Shotwell v. Brandt et al
Filing
50
ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING 40 REQUEST TO SCREEN COMPLAINT; DISMISSING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE; DENYING ( 42 , 43 ) MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT; GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT RAISING NEW CLAIMS. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service) (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/17/2012)
1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3
4
Plaintiff,
5
6
7
Case No.: C 10-5232 CW (PR)
MANUEL E. SHOTWELL,
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST TO
SCREEN COMPLAINT; DISMISSING
CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE; DENYING
MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL, ENTRY OF DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND LEAVE TO FILE
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT;
GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT RAISING NEW CLAIMS
v.
S. BRANDT, et al.,
8
Defendants.
9
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
11
(Docket nos. 40, 42, 43)
12
13
Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley
14
State Prison (SVSP), filed the instant pro se civil rights action
15
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining of the violation of his
16
constitutional rights by prison officials at SVSP.
17
paid the full filing fee and attempted to serve Defendants.
18
his attempts were unsuccessful, the Court directed the Clerk of
19
the Court to mail to Defendants a Notice of Lawsuit and Request
20
for Waiver of Service of Summons.
21
22
25
When
Defendants have waived service and move the Court to screen
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).1
23
24
Plaintiff
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any
case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity
26
1
27
28
Defendants are not required to respond to the complaint
prior to screening by the Court; accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion
for the entry of default judgment against Defendants because they
have not responded to the complaint is DENIED.
1
or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
2
§ 1915A(a).
3
cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous,
4
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
5
or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
6
relief.
7
liberally construed.
8
F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 U.S.C.
In its review, the court must identify any
Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Pro se pleadings must be
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the
11
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and
12
(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
13
under the color of state law.
14
(1988).
15
16
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
DISCUSSION
I.
Background
17
Plaintiff alleges the following: Defendants found two
18
inmate-manufactured weapons in his cell and issued a rules
19
violation report (RVR) against him even though his cellmate
20
confessed to ownership of the weapons; they held him in
21
administrative segregation pending investigation of the RVR,
22
wrongfully found him guilty of the RVR, sentenced him to a term
23
in the secured housing unit (SHU) and assessed a loss of 360 days
24
of credits; they continued to hold him in administrative
25
segregation after the finding of guilt was overturned for
26
procedural and evidentiary reasons on administrative appeal; they
27
reissued the RVR and held a second disciplinary hearing; and,
28
they did not release him from administrative segregation until
2
1
after he was found not guilty at the second hearing based on a
2
lack of evidence.
3
Plaintiff claims the above events violated his right to due
4
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and amounted to cruel and
5
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
6
II.
Due Process Violation
7
The requirements of due process apply only to the
8
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
9
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.
Board of Regents
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
11
may be created either by the Due Process Clause of its own force
12
or by states through statutes or regulations.
13
515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
14
law may amount to deprivation of a protected liberty interest if
15
the deprivation is one of “real substance,” that “imposes
16
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
17
the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484,
18
or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at
19
487.
20
A protected liberty interest
Sandin v. Connor,
A deprivation authorized by state
Plaintiff complains that his right to due process was
21
violated because he was charged with a RVR that was
22
unsubstantiated and ultimately dismissed.
23
constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or
24
wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of
25
a protected liberty interest.
26
450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951
27
(2d Cir. 1986).
28
been innocent of disciplinary charges brought against him and
A prisoner has no
See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d
Consequently, the fact that a prisoner may have
3
1
incorrectly held in administrative segregation does not raise a
2
due process issue.
3
error-free decision-making.
4
1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th
5
Cir. 1983).
The Constitution demands due process, not
See Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406,
6
Plaintiff further maintains that his right to due process
7
was violated because he was held in administrative segregation
8
pending investigation of the unsubstantiated charges against him.
9
The hardship associated with placement in administrative
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
segregation, such as loss of recreational and rehabilitative
11
programs or confinement to one’s cell for a lengthy period of
12
time, is not so severe as to violate the Due Process Clause
13
itself.
14
Cir. 1986) (applying Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)).
15
inmate’s placement in segregation pending investigation of
16
disciplinary charges does not present a constitutionally
17
cognizable claim unless the deprivation suffered is one of “real
18
substance” as defined in Sandin.
19
443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2000).
20
See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th
An
See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
Here, the Court need not decide whether the facts alleged by
21
Plaintiff show that his placement in administrative segregation
22
pending investigation of the disciplinary charges against him
23
amounted to a deprivation of real substance because, even if it
24
did, he does not allege facts that show he was denied due
25
process.
26
initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for
27
administrative reasons due process requires that they comply with
28
the following procedures: (1) they must hold an informal non-
The Ninth Circuit holds that when prison officials
4
1
adversarial hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner
2
is segregated, (2) the prisoner must be informed of the charges
3
against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and
4
(3) he must be allowed to present his views.
5
F.2d at 1100.
6
decision to place a prisoner in segregation for administrative
7
reasons.
8
9
See Toussaint, 801
Additionally, “some evidence” must support the
Id. at 1104.
The facts alleged by Plaintiff show that he was not denied
due process when he was placed and retained in administrative
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
segregation pending disposition of the initial RVR.
11
Specifically, he alleges that “immediately” after the two inmate-
12
manufactured weapons were found in his cell on February 18, 2009,
13
both he and his cellmate “were advised of the findings,” they
14
were rehoused in administrative segregation, and they were issued
15
CDC Form 114-D “lock-up” orders based on the possession of an
16
inmate manufactured weapon, in violation of California Code of
17
Regulations, Title 15 § 3006(a).2
18
he alleges that the next day he was interviewed by Defendant W.
Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.
Additionally,
19
2
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
California Code of Regulations, Title 15 § 3336 provides,
“The reasons for ordering an inmate's placement in administrative
segregation will be clearly documented on a CDC Form 114-D (Order
and Hearing on Segregated Housing).” Further, § 3338 provides
that a hearing must be held on the segregation order within ten
days of the inmate’s placement in segregation. When the reason
for an inmate’s initial placement in administrative segregation
is a disciplinary matter and likely to result in a formal report
of violation of institution rules on a CDC Form 115, “the hearing
will assume the alleged misconduct or criminal activities to be
factual as reported in the segregation order. The hearing will
not consider evidence or information relating to the guilt or
innocence of the inmate. The only determination to be made is
whether the inmate needs to be retained in administrative
segregation . . . pending resolution or disposition of
disciplinary issues.” § 3338(e).
5
1
Muniz, the facility captain, about the CDC Form 114-D order,
2
“during the CDC 114-D hearing” his cellmate took responsibility
3
for possession of the weapons, and he and his cellmate both were
4
issued RVRs on February 27, 2009.
5
such allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff was provided with the
6
process required by Toussaint.
7
Compl. ¶¶ 10-13.
Based on
Further, the Court finds no claim for the violation of due
8
process based on Plaintiff’s retention in administrative
9
segregation from November 9, 2009 -- the date on which the
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
results of the first disciplinary hearing were vacated -- until
11
December 8, 2009 -- the date on which he was found not guilty of
12
the reissued charges at the second disciplinary hearing.
13
California state prison regulations allow for the reissuance and
14
rehearing of disciplinary charges after a prior hearing is found
15
procedurally inadequate.
16
§ 3312(b)(1).
17
process, which requires that a violation of procedural due
18
process be corrected procedurally, not by reinstatement of the
19
substantive right.
20
another hearing.
See Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481
21
(9th Cir. 1991).
Here, due process was satisfied when the
22
results of the first disciplinary hearing were vacated, the RVR
23
was ordered reissued and reheard, Plaintiff was found not guilty
24
at the second hearing, and he was released from administrative
25
segregation and not subjected to credit loss or any other form of
26
punishment.
27
process to which he was entitled.3
28
3
See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15
This complies with the demands of federal due
That is, the remedy for an unfair hearing is
Consequently, Plaintiff was provided with all of the
No due process claim is alleged for the second hearing.
6
1
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
2
allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
3
granted for the violation of his right to due process, and that
4
granting him further leave to amend the complaint would be
5
futile.
6
III. Eighth Amendment Violation
7
Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free
8
from cruel and unusual punishment was violated by his placement
9
in administrative segregation for more than six months because of
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
the above events.
11
upon which relief may be granted, however, because an inmate’s
12
transfer to administrative segregation pending the investigation
13
and resolution of disciplinary charges against him does not
14
constitute punishment: “[T]he transfer of an inmate to less
15
amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is
16
well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a
17
prison sentence.”
18
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (contemporary
19
standards of decency are not violated by classification programs
20
which pursue “important and laudable” goals and are instituted
21
under the state's authority to operate correctional facilities).
22
Further, the usual hardships associated with administrative
23
segregation do not violate the Eighth Amendment.
24
Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); see Anderson v.
25
County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (no contact
26
with any other inmate in administrative segregation, either for
27
exercise, day room access or otherwise not cruel and unusual
28
punishment).
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); cf.
7
Toussaint v.
1
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
2
allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
3
granted for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
4
free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that granting him
5
further leave to amend the complaint would be futile.
6
Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
7
IV.
8
9
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Supplemental Complaint
Plaintiff has submitted a supplemental complaint for the
Court’s review.
Docket no. 49.
The district court may permit a party to serve supplemental
11
pleadings “setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
12
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
13
supplemented.”
14
supplemental pleadings is discretionary, to be exercised “upon
15
such terms as are just.”
16
supplemental complaint must have some relation to the claim set
17
forth in the original pleading.
18
467, 474 (9th Cir. 1988).
19
to introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action.
20
Planned Parenthood of So. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402
21
(9th Cir. 1997).
22
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
Id.
The power to allow
Matters newly alleged in a
See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d
Supplemental pleadings cannot be used
See
Here, Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaint alleges
23
that, from September 2010 to the present, prison officials have
24
improperly processed and denied his administrative appeals and
25
mishandled and tampered with his incoming and outgoing mail.
26
maintains that such actions are in retaliation for his having
27
filed the instant lawsuit and for filing administrative appeals.
28
He describes numerous incidents and names several alleged
8
He
1
responsible individuals.
2
Although Plaintiff alleges that the instant lawsuit was, in
3
part, the genesis of the actions complained of in the
4
supplemental complaint, the allegations are conclusory and
5
introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of action for
6
retaliation that is not related to the due process and Eighth
7
Amendment claims raised in the original complaint.
8
the claims are not properly raised in a supplemental complaint
9
and leave to file a supplemental complaint is DENIED.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff,
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
however, may raise these claims in an amended complaint, which
11
will supersede the original complaint in its entirety.
12
amended complaint will be screened by the Court under 28 U.S.C.
13
§ 1915A.
14
(1) that are sufficient for the Court to determine whether he
15
states a claim for the violation of his constitutional rights,
16
(2) that link each Defendant to the injury for which that
17
Defendant is alleged to be responsible, and (3) that specify and
18
link the relief he seeks to a particular Defendant or
19
Defendants.4
20
V.
21
The
Plaintiff must identify all Defendants and allege facts
Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has moved for the appointment of counsel to assist
22
him with the prosecution of this action.
23
pending claim at this time, the request is DENIED as premature.
Because there is no
24
CONCLUSION
25
For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
26
27
28
4
While Plaintiff is not required to plead the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in his amended complaint, he is informed
that any claim that has not been exhausted prior to the filing of
the amended complaint will be subject to dismissal.
9
1
1.
Defendants’ request to screen the complaint is GRANTED.
2
2.
Plaintiff’s request for the entry of default judgment
3
4
5
is DENIED.
3.
All claims in the original complaint are DISMISSED with
prejudice and without leave to amend.
6
4.
Leave to file a supplemental complaint is DENIED.
7
5.
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than
thirty days from the date of this Order.
9
court’s civil rights complaint form, a copy of which is provided
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
herewith, and include in the caption both the case number of this
11
action, No. C 10-5232 CW (PR), and the heading, “AMENDED
12
COMPLAINT.”
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
He shall use the
If Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint in
conformity with this Order, the case will be dismissed with
prejudice and closed.
6.
Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel is
DENIED.
This Order terminates Docket nos. 40, 42 and 43.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 12/17/2012
21
____________________________
CLAUDIA WILKEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?