Cortez v. New Century Mortgage Corporation et al

Filing 20

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT SAXON MORTGAGES 5 MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SERVE UNSERVED DEFENDANTS. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/3/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CLARISSA C. CORTEZ,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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No. 11-01019 CW

v.
NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORP; SAXON
MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.; OLD REPUBLIC
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY; and
PACIFIC MORTGAGE CONSULTANTS,

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ORDER GRANTING IN
PART DEFENDANT
SAXON MORTGAGE’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
AND ORDERING
PLAINTIFF TO
SERVE UNSERVED
DEFENDANTS

Defendants.
/

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This case involves the attempted foreclosure of pro se

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Plaintiff Clarissa Cortez’ residence by Defendant Saxon Mortgage

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Services, Inc. (Saxon).

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action alleged against it in Plaintiff’s complaint.1

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opposes the motion.

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decided on the papers.

Saxon moves to dismiss all causes of
Plaintiff

The matter was taken under submission and
Having considered all the papers filed by

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Saxon asserts that Defendants New Century Mortgage
Corporation and Pacific Mortgage Consultants were not served when
the case was in state court. The federal docket does not indicate
that these Defendants were served after the case was removed. On
March 29, 2011, Defendant Old Republic Default Management Services,
erroneously sued as Old Republic National Title Insurance Company
(Old Republic), filed a notice of filing of declaration of nonmonetary status in state court under California Civil Code section
2924l. Under this statute, Plaintiff has fifteen days from the
date of service of the declaration to object to the non-monetary
judgment status of the trustee. Plaintiff has not filed such an
objection. Therefore, Old Republic is bound by any order or
judgment issued by the Court regarding the subject deed of trust,
but need not participate in the litigation.

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the parties, the Court grants Saxon’s motion to dismiss, with the

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exception of Plaintiff’s claim under California Civil Code section

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2923.5.

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BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint and

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the documents submitted by Saxon, of which the Court takes judicial

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notice.2

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In August 2005, Plaintiff refinanced the mortgage on her home
located at

2609 Covelite Way, in Antioch, California (the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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property) with a $560,000 loan from New Century Mortgage

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Corporation (New Century).

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interest-only adjustable rate mortgage.

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secured by a first deed of trust on the property.

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Title Company was the trustee on the deed of trust.

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2, 2005, the note and deed of trust were assigned to Deutsche Bank

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Trust Company America, as trustee and custodian for HSBC Bank USA.

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Saxon is the loan servicer for Deutsche Bank.3

The loan that was offered was an
Repayment of the loan was
Old Republic
On September

Sometime in 2007,

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Although courts generally cannot consider documentary
evidence on a motion to dismiss, doing so is appropriate when the
pleadings refer to the documents, their authenticity is not in
question and there are no disputes over their relevance. Coto
Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010);
Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
courts may properly consider documents “whose contents are alleged
in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which
are not physically attached to the [plaintiff's] pleadings”).
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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that New Century assigned the
loan to Saxon. However, as indicated in the documents submitted by
Saxon, this is incorrect. Although, on a motion to dismiss, the
allegations in the complaint are to be taken as true, this does not
apply when the allegations are contradicted by documents of which
the Court may take judicial notice. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems
Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977)
(court may not assume truth of allegations if they are contradicted

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Plaintiff became delinquent on her loan payments.

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2008, a substitution of trustee was recorded whereby Old Republic

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Default Management Services became trustee on the deed of trust.

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Several notices of default and notices of trustee’s sale have been

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recorded against the property, but were stayed when Plaintiff filed

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for bankruptcy protection.

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26, 2010; a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on March 9, 2010.

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However, the sale was rescinded and, on March 29, 2010, a Notice of

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Rescission of Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded.4

On March 26,

The property was foreclosed on February

The most

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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recent notice of trustee’s sale was recorded on March 29, 2010 and

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the sale of the property was scheduled to take place on August 27,

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2010.

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According to Saxon, the trustee’s sale has not yet occurred.
Plaintiff alleges that the terms of her loan were not clear or

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conspicuous; Defendants qualified her for a loan that they knew or

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should have known that she could not pay; Defendants never

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explained to her the negative amortization aspect of the loan;

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Defendants engaged in predatory lending in making the loan to her;

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she has been attempting to contact Defendants to negotiate a

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modification of her loan, but they have not made a meaningful

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offer; and she was the victim of fraudulent lender behavior.

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on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of

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action against all Defendants: (1) breach of the implied covenant

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of good faith and fair dealing; (2) violation of the Truth in

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Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; (3) violation of the

Based

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by admissible evidence).
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The sale was rescinded because it occurred while Plaintiff
was protected by the bankruptcy stay.
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Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et

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seq.,; (4) violation of California Civil Code sections 1916.7b,

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1916.7b(2), 1916.7(b)(4)(B),5 1916.7(b)(8),6 1916.7(c),7 1918.5,

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1920, 1921,8 2079.16, and 1632; (5) violation of California

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Commercial Code section 9313; (6) rescission; (7) fraud; (8) unfair

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and deceptive business practices; (9) breach of fiduciary duty;

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(10) unjust enrichment; (11) unconscionability, (12) predatory

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lending in violation of California Business and Professions Code

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section 17200; (13) quiet title; (14) failure to modify loan in

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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violation of California Civil Code sections 2923.5 et seq. and

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2923.6; (15) wrongful foreclosure in violation of California Civil

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Code sections 2923.5 et seq. and 2924; (16) declaratory and

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injunctive relief; and (17) temporary restraining order and

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preliminary and permanent injunctions.

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LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

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claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

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Civ. P. 8(a).

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12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

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only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

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a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests.

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Fed. R.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

In

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Plaintiff incorrectly labels this as § 1916.7B

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Plaintiff incorrectly labels this as § 1916.7a(8).

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Plaintiff incorrectly labels this as § 1916.710(C).

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Plaintiff incorrectly labels §§ 1918.5, 1920 and 1921 as
§ 1918.5-1921.1920.
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considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim,

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the court will take all material allegations as true and construe

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them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

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v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

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principle is inapplicable to legal conclusions; “threadbare

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recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements,” are not taken as true.

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129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

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to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.

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Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

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F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).

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would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

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amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal "without

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contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint."

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Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).

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NL Indus., Inc.

However, this

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

In determining whether amendment

DISCUSSION
Saxon argues that this complaint is barred by the doctrine of

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res judicata based on a previous case filed by Plaintiff against

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the same Defendants that was dismissed without prejudice for

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failure to prosecute.

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al., C 10-4631 RS, Docket Nos. 25, 28.

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number C 10-4631 RS does not bar this litigation because a

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dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not a final

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judgment on the merits.

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Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1997) (Res judicata

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See Cortez v. New Century Mortgage Corp., et
The order dismissing case

See Western Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v.

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operates only where there is “(1) an identity of claims, (2) a

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final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between

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parties.”).9

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Saxon argues that Plaintiff’s claims against it arising from

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conduct that occurred during the loan application and negotiation

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process must be dismissed because it became the loan servicer after

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the loan closed and was assigned to Deutsche Bank.

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is well-taken.

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This argument

Plaintiff’s complaint and opposition does not distinguish

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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among the conduct undertaken by the four named Defendants.

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Saxon’s duties, as loan servicer, were to receive any scheduled

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periodic payments from Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the loan,

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and to make the payments of principal and interest and such other

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payments with respect to the amounts received from Plaintiff as

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were required pursuant to the terms of the loan.

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§ 2605 (definition of loan servicer in RESPA).

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arguments in her opposition that Saxon is responsible for the acts

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of the lender, New Century, due to a conspiracy or joint venture

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between the four Defendants or through an agency relationship are

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without merit.

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acts that took place during the loan negotiation, origination and

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closing must be dismissed for failure to state a claim against

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Saxon.

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certain disclosures be made in the loan origination process) and

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RESPA (requiring certain disclosures to loan applicant).

See 12 U.S.C.

Plaintiff’s

Therefore, all the claims against Saxon based upon

These include the federal claims under TILA (requiring

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Saxon incorrectly cites California res judicata law.
However, federal law applies here.
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Likewise,

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the fraud, unfair business practices, breach of fiduciary duty,

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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

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unconscionability, and predatory lending claims, which are based

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upon conduct undertaken during the loan negotiation, origination

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and closing processes, must be dismissed against Saxon.

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Furthermore, the claims premised upon California Civil Code section

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1916.7, governing disclosures for adjustable rate mortgages,

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California Civil Code section 2079.16, governing lender-agent

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relationships, California Civil Code section 1632, governing the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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translation of contracts into a foreign language, and other

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statutes governing disclosures to potential borrowers must be

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dismissed against Saxon for failure to state a claim.

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under California Commercial Code section 9313, which Plaintiff

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alleges requires Defendants to be in possession of the original

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promissory note, governs the perfection of security interest in

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collateral, and is dismissed because it does not apply to real

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estate transactions.

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The claim

The Court will address the claims that are based on the

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conduct of a loan servicer.

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I. Failure to Modify Loan: California Civil Code Sections
2923.5, 2923.6

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Plaintiff alleges that she:
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was in default of her loan payments and has been
attempting to achieve a meaningful and sustainable
modification of the terms of her loan agreement with
Defendants. Plaintiff provided Defendants with all
necessary and requested documents and information in
order to achieve a Loan Modification. Defendants made no
attempts in good faith to provide Plaintiff with a
meaningful and sustainable Loan Modification and simply
strung Plaintiff along. . . .

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Defendants . . . have a duty . . . to assess the
Plaintiff’s financial situation and explore options for
the Plaintiff to avoid foreclosure (California Civil Code
Section 2923.5).

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Defendants . . . have a duty . . . to implement a loan
modification or workout plan for Plaintiff, in the best
interest of their investors and/or loan pool when the
loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable, and anticipated recovery under
the loan modification or workout plan exceeds the
anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present
value basis (California Civil Code Section 2923.6).
Complaint at ¶¶ 168-70.
California Civil Code section 2923.5 provides that:
(a)(1) A mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to
section 2924 until 30 days after contact is made as
required by paragraph two . . .

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(2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent
shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in
order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.
During the initial contact, the mortgagee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent shall advise the borrower that he or
she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days.
The assessment of the borrower’s financial situation and
discussion of options may occur during the first contact,
or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.
(b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924
shall include a declaration that the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the
borrower as required by this section . . .

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(c) If a mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent had already filed the notice of default prior to
the enactment of this section and did not subsequently
file a notice of rescission, then the mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary or authorized agent shall, as part of the
notice of sale . . . include a declaration that either:

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(1) States that the borrower was contacted to assess
the borrower’s financial situation and to explore options
for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.

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(2) Lists the efforts made, if any, to contact the

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borrower in the event no contact was made.

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Although section 2923.5 addresses an authorized agent’s duty

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to contact a defaulting borrower regarding loan modification

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options, it does not require that the lender or agent actually

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modify the borrower’s loan.

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LP, 725 F. Supp. 2d 862, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

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contact and some analysis of the borrower’s financial situation.

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Id.

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that it failed to provide her with a loan modification proposal

Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing,
It contemplates

Plaintiff does not allege that Saxon did not contact her, but

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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that she found to be meaningful and sustainable.

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that she provided Saxon with the documents it requested to achieve

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a viable loan modification indicates that loan modification

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discussions took place.

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claim that section 2623.5 was violated, it is dismissed.

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is without leave to amend, because amendment would be futile.

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Her allegation

Because the facts that she pleads negate a
Dismissal

Section 2623.6 governs a servicer’s duty to parties and

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investors in a loan pool to maximize the present value under a

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pooling and servicing agreement.

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duty on lenders or servicers to negotiate loan modifications.

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Lopez v. Equifirst Corp., 2009 WL 3233912, *3 (E.D. Cal.).

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Section 2923.6 does not impose a

Saxon argues that Plaintiff’s section 2623.6 claim fails

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because it provides no private right of action and because

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Plaintiff is not a loan pool member and, therefore, is owed no duty

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under this section.

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provides that servicers of loan pools owe a duty to all parties in

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the pool so that a workout is in the best interest of the parties

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if a loan is in default.

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Plaintiff responds that section 2923.6

This may be so, but is non-responsive to
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Saxon’s arguments that Plaintiff is not in a loan pool and that

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section 2923.6, like section 2923.5, does not impose a duty on

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servicers to enter into loan modifications.

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Ct., 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 222-23 (2010) (§ 2923.6 merely

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expresses the hope that lender will offer loan modifications on

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certain terms; it imposes no duty on lenders or servicers actually

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to modify a loan).

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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See also Mabry v. Sup.

Therefore, this claim is dismissed without leave to amend as
amendment would be futile.
II.

Wrongful Foreclosure: California Civil Code section 2923.5
Plaintiff alleges that all the Notices of Default and Notices

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of Trustee’s Sale she received, including the latest one she

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received on August 2, 2010, violated section 2923.5(b) or (c)

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because they did not have the requisite declaration attached

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indicating that Saxon contacted her to discuss a loan

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modification.10

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The gravamen of section 2923.5 is that a lender or servicer

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cannot file a notice of default until it has contacted the borrower

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in person or by telephone.

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declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of

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section 2923.5(b) complies with the statute even if it does not

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delineate which one of the three categories set forth in the

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declaration applies to the particular situation.

Mabry, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 221.

Id. at 235.

A

The

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The operative notice of trustee’s sale is the last one
Plaintiff received on August 3, 2010. All others are moot because
the sales that were noticed in them were stayed when Plaintiff
filed for bankruptcy protection and the March 9, 2010 trustee’s
sale was rescinded.
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remedy for noncompliance is a postponement of the foreclosure sale

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to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5(b).

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Saxon submits a copy of the notice of trustee’s sale dated

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August 3, 2010.

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entitled, “Declaration of Lender, Trustee or Authorized Agent Under

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California Civil Code Section 2923.5(c),” which states that the

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borrower was “contacted in order to access the borrower’s financial

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situation and to explore options for the borrower to avoid

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foreclosure,” and lists four dates in February and March, 2009 on

RJN, Ex. 16.

Attached to it is a document

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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which Plaintiff was contacted.

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to the trustee’s sale scheduled to take place in August, 2010.

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Milyakov v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 3879503, *3 (N.D. Cal.)

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(questioning whether communications that took place over a year

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before the notice of default was filed satisfies requirements of

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section 2923.5(b)).

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Plaintiff’s allegation that she did not receive the required

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declaration.

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These dates are over one year prior

Furthermore, the Court must credit as true

Therefore, Saxon’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.
III. Unjust Enrichment

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This cause of action is based on the allegations that

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Defendants acknowledged, accepted, and benefitted from
the Plaintiff’s agreement to enter into the loan. A
forced sale of Plaintiff’s home, and an allowance for
Defendants to recoup the extreme profits enjoyed by
forcing Plaintiff into an imbalance of principal to
interest ratio, would be inequitable and unconscionable,
while the Defendants enjoy the benefit of the Plaintiff’s
actions without paying for their own breaches of the law
and professional responsibilities. Wherefore, Plaintiff
prays for restitution.

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Complaint at ¶ 152.
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See

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California courts are split as to whether there is an

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independent cause of action for unjust enrichment.

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Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270-71 (C.D. Cal. 2007)

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(applying California law).

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not a cause of action, or even a remedy, but rather a general

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principle which underlies various legal doctrines and remedies.

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McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 387 (2004).

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McBride, the court construed a “purported” unjust enrichment claim

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as a cause of action seeking restitution.

Baggett v.

One view is that unjust enrichment is

Id.

In

There are at least

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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two potential bases for a cause of action seeking restitution:

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(1) an alternative to breach of contract damages when the parties

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had a contract which was procured by fraud or is unenforceable for

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some reason; and (2) where the defendant obtained a benefit from

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the plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct and

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the plaintiff chooses not to sue in tort but to seek restitution on

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a quasi-contract theory.

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implies a contract, or quasi-contract, without regard to the

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parties’ intent, to avoid unjust enrichment.

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Id. at 388.

In the latter case, the law

Id.

Another view is that a cause of action for unjust enrichment

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exists and its elements are receipt of a benefit and unjust

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retention of the benefit at the expense of another.

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SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000); First Nationwide

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Savings v. Perry, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1657, 1662-63 (1992).

Lectrodryer v.

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Plaintiff fails to allege that Saxon received money as a

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result of Plaintiff’s agreement to enter into the loan or the loan

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funding.

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because, as stated above, Saxon was not involved in the loan

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Nor can Plaintiff correct this deficiency by amendment

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negotiations, closing or funding.

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dismiss the claim for unjust enrichment is granted, without leave

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to amend.

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IV. Quiet Title

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Therefore, Saxon’s motion to

To state a claim for quiet title under California law, a

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plaintiff’s complaint must contain: (1) a description of the

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property; (2) the title of the plaintiff and its basis; (3) the

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adverse claims to that title; (4) the date as of which the

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determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for relief of quiet

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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title.

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seeking to quiet title in the face of foreclosure must allege

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tender or an offer of tender of the amount borrowed.

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Washington Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2009);

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Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578-79 (1984)

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(claim to set aside trustee’s sale must be accompanied by offer to

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pay full amount of debt for which the property was security).

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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 761.020. In addition, a plaintiff

Mangindin v.

Saxon correctly argues that the quiet title cause of action is

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defective because it is entirely dependent on Plaintiff’s other

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causes of action, which are all defective.

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conclusory allegation that all Defendants claim an interest in the

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property adverse to her cannot stand against Saxon, which is merely

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the loan servicer.

Further, Plaintiff’s

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Saxon also correctly argues that this cause of action fails

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because Plaintiff has not tendered the amount owing on the loan.

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Plaintiff’s argument that she is not bound by the tender rule is

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incorrect.

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defaulting trustor’s attack upon an irregular sale, . . . once the

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As explained in Arnolds Mgmt., “in the context of a

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trustor fails to effectively exercise his right to redeem, the sale

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becomes valid and proper.

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irregular sale fails unless the trustor can allege and establish a

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valid tender.”

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A cause of action [regarding the]

158 Cal. App. 3d at 578.

Saxon’s motion to dismiss the quiet title claim is granted.

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Dismissal is without leave to amend because amendment would be

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futile.

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V. Declaratory Relief

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The Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) permits a federal court to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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"declare the rights and other legal relations" of parties to a case

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of actual controversy.

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Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986).

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controversy" requirement of the DJA is the same as the "case or

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controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States

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Constitution.

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(9th Cir. 1994).

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determine whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate.

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Life Insurance Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005).

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First, the court must determine if there exists an actual case or

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controversy within the court's jurisdiction.

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the court must decide whether to exercise its jurisdiction.

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28 U.S.C. § 2201; Wickland Oil Terminals v.
The "actual

American States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 143
Under the DJA, a two-part test is necessary to

Id.

Principal

Second, if so,
Id.

Because all causes of action alleged against Saxon have been

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adjudicated in its favor, no case or controversy exists between

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Plaintiff and Saxon.

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claim for declaratory relief is granted.

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leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

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VII. Rescission

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Therefore, Saxon's motion to dismiss the

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Dismissal is without

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Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to rescission based

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upon TILA violations, failure to provide a mortgage loan

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origination agreement and fraudulent concealment.

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claims against Saxon have been dismissed without leave to amend,

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they do not allow Plaintiff the remedy of loan rescission.

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Further, Plaintiff’s claim for rescission under TILA fails because

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she has not alleged the present ability to tender amounts owed

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under the loan.

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repayment of the amounts advanced by the lender.”

Because these

Rescission under TILA “should be conditioned on
Yamamoto v. Bank

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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of New York, 329 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in

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original) (citing LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.

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1976); see Garza v. Am. Home Mortgage, 2009 WL 188604, *5 (E.D.

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Cal.) (stating that “rescission is an empty remedy without [the

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borrower’s] ability to pay back what she has received”); Martinez

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v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 2009 WL 2043013, *6 (E.D. Cal.) (noting

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“absent meaningful tender, TILA rescission is an empty remedy, not

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capable of being granted”).

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to amend.

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VIII. Injunctive Relief

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This claim is dismissed without leave

Injunctive relief is a remedy and not an independent cause of

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action.

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(E.D. Cal.) (citing Marlin v. AIMCO Venezia, LLC, 154 Cal. App. 4th

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154, 162 (2007)).

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claim for relief against Saxon, she is not entitled to injunctive

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relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or a

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preliminary or permanent injunction.

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N.A., 2010 WL 4348127, at *16 (N.D. Cal.).

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Parrish v. Indymac Bank, Inc., 2010 WL 2771915, at *5

Because Plaintiff has not otherwise stated a

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Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank,
Thus, Plaintiff’s

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request for injunctive relief against Saxon is dismissed without

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leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

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IX. Other Defendants

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As mentioned above, the docket shows that Plaintiff has not

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yet served two named Defendants.

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a plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint within 120 days of

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the date of removal to federal court.

Camillo v. Washington Mut.

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Bank, 2010 WL 457346, *1 (E.D. Cal.).

This case was removed on

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March 4, 2011.

In the case of a removed action,

Therefore, the time to serve these Defendants has

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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passed.

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Defendants within thirty days from the date of this order.

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Plaintiff must inform the Court that she has served Defendants by

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filing a proof of service for each Defendant.

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not serve these Defendants within thirty days, her claims against

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them will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

However, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to serve

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If Plaintiff does

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Saxon’s motion to dismiss (Docket No.

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5) is granted, except for the claim under California Civil Code

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section 2923.5, which may go forward.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 11/3/2011
CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CLARISSA C. CORTEZ,

Case Number: CV11-01019 CW

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Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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v.
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NEW CENTURY MORTGAGE CORP et al,
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Defendant.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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/

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,
Northern District of California.
That on November 3, 2011, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said
envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located
in the Clerk's office.

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Clarrisa C. Cortez
2609 Covelite Way
Antioch, CA 94531

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Dated: November 3, 2011

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Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

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