supersede the original complaint in its entirety. 12 amended complaint will be screened by the Court under 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1915A. 14 (1) that are sufficient for the Court to determine whether he 15 states a claim for the violation of his constitutional rights, 16 (2) that link each Defendant to the injury for which that 17 Defendant is alleged to be responsible, and (3) that specify and 18 link the relief he seeks to a particular Defendant or 19 Defendants.4 20 V. 21 The Plaintiff must identify all Defendants and allege facts Appointment of Counsel Plaintiff has moved for the appointment of counsel to assist 22 him with the prosecution of this action. 23 pending claim at this time, the request is DENIED as premature. Because there is no 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 26 27 28 4 While Plaintiff is not required to plead the exhaustion of administrative remedies in his amended complaint, he is informed that any claim that has not been exhausted prior to the filing of the amended complaint will be subject to dismissal. 9 1 1. Defendants’ request to screen the complaint is GRANTED. 2 2. Plaintiff’s request for the entry of default judgment 3 4 5 is DENIED. 3. All claims in the original complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend. 6 4. Leave to file a supplemental complaint is DENIED. 7 5. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than thirty days from the date of this Order. 9 court’s civil rights complaint form, a copy of which is provided 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 8 herewith, and include in the caption both the case number of this 11 action, No. C 10-5232 CW (PR), and the heading, “AMENDED 12 COMPLAINT.” 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 He shall use the If Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint in conformity with this Order, the case will be dismissed with prejudice and closed. 6. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED. This Order terminates Docket nos. 40, 42 and 43. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 12/17/2012 21 ____________________________ CLAUDIA WILKEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10

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