Henderson v. McDonald
Filing
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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Signed by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on 1/10/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/10/2013)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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No. C 11-04254 YGR
MICHAEL HENDERSON,
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner,
v.
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M. MCDONALD, Warden,
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Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Michael Henderson, an inmate at High Desert State Prison, seeks federal relief
from his state convictions. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for such relief is DENIED.
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BACKGROUND
On November 6, 2008, an Alameda County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of
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attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and mayhem. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a
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state prison for an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole, in addition to an
enhancement term of 27 years to life.
The following statement of facts is taken from the reasoned decision of the California Court
of Appeal.
Sidney Joesph testified that he had known defendant since
2004, when they met through mutual friends. In 2004 they saw each
other "every day" around the intersection of 90th Street and
MacArthur Boulevard in Oakland. Joseph knew defendant as "Mike."
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For the Northern District of California
United States District Court
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In September 2004, the two men had an argument after someone told
Joseph that defendant had made an unfavorable statement about him.
Joseph approached defendant at a Mexican restaurant, tried to grab
him, and the two wrestled and threw punches at each other. The fight
moved outside of the restaurant and was broken up by others. Joseph
felt that he had lost the fight. Joseph saw defendant the next day but
they did not interact.
Joseph next saw defendant in February 2006, again near the
intersection of 90th Street and MacArthur Boulevard. Defendant was
in a car and Joseph was standing at the sidewalk. Defendant drove
past and made eye contact with Joseph but did not stop. After that,
Joseph saw defendant almost every day near the same intersection,
though the men did not talk to each other.
On the afternoon of April 13, 2006, Joseph was at the corner of
90th and MacArthur with his friend Antwan, speaking with another
friend, Eric. Defendant approached the men and stopped
approximately five feet from them. Defendant said, "What's up, JoeJoe," which is Joseph's nickname. Defendant's tone of voice suggested
he was "trying to start something, like an argument," and he was
"gritting his teeth, grinding his teeth real hard." Joseph responded,
"What do you mean, what's up?" and defendant started "nodding his
head and he had his hand in his pocket, like fidgeting, reaching for
something, trying to pull out something." Defendant pulled a black
revolver from his right pocket. Joseph turned and ran. Joseph saw
defendant "lift it up to start opening fire." He heard two or three
gunshots. After the second shot, he felt a pain in his stomach, side and
back and lost feeling in his legs. He fell to the ground. He saw Mike
running across the street.
Office Carletta Garrett testified that she was on patrol on April
13, 2006 when she was called to 90th Street and MacArthur
Boulevard. When she arrived she saw a crowd and Joseph lying on
the ground. She talked to him, and he told her that "Mike" shot him.
Joseph was surprised that defendant shot him because "I knew we had
problems, but I didn't know it had got that far, that he had that feeling
toward me to want to walk up to pull out a gun to shoot me." Joseph
identified defendant in a photo lineup as the person who shot him.
Defendant was arrested when he appeared in court to be
sentenced on another matter. After he was arrested, Sergeant Rebecca
Campbell interviewed him. Campbell told him that she was
investigating a shooting that occurred on April 13 around 3:30 p.m.
near 90th and MacArthur and asked defendant, "[D]id you do this?"
Defendant said he did not and told Campbell that he was in Fairfield
on that day. Campbell then showed defendant a videotape of the
incident the police had obtained from a surveillance camera at a smoke
shop at the corner of 90th Street and MacArthur Boulevard. The tape
showed that defendant was present that day.
Defendant testified that he knew Joseph but that they were
never friends. He testified that in 2004 he was eating in a restaurant
when Joseph entered and "was talking about something I said
something about him and he stared taking a nasty attitude with me. So
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I stood up." Joseph then hit him in the face. The altercation ended
outside the restaurant when others broke it up. Defendant felt that he
"got the better outcome of the situation" and that he had no reason to
seek revenge. Defendant saw Joseph the next day but nothing
happened.
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On April 13, 2006, defendant's sister dropped him off at 89th
and Hillside, about two blocks from 90th and MacArthur, to meet
some friends. After visiting with his friends, defendant walked
towards 90th and MacArthur where he was expecting to meet his
sister. Defendant had not spoken with Joseph and did not know he
was going to be at the intersection. He testified that, "As I was
walking up 90th towards MacArthur, I seen someone walking towards
me. . . . Me and the person who was walking towards me was five
steps away, and then the person stops and he turns around."
Defendant did not know the man. He had on a yellow shirt and was
bald. When the man turned, he walked around the corner of 90th and
MacArthur. Defendant heard gunshots and then saw the man run
towards 94th. Defendant testified that he then rounded the corner and
that is when his image was captured on the videotape He ran when he
heard the shots and did not see who had been shot. He called his sister
to ask her to pick him up at 88th and MacArthur.
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For the Northern District of California
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Defendant denied that he was carrying a gun on April 13.
Rather, he stated that he was holding a "beanie" hat in his hand, which
is what was seen on the videotape. He testified that when he told
Campbell he was in Fairfield, "I was trying to say I was on my way to
Fairfield, but it slipped out the wrong way."
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People v. Henderson, California Court of Appeal, case number A123553 at 1-4 (hereinafter "Exh.
F").
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this
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Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant
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to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be
granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s
adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
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the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
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the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The state court decision to which Section 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the state
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court, see Baker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005).
“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the
‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
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that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue
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For the Northern District of California
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the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application
must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable
application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal
law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.
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DISCUSSION
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As his sole ground for federal habeas relief, Petitioner asserts that insufficient evidence
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supports the finding that he premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder of his victim. This
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claim was addressed in a detailed, reasoned opinion on direct appeal.
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On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence that the attempted murder was premeditated. "In reviewing
appellant's insufficiency of evidence argument, we ask not whether
there is evidence from which the trier of fact could have reached some
other conclusion, but whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to respondent, and presuming in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier reasonably could deduce from the
evidence, there is substantial evidence of appellant's guilt, i.e.
evidence that is credible and of solid value, from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, our sole function as a reviewing court in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence is to determine if any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." (In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal. App. 4th 718,
726, fn. omitted.)
"An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it
occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than
unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citations.] However, the requisite
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reflection need not span a specific or extended period of time.'"'
Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold,
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.'"'" (People v. Stitely
(2005) 35 Cal. 4th 514, 543.) "The type of evidence which this court
has found sufficient to sustain a finding premeditation and deliberation
falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what
defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant
was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to
result in, the killing -- what may be characterized as 'planning' activity;
(2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and /or conduct with
the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a "motive" to
kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type
(1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the
result of 'a pre-existing reflection' and 'careful thought and weighing of
considerations' rather than 'mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily
executed' [citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from
which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular
and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a 'preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a
particular way for a 'reason' which the jury can reasonably infer from
facts of type (1) or (2)." (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal. 2d 15,
26-27.) "The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review,
are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor
are they exclusive." (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1117, 1125.)
In this case, there was evidence of planning in that defendant,
armed with a loaded gun, arrived on a street corner where he knew
Joseph was often present. "That defendant armed himself prior to the
attack 'supports the inference that he planned a violent encounter.'"
(People v. Elliott (2005) 37 Cal. 4th 453, 471.) Defendant argues that
his possession of a gun that day was not evidence of planning because
there was no evidence that he knew that Joseph would be present when
he arrived on the street corner. However, Joseph testified that he had
seen defendant at that street corner "every day almost" since February
2006, which supports the inference that defendant expected Joseph to
be there on the day in question. Defendant attempts to distinguish
People v. Elliott because in that case the defendant had spent the day
lying in wait for the victim and had talked to others about obtaining a
new knife before the attack. However, in People v. Marks (2003) 31
Cal. 4th 197, on which the court in Elliott relied, the evidence of
planning was that the defendant "brought a gun rather than money
with which to pay for the taxi ride." (Id. at p. 230). Although the
evidence of planning was stronger in Elliott, the evidence here was
sufficient to support the inference that defendant came to the 90th
Street and MacArthur intersection carrying a gun, anticipating that he
would see Joseph that afternoon.
The manner of the shooting also provides evidence that
supports a finding of premeditation. Joseph testified that defendant
spoke to him "like [he was] trying to start something, like an
argument," and was "grinding his teeth real hard." According to the evidence, Joseph did nothing to
provoke the shooting. "The lack of provocation by the victim leads to an inference that an attack
was the result of a deliberate plan." (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal. 3d 57, 87). . . . Defendant
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argues that Joseph's sarcastic response to [defendant's] greeting" was sufficient to provoke an
unplanned attack. Although a jury might have so interpreted the evidence, the jury also could
reasonably have found that defendant's manner and the minimal interaction between the men prior to
the shooting indicated that defendant had come to the corner with the premeditated intention of
killing Joseph.
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Moreover, there was also evidence that Joseph had previously
instigated a fight with defendant, which might have provided
defendant with a motive. The Attorney General cites People v. Hyde
(1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 463, 478 for the proposition that revenge is a
sufficient motive to support a finding of premeditation. Defendant
argues that in that case "the defendant spent weeks pursuing his victim
in every conceivable way, and after the killing, took every opportunity
to describe his satisfaction with his revenge." While the circumstances
in the present case undoubtedly are less extreme, and the evidence of a
revenge motive less compelling, nevertheless there was sufficient
evidence to support an inference that defendant remained angry about
the fight that Joseph had started two years before. Although both men
testified that defendant got the better of Joseph in the fight, there was a
history of animosity between the two men that could have provided a
motive for the shooting.
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In short, although the evidence might well have supported a
contrary finding, it was nonetheless sufficient to support the finding
that the jury did make, that defendant deliberately and with
premeditation shot and attempted to kill Joseph.
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Exh. F at 4-7.
The rejection of this claim by the state appellate court was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court authority. In addition,
the state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Demonstrating entitlement to habeas relief based on a claim of insufficient evidence requires
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a substantial showing. Because the Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction
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except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged", In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), a state prisoner who alleges that the
evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a
rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt states a constitutional claim. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-324 (1979).
The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that “Jackson claims face a high bar in federal
habeas proceedings . . .” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam) (finding
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that the 3rd Circuit “unduly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder” and failed to apply the
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deferential standard of Jackson when it engaged in “fine-grained factual parsing” to find that the
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evidence was insufficient to support petitioner’s conviction). A federal court reviewing collaterally
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a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Coleman,
132 S. Ct. at 2065 (“the only question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s finding of guilt] was so
insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality”). Rather, the federal court
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"determines only whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
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any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). A due process violation may be
found only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338. Furthermore, a federal habeas court “must
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presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any []
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conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.
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The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, see Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2065, and
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under Jackson's standard of review, a jury’s credibility determinations are entitled to near-total
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deference. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Here, as the California Supreme Court reasonably found, a rational trier of fact could have
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found that Petitioner's attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate. Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.
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Under California law, premeditation and deliberation may be found when there is evidence of
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"preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." People v. Stitely, 35
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Cal. 4th 514, 543 (2005). Included in the factors a jury may consider when evaluating whether a
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murder or attempted murder is premeditated and deliberate are planning, motive, and the nature and
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manner of the attack. People v. Anderson, 60 Cal. 2d 15, 25 (1968); Exh. F at 5.
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Here, there was more than enough evidence for a rational jury to find that the attempted
murder was premeditated and deliberate. As the California Supreme Court detailed, there was
evidence of planning and motive on the part of Petitioner. Exh. F at 5-6. For example, Petitioner
carried a gun to the crime scene, a place where he could reasonably have expected to encounter the
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victim. Exh. F at 5-6. In addition, Petitioner had a demonstrated motive, since he had once been
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publicly attacked by the victim. Exh. F at 6-7. Finally, the manner and nature of the attack support
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a finding of premeditation, since the evidence showed that Petitioner approached the victim
unprovoked, and shot him in the back repeatedly as he was running away from Petitioner. Exh. F at
2, 6 (finding that "'lack of provocation by the victim leads to an inference that an attack was the
result of a deliberate plan'" [citations omitted]). Accordingly, this Court finds that, after "'viewing
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the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution'", a rational trier of fact "'could have
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found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the rejection of this claim by the state appellate
court was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States
Supreme Court authority, this claim must be denied.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
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Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district court to rule
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on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in which the
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petition is denied. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that his claim amounted to a
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denial of his constitutional rights or demonstrate that a reasonable jurist would find the denial of his
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claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Consequently, no
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certificate of appealability is warranted in this case.
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The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED: January 10, 2013
YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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