McConnell v. Genentech, Inc. et al

Filing 23

ORDER REMANDING CASE., ***Civil Case Terminated.. Signed by Judge ARMSTRONG on 3/9/12. (lrc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/13/2012)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OAKLAND DIVISION

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6 GERALDINE O’CONNOR MCCONNELL,

Plaintiff,

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vs.

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Case No: C 11-4976 SBA
ORDER REMANDING ACTION
Dkt. 10

9 GENETECH, INC., CHRISTINE TEJEDA;

and DOES 1-20, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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The parties are presently before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand.

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Dkt. 10. Having read and considered the papers submitted in connection with this matter,

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and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion. The Court, in its

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discretion, finds the instant motion suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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I.

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BACKGROUND
On September 8, 2011, Plaintiff Geraldine O’Conner McConnell filed the instant

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action against her former employer, Genentech, Inc., and former manager, Christine

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Tejeda, in San Mateo County Superior Court. Her Complaint alleged fourteen causes of

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action. All claims were based on state law except her tenth claim, which alleged a violation

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of the federal Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). On October

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7, 2011, Defendants removed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, based on Plaintiff’s

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FMLA claim.

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On October 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging

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the same claims as her original Complaint, but omitting her FMLA claim. On November 3,

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2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 12. On

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February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. In her motion, Plaintiff contends that

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the Court should remand the action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

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based on the dismissal of her sole federal claim under the FMLA. She also urges the Court

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to decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged in the FAC.

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Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue in every federal case, the Court

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addresses Plaintiff’s motion to remand first.

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II.

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DISCUSSION
“A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore-

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Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). Under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1447(c), remand may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any

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defect in removal procedure. “A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other

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than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the

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notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Lively v. Wild

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Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Plaintiff contends that the Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction over the

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action by virtue of the dismissal of her FMLA claim. Pl.’s Mot. at 5-6. This contention is

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misplaced. “[J]urisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time

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of removal without reference to subsequent amendments[.]” Sparta Surgical Corp. v.

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National Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). At the time of

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removal, the pleadings alleged a federal claim under the FMLA. Because the Court

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indisputably had subject matter jurisdiction over the action when it was removed, Plaintiff’s

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motion to remand on the basis of lack of jurisdiction is without merit. Carlsbad Tech., Inc.

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v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, __, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1867 (2009) (“Upon dismissal of the

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federal claim, the District Court retained its statutory supplemental jurisdiction over the

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state-law claims. . . . The remand order, therefore, is not based on a ‘lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction’ . . . .”).

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Alternatively, Plaintiff requests that the Court exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1367(c)(3) and decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of

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action alleged in the FAC. Pl.’s Mot. at 7. When the federal claim that served as the basis

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for removal is eliminated, either through dismissal by the court or by a plaintiff amending

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his or her complaint, federal courts may decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the

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remaining state law causes of action and exercise its discretion to remand them to state

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court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Tech., 129 S.Ct. at 1867 (“A district court’s

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decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had

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original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999,

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1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (court may sua sponte exercise discretion and dismiss state law claims

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)) (en banc).

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Defendants make several arguments opposing remand under § 1367(c), none of

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which the Court finds persuasive. First, Defendants assert that the instant motion is

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untimely because Plaintiff filed it more than thirty days after removal. Defs.’ Opp’n at 4-5.

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However, the thirty-day time limit applies to remand motions predicated on 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1447(c), not those based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). C.f., City of Colton v. Am.

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Promotional Events, Inc.-West, 614 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that district

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court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after

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granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s federal claims).

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Next, Defendants contend that the reason Plaintiff is now seeking to remand the

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action is because she failed to file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC

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within the time prescribed by the Local Rules. Defs.’ Opp’n at 6. While the Court does not

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countenance Plaintiff’s failure to abide by the Local Rules, there is no indication that

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Plaintiff’s actions were in bad faith. Indeed, well before her response to Defendants’

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motion was due, Plaintiff filed her FAC, which eliminated her FMLA claim. Though it

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would have been preferable for Plaintiff to have moved for remand earlier, there is no

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indication that Plaintiff is seeking a remand order for inappropriately tactical reasons, such

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as where remand is sought after the issuance of an adverse ruling.
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Finally, Defendants contend that the interests of judicial economy militate in favor

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of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged in the FAC. Defs.’

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Opp’n at 6-7. The Court disagrees. To date, no substantive rulings have been issued, no

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responsive pleadings have been filed, no discovery has been taken, and no pretrial schedule

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has been issued. Thus, given the early stage of the litigation, the Court exercises its

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discretion and remands the action to the state court from which it was removed. See

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Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351(1988) (“When the single federal-law

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claim in the action was eliminated at an early stage of the litigation, the District Court had a

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powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction.”); Sanford v.

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MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) “‘[I]n the usual case in which all

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federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under

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the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will

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point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’” Id.

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(quoting Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d

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203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (“it is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining

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pendant claims to state court.”).

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III.

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CONCLUSION
The Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. However, the

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Court exercises its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and declines to assert

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supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims alleged in the FAC. Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s motion to remand is GRANTED. The

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instant action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo.

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In light of the Court’s decision to remand the action, the Court does not reach Defendants’

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motion to dismiss. The motion hearing scheduled for March 20, 2012 is VACATED. The

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Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending matters in this Court’s docket.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 9, 2012

______________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge

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