Gutierrez v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. et al

Filing 20

ORDER by Judge Claudia Wilken DENYING PLAINTIFF'S #16 MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO STATE COURT. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/27/2011)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GUADALUPE GUTIERREZ, SR.,

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No. C 11-03428 CW

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO REMAND CASE TO
STATE COURT

v.

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KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS,
CARLOS AVILA; AND DOES 1 THROUGH
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Defendants.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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________________________________/

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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Guadalupe Gutierrez, Sr., brought twelve causes of

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action in state court against Defendants Kaiser Foundation

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Hospitals and Carlos Avila based on allegations that Defendants

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subjected him to adverse employment actions including race and age

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discrimination, unlawful termination, and retaliation for

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disclosing unlawful conduct.

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federal court based on preemption under section 301 of the Labor

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Management Relations Act (LMRA).

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case to state court and seeks attorneys' fees.

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the motion.

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created by a collective bargaining agreement, and they are

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preempted.

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remaining claims, and the motion to remand is DENIED.

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Defendants removed the case to

Plaintiff moves to remand the
Defendants oppose

Plaintiff has brought two claims based on rights

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), as Lead Biomedical Engineer with Kaiser for more

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than twenty-two years.

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around June 6, 2009, Avila "abruptly removed" him from work and

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placed him on administrative leave without providing an

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explanation or an opportunity to address the alleged misconduct,

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which included excessive overtime, falsifying service reports, and

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entering false safety readings.

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in violation of Kaiser's policy of progressive discipline and,

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further, that it was part of Kaiser's practice falsely to accuse

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older workers of time sheet abuse in order to force them into

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff's complaint states that on or

Plaintiff alleges that this was

resignation.
Plaintiff further states that, around February 2008, he and

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other employees had complained about the racial discrimination and

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abusive conduct of a supervisor.

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five non-union subcontractors, which Plaintiff argues was in

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violation of the CBA.

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subcontractors schemed to cause his termination.

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2009, Avila allegedly removed Plaintiff from his work based on his

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being a "whistleblower."

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after an arbitration proceeding determined that he had not been

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terminated for just cause.

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returned to work, he was subjected to a hostile and discriminatory

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work environment designed to force his resignation.

Later that year, Kaiser hired

Plaintiff also alleges that the five
On June 26,

Plaintiff was eventually reinstated

Plaintiff alleges that when he

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Plaintiff brought twelve causes of action in state court:

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(1) retaliation; (2) hostile work environment; (3) harassment;

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(4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et

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seq.; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy;

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(6) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (7) constructive

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discharge in violation of public policy; (8) wrongful termination;
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(9) violation of Art. 1, section 8, of the California

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Constitution; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

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(11) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

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dealing; and (12) age discrimination.

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DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to

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federal district court so long as the district court could have

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exercised original jurisdiction over the matter.

28 U.S.C.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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§ 1441(a).

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statute must be strictly construed.

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564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

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removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the

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burden of establishing that removal is proper."

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should resolve doubts as to removability in favor of remanding the

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case to state court.

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On a motion to remand, the scope of the removal
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d

"The 'strong presumption' against

Id.

Courts

Id.

"In general, district courts have federal-question

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jurisdiction only if a federal question appears on the face of a

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plaintiff's complaint."

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F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.

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Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)).

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is the master of the complaint, a court does not exercise original

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jurisdiction over a matter solely because a federal defense may be

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anticipated.

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Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).

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or she wishes to bring and may forgo federal claims.

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however, an exception to the general rule: the artful pleading

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doctrine.

Brennan v. Southwest Airlines Co., 134

Because the plaintiff

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
A plaintiff chooses what claims he
There is,

Artful pleading exists where a plaintiff states an
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inherently federal claim in state-law terms.

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1409.

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Brennan, 134 F.3d at

DISCUSSION
I.

Remand
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis of federal

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preemption.

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over "[s]uits for violations of contracts between an employer and

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a labor organization representing employees in an industry

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affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between such

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Section 301 of the LMRA provides federal jurisdiction

labor organizations."

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

The Supreme Court has stated that section 301 of the LMRA, 29

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U.S.C. § 185(a), preempts equivalent remedies under state law and

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that "the preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to

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displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of

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contracts between an employer and a labor organization.'

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suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact

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that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of

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[section] 301."

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Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983); see also Caterpillar Inc.

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v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).

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cannot avoid removal by artfully pleading state law claims that

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are actually preempted by federal statutes.

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463 U.S. at 22; Young v. Anthony's Fish Grotto, Inc., 830 F.2d

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993, 996-97 (9th Cir. 1987).

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however, requires that a plaintiff be able to assert a federal

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cause of action based on the allegations in the state law

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complaint.

Any such

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers

Moreover, a plaintiff

Franchise Tax Bd.,

Federal removal jurisdiction,

Young, 830 F.2d at 997.

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A state law claim is completely preempted by section 301 of

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the LMRA if resolution of the claim requires the interpretation of

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a collective bargaining agreement.

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Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988).

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founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining

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agreements, and claims 'substantially dependent on analysis of a

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collective-bargaining agreement.'"

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(citation omitted); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,

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220 (1985) (tort claim preempted because extent of employer's duty

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
"Section 301 governs claims

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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of good faith depends on terms of collective bargaining

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agreement).

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Preemption under section 301 will not apply, however, in all

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instances in which a collective bargaining agreement is present.

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Section 301 preemption does not apply where a state-law remedy is

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independent of a collective bargaining agreement in the sense that

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resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the

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collective bargaining agreement.

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic

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Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).

Section 301 does not preempt

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state causes of action simply because they require analysis of the

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same facts that would be at issue in a Section 301 claim, Lingle,

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486 U.S. at 408-09, or because the court must refer to the

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collective bargaining agreement, as opposed to interpreting its

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terms, in order to decide the claim.

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U.S. 107, 123-24 (1994).

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exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result

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can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, are

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preempted by those agreements."

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213.

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512

Only state causes of action "that do not

Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at

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As Defendants indicate in their opposition, Plaintiff's

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eighth and eleventh causes of action allege wrongful termination

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and the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

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dealing.

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bargaining agreement, and the Court must refer to and interpret

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the agreement to adjudicate the claims.

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applies where claims are founded directly on rights created by a

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CBA.

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These claims invoke rights created by the collective

Complete preemption

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394.
Plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is based on Kaiser's

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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alleged violation of an agreement not to terminate employees

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without just cause and without progressive discipline.

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state law does not create such a right independent of a collective

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bargaining agreement.

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that provides that no union employee will be terminated without

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just cause.

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provides that Kaiser has "the right to issue rules of conduct and

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appropriate penalties for just cause infractions thereof."

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Plaintiff's eighth cause of action thus derives directly from and

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is created by the agreement.

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876 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Discharge for just cause is a

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subject governed by the collective bargaining agreement. This

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count is inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining

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agreement and is preempted by section 301.").

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California

It is the collective bargaining agreement

Avila Dec., Ex. A, CBA Section 3.

It further

See Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is read

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into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or

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promises of the contract, not to protect some general public

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policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purposes."

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Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 690 (1988).
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Although the eleventh cause of action itself is based in state

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law, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

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fair dealing requires a valid agreement and an interpretation of

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that agreement, to give effect to its terms.

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and County of San Francisco, 225 Cal. App. 3d 38, 49 (1990) ("The

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prerequisite for any action for breach of the implied covenant of

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good faith and fair dealing is the existence of a contractual

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relationship between the parties, since the covenant is an implied

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term in the contract.")

See Smith v. City

Here, that agreement is the CBA.

Ninth

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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Circuit cases are consistent with this reasoning.

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Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988), the court

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found that a claim of a breach of the implied covenant of good

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faith and fair dealing required it to interpret the specific

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language of a collective bargaining agreement's terms, and that,

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therefore, the claim was preempted under section 301.

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854 F.2d at 1148.

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II.

In Newberry v.

Newberry,

Supplemental Jurisdiction

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Because Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination and

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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are

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preempted by section 301, the Court has federal question

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jurisdiction over those claims.

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in its discretion, remand the remaining non-preempted state law

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claims.

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a common nucleus of operative facts with the preempted claims, the

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Court may, and does, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these

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claims.

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U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Court may,

However, because Plaintiff's remaining claims arise from

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

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III. Attorneys' Fees
Title 28 U.S.C. section 1447(c) provides for "just costs and

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any actual expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred as a

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result of the removal" to a moving party who successfully seeks

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remand.

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to attorneys' fees.

Because the motion is denied, Plaintiff is not entitled

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion (Docket No. 16)
is DENIED.

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: 9/27/2011

CLAUDIA WILKEN
United States District Judge

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